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Changes in utility as information.Morris H. Degroot - 1994 - Theory and Decision 17 (3):287-303.details
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Information and cognitive agents.Robert Cummins - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):68-69.details
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Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy.Vincenzo Crupi, Branden Fitelson & Katya Tentori - 2007 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):182 – 199.details
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On bayesian measures of evidential support: Theoretical and empirical issues.Vincenzo Crupi, Katya Tentori & and Michel Gonzalez - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (2):229-252.details
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New Axioms for Probability and Likelihood Ratio Measures.Vincenzo Crupi, Nick Chater & Katya Tentori - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):189-204.details
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Irrelevant conjunction: Statement and solution of a new paradox.Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (1):1-13.details
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Generalized Information Theory Meets Human Cognition: Introducing a Unified Framework to Model Uncertainty and Information Search.Vincenzo Crupi, Jonathan D. Nelson, Björn Meder, Gustavo Cevolani & Katya Tentori - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (5):1410-1456.details
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Content: Semantic and information-theoretic.Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):67-68.details
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The rational analysis of mind and behavior.Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford - 2000 - Synthese 122 (1-2):93-131.details
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Old Evidence and New Explanation III.Carl G. Wagner - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (3):S165 - S175.details
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Determining what is perceived.Radu J. Bogdan - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):66-67.details
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Information and semantics.Jon Barwise - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):65-65.details
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Do bets reveal beliefs?Jean Baccelli - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3393-3419.details
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How to confirm the disconfirmed. On conjunction fallacies and robust confirmation.David Atkinson, Jeanne Peijnenburg & Theo Kuipers - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (1):1-21.details
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How to Confirm the Conjunction of Disconfirmed Hypotheses.David Atkinson, Jeanne Peijnenburg & Theo Kuipers - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (1):1-21.details
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Indeterminism, proximal stimuli, and perception.D. M. Armstrong - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):64-65.details
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Knowledge is mutable.Michael A. Arbib - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):64-64.details
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Dretske on knowledge.William P. Alston - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):63-64.details
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Epistemic Probability and Coherent Degrees of Belief.Colin Howson - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 97--119.details
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Non-additive degrees of belief.Rolf Haenni - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 121--159.details
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Policymaking under scientific uncertainty.Joe Roussos - 2020 - Dissertation, London School of Economicsdetails
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Is Evidential Support the Same as Increase-in-Probability?Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (2):135–158.details
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Formal and Empirical Methods in Philosophy of Science.Vincenzo Crupi & Stephan Hartmann - 2009 - In Friedrich Stadler et al (ed.), The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 87--98.details
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Johannes von Kries’s Principien: A Brief Guide for the Perplexed.Sandy L. Zabell - 2016 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 47 (1):131-150.details
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On Uncertainty.Brian Weatherson - 1998 - Dissertation, Monash Universitydetails
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Metaconfirmation.Denis Zwirn & Herv� P. Zwirn - 1996 - Theory and Decision 41 (3):195-228.details
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The rule of succession.Sandy L. Zabell - 1989 - Erkenntnis 31 (2-3):283 - 321.details
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In defense of a constructive, information-based approach to decision theory.M. R. Yilmaz - 1997 - Theory and Decision 43 (1):21-44.details
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Bayesian conditionalisation and the principle of minimum information.P. M. Williams - 1980 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31 (2):131-144.details
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Postscript to Richard Jeffrey’s “Conditioning, Kinematics, and Exchangeability”.Carl G. Wagner - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (3):631-643.details
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Recovering a Prior from a Posterior: Some Parameterizations of Jeffrey Conditioning.Carl G. Wagner - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-10.details
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Probability kinematics and commutativity.Carl G. Wagner - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (2):266-278.details
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Measurement of Statistical Evidence: Picking Up Where Hacking and Others Left Off.Veronica J. Vieland - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (5):853-865.details
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No evidence amalgamation without evidence measurement.Veronica J. Vieland & Hasok Chang - 2019 - Synthese 196 (8):3139-3161.details
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Utility, informativity and protocols.Robert van Rooy - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (4):389-419.details
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Generics and typicality: a bounded rationality approach.Robert van Rooij & Katrin Schulz - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 43 (1):83-117.details
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Fine‐tuning, weird sorts of atheism and evidential favouring.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy (3):1-12.details
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Probaility and information.Patrick Suppes - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):81-82.details
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On the “content” and “relevance” of information-theoretic epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):79-81.details
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Updating, supposing, and maxent.Brian Skyrms - 1987 - Theory and Decision 22 (3):225-246.details
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Statistical Laws and Personal Propensities.Brian Skyrms - 1978 - PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978 (2):550-562.details
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The flow of information in signaling games.Brian Skyrms - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):155 - 165.details
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Maximum entropy inference as a special case of conditionalization.Brian Skyrms - 1985 - Synthese 63 (1):55 - 74.details
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Amplifying personal probability theory: Comments on L. J. Savage's "difficulties in the theory of personal probability".Abner Shimony - 1967 - Philosophy of Science 34 (4):326-332.details
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Is the conjunction fallacy tied to probabilistic confirmation?Jonah N. Schupbach - 2012 - Synthese 184 (1):13-27.details
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Some untoward consequences of Dretske's “causal theory” of information.Kenneth M. Sayre - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):78-79.details
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The sufficiency of information-caused belief for knowledge.Bede Rundle - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):78-78.details
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Can information be de-cognitized?William W. Rozeboom - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):76-77.details
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Inductivism and probabilism.Roger Rosenkrantz - 1971 - Synthese 23 (2-3):167 - 205.details
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