- Number Concepts: An Interdisciplinary Inquiry.Richard Samuels & Eric Snyder - 2024 - Cambridge University Press.details
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Can Compositionality Solve the Thought-or-Language Problem?Raquel Krempel - 2019 - Philosophical Papers 48 (2):265-291.details
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Consciousness and Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 560-585.details
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Mind and Body, Form and Content: How not to do Petitio Principii Analysis.Louise Cummings - 2000 - Philosophical Papers 29 (2):73-105.details
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The return of concept empiricism.Jesse J. Prinz - 2005 - In H. Cohen & C. Leferbvre (eds.), Categorization and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.details
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Minimalism, Psychological Reality, Meaning and Use.Henry Jackman - 2007 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism: New Essays on Semantics and Pragmatics. Oxford University Press UK.details
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Teleosemantics and indeterminacy.David Papineau - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):1-14.details
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Enciclopédia de Termos Lógico-Filosóficos.João Miguel Biscaia Branquinho, Desidério Murcho & Nelson Gonçalves Gomes (eds.) - 2006 - São Paulo, SP, Brasil: Martins Fontes.details
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Dennett’s Strategy for Naturalizing Intentionality: an Innovative Play at Second Base.Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):593-609.details
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Tools of the trade: the bio-cultural evolution of the human propensity to trade.Armin W. Schulz - 2022 - Biology and Philosophy 37 (2):1-24.details
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Remarks on Fodor on having concepts.Daniel A. Weiskopf & William Bechtel - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (1):48-56.details
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Infinite Reasoning.Jared Warren - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):385-407.details
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Teleosemantics and the troubles of naturalism.Steven J. Wagner - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (1):81-110.details
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Why reasons may not be causes.Julia Tanney - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (1-2):103-126.details
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Why Reasons May Not Be Causes.Julia Tanney - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (1‐2):105-128.details
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Spectrum inversion without a difference in representation is impossible.Jeff Speaks - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (3):339-361.details
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The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):665-682.details
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The benefits of rule following: a new account of the evolution of desires.Armin Schulz - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (4 A):595-603.details
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The benefits of rule following: A new account of the evolution of desires.Armin Schulz - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (4):595-603.details
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Representation and desire: A philosophical error with consequences for theory-of-mind research.Eric Schwitzgebel - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):157-180.details
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Enhancing thoughts: Culture, technology, and the evolution of human cognitive uniqueness.Armin W. Schulz - 2020 - Mind and Language 37 (3):465-484.details
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Condorcet and communitarianism: Boghossian’s fallacious inference.Armin Schulz - 2009 - Synthese 166 (1):55 - 68.details
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A recipe for concept similarity.Tim Schroeder - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (1):68-91.details
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A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2002 - Noûs 36 (2):249-275.details
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Acting contrary to our professed beliefs or the gulf between occurrent judgment and dispositional belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):531-553.details
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The given and the hard problem of content.Pietro Salis - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-26.details
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The best test theory of extension: First principle(s).Robert D. Rupert - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (3):321–355.details
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Mental Representations and Millikan’s Theory of Intentional Content: Does Biology Chase Causality?Robert D. Rupert - 1999 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):113-140.details
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Deep plasticity: The encoding approach to perceptual change.Mark Rollins - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (1):39-54.details
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Concepts and Perceptual Belief: How (Not) to Defend Recognitional Concepts.Bradley Rives - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (4):369-391.details
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Sensational sentences switched.Georges Rey - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):289 - 319.details
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Remembering Jerry Fodor and his work.Georges Rey - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (4):321-341.details
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Functional Properties are Epiphenomenal.Matthew Rellihan - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (3):1171-1195.details
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Informational Semantics and Frege Cases.Matthew Rellihan - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (3):267-294.details
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Realism without absolutes.Hilary Putnam - 1993 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 1 (2):179 – 192.details
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Can moral obligations be empirically discovered?Jesse J. Prinz - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):271-291.details
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Is Representation Rife?David Papineau - 2003 - Ratio 16 (2):107-123.details
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When is a concept a priori?Emmanuel Ordóñez Angulo - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Minds without Meanings: An Essay on the Content of Concepts.Karen Neander - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (3):410-417.details
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Do explanatory desire attributions generate opaque contexts?Naomi Reshotko - 1996 - Ratio 9 (2):153-170.details
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Some problems for Fodor's theory of content.Erik Myin - 1992 - Philosophica 50 (2):101-122.details
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Mind, World and Value.Michael Morris - 1998 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43:303-320.details
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Fodor’s Very Deep Thought.Martin Montminy - 1999 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):595-618.details
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Fodor’s Very Deep Thought.Martin Montminy - 1999 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):595-618.details
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What has Natural Information to Do with Intentional Representation?Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2001 - In D. Walsh (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 105-125.details
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What has Natural Information to do with Intentional Representation?Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2001 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 49:105-125.details
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Applying the causal theory of reference to intentional concepts.John Michael & Miles MacLeod - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (2):212-230.details
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Attacking the Bounds of cognition.Richard Menary - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):329-344.details
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Real people and virtual bodies: How disembodied can embodiment be? [REVIEW]Monica Meijsing - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (4):443-461.details
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Book reviews. [REVIEW]James A. McGilvray, Curtis Brown & Mark H. Bickhard - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):105-116.details
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