- The Value-Based Theory of Reasons.Barry Maguire - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.details
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Contrastive Reasons and Promotion.Justin Snedegar - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):39-63,.details
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(1 other version)Commitment, Reasons, and the Will.Ruth Chang - 2013 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 8. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 74-113.details
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Reason claims and contrastivism about reasons.Justin Snedegar - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):231-242.details
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What makes reasons sufficient?Mark Schroeder - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2):159-170.details
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(1 other version)Moral reasons and rational status.Joshua Gert - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 171-196.details
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(1 other version)Normative strength and the balance of reasons.Joshua Gert - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (4):533-562.details
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The Weight of Reasons: A Framework for Ethics.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The Balancing View of Ought.Thomas Schmidt - 2024 - Ethics 134 (2):246-267.details
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Semantics for Reasons, by Bryan R. Weaver and Kevin Scharp. [REVIEW]Shyam Nair - 2022 - Mind 131 (521):337-347.details
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The Procreation Asymmetry Destabilized: Analogs and Acting for People's Sake.Jonas H. Aaron - 2022 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):326-352.details
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Formalizing Reasons, Oughts, and Requirements.Robert Mullins - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7:568-599.details
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Wouldn’t It Be Nice: Enticing Reasons for Love.N. L. Engel-Hawbecker - 2021 - In Simon Cushing (ed.), New Philosophical Essays on Love and Loving. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 195-214.details
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Supererogation and Conditional Obligation.Daniel Muñoz & Theron Pummer - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1429–1443.details
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“Adding Up” Reasons: Lessons for Reductive and Nonreductive Approaches.Shyam Nair - 2021 - Ethics 132 (1):38-88.details
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Reasons As Evidence Against Ought-Nots.Kok Yong Lee - 2020 - Philosophical Papers 49 (3):431-455.details
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Reasons, Competition, and Latitude.Justin Snedegar - 2021 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 16. Oxford University Press.details
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Aesthetic Reasons and the Demands They (Do Not) Make.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):407-427.details
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(1 other version)Commitments, Reasons, and the Will.Ruth Chang - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8.details
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Hyperintensionality and Normativity.Federico L. G. Faroldi - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.details
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How to be a deontic buck-passer.Euan K. H. Metz - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3193-3211.details
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Reasons and oughts: an explanation and defence of deontic buck-passing.Euan Hans Metz - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Readingdetails
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Rationality, Appearances, and Apparent Facts.Javier González de Prado Salas - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 14 (2).details
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(1 other version)Moral Reasons and Rational Status.Joshua Gert - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 33 (sup1):171-196.details
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Toward an epistemology of certain substantive a priori truths.Joshua Gert - 2009 - Metaphilosophy 40 (2):214-236.details
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Normative metaphysics for accountants.Barry Maguire & Justin Snedegar - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):363-384.details
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How Emotions do not Provide Reasons to Act.Mary Carman - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (3):555-574.details
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Not So Enticing Reasons.Simon Robertson - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):263-277.details
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Moral Worth, Supererogation, and the Justifying/Requiring Distinction.Joshua Gert - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (4):611-618.details
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Resting content: Sensible satisficing?Patricia Greenspan - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):305 - 317.details
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