- The Architecture of Belief: An Essay on the Unbearable Automaticity of Believing.Eric Mandelbaum - 2010 - Dissertation, Unc-Chapel Hilldetails
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The Best With What We Have: A Threefold Metaphysics of Perception.Andrea Bucci - 2018 - Brainfactor:1-11.details
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Philosophy, Drama and Literature.Rick Benitez - 2010 - In Graham Robert Oppy, Nick Trakakis, Lynda Burns, Steven Gardner & Fiona Leigh (eds.), A companion to philosophy in Australia & New Zealand. Clayton, Victoria, Australia: Monash University Publishing. pp. 371-372.details
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(Mock-)Thinking about the Same.Alberto Voltolini - 2017 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 24:282-307.details
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What is Wrong with Self-Grounding?David Mark Kovacs - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (6):1157-1180.details
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Cartesianism and Intersubjectivity in Paranormal Activity and the Philosophy of Mind.Steve Jones - 2017 - Film-Philosophy 21 (1):1-19.details
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Can Reasons Be Propositions? Against Dancy's Attack on Propositionalism.Attila Tanyi & Morganti Matteo - 2017 - Theoria 83 (3):185-205.details
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(1 other version)The cognitive impenetrability of the content of early vision is a necessary and sufficient condition for purely nonconceptual content.Athanassios Raftopoulos - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (5):601-620.details
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(1 other version)The Illusory Theory of Colours: An Anti-Realist Theory.Barry Maund - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (3):245-268.details
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(2 other versions)What Is the Problem of Perception?Tim Crane - 2005 - Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2):237-264.details
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Conservation Laws and Interactionist Dualism.Ben White - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):387–405.details
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(3 other versions)Is There a Perceptual Relation?Tim Crane - 2006 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 126-146.details
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(2 other versions)Intentionalism.Tim Crane - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 474-93.details
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Avicenna on the Nature of Mathematical Objects.Mohammad Saleh Zarepour - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (3):511-536.details
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The Indispensability and Irreducibility of Intentional Objects.Casey Woodling - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41:543-558.details
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Why Frege cases do involve cognitive phenomenology but only indirectly.Alberto Voltolini - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):205-221.details
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Personal memories.Marina Trakas - 2015 - Dissertation, Macquarie Universitydetails
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Aspects of Psychologism: Précis and Reply to Critics.Tim Crane - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):96-98.details
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Attitudes Towards Objects.Alex Grzankowski - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):314-328.details
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Limits of propositionalism.Alex Grzankowski - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (7-8):819-838.details
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A Short History of the Philosophy of Consciousness in the Twentieth Century.Tim Crane - 2017 - In Amy Kind (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 6. New York: Routledge.details
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Powerful Qualities, Zombies and Inconceivability.Alexander Carruth - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):25–46.details
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Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons.Matteo Bianchin - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (4-5):442-461.details
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The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School.Uriah Kriegel (ed.) - 2017 - London and New York: Routledge.details
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Emergence in Mind (Mind Association Occasional Series) . Edited by Cynthia and Macdonald. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 288 pages ISBN 13: 978-0-19-958362-1. [REVIEW]Elly Vintiadis - 2012 - Philosophy 87 (4):603-610.details
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Uomini, topi e formiche: riflessioni sulla scienza cognitiva1 (bozza).Carlo Penco - 2005 - In Fondazione Devoto (ed.), Cultura umanistica e cultura scientifica.details
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Against propositionalism.Michelle Montague - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):503–518.details
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Demonstrative concepts without reidentification.Philippe Chuard - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):153-201.details
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(1 other version)Disjunctivism about visual experience.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 112--143.details
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Strengthening the exclusion argument.Matthew Rellihan - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6631-6659.details
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Adverbialism, the many-property problem, and inference: reply to Grzankowski.Casey Woodling - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (3):312-324.details
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Everything is clear: All perceptual experiences are transparent.Laura Gow - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):412-425.details
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Defending Dispositionalism of Color:色の傾向性理論を擁護する.Yasushi Ogusa - 2018 - Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 45 (1-2):1-21.details
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Neo-Pragmatism, Primitive Intentionality and Animal Minds.Laura Danón - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):39-58.details
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Openness to the World:: an Enquiry into the Intentionality of Perception.Giananti Andrea & Soldati Gianfranco - 2015 - Dissertation, L’Université de Fribourgdetails
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Brentano on Appearance and Reality.Seron Denis - 2017 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge.details
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Singular Thought.Tim Crane & Jody Azzouni - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):21-43.details
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Tim Crane, The Objects of Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, xii + 182 pp., £27.50 , ISBN 978-0-19-968274-4. [REVIEW]Alberto Voltolini - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (2):245-252.details
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What is it like to be the Metaphysical Subject? An Essay on Early Wittgenstein, our Epistemic Position, and Beyond.Konrad Werner - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (3):921-946.details
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A Defence of Sentiments: Emotions, Dispositions, and Character.Hichem Naar - unknowndetails
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Empfindungen–Skizze eines nicht-reduktiven, holistischen Verständnisses.Jan Slaby - 2007 - Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 32 (3):207-225.details
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Reply to Tanney.T. Crane - 1998 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6.details
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Consequences of schematism.Alberto Voltolini - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):135-150.details
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Sensory experience and intentionalism.Pierre Le Morvan - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):685-702.details
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(2 other versions)Intentionality and Emotion: Comment on Hutto.Tim Crane - 2006 - In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology, and Narrative : Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto. John Benjamins. pp. 107-119.details
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Intentionality as intentional inexistence.Laura Gow - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):1371-1385.details
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Deeper into Brentano’s mind: response to critics.Mark Textor - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):1440-1462.details
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The Strange Case of Dr. Moloch and Mr. Snazzo (or the Parmenides’ Riddle Once Again).Alberto Voltolini - 2023 - Philosophies 8 (4):54.details
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Lessons from Blur.Giulia Martina - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.details
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The problem of presentations: how it is that one object is perceptually given in multiple ways.Konrad Werner - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-25.details
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