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The Rational Significance of Desire.Avery Archer - 2013 - Dissertation, Columbia Universitydetails
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Précis of Vaulting Ambition: Sociobiology and the Quest for Human Nature.Philip Kitcher - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (1):61-71.details
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Counterfactuals as Strict Conditionals.Andrea Iacona - 2015 - Disputatio 7 (41):165-191.details
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Taking Something as a Reason for Action.Markus E. Schlosser - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (2):267-304.details
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(1 other version)Morality and the Meaning of Life: Some First Thoughts.Norman Dahl - 1987 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):1 - 22.details
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Practical Steps and Reasons for Action.Philip Clark - 1997 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):17 - 45.details
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Moral Motivation: Kantians versus Humeans (and Evolution).Laurence Thomas - 1988 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 13 (1):367-383.details
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Moore on the right, the good, and uncertainty.Michael Smith - 2006 - In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 2006--133.details
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(1 other version)Happiness, the self and human flourishing.Daniel M. Haybron - 2008 - Utilitas 20 (1):21-49.details
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Motivation in agents.Christian Miller - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):222–266.details
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Against internalism.Kieran Setiya - 2004 - Noûs 38 (2):266–298.details
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Against one form of judgment-determinism.Mark Thomas Walker - 2001 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (2):199 – 227.details
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The scope of instrumental reason.Mark Schroeder - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):337–364.details
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The Reasons that Matter.Stephen Finlay - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):1 – 20.details
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Do We Love For Reasons?Yongming Han - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):106-126.details
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The Nature of Desire.Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.) - 2017 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Normative Explanation and Justification.Pekka Väyrynen - 2021 - Noûs 55 (1):3-22.details
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Beyond Moral Fundamentalism: Dewey’s Pragmatic Pluralism in Ethics and Politics [preprint].Steven Fesmire - 2017 - In The Oxford Handbook of Dewey [Intro available free from OUP]. Oxford, UK and New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 209-234.details
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Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules?Darren Bradley - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.details
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Acting on a Ground : Reasons, Rational Motivation, and Explanation.Magnus Frei - 2016 - Dissertation, Fribourgdetails
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Reasons, rationality, reasoning: how much pulling-apart?Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Problema 12:59-93.details
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Affective Experience, Desire, and Reasons for Action.Declan Smithies & Jeremy Weiss - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (1):27-54.details
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On the Scope, Jurisdiction, and Application of Rationality and the Law.Daniel Fogal - 2018 - Problema 12:21-57.details
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Acting and Believing Under the Guise of Normative Reasons.Keshav Singh - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):409-430.details
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Moral property eliminativism.T. Ryan Byerly - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2695-2713.details
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The Challenge of Amoralism.Voin Milevski - 2018 - Ratio 31 (2):252-266.details
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Can Reasons Be Propositions? Against Dancy's Attack on Propositionalism.Attila Tanyi & Morganti Matteo - 2017 - Theoria 83 (3):185-205.details
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Reasons for Belief, Perception, and Reflective Knowledge.Alan Millar - 2014 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):1-19.details
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Universal practice and universal applicability tests in moral philosophy.Scott Forschler - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (12):3041-3058.details
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Epistemic instrumentalism, permissibility, and reasons for belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 260-280.details
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Rightness = right-maker.Long Joseph - 2015 - Disputatio 7 (41):193-206.details
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Blame and the Metaphysics of Practical Reasons.Elizabeth A. Oljar - 2002 - Disputatio 1 (13):1 - 16.details
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Empirical Work in Moral Psychology.Joshua May - 2017 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Weak Motivational Internalism, Lite: Dispositions, Moral Judgments, and What We're Motivated to Do.Jesse Steinberg - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):1-24.details
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Social ontology, practical reasonableness, and collective reasons for action.Polycarp Ikuenobe - 2019 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 49 (3):264-281.details
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Necessitation and Justification in Kant’s Ethics.Mark Timmons - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):223-261.details
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What You’re Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do.Errol Lord - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1109-1154.details
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Ficcionalização da moral:um roteiro.Wilson Mendonça & Idia Laura Ferreira - 2010 - Ethic@ - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 9 (2):175-198.details
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Constitutivism and the Self-Reflection Requirement.Caroline T. Arruda - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (4):1165-1183.details
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Against Strong Cognitivism: An Argument from the Particularity of Love.Hilla Jacobson - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):563-596.details
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Conditionals.R. A. Briggs - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 543-590.details
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Justification through biological faith: A rejoinder. [REVIEW]Robert J. Richards - 1986 - Biology and Philosophy 1 (3):337-354.details
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Self-validation and internalism in Velleman’s constitutivism.Michael Bukoski - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (11):2667-2686.details
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Evidencialismo.Tommaso Piazza - 2017 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.details
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(1 other version)Free Will and the Structure of Motivation.David Shatz - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):451-482.details
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What motive to virtue? Early modern empirical naturalist theories of moral obligation.Brady John Hoback - unknowndetails
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