- Evidence-Coherence Conflicts Revisited.Alex Worsnip - 2021 - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
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A Higher-Order Approach to Diachronic Continence.Catherine Rioux - 2022 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 11 (1):51-58.details
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An instrumentalist unification of zetetic and epistemic reasons.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Inquiry and the epistemic.David Thorstad - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (9):2913-2928.details
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Reasons, Competition, and Latitude.Justin Snedegar - 2021 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 16. Oxford University Press.details
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Veritism and the normativity of logic.Nader Shoaibi - 2020 - Ratio 34 (1):7-19.details
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Motivierende Gründe: Aktuelle Probleme und Kontroversen.Jean Moritz Müller - 2019 - Information Philosophie 2019 (4):16-28.details
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The Unity of Evidence and Coherence.Declan Smithies - forthcoming - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
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Anscombe on Acting for Reasons.Keshav Singh - 2020 - In Ruth Chang & Kurt Sylvan (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason. Routledge.details
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Knowledge of Objective 'Oughts': Monotonicity and the New Miners Puzzle.Daniel Muñoz & Jack Spencer - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):77-91.details
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Evidence and Virtue (and Beyond).Kurt Sylvan - forthcoming - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Evidence.details
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Immorality and Irrationality.Alex Worsnip* - 2019 - Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):220-253.details
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What is Structural Rationality?Wooram Lee - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):614-636.details
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Being Rational and Being Wrong.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23 (1).details
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Moral Worth and Skillful Action.David Horst - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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Evidence, reasons, and knowledge in the reasons-first program.Paul Silva & Sven Bernecker - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):617-625.details
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Goodness beyond Reason.Roberto Keller - 2022 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):78-85.details
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Agent-centered epistemic rationality.James Gillespie - 2023 - Synthese 201 (3):1-22.details
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Externalism Explained.Clayton Littlejohn - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Positive illusion and the normativity of substantive and structural rationality.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (3).details
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Love, Reasons, and Replaceability.Andrea Iacona & José Antonio Díez - 2021 - Critica 53 (158):3-21.details
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Possessing reasons: why the awareness-first approach is better than the knowledge-first approach.Paul Silva - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2925-2947.details
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Knowledge-First Evidentialism and the Dilemmas of Self-Impact.Paul Silva Jr & Eyal Tal - 2021 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Emotions and Process Rationality.Oded Na’Aman - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (3):531-546.details
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Respect and the reality of apparent reasons.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3129-3156.details
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Critical Notice of Epistemic Consequentialism (eds. Ahlstrom-Vij and Dunn). [REVIEW]Kurt Sylvan - forthcoming - Analysis.details
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An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2020 - The Philosophical Review 129 (1):1-51.details
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The place of reasons in epistemology.Kurt Sylvan & Ernest Sosa - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Reasons and Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason.Ruth Chang (ed.) - 1997 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard.details
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Who's Afraid Of Epistemic Dilemmas?Nick Hughes - forthcoming - In Scott Stapleford, Mathias Steup & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles.details
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Neither/Nor.Clayton Littlejohn - 2019 - In Casey Doyle, Joe Milburn & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism. Routledge.details
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Coherence, First-Personal Deliberation, and Crossword Puzzles.Marc-Kevin Daoust - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.details
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Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence.Sebastian Schmidt - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (1):1-24.details
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Books Received. [REVIEW][author unknown] - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (1):125-130.details
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Sentimental Reasons.Edgar Phillips - 2021 - In Simon Cushing (ed.), New Philosophical Essays on Love and Loving. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 171–194.details
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Structural Rationality and the Property of Coherence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (1):170-194.details
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Epistemic Consequentialism, Veritism, and Scoring Rules.Marc-Kevin Daoust & Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (4):1741-1765.details
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False Beliefs and Misleading Evidence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2021 - Theoria 87 (3):520-541.details
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Imperfection, Accuracy, and Structural Rationality.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (3):1095-1116.details
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A Puzzle About Knowledge, Blame, and Coherence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (4):493-503.details
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The Normativity of Rationality.John Brunero - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):313-317.details
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Group Belief for a Reason.Jessica Brown - 2022 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 96 (1):1-22.details
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Internalism and culpable irrationality.Karl Gustav Bergman - 2024 - Erkenntnis:1-21.details
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Epistemic Blame and the New Evil Demon Problem.Cristina Ballarini - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (8):2475-2505.details
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When Things Fail to Fit Together.Daniel Fogal - forthcoming - Analysis.details
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Incoherence and the balance of evidential reasons.Sebastian Schmidt - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-10.details
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Why and When is Pure Moral Motivation Defective.David Heering - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):665-684.details
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Minimal Rationality: Structural or Reasons-Responsive?Jean Moritz Müller - 2022 - In Christine Tappolet, Julien Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (eds.), A Tribute to Ronald de Sousa.details
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Epistemic Normativity is Independent of our Goals.Alex Worsnip - forthcoming - In Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup, John Turri & Blake Roeber (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.details
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