- Counterfactuals as Strict Conditionals.Andrea Iacona - 2015 - Disputatio 7 (41):165-191.details
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“Can perceptual content be conceptual and non-theory-laden?”.Costas Pagondiotis - 2005 - In Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.), Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Nova Science.details
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(2 other versions)The Large‐Scale Structure of Semantic Networks: Statistical Analyses and a Model of Semantic Growth.Mark Steyvers & Joshua B. Tenenbaum - 2005 - Cognitive Science 29 (1):41-78.details
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What is the narrow content of fence (and other definitionally and interpretationally primitive concepts)?Eric Mandelbaum - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3):138-138.details
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Précis of the origin of concepts.Susan Carey - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3):113-124.details
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Reliable Misrepresentation and Teleosemantics.Marc Artiga - 2013 - Disputatio (37):265-281.details
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Where Concepts Come from: Learning Concepts by Description and by Demonstration.Dylan Sabo - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):531-549.details
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(1 other version)Perception and Its Objects.Bill Brewer - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Modality, semantics, and consciousness.Joseph Levine - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):775-784.details
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Subjective Normativity and Action Guidance.Andrew Sepielli - 2012 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol. II. Oxford University Press.details
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Naturalizing the Mind.Marcin Miłkowski & Konrad Talmont-Kamiński - 2013 - In Marcin Miłkowski & Konrad Talmont-Kaminski (eds.), Regarding Mind, Naturally. Cambridge Scholars Press.details
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Critical Notice of Alvin Plantinga's Where the Conflict Really Lies.Greg Janzen - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):291-295.details
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Intentionality Bifurcated: A Lesson from Early Modern Philosophy?Lionel Shapiro - 2013 - In Martin Lenz & Anik Waldow (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives on Early Modern Philosophy: Nature and Norms in Thought. Springer Verlag.details
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Concepts, analysis, generics and the canberra plan.Mark Johnston & Sarah-Jane Leslie - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):113-171.details
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Is Intuition Based On Understanding?[I thank Jo].Elijah Chudnoff - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):42-67.details
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A verisimilitudinarian analysis of the Linda paradox.Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa - 2012 - VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosphy of Science.details
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On Travis cases.Agustin Vicente - 2012 - Linguistics and Philosophy 35 (1):3-19.details
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(1 other version)Semantic Eliminativism and the Theory-Theory of Linguistic Understanding.Dorit Bar-On - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (sup1):159-199.details
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Mental Representation and Closely Conflated Topics.Angela Mendelovici - 2010 - Dissertation, Princeton Universitydetails
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Embodying the Mind by Extending It.Pierre Jacob - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):33-51.details
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Knowledge of Grammar and Concept Possession.Edison Barrios - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):577-606.details
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Time in cognitive development.Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormack - 2011 - In Craig Callender (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time. Oxford University Press. pp. 439-459.details
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Problems of representation II: naturalizing content.Dan Ryder - 2009 - In Francisco Garzon & John Symons (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.details
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The Scope of the Conceptual.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2012 - In Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Learning Matters: The Role of Learning in Concept Acquisition.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (5):507-539.details
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A two speed mind? For a heuristic interpretation of dual-process theories (L'esprit à deux vitesses ? Pour une interprétation heuristique des théories à processus duaux).Guillaume Beaulac - 2010 - Dissertation, Université du Québec À Montréaldetails
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Impossible Words Again: Or Why Beds Break but Not Make.John Collins - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (2):234-260.details
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It Does So: Review of Jerry Fodor, The Mind Doesn't Work That Way. [REVIEW]Eric Dietrich - 2001 - AI Magazine 22 (4):121-24.details
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(1 other version)Why Rationalist Compositionality Won't Go Away (Either).Víctor M. Verdejo - 2009 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 24 (1):29-47.details
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AI, Concepts, and the Paradox of Mental Representation, with a brief discussion of psychological essentialism.Eric Dietrich - 2001 - J. Of Exper. And Theor. AI 13 (1):1-7.details
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Concepts: Fodor's little semantic BBs of thought - A critical look at Fodor's theory of concepts -.Eric Dietrich - 2001 - J. Of Experimental and Theoretical AI 13 (2):89-94.details
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11 Philosophy of Psychology.Edouard Machery - 2010-01-04 - In Fritz Allhoff (ed.), Philosophies of the Sciences. Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 262.details
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Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.details
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Are sensory properties represented in perceptual experience?Nicoletta Orlandi - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (6):721-740.details
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Is even thought compositional?Lenny Clapp - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):299-322.details
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Cognitive Architecture and the Epistemic Gap: Defending Physicalism without Phenomenal Concepts.Peter Fazekas - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (1):21-29.details
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Innateness.Steven Gross & Georges Rey - 2012 - In Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press.details
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Concepts and Cognitive Science.Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis - 1999 - In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings. MIT Press. pp. 3-81.details
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How to Learn the Natural Numbers: Inductive Inference and the Acquisition of Number Concepts.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2008 - Cognition 106 (2):924-939.details
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Doing without concepts by Edouard Machery * by Edouard Machery.A. Woodfield - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):186-188.details
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More on the Interactive Indexing Semantic Theory.John Dilworth - 2010 - Minds and Machines 20 (3):455-474.details
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Introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Clusters: On the structure of lexical concepts.Agustín Vicente - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (1):79-106.details
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Causal theories of mental content.Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(3 other versions)Précis of doing without concepts.Edouard Machery - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):602-611.details
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There are no phenomenal concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.details
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A Simple Realist Account of the Normativity of Concepts.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2005 - Disputatio 1 (19):1-17.details
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Symbol grounding in computational systems: A paradox of intentions.Vincent C. Müller - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):529-541.details
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Non-Conceptualism and the Problem of Perceptual Self-Knowledge.Robert Hanna & Monima Chadha - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):184-223.details
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A Paradox for Possible World Semantics.Michael J. Shaffer & Jeremy Morris - 2006 - Logique Et Analyse 49 (195):307-317.details
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