- A Phenomenal Theory of Grasping and Understanding.David Bourget - forthcoming - In Andrei Ionuţ Mărăşoiu & Mircea Dumitru (eds.), Understanding and Conscious Experience: Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives. Routledge.details
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What is the Problem of Non-Existence?Tim Crane - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):417-434.details
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Inner Awareness is Essential to Consciousness: A Buddhist-Abhidharma Perspective.Monima Chadha - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):83-101.details
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Truth and Consciousness.Chris Calvert-Minor - 2017 - Human Studies 40 (4):663-679.details
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The Paradox of Pain.Adam Bradley - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):pqaa084.details
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Why Are Some Phenomenal Experiences 'Vivid' and Others 'Faint'? Representationalism, Imagery, and Cognitive Phenomenology.David Bourget - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):673-687.details
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The Rational Role of Experience.David Bourget - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):467-493.details
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Representationalism and Sensory Modalities: An Argument for Intermodal Representationalism.David Bourget - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (3):251-268.details
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Implications of Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions for Relationalism, Disjunctivism, and Representationalism About Perceptual Experience.David Bourget - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):381-408.details
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Consciousness is Underived Intentionality.David Bourget - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):32 - 58.details
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Range content, attention, and the precision of representation.Trey Boone - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (8):1141-1161.details
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Response to Rosenthal and Weisberg.N. Block - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):443-448.details
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The scrambler: An argument against representationalism.Stephen Biggs - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 215-236.details
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The Scrambler: An Argument Against Representationalism.Stephen Biggs - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):215-236.details
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Macht uns die Veranderung unserer selbst autonom? Uberlegungen zur Rechtfertigung von Neuro-Enhancement der Emotionen.Monika Betzler - 2009 - Philosophia Naturalis 46 (2):167-212.details
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Is Thomas Reid a Direct Realist about Perception?Hagit Benbaji - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):1-29.details
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Are Introspective Beliefs about One’s Own Visual Experiences Immediate?Wolfgang Barz - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (1).details
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Mindfulness and Trauma: Some Striking Similarities.Yochai Ataria - 2018 - Anthropology of Consciousness 29 (1):44-56.details
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Two Kinds of Time-Consciousness and Three Kinds of Content.Jan Almäng - 2013 - Axiomathes 23 (1):61-80.details
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The Causal Self‐Referential Theory of Perception Revisited.Jan Almäng - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (1):29-53.details
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Perceptual Transparency and Perceptual Constancy.Jan Almäng - 2014 - Husserl Studies 30 (1):1-19.details
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An Argument for Shape Internalism.Jan Almäng - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):819-836.details
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A Dualist Account of Phenomenal Concepts.Martina Fürst - 2014 - In Andrea Lavazza & Howard Robinson (eds.), Contemporary Dualism. A Defense. 112-135. Routledge. pp. 112-135.details
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Husserl, representationalism, and the theory of phenomenal intentionality.Chang Liu - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):67-84.details
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How to dig up minds: The intentional analysis program in cognitive archaeology.Corijn van Mazijk - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):130-144.details
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Consciousness and Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 560-585.details
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Reductive Representationalism and Emotional Phenomenology.Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):41-59.details
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First Person and Minimal Self-Consciousness.Thor Grünbaum - 2012 - In Sofia Miguens & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. [Place of publication not identified]: Ontos Verlag. pp. 273-296.details
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Anomalous Dualism: A New Approach to the Mind-Body Problem.David Bourget - 2019 - In William Seager (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. Routledge.details
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A Short History of the Philosophy of Consciousness in the Twentieth Century.Tim Crane - 2018 - In Amy Kind (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 6. New York: Routledge.details
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“I” and “Me”: The Self in the Context of Consciousness.Mateusz Woźniak - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9:350047.details
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Sensory modalities and novel features of perceptual experiences.Douglas C. Wadle - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9841-9872.details
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Consequences of schematism.Alberto Voltolini - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):135-150.details
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Some reflections on Husserlian intentionality, intentionalism, and non-propositional contents.Corijn van Mazijk - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):499-517.details
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Phenomenological approaches to non-conceptual content.Corijn Van Mazijk - 2017 - HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology 6 (1):58-78.details
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Husserl, impure intentionalism, and sensory awareness.Corijn Van Mazijk - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.details
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Husserl, impure intentionalism, and sensory awareness.Corijn Van Mazijk - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (2):333-351.details
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Is 'no' a force-indicator? No!M. Textor - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):448-456.details
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A Bundle Definition of Scientific Understanding and its Application to Quantum Physics.Vera Spillner - 2009 - Philosophia Naturalis 46 (2):279-305.details
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The mental lives of zombies.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):343-372.details
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Perceptual Modes of Presentation as Object Files.Gabriel Siegel - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-19.details
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Is experience transparent?Charles Siewert - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):15-41.details
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The epistemic force of perceptual experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):87-100.details
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Prospects of enactivist approaches to intentionality and cognition.Tobias Schlicht & Tobias Starzak - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):89-113.details
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Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology.Susanna Schellenberg - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.details
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The Phenomenality and Intentional Structure of We-Experiences.Alessandro Salice - 2020 - Topoi 41 (1):195-205.details
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The Phenomenality and Intentional Structure of We-Experiences.Alessandro Salice - 2020 - Topoi 41 (1):1-11.details
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Crossed Wires about Crossed Wires: Somatosensation and Immunity to Error through Misidentification.Léa Salje - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):35-56.details
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Strong Representationalism and Bodily Sensations: Reliable Causal Covariance and Biological Function.Coninx Sabrina - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (2):210-232.details
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Sniffing and smelling.Louise Richardson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):401-419.details
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