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  1. Formal Ontology.Jani Hakkarainen & Markku Keinänen - 2023 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Formal ontology as a main branch of metaphysics investigates categories of being. In the formal ontological approach to metaphysics, these ontological categories are analysed by ontological forms. This analysis, which we illustrate by some category systems, provides a tool to assess the clarity, exactness and intelligibility of different category systems or formal ontologies. We discuss critically different accounts of ontological form in the literature. Of ontological form, we propose a character- neutral relational account. In this metatheory, ontological forms of entities (...)
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  • Stroud's Camap.Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):276-302.
    In “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” Camap drew his famous distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ questions of existence, pronouncing the former meaningful and the latter meaningless. In The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Barry Stroud understands Carnap to be applying the verification criterion of meaningfulness in order to refute Cartesian skepticism. I suggest that Stroud misrepresents both Carnap's aim and method. Camap was responding to critics who suggested that his willingness to quantify over abstract entities in his work in semantics violated his (...)
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  • Stroud's Camap.Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):276-302.
    In “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” Camap drew his famous distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ questions of existence, pronouncing the former meaningful and the latter meaningless. In The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Barry Stroud understands Carnap to be applying the verification criterion of meaningfulness in order to refute Cartesian skepticism. I suggest that Stroud misrepresents both Carnap's aim and method. Camap was responding to critics who suggested that his willingness to quantify over abstract entities in his work in semantics violated his (...)
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  • Probleme der Ontologie.Henri Lauener - 1978 - Zeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 9 (1):63-92.
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  • From a Phono-Logical Point of View: Neutralizing Quine’s Argument Against Analyticity.Reese M. Heitner - 2006 - Synthese 150 (1):15-39.
    Though largely unnoticed, in "Two Dogmas" Quine himself invokes a distinction: a distinction between logical and analytic truths. Unlike analytic statements equating 'bachelor' with 'unmarried man', strictly logical tautologies relating two word-tokens of the same word-type, e.g., 'bachelor' and 'bachelor' are true merely in virtue of basic phonological form, putatively an exclusively non-semantic function of perceptual categorization or brute stimulus behavior. Yet natural language phonemic categorization is not entirely free of interpretive semantic considerations. "Phonemic reductionism" in both its linguistic and (...)
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  • Parts and Moments. Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology.Barry Smith (ed.) - 1982 - Philosophia Verlag.
    A collection of material on Husserl's Logical Investigations, and specifically on Husserl's formal theory of parts, wholes and dependence and its influence in ontology, logic and psychology. Includes translations of classic works by Adolf Reinach and Eugenie Ginsberg, as well as original contributions by Wolfgang Künne, Kevin Mulligan, Gilbert Null, Barry Smith, Peter M. Simons, Roger A. Simons and Dallas Willard. Documents work on Husserl's ontology arising out of early meetings of the Seminar for Austro-German Philosophy.
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  • Real Work for Aggregates.Robert Pargetter John Bigelow - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (4):485-503.
    In this paper reasons are given for accepting a paradigmatically ‘metaphysical’ thesis called Unrestricted Mereological Composition, or something close to it. These reasons are drawn from thoroughly empirical considerations that played a significant role in the history of physical sciences, particularly in the emergence of the Newtonian laws of motion. Roughly: this metaphysical thesis is supported by a principle of ‘inference to the best explanation’ of observations of the very same kind that paradigmatically furnish evidence supporting or undermining empirical theories (...)
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  • What anti-realism in philosophy of mathematics must offer.Feng Ye - 2010 - Synthese 175 (1):13 - 31.
    This article attempts to motivate a new approach to anti-realism (or nominalism) in the philosophy of mathematics. I will explore the strongest challenges to anti-realism, based on sympathetic interpretations of our intuitions that appear to support realism. I will argue that the current anti-realistic philosophies have not yet met these challenges, and that is why they cannot convince realists. Then, I will introduce a research project for a new, truly naturalistic, and completely scientific approach to philosophy of mathematics. It belongs (...)
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  • Problems and meaning today: What can we learn from Hattiangadi's failed attempt to explain them together?John Wettersten - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (4):487-536.
    Philosophers have tried to explain how science finds the truth by using new developments in logic to study scientific language and inference. R. G. Collingwood argued that only a logic of problems could take context into account. He was ignored, but the need to reconcile secure meanings with changes in context and meanings was seen by Karl Popper, W. v. O. Quine, and Mario Bunge. Jagdish Hattiangadi uses problems to reconcile the need for security with that for growth. But he (...)
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  • Conventionalism and the Impoverishment of the Space of Reasons: Carnap, Quine and Sellars.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2015 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 3 (8).
    This article examines how Quine and Sellars develop informatively contrasting responses to a fundamental tension in Carnap’s semantics ca. 1950. Quine’s philosophy could well be styled ‘Essays in Radical Empiricism’; his assay of radical empiricism is invaluable for what it reveals about the inherent limits of empiricism. Careful examination shows that Quine’s criticism of Carnap’s semantics in ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ fails, that at its core Quine’s semantics is for two key reasons incoherent and that his hallmark Thesis of Extensionalism (...)
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  • Informal proof, formal proof, formalism.Alan Weir - 2016 - Review of Symbolic Logic 9 (1):23-43.
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  • How Carnap built the world in 1928.Anders Wedberg - 1973 - Synthese 25 (3-4):337 - 371.
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  • Metaphysics and the Future-Like-Ours Argument Against Abortion.Eric Vogelstein - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (4):419-434.
    Don Marquis’s “future-like-ours” argument against the moral permissibility of abortion is widely considered the strongest anti-abortion argument in the philosophical literature. In this paper, I address the issue of whether the argument relies upon controversial metaphysical premises. It is widely thought that future-like-ours argument indeed relies upon controversial metaphysics, in that it must reject the psychological theory of personal identity. I argue that that thought is mistaken—the future-like-ours argument does not depend upon the rejection of such a theory. I suggest, (...)
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  • Sign and Object : Quine’s forgotten book project.Sander Verhaegh - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):5039-5060.
    W. V. Quine’s first philosophical monograph, Word and Object, is widely recognized as one of the most influential books of twentieth century philosophy. Notes, letters, and draft manuscripts at the Quine Archives, however, reveal that Quine was already working on a philosophical book in the early 1940s; a project entitled Sign and Object. In this paper, I examine these and other unpublished documents and show that Sign and Object sheds new light on the evolution of Quine’s ideas. Where “Two Dogmas (...)
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  • Boarding Neurath's Boat: The Early Development of Quine's Naturalism.Sander Verhaegh - 2017 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (2):317-342.
    W. V. Quine is arguably the intellectual father of contemporary naturalism, the idea that there is no distinctively philosophical perspective on reality. Yet, even though Quine has always been a science-minded philosopher, he did not adopt a fully naturalistic perspective until the early 1950s. In this paper, I reconstruct the genesis of Quine’s ideas on the relation between science and philosophy. Scrutinizing his unpublished papers and notebooks, I examine Quine’s development in the first decades of his career. After identifying three (...)
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  • Blurring Boundaries: Carnap, Quine, and the Internal–External Distinction.Sander Verhaegh - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):873-890.
    Quine is routinely perceived as saving metaphysics from Carnapian positivism. Where Carnap rejects metaphysical existence claims as meaningless, Quine is taken to restore their intelligibility by dismantling the former’s internal–external distinction. The problem with this picture, however, is that it does not sit well with the fact that Quine, on many occasions, has argued that metaphysical existence claims ought to be dismissed. Setting aside the hypothesis that Quine’s metaphysical position is incoherent, one has to conclude that his views on metaphysics (...)
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  • In Memoriam: Nelson Goodman 1906–1998.Joseph S. Ullian - 1999 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 5 (3):392-394.
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  • Prioritizing platonism.Kelly Trogdon & Sam Cowling - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2029-2042.
    Discussion of atomistic and monistic theses about abstract reality.
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  • The 2007 Annual Conference of the Australasian Association for Logic.Greg Restall - 2008 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 14 (3):438-443.
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  • The Bradleyan Regress, Non-Relational Realism, and the Quinean Semantic Strategy.Jonathan Reid Surovell - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (1):63-79.
    Non-Relational Realism is a popular solution to the Bradleyan regress of facts or truths. It denies that there is a relational universal of exemplification; for an object a to exemplify a universal F-ness, on this view, is not for a relation to subsist between a and F-ness. An influential objection to Non-Relational Realism is that it is unacceptably obscure. The author argues that Non-Relational Realism can be understood as a selective application of satisfaction semantics to predicates like ‘exemplify’, and that (...)
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  • Sixteen days.Barry Smith & Berit Brogaard - 2003 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 28 (1):45 – 78.
    When does a human being begin to exist? We argue that it is possible, through a combination of biological fact and philosophical analysis, to provide a definitive answer to this question. We lay down a set of conditions for being a human being, and we determine when, in the course of normal fetal development, these conditions are first satisfied. Issues dealt with along the way include: modes of substance-formation, twinning, the nature of the intra-uterine environment, and the nature of the (...)
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  • Quine’s Intuition: Why Quine’s Early Nominalism is Naturalistic.James Andrew Smith - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (5):1199-1218.
    According to a growing consensus in the secondary literature on Quine, the judgment Quine makes in favor of the nominalism outlined in “Steps Toward a Constructive Nominalism” is in tension with the naturalism he later adopts. In this paper, I show the consensus view is mistaken by showing that Quine’s judgment is rooted in a naturalistic standard of clarity. Moreover, I argue that Quine late in his career is committed to accepting one plausible reading of his judgment in 1947. In (...)
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  • Quine on naturalism, nominalism, and philosophy’s place within science.James Andrew Smith - 2021 - Synthese 198 (2):1549-1567.
    W.V. Quine is a well-known proponent of naturalism, the view on which reality is described only in science. He is also well-known for arguing that our current scientific theories commit us to the existence of abstract objects. It is tempting to believe that the naturalistic philosopher should think scientists outside of philosophy are in the best position to assess the merits of revising our current commitment to abstract objects. But Quine rejects this deferential view. On the reading of Quine’s philosophical (...)
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  • Frederique Janssen-Lauret and Gary Kemp, eds., Quine and His Place in History. [REVIEW]James Andrew Smith Jr - 2019 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 7 (7).
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  • Tracks of Relations and Equivalences-based Reasoning.G. Shtakser & L. Leonenko - 2011 - Studia Logica 97 (3):385-413.
    It is known that the Restricted Predicate Calculus can be embedded in an elementary theory, the signature of which consists of exactly two equivalences. Some special models for the mentioned theory were constructed to prove this fact. Besides formal adequacy of these models, a question may be posed concerning their conceptual simplicity, "transparency" of interpretations they assigned to the two stated equivalences. In works known to us these interpretations are rather complex, and can be called "technical", serving only the purpose (...)
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  • Truth and Scientific Change.Gila Sher - 2017 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 48 (3):371-394.
    The paper seeks to answer two new questions about truth and scientific change: What lessons does the phenomenon of scientific change teach us about the nature of truth? What light do recent developments in the theory of truth, incorporating these lessons, throw on problems arising from the prevalence of scientific change, specifically, the problem of pessimistic meta-induction?
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  • A scientific enterprise?: A critical study of P. Maddy, Second Philosophy: A Naturalistic Method[REVIEW]Stewart Shapiro & Patrick Reeder - 2009 - Philosophia Mathematica 17 (2):247-271.
    For almost twenty years, Penelope Maddy has been one of the most consistent expositors and advocates of naturalism in philosophy, with a special focus on the philosophy of mathematics, set theory in particular. Over that period, however, the term ‘naturalism’ has come to mean many things. Although some take it to be a rejection of the possibility of a priori knowledge, there are philosophers calling themselves ‘naturalists’ who willingly embrace and practice an a priori methodology, not a whole lot different (...)
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  • Objectivity, Realism, and Proof. FilMat Studies in the Philosophy of Mathematics.Francesca Boccuni & Andrea Sereni (eds.) - 2016 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing.
    This volume covers a wide range of topics in the most recent debates in the philosophy of mathematics, and is dedicated to how semantic, epistemological, ontological and logical issues interact in the attempt to give a satisfactory picture of mathematical knowledge. The essays collected here explore the semantic and epistemic problems raised by different kinds of mathematical objects, by their characterization in terms of axiomatic theories, and by the objectivity of both pure and applied mathematics. They investigate controversial aspects of (...)
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  • Carving Intuition at its Joints.Jason Schukraft - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (3):326-352.
    A central metaphilosophical project seeks to evaluate the reliability of the types of evidence that figure in philosophical arguments and, relatedly, the justificatory status of relying on those types of evidence. Traditionally, metaphilosophers have approached this project via an analysis of intuition. This article argues that the category picked out by “intuition” is both too broad and too heterogeneous to serve as the appropriate target for metaphilosophical inquiry. Intuition is a gerrymandered and disjunctive kind, undeserving of the widespread attention it (...)
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  • Normative realism and ontology: reply to Clarke-Doane, Rosen, and Enoch and McPherson.T. M. Scanlon - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):877-897.
    In response to comments on my book, Being Realistic about Reasons, by Justin Clarke-Doane, David Enoch and Tristram McPherson, and Gideon Rosen, I try to clarify my domain-based view of ontology, my understanding of the epistemology of normative judgments, and my interpretation of the phenomenon of supervenience.
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  • Logical Consequence for Nominalists.Marcus Rossberg & Daniel Cohnitz - 2009 - Theoria 24 (2):147-168.
    It is often claimed that nominalistic programmes to reconstruct mathematics fail, since they will at some point involve the notion of logical consequence which is unavailable to the nominalist. In this paper we use an idea of Goodman and Quine to develop a nominalistically acceptable explication of logical consequence.
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  • ¿De qué se trata la matemática?Gustavo Esteban Romero - 2020 - Scientia in Verba Magazine 6 (1):60-64.
    Las teorías que usamos para representar el mundo pueden ser extremadamente complejas. Abordan temas tales como electrones, campos cuánticos, estrellas de neutrones, materia oscura, redes neuronales, mercados económicos, la atmósfera y muchas otras entidades que suponemos existen en el universo. Al formular nuestras teorías, recurrimos a lenguajes exactos que nos permiten minimizar la vaguedad y expresarnos lo más precisa y cuantitativamente posible. Recurrimos a la matemática. Cuando formulamos nuestras teorías fácticas en lenguaje matemático, estas se refieren no solamente a objetos (...)
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  • A survey of formal semantics.Robert Rogers - 1963 - Synthese 15 (1):17 - 56.
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  • What do symbols symbolize?: Nominalism.Richard S. Rudner - 1974 - Philosophia Mathematica (1-2):41-63.
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  • Syntactic reductionism.Richard Heck - 2000 - Philosophia Mathematica 8 (2):124-149.
    Syntactic Reductionism, as understood here, is the view that the ‘logical forms’ of sentences in which reference to abstract objects appears to be made are misleading so that, on analysis, we can see that no expressions which even purport to refer to abstract objects are present in such sentences. After exploring the motivation for such a view, and arguing that no previous argument against it succeeds, sentences involving generalized quantifiers, such as ‘most’, are examined. It is then argued, on this (...)
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  • How nominalist is Hartry field's nominalism?Michael D. Resnik - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (2):163 - 181.
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  • Labyrinth of Continua.Patrick Reeder - 2018 - Philosophia Mathematica 26 (1):1-39.
    This is a survey of the concept of continuity. Efforts to explicate continuity have produced a plurality of philosophical conceptions of continuity that have provably distinct expressions within contemporary mathematics. I claim that there is a divide between the conceptions that treat the whole continuum as prior to its parts, and those conceptions that treat the parts of the continuum as prior to the whole. Along this divide, a tension emerges between those conceptions that favor philosophical idealizations of continuity and (...)
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  • Mathematics and the existence of abstract entities.Hilary Putnam - 1956 - Philosophical Studies 7 (6):81 - 88.
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  • Thomism and modern formal logic. Remarks on the cracow circle.Ryszard Puciato - 1993 - Axiomathes 4 (2):169-191.
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  • Quine's Scientific Realism Revisited.Raimund Pils - 2020 - Theoria 86 (5):612-642.
    In order to reconnect Quine's views to the current debate on scientific realism, I reframe Quine's scientific realism into a semantic, a metaphysical, and an epistemological dimension. With this conceptual background, I review the historical development of Quine's scientific realism from the late 1940s until his death in 2000. I challenge Soames's view that Quine is a phenomenalist at the time of “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951) and show that he remains agnostic between a realist and an anti‐realist conceptual scheme (...)
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  • William Tait. The provenance of pure reason. Essays on the philosophy of mathematics and on its history.Charles Parsons - 2009 - Philosophia Mathematica 17 (2):220-247.
    William Tait's standing in the philosophy of mathematics hardly needs to be argued for; for this reason the appearance of this collection is especially welcome. As noted in his Preface, the essays in this book ‘span the years 1981–2002’. The years given are evidently those of publication. One essay was not previously published in its present form, but it is a reworking of papers published during that period. The Introduction, one appendix, and some notes are new. Many of the essays (...)
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  • R. M. Martin’s Logic of Belief.David Parsons - 2017 - History and Philosophy of Logic 38 (1):72-86.
    In this paper I revisit R. M. Martin’s logic of belief. As with much of Martin’s work, his formal studies into belief and belief reports have gone largely unnoticed. However, in my article I suggest reasons for thinking that these studies warrant revisiting. One reason is that Martin adopted an account of the notion of belief which was more comprehensive than that employed by most rival theorists. Another reason is that Martin couched his theory in a formal pragmatics which utilised (...)
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  • Popper's world 3 & human creativity.Zuzana Parusnikova - 1990 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (3):263 – 269.
    Abstract This paper aims to analyse Karl Popper's conception of ?three worlds?, and especially the problem of world 3?the world of objective knowledge. Firstly, I try to explain Popper's turn to ontological questions which I link to his antipsychologism and to issues raised by the development of logic after World War II. I then consider Popper's concept of the autonomy of world 3 and his attempt to introduce world 3 as a world of knowledge without a knowing subject. I conclude (...)
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  • Inscriptionalism and intensionality.David Parsons - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (2):567-585.
    Intensional contexts are typically characterised by an apparent failure of either (A) the principle of the inter-substitution of co-referring terms salva veritate, or (B) existential generalisation. The difficulties which are seen to occur do so in contexts involving either modality or the propositional attitudes. In this paper attempts are made to determine whether or not Scheffler’s inscriptional analysis can provide a viable means of accounting for the problems which are thought to occur in intensional contexts. Somewhat unexpectedly, little effort has (...)
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  • Harvard 1940–1941: Tarski, Carnap and Quine on a finitistic language of mathematics for science.Paolo Mancosu - 2005 - History and Philosophy of Logic 26 (4):327-357.
    Tarski, Carnap and Quine spent the academic year 1940?1941 together at Harvard. In their autobiographies, both Carnap and Quine highlight the importance of the conversations that took place among them during the year. These conversations centred around semantical issues related to the analytic/synthetic distinction and on the project of a finitist/nominalist construction of mathematics and science. Carnap's Nachlaß in Pittsburgh contains a set of detailed notes, amounting to more than 80 typescripted pages, taken by Carnap while these discussions were taking (...)
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  • Nominalisme occamiste et nominalisme contemporain.Claude Panaccio - 1987 - Dialogue 26 (2):281.
    Le nominalisme est « le refus d'admettre toute entité autre qu'indivi-duelle ». II doit, pour justifier la simplicité de son ontologie, proposer une théorie de laconnaissance et une théorie sémantique qui ne présupposent ni l'une ni l'autre l'existence réelle des univer-saux. Certaines des voies qui s'ouvrent à cette entreprise délicate ont été systématiquement explorées vers la fin du Moyen Age et il y a tout à parier que, malgré les ruptures épistémologiques, les révolutions scientifiques et autres changements d'epistémè, les nominalistes (...)
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  • Carnap and Quine: Analyticity, Naturalism, and the Elimination of Metaphysics.Sean Morris - 2018 - The Monist 101 (4):394-416.
    Rudolf Carnap is well known for his attack on metaphysics, and W. V. Quine is equally well known for his attack on Carnap’s analytic/synthetic distinction. Receiving far less attention is their basic agreement that a properly scientific approach to philosophy should eliminate the metaphysical excesses of the past. This paper aims to remedy this. It focuses initially on the development of Carnap’s rejection of metaphysics from 1932 to 1950 and the role that analyticity plays. It then turns to Quine, emphasizing (...)
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  • Numbers, properties, and Frege.Brendan P. Minogue - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 31 (6):423 - 427.
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  • The ontology of words: Realism, nominalism, and eliminativism.J. T. M. Miller - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (7):e12691.
    What are words? What makes two token words tokens of the same word-type? Are words abstract entities, or are they (merely) collections of tokens? The ontology of words tries to provide answers to these, and related questions. This article provides an overview of some of the most prominent views proposed in the literature, with a particular focus on the debate between type-realist, nominalist, and eliminativist ontologies of words.
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  • Ontology and logic: remarks on hartry field's anti-platonist philosophy of mathematics.Michael D. Resnik - 1985 - History and Philosophy of Logic 6 (1):191-209.
    In Science without numbers Hartry Field attempted to formulate a nominalist version of Newtonian physics?one free of ontic commitment to numbers, functions or sets?sufficiently strong to have the standard platonist version as a conservative extension. However, when uses for abstract entities kept popping up like hydra heads, Field enriched his logic to avoid them. This paper reviews some of Field's attempts to deflate his ontology by inflating his logic.
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