This paper outlines and discusses the relative merits and problems of two current interpretations of Philosophy of Information (PI), the metaphysical approach and the analytical approach. The paper argues that both approaches complement one another, being normative and mutually compatible.

El propósito de este capítulo es argumentar la vitalidad de una ética cívica frente a una robotización del ejercicio periodístico. Para ello se contrasta la idea de que la inteligencia artificial se basta a sí misma para luchar contra los bulos con una infoética digital o algorítmica, que pone en valor los principios de la ethica cordis.

Presenting the challenges that face digital age citizens as philosophical, as opposed to technological, this paper explores the underpinning structure of digital civics through an overview of its four foundational pillars and their informing scholarship. Through this framework and the literature that supports it, a set of five key concepts are identified as a useful guide for developing digital civics initiatives, including policy and educational interventions. In closing, this work urges the further exploration of the conceptual underpinnings of digital civics (...) to improve future formulations of digital civics and digital citizenship endeavours. (shrink)

Can machines be conscious and what would be the ethical implications? This article gives an overview of current robotics approaches toward machine consciousness and considers factors that hamper an understanding of machine consciousness. After addressing the epistemological question of how we would know whether a machine is conscious and discussing potential advantages of potential future machine consciousness, it outlines the role of consciousness for ascribing moral status. As machine consciousness would most probably differ considerably from human consciousness, several complex questions (...) must be addressed, including what forms of machine consciousness would be morally relevant forms of consciousness, and what the ethical implications of morally relevant forms of machine consciousness would be. While admittedly part of this reflection is speculative in nature, it clearly underlines the need for a detailed conceptual analysis of the concept of artificial consciousness and stresses the imperative to avoid building machines with morally relevant forms of consciousness. The article ends with some suggestions for potential future regulation of machine consciousness. (shrink)

PurposeAs interest in technology ethics is increasing, so is the interest in bringing schools of ethics from non-Western philosophical traditions to the field, particularly when it comes to information and communication technology. In light of this development and recent publications that result from it, this paper aims to present responds critically to recent work on Confucian virtue ethics (CVE) and technology.Design/methodology/approachFour critiques are presented as theoretical challenges to CVE in technology, claiming that current literature insufficiently addresses: overall applicability, collective ethics (...) issues, epistemic overconfidence within technology corporations and amplification of epistemic overconfidence by the implementation of CVE. These challenges make use of general CVE literature and work on technology critique, political philosophy, epistemology and business ethics.FindingsImplementing CVE in technology may yield some benefits, but these may be outweighed by other outcomes, include strengthening hierarchies, widening inequities, increasing, rather than limiting, predictive activity, personal data collection, misinformation, privacy violations and challenges to the democratic process.Originality/valueThough not directly advocating against CVE, the paper reveals hitherto unidentified and serious issues that should be addressed before CVE are used to inform ethics guidelines or regulatory policies. It also serves as a foundation for further inquiry into how Eastern philosophy more broadly can inform technology ethics in the West. (shrink)

Ethics plays a key role in the normative analysis of the impacts of technology. We know that computers in general and the processing of data, the use of artificial intelligence, and the combination of computers and/or artificial intelligence with robotics are all associated with ethically relevant implications for individuals, groups, and society. In this article, we argue that while all technologies are ethically relevant, there is no need to create a separate ‘ethics of X’ or ‘X ethics’ for each and (...) every subtype of technology or technological property—e.g. computer ethics, AI ethics, data ethics, information ethics, robot ethics, and machine ethics. Specific technologies might have specific impacts, but we argue that they are often sufficiently covered and understood through already established higher-level domains of ethics. Furthermore, the proliferation of tech ethics is problematic because (a) the conceptual boundaries between the subfields are not well-defined, (b) it leads to a duplication of effort and constant reinventing the wheel, and (c) there is danger that participants overlook or ignore more fundamental ethical insights and truths. The key to avoiding such outcomes lies in a taking the discipline of ethics seriously, and we consequently begin with a brief description of what ethics is, before presenting the main forms of technology related ethics. Through this process, we develop a hierarchy of technology ethics, which can be used by developers and engineers, researchers, or regulators who seek an understanding of the ethical implications of technology. We close by deducing two principles for positioning ethical analysis which will, in combination with the hierarchy, promote the leveraging of existing knowledge and help us to avoid an exaggerated proliferation of tech ethics. (shrink)

We argue that the growing prevalence of statistical machine learning in everyday decision making – from creditworthiness to police force allocation – effectively replaces many of our humdrum practical judgments and that this will eventually undermine our capacity for making such judgments. We lean on Aristotle’s famous account of how phronesis and moral virtues develop to make our case. If Aristotle is right that the habitual exercise of practical judgment allows us to incrementally hone virtues, and if AI saves us (...) time by taking over some of those practical judgments, or if its pattern recognition capacities are very good at learning that kind of behavior – we risk innovating ourselves out of moral competence with the introduction of AI. (shrink)

Moral reasoning traditionally distinguishes two types of evil:moral and natural. The standard view is that ME is the product of human agency and so includes phenomena such as war, torture and psychological cruelty; that NE is the product of nonhuman agency, and so includes natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, disease and famine; and finally, that more complex cases are appropriately analysed as a combination of ME and NE. Recently, as a result of developments in autonomousagents in cyberspace, a new (...) class of interesting and importantexamples of hybrid evil has come to light. In this paper, it is called artificial evil and a case is made for considering it to complement ME and NE to produce a more adequate taxonomy. By isolating the features that have led to the appearance of AE, cyberspace is characterised as a self-contained environment that forms the essential component in any foundation of the emerging field of Computer Ethics. It is argued that this goes someway towards providing a methodological explanation of whycyberspace is central to so many of CE's concerns; and it isshown how notions of good and evil can be formulated incyberspace. Of considerable interest is how the propensity for anagent's action to be morally good or evil can be determined evenin the absence of biologically sentient participants and thusallows artificial agents not only to perpetrate evil but conversely to `receive' or `suffer from'it. The thesis defended is that the notion of entropy structure,which encapsulates human value judgement concerning cyberspace ina formal mathematical definition, is sufficient to achieve thispurpose and, moreover, that the concept of AE can be determinedformally, by mathematical methods. A consequence of this approachis that the debate on whether CE should be considered unique, andhence developed as a Macroethics, may be viewed, constructively,in an alternative manner. The case is made that whilst CE issues are not uncontroversially unique, they are sufficiently novel to render inadequate the approach of standard Macroethics such as Utilitarianism and Deontologism and hence to prompt the search for a robust ethical theory that can deal with them successfully. The name Information Ethics is proposed for that theory. Itis argued that the uniqueness of IE is justified by its beingnon-biologically biased and patient-oriented: IE is anEnvironmental Macroethics based on the concept of data entityrather than life. It follows that the novelty of CE issues suchas AE can be appreciated properly because IE provides a newperspective. In light of the discussion provided in this paper, it is concluded that Computer Ethics is worthy of independent study because it requires its own application-specific knowledge and is capable of supporting a methodological foundation, Information Ethics. (shrink)

The article seeks to highlight the relation between ontology and communication while considering the role of AI in society and environment. Bioinformationalism is the technical term that foregrounds this relationality. The study reveals instructive consequences for philosophy of technology in general and AI in particular. The first section introduces the bioinformational approach to AI, focusing on three critical features of the current AI debate: ontology of information, property-based vs. relational AI, and ontology vs. constitution of AI. When applied to the (...) themes of relationality and non-anthropocentric communications, bioinformational insights highlight an inclusive and meaningful groundwork for understanding AI by ‘relating’ it with society and the environment through an engagement with the ongoing critique of human supremacy. In the second section, we move from ‘relating’ AI to ‘rewilding’ AI by proposing taxonomical classification for certain technological entities. We situate our proposal in the broader personhood debate with the proposal of taxonomical ranking. In the last section, we show an instance of a relational approach steeped in substantialist ontology by introducing the fourth feature of the AI debate. A broad critique of Floridi’s philosophy of information introduces this fourth feature from the domain of philosophy and sociology to address various theoretical and ecological problems with current relational accounts. In doing so, we argue for ‘communication’ to be the replacement of ‘information’ as the moral unit. A bioinformational understanding of AI advocates taking ontological commitments seriously at all levels of informational and technological processes and products. (shrink)

Qual o lugar da filosofia nos dias atuais? Diante das inúmeras respostas possíveis a esta questão, nos debruçaremos em alguns tópicos que podemos inserir na chamada Ética Informacional, um ramo de investigação filosófico-interdisciplinar relativamente recente que discute problemas oriundos da relação ser humano/tecnologias digitais. Temas como privacidade informacional, arrogância epistêmica e divisão digital serão discutidos e relacionados, com o intuito de ilustrar o papel da filosofia na compreensão da complexidade inerente às dinâmicas sociais no contexto da sociedade da informação. Argumentaremos (...) que pensar o mundo contemporâneo a partir do viés da ética informacional se faz cada dia mais imprescindível para que possamos entrar em sintonia com as rápidas mudanças que a revolução informacional impõe à vida em sociedade e não sermos levados pelas enxurradas informacionais que presenciamos diariamente. (shrink)

Purpose Computing ethics represents a long established, yet rapidly evolving, discipline that grows in complexity and scope on a near-daily basis. Therefore, to help understand some of that scope it is essential to incorporate a range of perspectives, from a range of stakeholders, on current and emerging ethical challenges associated with computer technology. This study aims to achieve this by using, a three-pronged, stakeholder analysis of Computer Science academics, ICT industry professionals, and citizen groups was undertaken to explore what they (...) consider to be crucial computing ethics concerns. The overlap between these stakeholder groups are explored, as well as whether their concerns are reflected in the existing literature. Design/methodology/approach Data collection was performed using focus groups, and the data was analysed using a thematic analysis. The data was also analysed to determine if there were overlaps between the literature and the stakeholders’ concerns and attitudes towards computing ethics. Findings The results of the focus group analysis show a mixture of overlapping concerns between the different groups, as well as some concerns that are unique to each of the specific groups. All groups stressed the importance of data as a key topic in computing ethics. This includes concerns around the accuracy, completeness and representativeness of data sets used to develop computing applications. Academics were concerned with the best ways to teach computing ethics to university students. Industry professionals believed that a lack of diversity in software teams resulted in important questions not being asked during design and development. Citizens discussed at length the negative and unexpected impacts of social media applications. These are all topics that have gained broad coverage in the literature. Social implications In recent years, the impact of ICT on society and the environment at large has grown tremendously. From this fast-paced growth, a myriad of ethical concerns have arisen. The analysis aims to shed light on what a diverse group of stakeholders consider the most important social impacts of technology and whether these concerns are reflected in the literature on computing ethics. The outcomes of this analysis will form the basis for new teaching content that will be developed in future to help illuminate and address these concerns. Originality/value The multi-stakeholder analysis provides individual and differing perspectives on the issues related to the rapidly evolving discipline of computing ethics. (shrink)

Ethicists, policy-makers, and the general public have questioned whether artificial entities such as robots warrant rights or other forms of moral consideration. There is little synthesis of the research on this topic so far. We identify 294 relevant research or discussion items in our literature review of this topic. There is widespread agreement among scholars that some artificial entities could warrant moral consideration in the future, if not also the present. The reasoning varies, such as concern for the effects on (...) artificial entities and concern for the effects on human society. Beyond the conventional consequentialist, deontological, and virtue ethicist ethical frameworks, some scholars encourage “information ethics” and “social-relational” approaches, though there are opportunities for more in-depth ethical research on the nuances of moral consideration of artificial entities. There is limited relevant empirical data collection, primarily in a few psychological studies on current moral and social attitudes of humans towards robots and other artificial entities. This suggests an important gap for psychological, sociological, economic, and organizational research on how artificial entities will be integrated into society and the factors that will determine how the interests of artificial entities are considered. (shrink)

Software systems play an ever more important role in our lives and software engineers and their companies find themselves in a position where they are held responsible for ethical issues that may arise. In this paper, we try to disentangle ethical considerations that can be performed at the level of the software engineer from those that belong in the wider domain of business ethics. The handling of ethical problems that fall into the responsibility of the engineer has traditionally been addressed (...) by the publication of Codes of Ethics and Conduct. We argue that these Codes are barely able to provide normative orientation in software development. The main contribution of this paper is, thus, to analyze the normative features of Codes of Ethics in software engineering and to explicate how their value-based approach might prevent their usefulness from a normative perspective. Codes of Conduct cannot replace ethical deliberation because they do not and cannot offer guidance because of their underdetermined nature. This lack of orientation, we argue, triggers reactive behavior such as “cherry-picking,” “risk of indifference,” “ex-post orientation,” and the “desire to rely on gut feeling.” In the light of this, we propose to implement ethical deliberation within software development teams as a way out. (shrink)

The ethics of artificial intelligence is a widely discussed topic. There are numerous initiatives that aim to develop the principles and guidance to ensure that the development, deployment and use of AI are ethically acceptable. What is generally unclear is how organisations that make use of AI understand and address these ethical issues in practice. While there is an abundance of conceptual work on AI ethics, empirical insights are rare and often anecdotal. This paper fills the gap in our current (...) understanding of how organisations deal with AI ethics by presenting empirical findings collected using a set of ten case studies and providing an account of the cross-case analysis. The paper reviews the discussion of ethical issues of AI as well as mitigation strategies that have been proposed in the literature. Using this background, the cross-case analysis categorises the organisational responses that were observed in practice. The discussion shows that organisations are highly aware of the AI ethics debate and keen to engage with ethical issues proactively. However, they make use of only a relatively small subsection of the mitigation strategies proposed in the literature. These insights are of importance to organisations deploying or using AI, to the academic AI ethics debate, but maybe most valuable to policymakers involved in the current debate about suitable policy developments to address the ethical issues raised by AI. (shrink)

While philosophers have been debating for decades on whether different entities—including severely disabled human beings, embryos, animals, objects of nature, and even works of art—can legitimately be considered as having moral status, this question has gained a new dimension in the wake of artificial intelligence (AI). One of the more imminent concerns in the context of AI is that of the moral rights and status of social robots, such as robotic caregivers and artificial companions, that are built to interact with (...) human beings. In recent years, some approaches to moral consideration have been proposed that would include social robots as proper objects of moral concern, even though it seems unlikely that these machines are conscious beings. In the present paper, I argue against these approaches by advocating the “consciousness criterion,” which proposes phenomenal consciousness as a necessary condition for accrediting moral status. First, I explain why it is generally supposed that consciousness underlies the morally relevant properties (such as sentience) and then, I respond to some of the common objections against this view. Then, I examine three inclusive alternative approaches to moral consideration that could accommodate social robots and point out why they are ultimately implausible. Finally, I conclude that social robots should not be regarded as proper objects of moral concern unless and until they become capable of having conscious experience. While that does not entail that they should be excluded from our moral reasoning and decision-making altogether, it does suggest that humans do not owe direct moral duties to them. (shrink)

In this paper I provide an exposition and critique of the Organic View of Ethical Status, as outlined by Torrance (2008). A key presupposition of this view is that only moral patients can be moral agents. It is claimed that because artificial agents lack sentience, they cannot be proper subjects of moral concern (i.e. moral patients). This account of moral standing in principle excludes machines from participating in our moral universe. I will argue that the Organic View operationalises anthropocentric intuitions (...) regarding sentience ascription, and by extension how we identify moral patients. The main difference between the argument I provide here and traditional arguments surrounding moral attributability is that I do not necessarily defend the view that internal states ground our ascriptions of moral patiency. This is in contrast to views such as those defended by Singer (1975, 2011) and Torrance (2008), where concepts such as sentience play starring roles. I will raise both conceptual and epistemic issues with regards to this sense of sentience. While this does not preclude the usage of sentience outright, it suggests that we should be more careful in our usage of internal mental states to ground our moral ascriptions. Following from this I suggest other avenues for further exploration into machine moral patiency which may not have the same shortcomings as the Organic View. (shrink)

Purpose Moor designated two major problem sources typifying the social and ethical implications of computer technologies, namely, “policy vacuum” and “conceptual muddles.” Motivated by Moor’s seminal definition and Floridi’s conceptualization of information and communication technologies as re-ontologizing technologies, this study aims to explore Omani undergraduates’ cognition regarding ICT ethics. Design/methodology/approach Adopting a grounded theory approach for the constant comparative thematic analysis, the constituents of ICT ethics-related cognition among undergraduates and influencing factors were scrutinized. Qualitative data were gathered via focus group (...) discussions with undergraduates and interviews with academics and information systems professionals at Sultan Qaboos University. Findings In total, 10 thematic categories revolving around a core category, constructing conceptual perceptions of and attitudes toward the realms constituting ICT ethics using an ontological, object-oriented approach, emerged from the comparative analysis. Undergraduates were found to adopt an applied approach when defining professional ICT ethics codes and policies, with a particular focus on information privacy and integrity. Research limitations/implications This qualitative study was conducted at a single research site. This may restrict the generalizability of the findings. Postgraduates were not considered when designing this qualitative inquiry. Originality/value The findings of the study hold theoretical and methodological significance with regard to ICT ethics-related cognition in the era following the fourth industrial revolution by sustaining feminist ethics in this research. Ultimately, the study developed a substantive theory scrutinizing the constitutive elements of ICT ethics-related cognition among Generation Z. (shrink)

In 2002, Luciano Floridi published a paper called What is the Philosophy of Information?, where he argues for a new paradigm in philosophical research. To what extent should his proposal be accepted? Is the Philosophy of Information actually a new paradigm, in the Kuhninan sense, in Philosophy? Or is it only a new branch of Epistemology? In our discussion we will argue in defense of Floridi’s proposal. We believe that Philosophy of Information has the types of features had by other (...) areas already acknowledge as authentic in Philosophy. By way of an analogical argument we will argue that since Philosophy of Information has its own topics, method and problems it would be counter-intuitive not to accept it as a new philosophical area. To strengthen our position we present and discuss main topics of Philosophy of Information. (shrink)

The aim of this thesis is to advance a philosophically justifiable account of Artificial Moral Agency (AMA). Concerns about the moral status of Artificial Intelligence (AI) traditionally turn on questions of whether these systems are deserving of moral concern (i.e. if they are moral patients) or whether they can be sources of moral action (i.e. if they are moral agents). On the Organic View of Ethical Status, being a moral patient is a necessary condition for an entity to qualify as (...) a moral agent. This view claims that because artificial agents (AAs) lack sentience, they cannot be proper subjects of moral concern and hence cannot be considered to be moral agents. I raise conceptual and epistemic issues with regards to the sense of sentience employed on this view, and I argue that the Organic View does not succeed in showing that machines cannot be moral patients. Nevertheless, irrespective of this failure, I also argue that the entire project is misdirected in that moral patiency need not be a necessary condition for moral agency. Moreover, I claim that whereas machines may conceivably be moral patients in the future, there is a strong case to be made that they are (or will very soon be) moral agents. Whereas it is often argued that machines cannot be agents simpliciter, let alone moral agents, I claim that this argument is predicated on a conception of agency that makes unwarranted metaphysical assumptions even in the case of human agents. Once I have established the shortcomings of this “standard account”, I move to elaborate on other, more plausible, conceptions of agency, on which some machines clearly qualify as agents. Nevertheless, the argument is still often made that while some machines may be agents, they cannot be moral agents, given their ostensible lack of the requisite phenomenal states. Against this thesis, I argue that the requirement of internal states for moral agency is philosophically unsound, as it runs up against the problem of other minds. In place of such intentional accounts of moral agency, I provide a functionalist alternative, which makes conceptual room for the existence of AMAs. The implications of this thesis are that at some point in the future we may be faced with situations for which no human being is morally responsible, but a machine may be. Moreover, this responsibility holds, I claim, independently of whether the agent in question is “punishable” or not. (shrink)

We propose to steer the digital revolution towards a new kind of ICT, by designing and developing technologies that are good, clean, and fair. An ICT that is human-centred, and that takes into account both the limits of the planet and those of human beings.

Business Ethics: A European Review, EarlyView.

Recent advancements in AI have prompted a large number of AI ethics guidelines published by governments and nonprofits. While many of these papers propose concrete or seemingly applicable ideas, few philosophically sound proposals are made. In particular, we observe that the line of questioning has often not been examined critically and underlying conceptual problems not always dealt with at the root. In this paper, we investigate the nature of ethical AI systems and what their moral status might be by first (...) turning to the notions of moral agency and patience. We find that their explication would come at a too high cost which is why we, second, articulate a different approach that avoids vague and ambiguous concepts or the problem of other minds. Third, we explore the impact of our philosophical and conceptual analysis on the regulatory landscape, make this link explicit, and finally propose a set of promising policy steps. (shrink)

Purpose This paper aims to examine exceptionalisms in ethics in general and in the fields of animal and technology ethics in particular. Design/methodology/approach This paper reviews five sample works in animal/technology ethics it considers representative for particularly popular forms of “exceptionalism”. Findings The shared feature of the exceptionalisms exhibited by the chosen samples appears to be born out of the cultural and biological history, which provides powerful intuitions regarding the on “specialness”. Research limitations/implications As this paper is mostly a critique (...) of existing approaches, it contains only a limited amount of counter-proposed alternative approaches. Practical implications This is a discussion worth having because arguments based on exceptionalism have more chance of resulting in significantly altered theoretical conclusions and practical suggestions for normative guidance than non-exceptionalist perspectives. Social implications The approaches critiqued in this paper have a significant effect on the way the authors approach animals, machines/technologies and each other. Originality/value The paper identifies intuitive notions of exceptionalism and argues in favour of a reformist, ethical expansionist stance, which views humanity as residing on the same plane of ethical significance as any other entity regardless of its material composition. (shrink)

In 2002, Luciano Floridi published a paper called What is the Philosophy of Information?, where he argues for a new paradigm in philosophical research. To what extent should his proposal be accepted? Is the Philosophy of Information actually a new paradigm, in the Kuhninan sense, in Philosophy? Or is it only a new branch of Epistemology? In our discussion we will argue in defense of Floridi’s proposal. We believe that Philosophy of Information has the types of features had by other (...) areas already acknowledge as authentic in Philosophy. By way of an analogical argument we will argue that since Philosophy of Information has its own topics, method and problems it would be counter-intuitive not to accept it as a new philosophical area. To strengthen our position we present and discuss main topics of Philosophy of Information. (shrink)

This paper aims at investigating the perceived difference between ethics and IT ethics in college students. The study mainly investigates whether university students in the Middle East and their counterpart in the USA hold the same ethical values both in a traditional context and in an IT context. The study also investigates possible differences in students’ ethics considering their level of study and whether they have prior business ethics knowledge or not. Furthermore, the study controls for possible self-others bias in (...) students’ responses to ethical issues by addressing some ethical issues where the respondent is the subject of the issue and other ethical issues where someone other than the respondent is the subject of the issue. Questionnaires were administered to university students in the USA and in several Middle East countries. A total of 401 usable questionnaires were returned. The study found that both the USA and the Middle East students have statistically significant lower ethical intention scores when addressing ethical issues in an IT context compared to traditional non-IT context. This pattern was consistent regardless of the students’ level of study and their prior knowledge of business ethics, and taking into consideration self-others bias. Additionally, it was found that graduate students have higher IT as well as non-IT ethical intentions compared to undergraduate students, however, it was found that the students’ prior business ethics knowledge did not affect the students’ ethical intention scores. Self-other bias was found to act in opposite directions for ethical issues in an IT context compared to ethical issues in a traditional context. For ethical issues within IT-context, students were less strict with themselves while they were stricter with others. For ethical issues within traditional non-IT context, students were stricter with themselves, while they were less strict with others. Finally, the study found that while students both in the USA and in the Middle East disagree with unethical IT as well as non-IT conducts, the degree to which they disagree with the unethical behavior significantly differ, where USA students were found to be significantly stricter with their disagreement. (shrink)

This article is an inquiry on the role of play in shaping the cultures of the Information Age. By applying concepts from Postphenomenology and the Philosophy of Information, this paper argues that play and computation share a capacity to shape human experience. I will apply the concept of re-ontologization to describe the effect that computation has had in shaping the world. I will apply the concept of relational strategies to argue that play is a way of interfacing with the computational (...) world. This paper argues that play is a particularly relevant form of shaping the human experience of the re-ontologized infosphere because play, like computation, can create worlds. The goal of this article is to propose a research program that situates play as a relevant perspective to analyze the culture of the Information Age. (shrink)

In this article, we expand on the models available for defining various different business logics relevant to video game development, especially those concerning free-to-play games. We use the models to analyse those business logics from an Aristotelian virtue ethics perspective. We argue that if an individual wishes to follow the Aristotelian virtue ethics code in order to develop the virtues inherent in his or her own character, how he or she chooses to try and generate revenue from the fruits of (...) his or her labour is not irrelevant. Moreover, we argue that some of these methods are in fact vices, which are damaging to the character of the developer, and should therefore be avoided. (shrink)

The work of Luciano Floridi lies at the interface of philosophy, information science and technology, and ethics, an intersection whose existence and significance he was one of the first to establish. His closely related concepts of a philosophy of information (PI), informational structural realism, information logic (IL), and information ethics (IE) provide a new ontological perspective from which moral concerns can be addressed, especially but not limited to those arising in connection with the new information and communication technologies. In this (...) paper, I relate Floridi's approach to another novel perspective, namely, that of an extension of logic to complex real processes, including those of information production and transfer. This non-propositional, non-truth-functional logic (logic in reality (LIR)) is grounded in the fundamental dualism (dynamic opposition) inherent in energy and accordingly present at all levels of reality. The LIR description of the dynamics of processes and their evolution is relevant to what Floridi refers to as the possible non-linguistic aspects of information. It suggests answers to some of Floridi's “outstanding problems” in PI related to the ontological status of information and how it is used in cognition. Floridi's IL retains the formal structure of the doxastic and epistemic logics from which he correctly distinguishes it and is the basis for his conceptual PI. However, LIR fulfills Floridi's implied requirement that logic be regarded as a natural phenomenon dealing with other natural phenomena, recovering its original philosophical function. LIR provides a logical foundation for discussion of ethical questions based on kinds of information that complements IL. Both are reconsiderations of logic that, as Marijuan suggests, may be necessary for the advancement of information technology in an ethical direction (cf. also Brenner). IE focuses on entities as constituted by information in an overall strategy that generalizes the concept of moral agents. LIR and its related ontology naturalize critical aspects of Floridi's theses, especially, the moral value of being as such and a non-separable joint responsibility of individuals and groups. I compare IE to other current approaches to ethics and information technology (e.g., phenomenological and social constructivist). Ethical information is defined “ecologically” in process terms as reality in a physical space (cf. Floridi), with an intentional “valence,” positive and negative, in the morally valued interaction between producer and receiver. LIR is neither topic-neutral nor context independent and can support an ethics involving apparently contradictory perspectives (e.g., internalist and externalist). Ethics involves practical reasoning, and unlike standard logics, LIR supports Magnani's approach to abductive reasoning in rational moral decision making. The basis of moral responsibility and the consequent behavior of individuals involved in information and communications technologies is the same logical–metaphysical principle of dynamic opposition instantiated at other levels of reality. The way moral responsibilities are actively accepted (or not) by individuals supervenes on their primitive psychological structure, which in turn reflects an evolutionary development grounded in the fundamental dualism of the physical world. The paper concludes with some suggestions of areas of philosophical research, such as causality, identity, and the ontological turn, where convergence of the Floridi and LIR approaches might be envisaged. Their overall motivation is the same, namely, the development of strategies for reinforcing and increasing ethical sensitivity wherever possible. The ethical information concept outlined in the paper supports the function of IE, assigned to it by Floridi, of potentially determining what is right and what is wrong. (shrink)

In my paper I will focus my attention on some philosophical aspects of the Information Ethics displayed by Luciano Floridi. Floridi’s Information Ethics has the methodological merit of providing the interpretation of the Informational Turn with a solid philosophical basis, the roots of which deserve a careful investigation. In this perspective, I will analyse a key question, which is essential not only from a theoretical but also from a practical point of view, i.e. whether or not Floridi’s construction of information (...) is consistent with a pluralistic conception of Being. (shrink)

Purpose– This paper aims to demonstrate that computing social issues courses are often being taught by articulating the social impacts of different computer technologies and then applying moral theories to those impacts. It then argues that that approach has a number of serious drawbacks.Design/methodology/approach– A bibliometric analysis of ETHICOMP papers is carried out. Papers from early in the history of ETHICOMP are compared to recent years, so as to determine if papers are more or less focused on social scientific examinations (...) of issues or on ethical evaluations of impacts of technology. The literature is examined to argue the drawbacks of the impact approach.Findings– Over time, ETHICOMP papers have moved away from social scientific examinations of computing to more philosophic and ethical evaluations of perceived impacts of computing. The impact approach has a number of drawbacks. First, it is based on a technological deterministic style of social explanation that has been in disrepute in the academic social sciences for decades. Second, it uses an algorithmic approach to ethics that simplifies the social complexity and uncertainty that is the reality of socio-technological change.Research limitations/implications– The methodology used in this paper is limited in several ways. The bibliometric analysis only examined five years of ETHICOMP papers, while the literature review focused on published computing education research. It is possible that neither of these forms of evidence reflects actual common teaching practice.Practical implications– It is hoped that the arguments in this paper will convince teaching practitioners to modify the way they are teaching computing social issues courses: that is, the authors hope to convince educators to add more focus on the social context of computing.Originality/value– The use of bibliometric analysis in this area is unique. The paper’s argument is perhaps unusual as well. (shrink)

Purpose– The purpose of this paper is to examine how Slow Tech can support the celebration of the 20-year series of ETHICOMP conferences, with its ethical and societal focus, building on earlier descriptions of Slow Tech. The paper takes Slow Tech’s ideas a step further to explore how a roadmap and concrete checklist of activities can be developed.Design/methodology/approach– The paper is a thought leadership or conceptual piece. Its approach is based on a normative, qualitative discourse. It, nevertheless, indicates a shift (...) towards concrete actions.Findings– Extracting from a brief historical overview, the paper lays out the means of building a Slow Tech roadmap and a Slow Tech checklist of actions. It also investigates a number of the challenges that might face Slow Tech in the future.Research limitations/implications– The paper has implications for stakeholder fields as far-ranging as corporations, computing professional associations, universities and research institutions and end-users.Originality/value– As with other investigations of Slow Tech, the value of this paper is in its call for reflection followed by action. It provides a useful complement and counterbalance to an earlier paper by the same authors: “Slow Tech: a quest for good, clean and fair ICT” published inJournal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society(Vol. 12, issue 2, pp. 78-92). (shrink)

This article argues that the traditional jus ad bellum and jus in bello criteria are fully capable of providing the ethical guidance needed to legitimately conduct military cyber operations. The first part examines the criteria’s foundations by focusing on the notion of liability to defensive harm worked out by revisionist just war thinkers. The second part critiques the necessity of alternative frameworks, which its proponents assert are required to at least supplement the traditional just war criteria. Using the latter, the (...) third part evaluates ethical issues germane to responding to cyber force, including casus belli, moral aspects of “the attribution problem,” and respective rights and duties when attacks involve innocent third-party states. The fourth part addresses in bello issues, including compliance with discrimination, necessity, and civilian due care imperatives; whether civilians may be targeted with sub-“use of force” cyber-attacks and the permissibility of using civilian contractors to conduct cyber-attacks. Throughout these analyses, conclusions are brought into conversation with those of The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. (shrink)

PurposeThe paper aims to introduce the Islamic “legal system of Shari'ah laws and ethics” and its process of resolving ethical quandaries as applied in the field of information ethics.Design/methodology/approachThe paper first introduces some of the intricacy of the Islamic Shari'ah laws and ethics and then to reason its applicability in the field of IE, a scenario is discussed to illustrate how Islamic legal maxims maybe implemented to arrive at a moral judgment.FindingsThe discussed scenario shows glimpses of the Shari'ah laws and (...) reasoning processes of the Islamic ethical methodology for deriving moral judgment as used in the Muslim world to bring benefits and repel harms. The system respects both collective and individual's perspectives and can be conceived as being a synthesis between deontological, consequentialist and virtue ethics theories.Practical implicationsThe paper is sufficient to give the reader a feel for its potential to encourage further research in the area of resolving ethical issues, specifically for those who are calling for universal ethical theories to avoid moral imperialism.Originality/valueEthical researchers have gone back in history as far as Aristotle and Descartes to address ethical issues arising from the development and application of information and computer technologies. One area of ethics rarely touched by ethical theorists is the religious laws and ethics of Islam. The paper introduces Islam and its sources of knowledge, which are the foundation for a large set of legal maxims used to govern ethical decisions. (shrink)

The networked society is impacting all aspects of people’s lives and changing the way that information is obtained and used. For students this impact is changing how information is shared and tasks are performed. A digital enabled culture is resulting in changed norms on collaboration and providing more opportunities for teams to collaborate on a moment’s notice. The digital ethics code of the 1980s is addressed in the current digital culture. This research will develop a measurement scale for digital ethics (...) and assess this scale in the context using students from China. (shrink)

La ética de la información propuesta por L. Floridi es la principal alternativa teórica que, por un lado, permite superar la polémica de la singularidad de la ética de los computadores y, por otro, dotar de un fundamento teórico general a dicha ética en un nivel ontológico. Su análisis crítico desvela los mecanismos cognitivos empleados en su constitución y, al mismo tiempo, pone en cuestión algunas de sus consecuencias, como la equiparación del mal moral con alguna forma de entropía.

Una ética de la computación es necesaria, y hoy en día insoslayable, para garantizar la construcción ética, democrática y participativa de las tecnologías computacionales y, con ellas, de la sociedad de la información que caracteriza a un conjunto cada vez más creciente de grupos sociales por todo el planeta. Sólo desde un estudio pormenorizado de las características y posibilidades de las dichas tecnologías se puede abordar el trabajo de justificación de la singularidad de la ética de la computación y el (...) de la elaboración de sus principios generales. Aquí se presentan estos principios señalando su importancia para la evaluación constructiva de las tecnologías computacionales y defendiendo su singularidad frente a otros marcos éticos, sin que ello menoscabe las vías de articulación y justificación de los mismos con los principios generales de marcos macroéticos como la infoética o la teoría de la justicia. Palabras clave: código, software, ética. (shrink)

It is common today to see the world as increasingly unpredictable, and to see that unpredictability as a major source of anxiety. Many of the proposed cures for that anxiety, such as systems like Memex and MyLifeBits, have sought solutions in systems that collect and store a thorough record of events, at a scale from the personal to the global. There the solution to anxiety lies in the ability to play back the record, to turn back the clock and be (...) there then. Both this anxiety and its solution are best seen not simply as remedies for an immediate problem-of terrorism, for example-but rather as evidence of a more deep-seated set of cultural changes, which emerged early in the twentieth century. Paradoxically, the technological solutions offered, whatever the scale, embody the very thing, a lack of a connection to a community, that is both the source of the anxiety and a fundamental impediment to its elimination. (shrink)

The iSchool movement is an academic endeavor focusing on the information sciences and characterized by a number of features: concern with society-wide information problems, flexibility and adaptability of curricula, repositioning of research towards interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary exchange . Teaching information ethics in an iSchool would seem to be a requisite for students who will have an enormous impact on the information technologies that increasingly permeate our lives. The case for studying ethics in a college of information science and technology, as (...) opposed to the liberal arts and humanities, has been regarded only marginally, however. In this paper I explore how I developed and delivered an information ethics course, paying attention to student receptivity and learning, course structure and assignments, as well as its connection to the wider curriculum and its efficacy. (shrink)

The neo-Aristotelian virtue theory of Philippa Foot is presented here as an alternative framework that is arguably more useful than deontological approaches and that relies less on the assertions of moral claims about the intrinsic goodness of foundational principles. Instead, this project focuses more on cultivating a true ethic; that is, a set of tools and propositions to enable individuals to negotiate inevitable conflicts among moral values and challenges posed by cultural contexts and technology use. Foot's ?natural normativity? connects the (...) conditions of human flourishing and objective reasons for acting morally, providing a framework for a digital media ethic to address three critical categories: virtuality and authenticity, privacy and autonomy, and exchange and discourse. (shrink)

Today’s computer network technologies are sociologically founded on hunter-gatherer principles; common users may be possible subjects of surveillance and sophisticated internet-based attacks are almost impossible to prevent. At the same time, information and communication technology, ICT offers the technical possibility of embedded privacy protection. Making technology legitimate by design is a part of the intentional design for democracy. This means incorporating options for socially acceptable behaviour in technical systems, and making the basic principles of privacy protection, rights and responsibilities, transparent (...) to the user. The current global e-polis already has, by means of different technologies, de facto built-in policies that define the level of user-privacy protection. That which remains is to make their ethical implications explicit and understandable to citizens of the global village through interdisciplinary disclosive ethical methods, and to make them correspond to the high ethical norms that support trust, the essential precondition of any socialization. The good news is that research along these lines is already in progress. Hopefully, this will result in a future standard approach to the privacy of network communications. (shrink)

It has been debated whether unauthorized copying of computer software is morally justified and whether developers or software companies can own software and require users to pay for its use. Four views in favour of unauthorized copying of software can be distinguished: 'free software', the landlord analogy, the 'non-exclusiveness argument' and 'it is justified to copy a program that we would never buy'. Considerations regarding these issues can be retraced to the three foundations of rights: inherited rights that are already (...) in place, agreed rights, and no rights. From the viewpoint of agreed rights, rights are based on agreement and negotiation, and, referring to the universalizability theses by Rawls and Hare, I argue that it is justified that developers or software companies 'own' their software. I discuss the economic and social effects of free SW, understood as the abolition of financial acknowledgements, suggested by Stallman. I conclude that such free software would give rise to socio-political changes toward systems that are something other than liberal-based. Again, I argue that we have a reason to object to Stallman's program in the light of the universalizability theses. Nevertheless, even if one were to perceive this as a convincing goal, it is questionable whether one should make unauthorized copies on these grounds in a society that does not function on such lines: one should first seek to change the norms and practices of one's society. This is further argued to be advisable, since it is not obvious that adhering to software copyright in the general sense is unfair or irrelevant. For these reasons, we should take violation of the laws governing software copying seriously. Finally, I criticize the non-exclusiveness argument, the landlord analogy and the view that 'is it justified to copy a program that we would never buy'. (shrink)

What exactly is Cyberethics? How did the field develop? What are some of the central issues and themes in this field, and what methodologies are used by those working in this area of applied ethics? These and related questions are considered in the readings included in Chapter 1. It is perhaps important to note at the outset that the field that many are now beginning to refer to as "cyberethics" has until quite recently been referred to by the more general (...) label "computer ethics." Other expressions that are also now used to refer to ethical issues involving computing and Internet technologies are "information ethics," "information technology ethics," "information and communication technology ethics," "global information ethics," and "Internet ethics." As in the case of "Internet ethics," "cyberethics" is intended to refer to ethical concerns involving the Internet, in particular. And it is primarily with ethical issues involving that particular medium that we will be concerned in this textbook of readings. It is also important to note that the expression "computer ethics" describes better the impact that computing technology in general has had for ethics as well as for our social and political institutions. Although our main concern will be with those ethical issues involving the Internet, many of the readings included in Chapter 1 are also concerned with ethical issues in a broader sense of computing technologies. Hence, the expressions "cyberethics" and "computer ethics" may, at times, be used interchangeably in this chapter. (shrink)

In her article 'What is Information Ethics?', Mathieson seeks to establish a new framework for Information Ethics, contesting the 'rival theories' of Van Den Hoven and of Floridi. However, when the arguments are examined in terms of Object Oriented Modelling conventions, the concepts in question appear in a different light.

Luciano Floridi presents Information Ethics (IE) as an alternative to traditional moral theories. IE consists of two tenets. First, reality can be interpreted at numerous, mutually consistent levels of abstraction, the highest of which is information. This level, unlike the others, applies to all of reality. Second, everything, insofar as it is an information object, has some degree of intrinsic value and hence moral dignity. I criticize IE, arguing that Floridi fails to show that the moral community should be expanded (...) beyond beings capable of suffering or having preferences. Next, I look at Floridi’s extended case against consequentialism generally and utilitarianism in particular. I try to show that his criticisms are flawed. Third, I argue that, for the most part, it is not clear what IE’s practical implications are. I conclude with a critical discussion of the one area of information ethics, traditionally conceived, that Floridi has written about at length, privacy. (shrink)

The present essay includes an overview of key milestones in the development of computer ethics as a field of applied ethics. It also describes the ongoing debate about the proper scope of CE, as a subfield both in applied ethics and computer science. Following a brief description of the cluster of ethical issues that CE scholars and practitioners have generally considered to be the standard or "mainstream" issues comprising the field thus far, the essay speculates about the future direction of (...) CE and describes some theoretical and practical questions that will likely arise. (shrink)

The interpretation of the terms 'information' and 'ethics' is often culturally situated. A common understanding is contingent to facilitating dialogue concerning the novel ethical issues we face during computer-mediated interactions. Developing a nuanced understanding of information ethics is critical at a point when the number of information and communication technology -enabled interactions may soon exceed traditional human interactions. Utilitarianism and deontology, the two major schools of ethics are based in a western perspective. We contribute to the existing discourse on information (...) ethics by arguing for the inclusion of Gandhian notions of non-violence and confrontation. These are particularly relevant to cyberspace, which does not always lend itself to coercion due to legal, political and economic limitations. We address the applicability of ahimsa, satyagraha, and swaraj to cyberspace. We discuss a Gandhian approach to system design. Finally, we use case studies to illuminate the application of Gandhian notions as well as their limitations. (shrink)

This article examines some of the most relevant issues concerning P2P systems so as to take sides in today's strongly polarized debate. The idea is to integrate a context-based perspective with an ontological representation of informational norms; thanks to a procedural outlook which is presented in terms of burden of proof More particularly, we examine three ''roads." First, the topological approach to complex social networks allows us to comprehend the laws according to which information is distributed through P2P systems and (...) how a "short route" has joined, and sometimes replaced, the traditional "long route" between creator, business, and the public. The second road is the context-based perspective elaborated by Helen Nissenbaum, and developed by Francis Grodzinsky and Herman Tavani: The goal is to determine the norms that govern such an informational flow as norms of appropriateness and distribution. The final road is the informational viewpoint on ethics proposed by Luciano Floridi with the idea that standard ethical theories cannot easily be adapted to deal with the new informational issues emerging with digital technology. While empirical evidence on the impact of P2P systems is still quite controversial, it is crucial to determine on whom the burden of proof falls in a given context, on censors or advocates, by singling out both the default norms and exceptions in the use and development of P2P software. (shrink)