- Group reasons.Raimo Tuomela - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):402-418.details
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Blame and the Humean Theory of Motivation.Adam R. Thompson - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1345-1364.details
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Sobel on Pleasure, Reason, and Desire.Attila Tanyi - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):101-115.details
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Pure Cognitivism and Beyond.Attila Tanyi - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (3):331-348.details
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Desires as additional reasons? The case of tie-breaking.Attila Tanyi - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):209-227.details
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Circularity, Naturalism, and Desire-Based Reasons.Attila Tanyi - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (4):451-470.details
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What apparent reasons appear to be.Kurt Sylvan - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):587-606.details
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Respect and the reality of apparent reasons.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3129-3156.details
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Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):364-376.details
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Epistemic Reasons II: Basing.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):377-389.details
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Regimenting Reasons.Frans Svensson & Jonas Olson - 2005 - Theoria 71 (3):203-214.details
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Defending the Anti-casual Theory of Action Based on the Anti-psychologism of Reason.Yudai Suzuki - 2016 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 49 (1):1-17.details
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Why would very bad lives be worth continuing?Matej Sušnik - 2020 - South African Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):285-295.details
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The Social Construction of Incompetency: Moving Beyond Embedded Paternalism Toward the Practice of Respect.Supriya Subramani - 2020 - Health Care Analysis 28 (3):249-265.details
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Reasons and Entailment.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (3):353-374.details
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Inferential and non-inferential reasoning.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):1-29.details
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Why Animals Can't Act.Ralf Stoecker - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):255-271.details
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Internalising practical reasons.Rowland Stout - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):229–243.details
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Explanation and the A-theory.David Storrs-Fox - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178:4239-4259.details
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Epistemic instrumentalism, permissibility, and reasons for belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press. pp. 260-280.details
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Reasons without principles.Herman E. Stark - 2004 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):143 – 167.details
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Can affordances be reasons?Tobias Starzak & Tobias Schlicht - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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Epistemic justification: its subjective and its objective ways.Wolfgang Spohn - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3837-3856.details
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The Role of Memory in Agential Self-Knowledge.Ben Sorgiovanni - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):413-425.details
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Habitual Virtuous Actions and Automaticity.Nancy E. Snow - 2006 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (5):545-561.details
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The Structure of Orthonomy.Michael Smith - 2004 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:165-193.details
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Non-distributive blameworthiness.Thomas H. Smith - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt1):31-60.details
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Humeanism, Psychologism, and the Normative Story.Michael Smith - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):460-467.details
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Four objections to the standard story of action (and four replies).Michael Smith - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):387-401.details
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Depression and motivation.Benedict Smith - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):615-635.details
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Affective Experience, Desire, and Reasons for Action.Declan Smithies & Jeremy Weiss - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (1):27-54.details
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Acting and Believing Under the Guise of Normative Reasons.Keshav Singh - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):409-430.details
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Being Rational and Being Right, by Juan Comesaña.Mona Simion - 2022 - Mind 131 (523):1005-1015.details
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Ignorance and awareness.Paul Silva & Robert Weston Siscoe - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):225-243.details
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Group Action Without Group Minds.Kenneth Silver - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):321-342.details
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Deception and evidence.Nicholas Silins - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):375–404.details
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Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge: The awareness‐first solution.Paul Silva - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):564-586.details
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Agency and Normative Self-Governance.Matthew Silverstein - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):517-528.details
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Moral and Rational Commitment.Sam Shpall - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):146-172.details
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Wide and narrow scope.Sam Shpall - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):717-736.details
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Still waiting for a plausible Humean theory of reasons.Nicholas Shackel - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):607-633.details
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Pseudoscience and Idiosyncratic Theories of Rational Belief.Nicholas Shackel - 2013 - In M. Pigliucci & M. Boudry (eds.), Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem. University of Chicago Press. pp. 417-438.details
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Do affective desires provide reasons for action?Ashley Shaw - 2020 - Ratio 34 (2):147-157.details
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Consequentialism and Moral Worth.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (2):117-136.details
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What is a Reason to Act?Kieran Setiya - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):221-235.details
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Explaining action.Kieran Setiya - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):339-393.details
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Against internalism.Kieran Setiya - 2004 - Noûs 38 (2):266–298.details
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Taking Something as a Reason for Action.Markus E. Schlosser - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (2):267-304.details
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The neuroscientific study of free will: A diagnosis of the controversy.Markus E. Schlosser - 2014 - Synthese 191 (2):245-262.details
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Traditional Compatibilism Reformulated and Defended.Markus E. Schlosser - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42:277-300.details
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