- Valuable Ignorance: Delayed Epistemic Gratification.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):363–84.details
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No Hope for Conciliationism.Jonathan Dixon - forthcoming - Synthese.details
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Argumentation and the epistemology of disagreement.Harvey Siegal - unknowndetails
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Disagreement and the value of self-trust.Robert Pasnau - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2315-2339.details
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Conciliatory Reasoning, Self-Defeat, and Abstract Argumentation.Aleks Https://Orcidorg Knoks - 2023 - Review of Symbolic Logic 16 (3):740-787.details
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The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Problems for Credulism.James Pryor - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 89–131.details
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The Perniciousness of Higher-Order Evidence on Aesthetic Appreciation.David Sackris & Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen - 2023 - Dialogue 62 (2):303-322.details
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Epistemic authority: preemption through source sensitive defeat.Jan Constantin & Thomas Grundmann - 2020 - Synthese 197 (9):4109-4130.details
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The Epistemic Benefits of Disagreement.Kirk Lougheed - 2019 - Springer Verlag.details
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A puzzle about fickleness.Elise Woodard - 2020 - Noûs 56 (2):323-342.details
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Is Epistemic Permissivism a Consistent Position to Argue from?Matthew Wilson - 2017 - Southwest Philosophy Review 33 (1):43-51.details
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Do great minds really think alike?Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3).details
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Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.details
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Peer disagreement and counter-examples.Ruth Weintraub - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1773-1790.details
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A new solution to the problem of peer disagreement.Ruth Weintraub - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (8):795-811.details
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After Pascal’s Wager: on religious belief, regulated and rationally held.Jack Warman & David Efird - 2021 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 90 (1):61-78.details
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Peer Disagreement, Evidence, and Well-Groundedness.Han van Wietmarschen - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):395-425.details
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Explaining Higher-order Defeat.Marco Tiozzo - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (3):453-469.details
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How to respond rationally to peer disagreement: The preemption view.Thomas Grundmann - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):129-142.details
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Self-Intimation, Infallibility, and Higher-Order Evidence.Eyal Tal - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):665-672.details
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Is higher-order evidence evidence?Eyal Tal - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3157-3175.details
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Transitional attitudes and the unmooring view of higher‐order evidence.Julia Staffel - 2021 - Noûs 57 (1):238-260.details
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Disagreement and epistemic improvement.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & Mona Simion - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14641-14665.details
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Undermining, circularity, and disagreement.Andrew Rotondo - 2013 - Synthese 190 (3):563-584.details
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Evidence of evidence is evidence under screening-off.William Roche - 2014 - Episteme 11 (1):119-124.details
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A higher-order approach to disagreement.Mattias Skipper Rasmussen, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Jens Christian Bjerring - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):80-100.details
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Inferior Disagreement.Maura Priest - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (3):263-283.details
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Three conceptions of explaining how possibly—and one reductive account.Johannes Persson - 2009 - In Henk W. de Regt (ed.), Epsa Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 275--286.details
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Evidence and Knowledge from Computer Simulation.Wendy S. Parker - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1521-1538.details
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Why Truth-Relativists Should Be Non-conformists.Michele Palmira - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (3):239-247.details
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Defeaters in current epistemology: introduction to the special issue.Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2845-2854.details
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Evidence of expert's evidence is evidence.Luca Moretti - 2016 - Episteme 13 (2):208-218.details
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Gender, race, and group disagreement.Martin Miragoli & Mona Simion - 2020 - In Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & J. Adam Carter (eds.), The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. pp. 125-138.details
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Strategy and the pursuit of truth.Christoph Merdes - 2018 - Synthese 198 (1):117-138.details
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Conciliationism and the Menace of Scepticism.Diego E. Machuca - 2015 - Dialogue 54 (3):469–488.details
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Agrippan Pyrrhonism and the Challenge of Disagreement.Diego E. Machuca - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Research 40:23-39.details
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A Neo-Pyrrhonian Response to the Disagreeing about Disagreement Argument.Diego E. Machuca - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1663-1680.details
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What is Evidence of Evidence Evidence of?Fabio Lampert & John Biro - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (2):195-206.details
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Conciliatory views, higher-order disagreements, and defeasible logic.Aleks Knoks - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2).details
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Resolution of Deep Disagreement: Not Simply Consensus.Leah Henderson - 2020 - Informal Logic 40 (3):359-382.details
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Higher‐order evidence and losing one's conviction.Leah Henderson - 2022 - Noûs 56 (3):513-529.details
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Entitlement and mutually recognized reasonable disagreement.Allan Hazlett - 2013 - Episteme (1):1-25.details
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Gradually Adaptive Frameworks: Reasonable Disagreement and the Evolution of Evaluative Systems in Music Education.Stanley Haskins - 2013 - Philosophy of Music Education Review 21 (2):197.details
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The Impossibility of Mere Animal Knowledge for Reflective Subjects.Sanford Goldberg & Jonathan Matheson - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):829-840.details
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Conservative Treatment of Evidence.Alireza Fatollahi - 2023 - Episteme 20 (3):568-583.details
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Is moral deference reasonably acceptable?Martin Ebeling - 2017 - Social Epistemology 31 (3):296-309.details
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Higher-Order Defeat is Object-Independent.Joshua DiPaolo - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2):248-269.details
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Evidence and fallibility.Joshua DiPaolo - 2019 - Episteme 16 (1):39-55.details
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Disagreement in science: introduction to the special issue.Finnur Dellsén & Maria Baghramian - 2020 - Synthese 198 (S25):6011-6021.details
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