For a long time, philosophers of science have expressed little interest in the so-called demarcation project that occupied the pioneers of their field, and most now concur that terms like “pseudoscience” cannot be defined in any meaningful way. However, recent years have witnessed a revival of philosophical interest in demarcation. In this paper, I argue that, though the demarcation problem of old leads to a dead-end, the concept of pseudoscience is not going away anytime soon, and deserves a fresh look. (...) My approach proposes to naturalize and down-size the concept, anchoring it in real-life doctrines and fields of inquiry. First, I argue against the definite article “the” in “the demarcation problem”, distinguishing between territorial and normative demarcation, and between different failures and shortcomings in science apart from pseudoscience. Next, I argue that pseudosciences can be fruitfully regarded as simulacra of science, doctrines that are not epistemically warranted but whose proponents try to create the impression that they are. In this element of imitation or mimicry, I argue, lies the clue to their common identity. Despite the huge variety of doctrines and beliefs gathered under the rubric of “pseudoscience”, and the wide range of defects from which they suffer, pseudosciences all engage in similar strategies to create an impression of epistemic warrant. The indirect, symptomatic approach defended here leads to a general characterization of pseudosciences in all domains of inquiry, and to a useful diagnostic tool. (shrink)

This paper reviews how research on the demarcation problem has developed, starting from Popper’s criterion of falsifiability and ending with recent naturalistically oriented approaches. The main differences between traditional and contemporary approaches to the problem are explicated in terms of six postulates called the traditional assumptions. It is argued that all of the assumptions can be dismissed without giving up on the demarcation problem and that doing so might benefit further discussions on pseudoscience. Four present-day research movements on evaluating the (...) boundaries of science are introduced: (1) philosophy of pseudoscience, (2) social epistemology of dissent, (3) agnotology, and (4) evaluation of expertise. Researchers working within these areas have abandoned some or all traditional assumptions. (shrink)

A definition of pseudoscience is proposed, according to which a statement is pseudoscientific if and only if it (1) pertains to an issue within the domains of science, (2) is not epistemically warranted, and (3) is part of a doctrine whose major proponents try to create the impression that it is epistemically warranted. This approach has the advantage of separating the definition of pseudoscience from the justification of the claim that science represents the most epistemically warranted statements. The definition is (...) used to explain why proponents of widely divergent criteria for the demarcation between science and pseudoscience tend to be in almost complete agreement on the particular demarcations that should presumably be based on these general criteria. (shrink)

What is wrong with ad hoc hypotheses? Ever since Popper’s falsificationist account of adhocness, there has been a lively philosophical discussion about what constitutes adhocness in scientific explanation, and what, if anything, distinguishes legitimate auxiliary hypotheses from illicit ad hoc ones. This paper draws upon distinct examples from pseudoscience to provide us with a clearer view as to what is troubling about ad hoc hypotheses. In contrast with other philosophical proposals, our approach retains the colloquial, derogative meaning of adhocness, and (...) calls attention to the way in which the context of a theoretical move bears on the charge of adhocness. We also discuss the role of motivations implicit in the concept of adhocness, and the way ad hoc moves draw on theory-internal rationalizations. (shrink)

According to both traditional positivist approaches and also to the sociology of scientific knowledge, social analysts should not themselves become involved in the controversies they are investigating. But the experiences of the authors in studying contemporary scientific controversies—specifically, over the Australian Animal Health Laboratory, fluoridation, and vitamin C and cancer—show that analysts, whatever their intentions, cannot avoid being drawn into the fray. The field of controversy studies needs to address the implications of this process for both theory and practice.

Four empirically equivalent versions of general relativity, namely standard GR, Lorentz-invariant gravitational theory,and the gravitational gauge theories of the Lorentz and translation groups, are investigated in the form of a case study for theory underdetermination. The various ontological indeterminacies (both underdetermination and inscrutability of reference) inherent in gravitational theories are analyzed in a detailed comparative study. The concept of practical underdetermination is proposed, followed by a discussion of its adequacy to describe scientific progress.

Fringe science has been an important topic since the start of the revolution in the social studies of science that occurred in the early 1970s. The revolution was what Collins and Evans refer to as the "second wave of science studies," while this paper is best thought of as an exercise in "third wave science studies." The first wave was that period which reached its apogee in the aftermath of the Second World War when science was seen as unquestionably the (...) pre-eminent form of knowledge-making, and the role of philosophy and sociology was to understand how it was so and how societies could be arranged to nurture it best; the second wave was "social constructionism" which became folded into post-modernism in... (shrink)

The fairy tale The Three Princes of Serendip can be taken to be allegorical of not only chance discovery (serendipity) but of other aspects of scientific discovery as well. Just as Horace Walpole coined serendipity, so can the term bahramdipity be derived from the tale and defined as the cruel suppression of a serendipitous discovery. Suppressed, unpublished discoveries are designated nulltiples. Several examples are presented to make the case that bahramdipity is an existent aspect of scientific discovery. Other examples of (...) non-ideal scientific research and discovery are provided in order to contrast and clarify the meaning and use of bahramdipity. Additional allegories of scientific discovery are taken from the tale and a hope for the strengthening of scientific integrity is expressed. (shrink)

After a review of previous uses of the term “pseudotechnology”, a definition is proposed: “A pseudotechnology is an alleged technology that is irreparably dysfunctional for its intended purpose since it is based on construction principles that cannot be made to work”. The relationship between pseudotechnology and pseudoscience is discussed, and so is the relationship between pseudotechnology and the much weaker concept of technological malfunction. An explanation is offered of why pseudotechnology is much more seldom referred to than pseudoscience: dysfunctional technology (...) usually reveals itself when put to use, whereas dysfunctional science tends to be more difficult to disclose. (shrink)

Can statistical inference shed any worthwhile light on theory change? For many years I have believed that the answer is “Yes.” Let me try to explain why I think so. On my first reading of Thomas S. Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) I was so deeply shocked at his repudiation of the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification that I put the book down without finishing it. By 1969, when a conference was held (...) at the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science on the relations between the history of science and the philosophy of science, I had returned to Structure and formed the view that Kuhn’s rejection of this fundamental distinction resulted from his adoption of an inadequate conception of scientific justification. It appeared that he saw scientific confirmation in terms of the traditional hypothetico-deductive (H-D) schema, according to which a scientific hypothesis (or theory) is confirmed by observing the truth of its logical consequences. (shrink)

Mr. B. A. Farrell has argued that psychoanalysis is refutable, without clarifying different senses of 'refutable'. Once this clarification is done and the relevant literature examined, however, it is seen that psychoanalysis is not refutable in several important senses of 'refutable', although it is refutable in a sense that is quite uninteresting.

According to Thagard, the behavior of practitioners of a field may also be used for demarcation between science and pseudoscience due to its social dimension in addition to the epistemic one. I defended the tendency of pseudoscientists to commit fallacies, and the number of fallacies they commit can be a secondary tool for demarcation problem and this tool is consistent with Thagardian approach. In this paper, I selected the astrology as the case and I revealed nine types of logical fallacies (...) frequently committed by astrologers while introducing their field and/or defending their claims against the scientific inquiries and refutation efforts. I also argued that recognizing these fallacies may help the audience to demarcate between the scientific and the pseudoscientific arguments. (shrink)

After a review of previous uses of the term “pseudotechnology”, a definition is proposed: “A pseudotechnology is an alleged technology that is irreparably dysfunctional for its intended purpose since it is based on construction principles that cannot be made to work”. The relationship between pseudotechnology and pseudoscience is discussed, and so is the relationship between pseudotechnology and the much weaker concept of technological malfunction. An explanation is offered of why pseudotechnology is much more seldom referred to than pseudoscience: dysfunctional technology (...) usually reveals itself when put to use, whereas dysfunctional science tends to be more difficult to disclose. (shrink)

Après un examen des emplois antérieurs du terme « pseudotechnologie », une définition est proposée : « Une pseudotechnologie est une technologie présumée, irrémédiablement dysfonctionnelle pour l’usage auquel elle est destinée, puisqu’elle est basée sur des principes de construction qui ne peuvent pas être mis en œuvre ». La relation entre la pseudotechnologie et la pseudoscience est examinée, tout comme la relation entre la pseudotechnologie et le concept beaucoup plus faible de malfonction technologique. Une explication est proposée de la raison (...) pour laquelle la pseudotechnologie est beaucoup plus rarement mentionnée que la pseudoscience : le dysfonctionnement d’une technologie se manifeste généralement au moment de son utilisation, tandis que le dysfonctionnement d’une science est généralement plus difficile à établir. (shrink)

There is no satisfactory way of distinguishing the parodies of science from the genuine thing. Philosophers tend to think science and pseudoscience differ in kind, but the fact is they differ mostly in degree.

Integrative bioethics is a predominantly Croatian school of thought whose proponents claim to have initiated an innovative and recognizably European concept of bioethics capable of dealing with the most pressing issues of our time. In this paper, a critical overview of the integrative bioethics project is undertaken to show that it is, in fact, a poorly articulated and arguably pseudoscientific enterprise fundamentally incapable of dealing with practical challenges. The first section provides the basic outline of integrative bioethics: its historical development, (...) major proponents, geographical context and philosophical foundations. The second section considers its main theoretical shortcomings: the absence of normativity, collapse into ethical relativism and frequent intratheoretical inconsistencies. The third section addresses the issue of typically pseudoscientific features of integrative bioethics: verbose language, constant self- glorification and isolation from mainstream science. The fourth and concluding section of the paper argues that integrative bioethics––regarding its quality, reception and identity––does not merit the “European bioethics” label and is better described as a blind alley of European bioethics. (shrink)

Two case studies involving waves of claims and public discourse about mysterious aerial sightings in the United States over half a century apart are presented. Most evaluations of such episodes by scientists ethnocentrically portray sightings of unidentified flying objects (UFOs) as the product of deviance, irrationality, or psychopathology The emphasis on natural science approaches to understanding the social sciences is primarily responsible for the present erroneous pseudoscientific status of UFOs, as is the failure to recognize or take as problematic the (...) notion of rationality as a cultural category. Consequently, the symbolic significance of UFOs has been obscured. Contemporary interpretations of UFOs serve the unconscious resurrection of the power and function of omnipotent beings during a secular age. A semiotic culture‐as‐text social anthropology approach is more fruitful as it does not treat rationality as an objective given, but emphasizes the social construction of reality and the translation of unfamiliar symbol systems. (shrink)

The notorious but: unimpeachably corroborated case of Pavlov's mice raises, in capsule form, a variety of fascinating issues with far-reaching ramifications in several directions, but with particularly serious implications, several of which are well worth restating and pondering further (cf. Sebeóle 1977b: 192-201), both for the foundations and research methodology of contemporary semiotics.

Imre Lakatos holds a well-deserved primary place in current philosophy of science. In this essay, Leslie Allan critically examines Lakatos' theory of knowledge in two key areas. The first area of consideration is Lakatos' notion that knowledge is gained through a process of competition between rival scientific research programmes. Allan identifies and discusses four problems with Lakatos' characterization of a research programme. Next, Allan considers Lakatos' proposed test of adequacy for theories of rationality using his methodology of historiographical research programmes. (...) Allan discovers tensions within Lakatos' criteria and suggests ways of strengthening his test. (shrink)

In this comprehensive work on theories of rationality, Leslie Allan builds on the seminal insights of Imre Lakatos. Allan begins by critically reviewing Lakatos' theory of rationality (MSRP) and his meta-theory of rationality (MHRP) and suggesting improvements to his scheme. Allan's main task is developing a theory of rationality that avoids Lakatos' Achilles' heel; the presupposition that science is a rational enterprise. To achieve this, he attempts to draw out from the general demands of an objectivist epistemology the various criteria (...) of dependence and independence applying to evidence-statements. He concludes by considering two serious objections to his framework. (shrink)

[[THIS IS THE COMPLETE SECOND ISSUE OF MΕTASCIENCE]] -/- This second issue of the journal Mεtascience continues the char acterization of this new branch of knowledge that is metasci ence. If it is new, it is not in a radical sense since Mario Bunge practiced it in an exemplary way, since logical positivists were accused of practicing only a mere metascience, since scientists have always practiced it implicitly, and since some philosophers no longer practice philosophy but rather metascience, but without (...) characterizing it or theorizing it, that is, without realizing that they have abandoned one general discourse for another. The novelty therefore lies in this aware ness that a general discourse without philosophy is possible: a scien tific general discourse. The twelve contributions gathered in this volume illustrate the metascientific approach to knowledge of the world as well as to knowledge of knowledge of the world, that is, science. And like Bunge’s project, they are neither part of the analytical movement nor the continental movement in philosophy. We will read here studies about the Bungean system, some applications of Bungean thought, some metascientific contributions, and some reflections around meta science. Among metascientific disciplines, ontology occupies a prominent place in this issue of Mεtascience. Metascience differs from philoso phy in its rejection of the fundamental philosophical distinction be tween appearance and reality. Metascientific ontology therefore does not postulate the existence of any metaphysical reality. But metasci entific ontology, no more than philosophical ontology, is a factual sci ence. The first, because it studies scientific constructs and not concrete objects, the second, because it is interested in transcendent or meta physical objects. (shrink)

Drawing on insights from Imre Lakatos' seminal work on theories of rationality, Leslie Allan develops seven criteria for rational theory choice that avoid presuming the rationality of the scientific enterprise. He shows how his axioms of rationality follow from the general demands of an objectivist epistemology. Allan concludes by considering two weighty objections to his framework.

Several substantial critiques remain a source of fractionalizing debate within transpersonal psychology, including the weakness of its definition, whether it is redundant with Wilber’s integral psychology, whether it is a scientific field, whether it is too metaphysical, whether it neglects the problem of evil, and what contribution can it make to mainstream psychology. This article explicates these and related areas of critique and provides a response that identifies the essential challenges and future prospects of transpersonal psychology. The article also emphasizes (...) the field’s unique role as a potential bridge connecting psychological science with the transpersonal psyche in a way that can more fully recognize the importance of the latter. (shrink)

There is an argument for God’ s existence from consciousness. The argument was initially formulated by Swinburne in contemporary Western philosophy. He claims that no one has preceded him in formulating the argument, except John Locke who had a vague reference to it. The argument considers the existence of mental phenomena, such as feelings, emotions, intentions, and thoughts— which are scientifically unexplainable and merely admit of subjective explanations— as evidence for God’ s existence. Swinburne provides an inductive versions of the (...) argument, which confirms and reinforces the probability of God’ s existence. A survey of arguments for God’ s existence in Islamic philosophical tradition reveals that Mullā Ṣ adra was the first philosopher who argued for God’ s existence from rational consciousness. His argument is syllogistic and certainty-conferring. This paper deploys a descriptive-analytic method to consider the two versions of the argument from consciousness for God’ s existence in Western and Islamic philosophical traditions, comparing their agreements, distinctions, weaknesses, and strengths. (shrink)

Recent decades have seen a number of public disputes over scientific anomalies and unorthodoxies, typically framed as science versus pseudo-science. This Essay suggests historical and intellectual context for these controversies. The main point: There is no universally applicable, objective, impartial formula for distinguishing good science from bad science or real science from pseudo—the devil is always in the details. Anomalies and unorthodoxies are defined implicitly by the contemporary state of the art in mainstream science; “pseudo-science” is a pejorative aimed at (...) non-mainstream claims in defense of the authority of established, mainstream science. WWII was a game-changer: In its aftermath, science achieved unprecedented influence over public policies. As the stakes became high, “pseudo-science” seemed no longer a sufficiently powerful pejorative and was superseded by charges of “junk science” and “denialism.”. (shrink)

Some vociferous proponents of established science assert that it should always be believed when there are controversies over issues of public importance. That assertion rests on three assumptions, none of which are usually made explicit: 1) that only science is capable of arriving at truths about the natural world and that it actually does so; 2) that “science” is identical to the views propounded by the contemporary prevailing establishment of science, its mainstream institutions; and 3) that science can be distinguished (...) unequivocally, with certainty, from everything else. None of those presumptions has been demonstrated to be correct, and indeed there are excellent historical and logical reasons to regard all of them as wrong. Since these underlying assumptions cannot be proven, self-styled “skeptics” and other activists who seek hegemony for contemporaneous scientific consensuses engage in intellectual and rhetorical misdirection to give actual uncertainty the appearance of “practical” certainty. In doing so, activists fail to acknowledge the crucial distinction between a point of view that appropriately guides scholarly discourse or scientific research and views (expert opinions or assertions or conclusions) that “everyone” should accept and that offer appropriate guidance to public policies and actions. (shrink)

This volume consists of the invited papers presented at the 23rd International Wittgenstein Conference held in Kirchberg, Austria in August 2000. Among the topics treated are: truth, psychologism, science, the nature of rational discourse, practical reason, contextualism, vagueness, types of rationality, the rationality of religious belief, and Wittgenstein. Questions addressed include: Is rationality tied to special sorts of contexts? ls rationality tied to language? Is scientific rationality the only kind of rationality? Is there something like a Western rationality? and: Could (...) we genetically engineer human beings to be less wicked? (shrink)

This essay examines several important issues regarding Galen's depiction of the physiology of the arteries. In the process some of Galen's supporting doctrines on the blood and pulse will also be discussed in the context of a coherent scientific explanation. It will be the contention of this essay that though Galen may often have a polemical goal in mind, he correctly identifies the important and complex role of the arteries in human biological systems.