- Global safety: how to deal with necessary truths.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2019 - Synthese 196 (3):1167-1186.details
|
|
Closure of A Priori Knowability Under A Priori Knowable Material Implication.Jan Heylen - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (2):359-380.details
|
|
The Significance of Fallibilism Within Gettier’s Challenge: A Case Study.Stephen Hetherington - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):539-547.details
|
|
Sceptical possibilities? No worries.Stephen Hetherington - 2009 - Synthese 168 (1):97 - 118.details
|
|
Knowing (How It Is) That P: Degrees and Qualities of Knowledge.Stephen Hetherington - 2005 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (4):129-152.details
|
|
Where’s the Bridge? Epistemology and Epistemic Logic.Vincent F. Hendricks & John Symons - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (1):137-167.details
|
|
Are Gettier cases disturbing?Peter Hawke & Tom Schoonen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1503-1527.details
|
|
Epistemic Contextualism as a Theory of Primary Speaker Meaning 1. [REVIEW]Gilbert Harman - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):173-179.details
|
|
The Universal Core of Knowledge.Michael Hannon - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):769-786.details
|
|
Contemporary ordinary language philosophy.Nat Hansen - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (8):556-569.details
|
|
The Evil Demon argument as based on closure plus meta-coherence.Jean Baptiste Guillon - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4703-4731.details
|
|
Dretske & McDowell on perceptual knowledge, conclusive reasons, and epistemological disjunctivism.Peter J. Graham & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):148-166.details
|
|
On the Rational Resolvability of Deep Disagreement Through Meta-argumentation: A Resource Audit.David Godden - 2019 - Topoi 38 (4):725-750.details
|
|
Dretske on knowledge and content.Olav Gjelsvik - 1991 - Synthese 86 (March):425-41.details
|
|
Skepticism and elegance: problems for the abductivist reply to Cartesian skepticism.Matthew B. Gifford - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):685-704.details
|
|
Essays on Skepticism.Mikkel Gerken - 2012 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (1):65-77.details
|
|
Conceptual Equivocation and Warrant by Reasoning.Mikkel Gerken - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):381-400.details
|
|
Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk.Georgi Gardiner - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):481-511.details
|
|
Epistemology in Japan: 2000-2005.Tomohisa Furuta - 2007 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 15 (2):53-79.details
|
|
Is probabilistic evidence a source of knowledge?Ori Friedman & John Turri - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (5):1062-1080.details
|
|
Contradictory Belief and Epistemic Closure Principles.Bryan Frances - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (2):203–226.details
|
|
Externalism and self-knowledge: A puzzle in two dimensions.Jordi Fernández - 2004 - European Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):17-37.details
|
|
Externalism and Self‐Knowledge: A Puzzle in Two Dimensions.Jordi Fernández - unknowndetails
|
|
Uma sombra de dúvida: Reflexividade E fechamento epistêmico.Paulo Faria - 2009 - Philósophos - Revista de Filosofia 14 (2):63-113.details
|
|
A noncontextualist account of contextualist linguistic data.Mylan Engel - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (2):56-79.details
|
|
Knowledge is closed under analytic content.Samuel Z. Elgin - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5339-5353.details
|
|
Perceptual Knowledge, Discrimination, and Closure.Santiago Echeverri - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (6):1361-1378.details
|
|
How to Undercut Radical Skepticism.Santiago Echeverri - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1299-1321.details
|
|
A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism.Santiago Echeverri - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):692-719.details
|
|
Transmission of warrant-failure and the notion of epistemic analyticity.Philip A. Ebert - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):505 – 521.details
|
|
Lottery judgments: A philosophical and experimental study.Philip A. Ebert, Martin Smith & Ian Durbach - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):110-138.details
|
|
A contextualist modification of Cornman.Jane Duran - 1986 - Philosophia 16 (3-4):377-388.details
|
|
Nelkin on the lottery paradox.Igor Douven - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):395-404.details
|
|
Nelkin on the Lottery Paradox.Igor Douven - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):395-404.details
|
|
The ordinary language argument against skepticism—pragmatized.Sinan Dogramaci - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):879-896.details
|
|
Evidentialism and skeptical arguments.Dylan Dodd - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):337-352.details
|
|
When Science Confronts Philosophy: Three Case Studies.Eric Dietrich - 2020 - Axiomathes 1:1-22.details
|
|
Can probability theory explain why closure is both intuitive and prone to counterexamples?Marcello Di Bello - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2145-2168.details
|
|
Epistemic closure, assumptions and topics of inquiry.Marcello Di Bello - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3977-4002.details
|
|
Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva - 2015 - London, England: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
|
|
Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
References.John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett - 2011 - In Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 361-386.details
|
|
Reliabilist Epistemology.Alvin Goldman & Bob Beddor - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
The Problem of Easy Justification: An Investigation of Evidence, Justification, and Reliability.Samuel Alexander Taylor - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Iowadetails
|
|
Ramsey's Principle Re-situated.Jérôme Dokic & Pascal Engel - 2004 - In Hallvard Lillehammer & D. H. Mellor (eds.), Ramsey's Legacy. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic.Nicholas Silins - 2007 - In Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 2. Oxford University Press. pp. 108.details
|
|
A Tale of Two Doctrines: Moral Encroachment and Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu - 2021 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 99-118.details
|
|
The Aporetic Structure of Philosophical Problems.Wolfgang Barz - 2019 - Journal of Didactics of Philosophy 3 ((1)):5-18.details
|
|
Inference and Scepticism.Jose L. Zalabardo - 2014 - In Elia Zardini & Dylan Dodd (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Fiabilismo.Ernesto Perini-Santos - 2018 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.details
|
|