- Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.details
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Doxastic Voluntarism and the Function of Epistemic Evaluations.Steven L. Reynolds - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (1):19-35.details
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Believing at Will.Pamela Hieronymi - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 35 (sup1):149-187.details
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All things considered duties to believe.Anthony Robert Booth - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):509-517.details
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The ethics of belief.Andrew Chignell - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Epistemic Internalism.Bjc Madison - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.details
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Epistemic responsibility without epistemic agency.Pascal Engel - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):205 – 219.details
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Why There are No Epistemic Duties.Chase B. Wrenn - 2007 - Dialogue: The Canadian Philosophical Review 46 (1):115-136.details
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Epistemic rationality as instrumental rationality: A critique.Thomas Kelly - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.details
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Responsibility for believing.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):357-373.details
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Modest deontologism in epistemology.Richard Feldman - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):339 - 355.details
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The rationality of belief and other propositional attitudes.Thomas Kelly - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (2):163-96.details
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On the Practical Significance of Irrelevant Factors.Seyed Mohammad Yarandi - 2023 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):156-171.details
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The Normative Complexity of Virtues.Giulia Luvisotto - 2023 - Philosophies 8 (5):77.details
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Reasons for Belief and Aretaic Obligations.Emmanuel Smith - 2023 - Episteme (N/A):1-12.details
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Only Light and Evidence: Locke on the Will to Believe.Mark Boespflug - 2021 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 38 (1):1-21.details
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In Defense of Clutter.Brendan Balcerak Jackson, DiDomenico David & Kenji Lota - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.details
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Two Shapes of Pragmatism.Léna Mudry - 2021 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):151-165.details
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Epistemic Paternalism, Epistemic Permissivism, and Standpoint Epistemology.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - In Amiel Bernal & Guy Axtell (eds.), Epistemic Paternalism Reconsidered: Conceptions, Justifications and Implications. Lanham, Md: Rowman & LIttlefield. pp. 201-215.details
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The value of truth and the normativity of evidence.Tommaso Piazza - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5067-5088.details
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Staying true with the help of others: doxastic self-control through interpersonal commitment.Leo Charles Townsend - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (3):243-258.details
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The Epistemic Norm of Inference and Non-Epistemic Reasons for Belief.Patrick Bondy - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-21.details
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Stance empiricism and epistemic reason.Jonathan Reid Surovell - 2019 - Synthese 196 (2):709-733.details
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Knowledge as a Thick Concept: New Light on the Gettier and Value Problems.Brent G. Kyle - 2011 - Dissertation, Cornell Universitydetails
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Is There an ‘I’ in Epistemology?Ted Poston - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (4):517-541.details
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In defense of doxastic blame.Lindsay Rettler - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2205-2226.details
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Agency and Reasons in Epistemology.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherstdetails
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Agency of belief and intention.A. K. Flowerree - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2763-2784.details
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What can we not do at will and why.Hagit Benbaji - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1941-1961.details
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Epistemic versus all things considered requirements.Scott Stapleford - 2015 - Synthese 192 (6):1861-1881.details
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A normatively adequate credal reductivism.Justin M. Dallmann - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2301-2313.details
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Sceptical Rationality.Jan Willem Wieland - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):222-238.details
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Completing Epistemic Oughts.Scott Stapleford - 2014 - Philosophical Forum 45 (2):133-148.details
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Scientific Controversies and the Ethics of Arguing and Belief in the Face of Rational Disagreement.Xavier de Donato Rodríguez & Jesús Zamora Bonilla - 2014 - Argumentation 28 (1):39-65.details
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The deontological conception of epistemic justification: a reassessment.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2219-2241.details
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“The Thing To Do” Implies “Can”.Nicholas Southwood - 2016 - Noûs 50 (1):61-72.details
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The Good and the True (or the Bad and the False).Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Philosophy 88 (2):219-242.details
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Epistemic Ought is a Commensurable Ought.Anthony Robert Booth - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):529-539.details
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Does belief (only) aim at the truth?Daniel Whiting - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.details
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Taking control of belief.Miriam McCormick - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):169-183.details
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Taking aim at the truth.Masahiro Yamada - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):47-59.details
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Instrumental rationality, epistemic rationality, and evidence-gathering.Lara Buchak - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):85-120.details
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A metaphilosophical dilemma for epistemic externalism.Pierre Le Morvan - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 36 (5):688-707.details
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Epistemic norms without voluntary control.Philippe Chuard & Nicholas Southwood - 2009 - Noûs 43 (4):599-632.details
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Two notions of epistemic normativity.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2009 - Theoria 75 (3):161-178.details
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Stick to what you know.Jonathan Sutton - 2005 - Noûs 39 (3):359–396.details
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Epistemically appropriate perceptual belief.Peter J. Markie - 2006 - Noûs 40 (1):118-142.details
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The Type-B Moral Error Theory.Anthony Robert Booth - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2181-2199.details
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Moore′s paradox generalized.Claudio de Almeida - 2022 - Theoria 88 (6):1111-1127.details
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Banks, Bosses, and Bears: A Pragmatist Argument Against Encroachment.Stephanie Leary - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):657-676.details
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