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  1. Truth, meaning, and translation.Panu Raatikainen - 2008 - In Douglas Patterson (ed.), New essays on Tarski and philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 247.
    Philosopher’s judgements on the philosophical value of Tarski’s contributions to the theory of truth have varied. For example Karl Popper, Rudolf Carnap, and Donald Davidson have, in their different ways, celebrated Tarski’s achievements and have been enthusiastic about their philosophical relevance. Hilary Putnam, on the other hand, pronounces that “[a]s a philosophical account of truth, Tarski’s theory fails as badly as it is possible for an account to fail.” Putnam has several alleged reasons for his dissatisfaction,1 but one of them, (...)
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  • A Fallacy about the Modal Status of Logic.Manuel Ppérez Otero - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (1):9-27.
    In John Etchemendy's book, The Concept of Logical Consequence, several arguments are put forth against the standard model‐theoretic account of logical consequence and logical truth. I argue in this article that crucial parts of Etchemendy's attack depend on a failure to distinguish two senses of logic and two correlative senses of being something a logical question. According to one of these senses, the logic of a language, L, is the set of logical truths of L. In the other sense, logic (...)
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  • Reflections on consequence.John Etchemendy - 2008 - In Douglas Patterson (ed.), New essays on Tarski and philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 263--299.
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  • Truth is One (No Need for Pluralism).Giorgio Volpe - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-19.
    In this paper, I discuss the currently most popular argument for alethic pluralism, maintaining that the so-called scope problem provides no compelling reason for abandoning the traditional view that truth is one and the same (substantive) property across the various regions of thought or discourse in which it is ascribed or denied to the things we think or say. I disarm the argument by showing that the scope problem does not arise for a number of non-deflationary, monistic views of truth (...)
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  • Is there a Commonsense Semantic Conception of Truth?Joseph Ulatowski - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (2):487-500.
    Alfred Tarski’s refinement of an account of truth into a formal system that turns on the acceptance of Convention-T has had a lasting impact on philosophical logic, especially work concerning truth, meaning, and other semantic notions. In a series of studies completed from the 1930s to the 1960s, Arne Næss collected and analysed intuitive responses from non-philosophers to questions concerning truth, synonymy, certainty, and probability. Among the formulations of truth studied by Næss were practical variants of expressions of the form (...)
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  • First‐order logics over fixed domain.R. Gregory Taylor - 2022 - Theoria 88 (3):584-606.
    What we call first‐order logic over fixed domain was initiated, in a certain guise, by Peirce around 1885 and championed, albeit in idiosyncratic form, by Zermelo in papers from the 1930s. We characterise such logics model‐ and proof‐theoretically and argue that they constitute exploration of a clearly circumscribed conception of domain‐dependent generality. Whereas a logic, or family of such, can be of interest for any of a variety of reasons, we suggest that one of those reasons might be that said (...)
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  • Non-transitive counterparts of every Tarskian logic.Damian E. Szmuc - 2024 - Analysis 84 (2):320-326.
    The aim of this article is to show that, just as in recent years Cobreros, Egré, Ripley and van Rooij have provided a non-transitive counterpart of classical logic (i.e. one in which all classically acceptable inferences are valid but Cut and other metainferences are not), the same can be done for every Tarskian logic, with full generality. To establish this fact, a semantic approach is taken by showing that appropriate structures can be devised to characterize a non-transitive counterpart of every (...)
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  • Alfred Tarski: Semantic shift, heuristic shift in metamathematics.Hourya Sinaceur - 2001 - Synthese 126 (1-2):49 - 65.
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  • Did Tarski commit "Tarski's fallacy"?Gila Sher - 1996 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 61 (2):653-686.
    In his 1936 paper,On the Concept of Logical Consequence, Tarski introduced the celebrated definition oflogical consequence: “The sentenceσfollows logicallyfrom the sentences of the class Γ if and only if every model of the class Γ is also a model of the sentenceσ.” [55, p. 417] This definition, Tarski said, is based on two very basic intuitions, “essential for the proper concept of consequence” [55, p. 415] and reflecting common linguistic usage: “Consider any class Γ of sentences and a sentence which (...)
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  • On Magari's concept of general calculus: notes on the history of tarski's methodology of deductive sciences.S. Roberto Arpaia - 2006 - History and Philosophy of Logic 27 (1):9-41.
    This paper is an historical study of Tarski's methodology of deductive sciences (in which a logic S is identified with an operator Cn S, called the consequence operator, on a given set of expressions), from its appearance in 1930 to the end of the 1970s, focusing on the work done in the field by Roberto Magari, Piero Mangani and by some of their pupils between 1965 and 1974, and comparing it with the results achieved by Tarski and the Polish school (...)
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  • Tarskian truth and the two provinces of semantics.Ricardo Santos - 2004 - Disputatio 1 (16):26-37.
    In this paper, I argue that the cleavage between the theory of reference and the theory of meaning, which under the influence of Quine has dominated a large part of the philosophy of language of the last fifty years, is based on a misrepresentation of Tarski's achievement and on an overestimation of the scope and value of disquotation. In particular, I show that, if we accept Davidson's critique of disquotation, the same kind of reasons that Quine offered in opposition to (...)
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  • A Recommendation for Correspondence Theory of Truth.K. S. Sangeetha - 2016 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 33 (3):465-480.
    The purpose of this paper is to show that the correspondence theory as a truth-maker theory has certain advantages over some of the other theories of truth. The cost of this advantage is postulating extra entities—facts. However, the benefits outweigh the costs; facts facilitate our understanding of the nature of truth made by the world. Facts are required for understanding this world; therefore, one cannot claim that a separate cost is incurred for explaining truth. It is further argued that because (...)
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  • Etchemendy and Bolzano on Logical Consequence.Paul Rusnock & Mark Burke - 2010 - History and Philosophy of Logic 31 (1):3-29.
    In a series of publications beginning in the 1980s, John Etchemendy has argued that the standard semantical account of logical consequence, due in its essentials to Alfred Tarski, is fundamentally mistaken. He argues that, while Tarski's definition requires us to classify the terms of a language as logical or non-logical, no such division is guaranteed to deliver the correct extension of our pre-theoretical or intuitive consequence relation. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, Tarski's account is claimed to be incapable of (...)
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  • Semantic theory and necessary truth.Ian Rumfitt - 2001 - Synthese 126 (1-2):283 - 324.
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  • Radical quotation and real repetition.David Roden - 2004 - Ratio 17 (2):191–206.
    In this essay I argue for a constructivist account of the entities composing the object languages of Davidsonian truth theories and a quotational account of the reference from metalinguistic expressions to interpreted utterances. I claim that ‘radical quotation’ requires an ontology of repeatable events with strong similarities to Derrida's account of iterable events. In part one I summarise Davidson's account of interpretation and Olav Gjelsivk's arguments to the effect that the syntactic individuation of linguistic objects is only workable if interpreters (...)
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  • Formal and material consequence.Stephen Read - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (3):247 - 265.
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  • On the possibility of a privileged class of logical terms.Greg Ray - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):303 - 313.
    Alfred Tarski's (1936) semantic account of the logical properties (logical consequence, logical truth and logical consistency) makes essential appeal to a distinction between logical and non-logical terms. John Etchemendy (1990) has recently argued that Tarski's account is inadequate for quite a number of different reasons. Among them is a brief argument which purports to show that Tarski's reliance on the distinction between logical and non-logical terms is in principle mistaken. According to Etchemendy, there are very simple (even first order) languages (...)
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  • Logical consequence: A defense of Tarski.Greg Ray - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (6):617 - 677.
    In his classic 1936 essay "On the Concept of Logical Consequence", Alfred Tarski used the notion of satisfaction to give a semantic characterization of the logical properties. Tarski is generally credited with introducing the model-theoretic characterization of the logical properties familiar to us today. However, in his book, The Concept of Logical Consequence, Etchemendy argues that Tarski's account is inadequate for quite a number of reasons, and is actually incompatible with the standard model-theoretic account. Many of his criticisms are meant (...)
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  • More on Putnam and Tarski.Panu Raatikainen - 2003 - Synthese 135 (1):37 - 47.
    Hilary Putnam's famous arguments criticizing Tarski's theory of truth are evaluated. It is argued that they do not succeed to undermine Tarski's approach. One of the arguments is based on the problematic idea of a false instance of T-schema. The other ignores various issues essential for Tarski's setting such as language-relativity of truth definition.
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  • Against Fregean Quantification.Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9 (37):971-1007.
    There are two dominant approaches to quantification: the Fregean and the Tarskian. While the Tarskian approach is standard and familiar, deep conceptual objections have been pressed against its employment of variables as genuine syntactic and semantic units. Because they do not explicitly rely on variables, Fregean approaches are held to avoid these worries. The apparent result is that the Fregean can deliver something that the Tarskian is unable to, namely a compositional semantic treatment of quantification centered on truth and reference. (...)
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  • The "natural" and the "formal".Jaroslav Peregrin - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (1):75-101.
    The paper presents an argument against a "metaphysical" conception of logic according to which logic spells out a specific kind of mathematical structure that is somehow inherently related to our factual reasoning. In contrast, it is argued that it is always an empirical question as to whether a given mathematical structure really does captures a principle of reasoning. (More generally, it is argued that it is not meaningful to replace an empirical investigation of a thing by an investigation of its (...)
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  • Interpreting formal logic.Jaroslav Peregrin - 1994 - Erkenntnis 40 (1):5 - 20.
    The concept ofsemantic interpretation is a source of chronic confusion: the introduction of a notion ofinterpretation can be the result of several quite different kinds of considerations.Interpretation can be understood in at least three ways: as a process of dis-abstraction of formulas, as technical tool for the sake of characterizing truth, or as a reconstruction of meaning-assignment. However essentially different these motifs are and however properly they must be kept apart, these can all be brought to one and the same (...)
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  • Doing Worlds with Words: Formal Semantics Without Formal Metaphysics.Jaroslav Peregrin - 1995 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
    Doing Worlds with Words throws light on the problem of meaning as the meeting point of linguistics, logic and philosophy, and critically assesses the possibilities and limitations of elucidating the nature of meaning by means of formal logic, model theory and model-theoretical semantics. The main thrust of the book is to show that it is misguided to understand model theory metaphysically and so to try to base formal semantics on something like formal metaphysics; rather, the book states that model theory (...)
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  • Truth-definitions and Definitional Truth.Douglas Patterson - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):313-328.
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  • A fallacy about the modal status of logic.Manuel Ppérez Otero - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (1):9–27.
    In John Etchemendy's book, The Concept of Logical Consequence, several arguments are put forth against the standard model‐theoretic account of logical consequence and logical truth. I argue in this article that crucial parts of Etchemendy's attack depend on a failure to distinguish two senses of logic and two correlative senses of being something a logical question. According to one of these senses, the logic of a language, L, is the set of logical truths of L. In the other sense, logic (...)
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  • Tarski's definition and truth-makers.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2004 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 126 (1-3):57-76.
    A hallmark of correspondence theories of truth is the principle that sentences are made true by some truth-makers. A well-known objection to treating Tarski’s definition of truth as a correspondence theory has been put forward by Donald Davidson. He argued that Tarski’s approach does not relate sentences to any entities (like facts) to which true sentences might correspond. From the historical viewpoint, it is interesting to observe that Tarski’s philosophical teacher Tadeusz Kotarbinski advocated an ontological doctrine of reism which accepted (...)
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  • Proxy functions, truth and reference.R. J. Nelson - 1997 - Synthese 111 (1):73-96.
    Quines ontological relativity is related to Tarskis theory of truth in two ways: Quine repudiates term-by-term-correspondence, as does Tarskis rule of truth; and Quines proxy argument in support of relativity finds exact formulation in Tarskis truth definition.Unfortunately, relativity is threatened by the fact that the proxy argument doesnt comply with the rule of truth (Tarskis celebrated condition (T)). Despite Quines express allegiance to (T), use of proxy schemes does not generate all of the true sentences condition (T) requires.
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  • The enumerative character of Tarski's definition of truth and its general character in a Tarskian system.Bo Mou - 2001 - Synthese 126 (1-2):91 - 121.
    In this paper, I suggest an approach to the alleged problem with the Tarskian formal definition of truth: its enumerative character seems to make it unable to capture our pretheoretic general understanding of truth. For this purpose, after spelling out two requirements for extending an enumerative definition to new cases, I examine to what extent Tarski's Convention T provides what are needed for extending the Tarski's enumerative definition. I conclude that, though not explicitly providing what are needed, Convention T does (...)
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  • What does formal logic have to do with arguments?Matthew W. McKeon - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (5):696-708.
    This paper sharpens the distinction between inferential and logcon arguments. Inferential arguments represent possible inferences, logcon ones need not. This distinction clarifies the roles that arguments play in accounting for the normativity of validity for inferential reasoning and in establishing the theoretical connection between validity and logical consequence. There are two related takeaways. First, the normativity of validity for inferential reasoning is grounded on the notion of an inferential argument. This will account for the use of validity to judge inference (...)
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  • Logical operations.Vann McGee - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (6):567 - 580.
    Tarski and Mautner proposed to characterize the "logical" operations on a given domain as those invariant under arbitrary permutations. These operations are the ones that can be obtained as combinations of the operations on the following list: identity; substitution of variables; negation; finite or infinite disjunction; and existential quantification with respect to a finite or infinite block of variables. Inasmuch as every operation on this list is intuitively "logical", this lends support to the Tarski-Mautner proposal.
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  • Tarski on Logical Consequence.Mario Gómez-Torrente - 1996 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 37 (1):125-151.
    This paper examines from a historical perspective Tarski's 1936 essay, "On the concept of logical consequence." I focus on two main aims. The primary aim is to show how Tarski's definition of logical consequence satisfies two desiderata he himself sets forth for it: (1) it must declare logically correct certain formalizations of the -rule and (2) it must allow for variation of the individual domain in the test for logical consequence. My arguments provide a refutation of some interpreters of Tarski, (...)
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  • The grounds for the model-theoretic account of the logical properties.Manuel García-Carpintero Sánchez-Miguel - 1992 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 34 (1):107-131.
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  • The development of mathematical logic from Russell to Tarski, 1900-1935.Paolo Mancosu, Richard Zach & Calixto Badesa - 2011 - In Leila Haaparanta (ed.), The development of modern logic. New York: Oxford University Press.
    The period from 1900 to 1935 was particularly fruitful and important for the development of logic and logical metatheory. This survey is organized along eight "itineraries" concentrating on historically and conceptually linked strands in this development. Itinerary I deals with the evolution of conceptions of axiomatics. Itinerary II centers on the logical work of Bertrand Russell. Itinerary III presents the development of set theory from Zermelo onward. Itinerary IV discusses the contributions of the algebra of logic tradition, in particular, Löwenheim (...)
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  • Fixed- versus Variable-domain Interpretations of Tarski’s Account of Logical Consequence.Paolo Mancosu - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (9):745-759.
    In this article I describe and evaluate the debate that surrounds the proper interpretation of Tarski’s account of logical consequence given in his classic 1936 article ‘On the concept of logical consequence’. In the late 1980s Etchemendy argued that the familiar model theoretic account of logical consequence is not to be found in Tarski’s original article. Whereas the contemporary account of logical consequence is a variable‐domain conception – in that it calls for a reinterpretation of the domain of variation of (...)
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  • Logical constants.John MacFarlane - 2008 - Mind.
    Logic is usually thought to concern itself only with features that sentences and arguments possess in virtue of their logical structures or forms. The logical form of a sentence or argument is determined by its syntactic or semantic structure and by the placement of certain expressions called “logical constants.”[1] Thus, for example, the sentences Every boy loves some girl. and Some boy loves every girl. are thought to differ in logical form, even though they share a common syntactic and semantic (...)
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  • Uniting model theory and the universalist tradition of logic: Carnap’s early axiomatics.Iris Loeb - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2815-2833.
    We shift attention from the development of model theory for demarcated languages to the development of this theory for fragments of a language. Although it is often assumed that model theory for demarcated languages is not compatible with a universalist conception of logic, no one has denied that model theory for fragments of a language can be compatible with that conception. It thus seems unwarranted to ignore the universalist tradition in the search for the origins and development of model theory. (...)
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  • Before the law.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):219-244.
    Before the law sits a gatekeeper. To this gatekeeper comes a man from the country who asks to gain entry into the law. But the gatekeeper says that he cannot grant him entry at the moment. The man thinks about it and then asks if he will be allowed to come in sometime later on. “It is possible,” says the gatekeeper, “but not now.”—Franz Kafka..
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  • Tarski, Truth, and Semantics.Richard G. Heck Jr - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (4):533 - 554.
    John Etchemendy has argued that it is but "a fortuitous accident" that Tarski's work on truth has any signifance at all for semantics. I argue, in response, that Etchemendy and others, such as Scott Soames and Hilary Putnam, have been misled by Tarski's emphasis on definitions of truth rather than theories of truth and that, once we appreciate how Tarski understood the relation between these, we can answer Etchemendy's implicit and explicit criticisms of neo-Davidsonian semantics.
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  • Reduction and Tarski's Definition of Logical Consequence.Jim Edwards - 2003 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44 (1):49-62.
    In his classic 1936 paper Tarski sought to motivate his definition of logical consequence by appeal to the inference form: P(0), P(1), . . ., P(n), . . . therefore ∀nP(n). This is prima facie puzzling because these inferences are seemingly first-order and Tarski knew that Gödel had shown first-order proof methods to be complete, and because ∀nP(n) is not a logical consequence of P(0), P(1), . . ., P(n), . . . by Taski's proposed definition. An attempt to resolve (...)
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  • Truth, Meaning, and Circularity.Claire Horisk - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (2):269-300.
    It is often argued that the combination of deflationism about truth and the truth-conditional theory of meaning is impossible for reasons of circularity. I distinguish, and reject, two strains of circularity argument. Arguments of the first strain hold that the combination has a circular account of the order in which one comes to know the meaning of a sentence and comes to know its truth condition. I show that these arguments fail to identify any circularity. Arguments of the second strain (...)
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  • The presidential address: Truth: The identity theory.Jennifer Hornsby - 1997 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (1):1–24.
    I want to promote what I shall call ‘the identity theory of truth’. I suggest that other accounts put forward as theories of truth are genuine rivals to it, but are unacceptable. A certain conception of thinkables belongs with the identity theory’s conception of truth. I introduce these conceptions in Part I, by reference to John McDowell’s Mind and World; and I show why they have a place in an identity theory, which I introduce by reference to Frege. In Part (...)
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  • Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions.Claire Horisk, Dorit Bar-On & William G. Lycan - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 101 (1):1 - 28.
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  • A forgotten logical expressivist: Strawson’s philosophy of logic and its challenges.Sybren Heyndels - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-23.
    P.F. Strawson contributed to many philosophical domains, including the philosophy of language, the history of philosophy, metaphysics, moral philosophy and philosophical methodology. Most of his contributions in these areas have influenced contemporary debates, either because his views are still defended or because they are still considered worthy of detailed responses. His views on the philosophy of logic have been only rarely discussed, however. My aim in this paper is threefold. First, I provide a systematic account of Strawson’s philosophy of logic. (...)
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  • Ray on Tarski on logical consequence.William H. Hanson - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (6):605-616.
    In "Logical consequence: A defense of Tarski" (Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 25, 1996, pp. 617-677), Greg Ray defends Tarski's account of logical consequence against the criticisms of John Etchemendy. While Ray's defense of Tarski is largely successful, his attempt to give a general proof that Tarskian consequence preserves truth fails. Analysis of this failure shows that de facto truth preservation is a very weak criterion of adequacy for a theory of logical consequence and should be replaced by a stronger (...)
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  • How Innocent Is Deflationism?Volker Halbach - 2001 - Synthese 126 (1-2):167-194.
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  • A Typology of Conceptual Explications.Dirk Greimann - 2012 - Disputatio 4 (34):645-670.
    Greimann-Dirk_A-typology-of-conceptual-explications.
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  • Rereading Tarski on logical consequence.Mario Gómez-Torrente - 2009 - Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (2):249-297.
    I argue that recent defenses of the view that in 1936 Tarski required all interpretations of a language to share one same domain of quantification are based on misinterpretations of Tarski’s texts. In particular, I rebut some criticisms of my earlier attack on the fixed-domain exegesis and I offer a more detailed report of the textual evidence on the issue than in my earlier work. I also offer new considerations on subsisting issues of interpretation concerning Tarski’s views on the logical (...)
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  • Was Tarski's Theory of Truth Motivated by Physicalism?Greg Frost-Arnold - 2004 - History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (4):265-280.
    Many commentators on Alfred Tarski have, following Hartry Field, claimed that Tarski's truth-definition was motivated by physicalism—the doctrine that all facts, including semantic facts, must be reducible to physical facts. I claim, instead, that Tarski did not aim to reduce semantic facts to physical ones. Thus, Field's criticism that Tarski's truth-definition fails to fulfill physicalist ambitions does not reveal Tarski to be inconsistent, since Tarski's goal is not to vindicate physicalism. I argue that Tarski's only published remarks that speak approvingly (...)
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  • Cut as Consequence.Curtis Franks - 2010 - History and Philosophy of Logic 31 (4):349-379.
    The papers where Gerhard Gentzen introduced natural deduction and sequent calculi suggest that his conception of logic differs substantially from the now dominant views introduced by Hilbert, Gödel, Tarski, and others. Specifically, (1) the definitive features of natural deduction calculi allowed Gentzen to assert that his classical system nk is complete based purely on the sort of evidence that Hilbert called ?experimental?, and (2) the structure of the sequent calculi li and lk allowed Gentzen to conceptualize completeness as a question (...)
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  • Susan Stebbing’s Logical Interventionism.Alexander X. Douglas & Jonathan Nassim - 2021 - History and Philosophy of Logic 42 (2):101-117.
    We examine a contribution L. Susan Stebbing made to the understanding of critical thinking and its relation to formal logic. Stebbing took expertise in formal logic to authorise logical intervention in public debate, specifically in assessing of the validity of everyday reasoning. She held, however, that formal logic is purely the study of logical form. Given the problems of ascertaining logical form in any particular instance, and that logical form does not always track informal validity, it is difficult to see (...)
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