According to the Monist Interpretation of Descartes, there is really only one corporeal substance—the entire extended plenum. Evidence for this interpretation seems to be provided by Descartes in the Synopsis of the Meditations, where he claims that all substances are incorruptible. Finite bodies, being corruptible, would then fail to be substances. On the other hand, ‘body, taken in the general sense,’ being incorruptible, would be a corporeal substance. In this paper, I defend a Pluralist Interpretation of Descartes, according to which (...) there are many corporeal substances. In particular, I show that none of the claims in the Synopsis about incorruptibility and substance entail either that finite bodies are not substances, or that the only corporeal substance is the entire plenum. (shrink)

Resumen¿Es relevante la propuesta moral cartesiana? La influencia de Montaigne sobre Descartes se sitúa no sólo al inicio (como lo que debe ser superado) sino también al final de la filosofía cartesiana, porque la moral cartesiana recoge aspectos clave de la actitud vital que aparece en los Ensayos de Montaigne. El análisis de los textos cartesianos de la década de los 40, y en especial de Principios de la Filosofía, permite precisar la peculiaridad de la moral cartesiana, que sin abandonar (...) Montaigne apunta a Kant.Palabras claveDescartes, Filosofía Moral, Montaigne, Principios de la FilosofíaAbstractIs the Cartesian moral proposal relevant? Montaigne’s influence on Descartes stands at the beginning and end of Cartesian philosophy; at the beginning because it is in the epistemological field, which must be surpassed; at the end, because the Cartesian moral collects key aspects of the attitude towards life that appear in Montaigne’s Essays. The analysis of Principles of Philosophy, among other texts, allows us to specify the peculiarity of the Cartesian moral, which without moving away from Montaigne approaches Kant.KeYwordsDescartes, Moral Philosophy, Montaigne, Principles of Philosophy. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é provar que a experiência tem um papel central na ciência cartesiana e que, portanto, Descartes está disposto a abandonar alguns pressupostos teóricos para adequar-se a algumas observações científicas. Meu ponto é que o compromisso de Descartes com as observações científicas é tão forte que, no estudo do magnetismo, ele opta pela inconsistência do seu sistema quando adota uma propriedade do magnetismo que contraria a lei da conservação da quantidade de movimento. Ou seja, mostrarei que Descartes (...) acata uma propriedade do ímã, observada por vários cientistas, especialmente Gilbert, que é contrária à lei da conservação da quantidade de movimento para resguardar uma sintonia com as observações empíricas. Esse compromisso com a experiência reforça a imagem de que Descartes não era indiferente às observações empíricas do seu tempo, mas opera uma ciência que tenta adequar-se a elas. This article sets out to prove that experience plays a central role in Cartesian science and, therefore, that Descartes is willing to let go of some theoretical assumptions in order to accommodate scientific observations. My point is that Descartes' commitment to scientific observation is so strong that in the study of magnetism, he chooses not to keep his system not completely consistent when he adopts a magnetic property (a property that was observed by several scientists, especially Gilbert) that contradicts the law of conservation of quantity of motion in order to keep in touch with empirical observations. This commitment to experience further strengthens the notion that Descartes was not indifferent to the empirical observations of his time, and actually engages in scientific work that tries to adapt itself to them. (shrink)

This paper examines Descartes's third primary notion and the distinction between different kinds of knowledge based on different and mutually irreducible primary notions. It discusses the application of the notions of clearness and distinctness to the domain of knowledge based on that of mind-body union. It argues that the consequences of the distinctions Descartes is making with regard to our knowledge of the human mind and nature are rather different from those that have been attributed to Descartes due to the (...) influential Rylean picture of Cartesian mind-body dualism. (shrink)

I argue that Descartes' Second Causal Proof of God in the Third Meditation evidences, and commits him to, the belief that time is "strongly discontinuous" -- that is, that there is actually a gap between each consecutive moment of time. Much of my article attempts to reconcile this interpretation, the "received view," with Descartes' statements about time, space, and matter in his other writings, including his correspondence with various philosophers.

As a practicing life scientist, Descartes must have a theory of what it means to be a living being. In this paper, I provide an account of what his theoretical conception of living bodies must be. I then show that this conception might well run afoul of his rejection of final causal explanations in natural philosophy. Nonetheless, I show how Descartes might have made use of such explanations as merely hypothetical, even though he explicitly blocks this move. I conclude by (...) suggesting that there is no reason for him to have blocked the use of hypothetical final causes in this way. (shrink)

Descartes afirma que el cogito se "experimenta en uno" (apud se experiatur)o se "siente en uno mismo" ("il sent in lui-même"), pero también ha señalado que uno no siente sino a través del cuerpo. El problema es que, en las Meditaciones, el cogito fue caracterizado cuando todavía no se había demostrado la existencia del cuerpo. Pese a esto, Descartes parece haberse dejado influir por ciertas sensaciones internas de duda y certeza. En el trabajo se sostiene que esto fue posible porque (...) esas sensaciones internas son efecto de una ratio implícita: la existencia de un Dios no engañador. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to advance the idea according to which the Cartesian Cogito, the ground of modern philosophy and the source of the notion of thinking subject, is tributary of a certain method whose legitimation is grounded in western history. According to this hypothesis, there is a certain tool that plays a fundamental role in the production of this new philosophical notion: the dream. The argument will be developed in four parts. We will first proceed to (i) (...) an analysis of the role of the hypothesis of the dream in the formulation of the notion of res cogitans, what will bring us to (ii) an exploration of the conception of private world supposed by such a hypothesis so as to (iii) clarify the specificity of the Cartesian notion of knowledge, a knowledge that must be acquirable in a dream; in conclusion (iv) we will indicate in a schematic way the historic-cultural anchor of the Cartesian dream where the subject is originated. (shrink)

Collection of papers presented at the First Budapest Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy.

I defend in this paper the following two theses: first, that Descartes was a Pluralist as regards extended substances, that is, that for him the extended world includes a plurality of bodies, including ordinary objects, each of which may be adequately described as a substance; and that for him the notion of substance is a rather slim notion, making no specific requirements as regards individuation or persistence conditions, and determining therefore no strict constraints on the kind of material objects that (...) may count as substances. In short, I will be arguing for a certain view concerning the extension of the phrase ‘extended substance’ by defending a specific view of what ‘substance’ means.Keywords: substance, body, Monism, dependence. (shrink)

O objetivo desse artigo é analisar e refutar a opinião de Jean-Luc Marion acerca da relação entre a doutrina das naturezas simples e a metafísica cartesiana. Em primeiro lugar, apontaremos alguns problemas com o método estruturalista empregado por Marion. A seguir, mostraremos a impossiblidade de se converter noções epistemológicas em noções ontológicas. Por fim, sugerimos que o método empregado por Descartes na conversão das naturezas simples em sua metafísica das _Meditações_ foi o introspectivismo ou disciplina da interioridade tomada emprestada de (...) Agostinho. Esta constatação reforçara nossa convicção na recusa da interpretação estruturalista da obra de Descartes. (shrink)

I consider a somewhat obscure but important feature of Descartes’s physics that concerns the notion of the “force of rest.” Contrary to a prominent occasionalist interpretation of Descartes’s physics, I argue that Descartes himself attributes real forces to resting bodies. I also take his account of rest to conflict with the view that God conserves the world by “re-creating” it anew at each moment. I turn next to the role of rest in Malebranche. Malebranche takes Descartes to endorse his own (...) occasionalist version of physics. However, he nonetheless rejects Descartes’s account of rest by appealing to the fact that whereas God’s production of motion requires a power beyond the mere power to create, his production of rest requires only the latter power. It turns out that this argument in Malebranche is incompatible with the sort of “re-creationist” account of divine conservation that he is widely thought to have inherited from Descartes. (shrink)

Resumo: Muitos trabalhos em história da filosofia, eminentemente em história da filosofia medieval, são marcados por uma oposição metodológica entre três abordagens: a ênfase na estrutura interna de um pensamento; a ênfase na investigação de um tema ou conceito; a ênfase na inserção de um pensamento em seu contexto histórico-filosófico. No entanto, é possível defender a aproximação dessas três abordagens, e mesmo a combinação delas, em vista de um ganho de inteligibilidade dos pensamentos estudados. É o que pretende o presente (...) artigo, procurando apontar para a artificialidade da oposição entre as três abordagens e defendendo um modelo comunicacional que a supere.: Many works in history of philosophy, especially in the history of medieval philosophy, are marked by a methodological opposition between three approaches: an emphasis on the internal structure of a thought, an emphasis on investigating a theme or concept, and an emphasis on the place of a thought in its historical-philosophical context. However, it is possible to defend the approximation of these three approaches, and even their combination, aiming at greater intelligibility of the thoughts under investigation. This article aims to point out the artificiality of the opposition between the three approaches and to defend a communicational model that overcomes it. (shrink)

In various arguments, Descartes relies on the principles that conceivability implies possibility and that inconceivability implies impossibility. Those principles are in tension with another Cartesian view about the source of modality, i.e. the doctrine of the free creation of eternal truths. In this paper, I develop a ‘two-modality’ interpretation of the doctrine of eternal truths which resolves the tension and I discuss how the resulting modal epistemology can still be relevant for the contemporary discussion.

If Descartes's Cogito can be held as the opening of the era of modern subjectivity, it is to the extent that the I is taken for the first time in the position of foundation, i.e., as the ultimate condition for the possibility of all philosophical discourse. The question raised in this paper is whether the crisis of the Cogito, opened later by Hume, Nietzsche and Heidegger on different philosophical grounds, is not already contemporaneous to the very positing of the Cogito.

This article presents a decades-long conflict in the upper echelons of postwar French academic philosophy between the self-identifying “Cartesian” Ferdinand Alquié, professor at the Sorbonne, and the “Spinozist” Martial Gueroult of the Collège de France. Tracking the development of this rivalry serves to illuminate the historical drama that occurred in France as phenomenology was integrated into the Cartesian tradition and resisted by a commitment to rationalism grounded in a specifically French understanding of Spinozism. Over the course of Alquié and Gueroult's (...) polemic, however, we nevertheless witness a shared concern to preserve philosophy from the reductive tendencies of historicism and its possible assimilation to theology. What is more, the ultimate impasse of this conflict continues to inform the most innovative projects in French thought in the wake of structuralism and the “theological turn” of French phenomenology. (shrink)

Cet article explore la conception foucaldienne de l'archéologie à la sortie de Les mots et les choses, avant la publication de l'Archéologie du savoir. Il retrace les sources de cette conception chez Kant, Gueroult et Husserl, mais à chaque fois avec des écarts significatifs qui poussent Foucault à concevoir l'archéologie comme une “enquête horizontale” sur notre présent. Apparaît alors la proximité avec l'ethnologie, discipline scientifique que Foucault aborde surtout dans Les mots et les choses et dans Le discours philosophique, un (...) texte inédit où Foucault applique la méthodologie du livre de 1966 à l'histoire de la philosophie. (shrink)

Descartes held that practicing mathematics was important for developing the mental faculties necessary for science and a virtuous life. Otherwise, he maintained that the proper uses of mathematics were extremely limited. This article discusses his reasons which include a theory of education, the metaphysics of matter, and a psychologistic theory of deductive reasoning. It is argued that these reasons cohere with his system of philosophy.

Este texto investiga a passagem sartriana à filosofia primeira. O mérito maior da fenomenologia – a superação da querela entre realismo e idealismo – será comprometido pelo pensamento ulterior de Husserl, caracterizado como “idealista”. Recusando o conceito de noema irreal, Sartre procurará retomar os “verdadeiros princípios” da fenomenologia, reinaugurando o discurso da filosofia primeira.

O ceticismo desempenha um papel decisivo na filosofia pascaliana. De fato, amplamente influenciado por autores como Michel de Montaigne e Pierre Charron, Blaise Pascal acaba por contrariar a tendência geral do século do grande Racionalismo, levantando profundas objeções relativamente à pretensão – tipicamente cartesiana – de se conhecer a Verdade de maneira certa e segura. Como se pode depreender mesmo de uma rápida leitura de seus escritos, a obra pascaliana é toda perpassada por uma notável desconfiança de nossa suposta capacidade (...) de adquirir certezas inabaláveis sobre o que quer que seja: desconfiança esta que, diga-se de passagem, está em profunda sintonia com a chocante posição do autor concernente às consequências do pecado original. Assim sendo, o que pretendemos neste artigo é: i) apresentar os argumentos céticos subscritos por Pascal em sua principal obra filosófica – os Pensamentos; e ii) analisando a obra Do espírito geométrico e da arte de persuadir, indicar que nem mesmo os conhecimentos oferecidos pela luz natural são capazes de nos livrar das dúvidas suscitadas pela argumentação cética. (shrink)

The attack of Pierre-Daniel Huet on Cartesianism at the end of the seventeenth century was one of the most significant events in the history of skepticism in the early modern period. It capitalized on the building momentum generated by the use of skeptical arguments throughout the century, and it opened the way to the anti-metaphysical stance of the Enlightenment, beginning with Bayle and passing to the philosophes, including Hume. The inevitable Cartesian response to Huet came from Pierre-Sylvain Regis, to whom (...) Huet then responded in various ways. Although Huet’s attack had taken aim at all the themes with which Cartesianism has come to be associated (the method of doubt, the cogito, clarity and distinctness of perception, etc.), and although Regis replied on all these topics, the debate between them concentrated on Cartesian doubt, here closely examined in light of their debate. (shrink)

O artigo tem como objetivo investigar as razões que levaram Descartes a não concluir as Regras para a direção do Espírito, estabelecendo uma relação entre a interrupção da obra e a teoria de 1630 sobre a natureza criada das verdades eternas. Com a doutrina da livre criação das verdades, Descartes apresenta uma proposta metafísica que exigia uma revisitação dos pressupostos da sua própria epistemologia. Se nas Regras a matemática e a geometria eram consideradas isentas de toda incerteza, com a entrada (...) em cena da teoria de 1630 essas disciplinas encontram-se submetidas à causalidade arbitrária da onipotência divina. Essa consideração metafísica requer uma reflexão ulterior para avaliar as suas consequências. O projeto das Regras – interrompido, mas não abandonado – será assim reformulado à luz da novidade metafísica de 1630. As Meditações se encarregarão dessa tarefa, demonstrando de que modo a natureza criada das verdades eternas não implica colocar em questão o conhecimento humano. (shrink)

As a tenacious and rigorous reader of the Cartesian corpus, Merleau-Ponty payed special attention to its ambiguities. On the one hand, the intellectualism of the Cartesian theory of perception (Dioptrique) goes along with a mechanistic physiology (Traité de l’Homme) and also with the substantial dualism of the first Méditations Métaphysiques. On the other, Descartes always insisted on hylomorphism, composition, permixtio and even substantial union. Thereby, the human body becomes endowed with such peculiar properties as its inner binding, indivisibility and a (...) biological self-interest, instilling a certain teleology into a part of extension. (shrink)

From the perspective of Cartesian doubt, this article explores the concept of the limitations of reasoning through the use of the Kantian words 'boundary' and 'barrier' in his Critique of Pure Reason. Hegel's critical dialogue with Kant is presented focusing on the limitation that the latter imposed on reason for the acquisition of the true knowledge of philosophical/metaphysical objects. For this purpose, the Hegelian position is presented from its discussion on the second chapter of the first section of the The (...) Doctrine of Being and references are made to conceptual elements of the Phenomenology of Spirit. (shrink)

Proceedings of the 2016 "one word" colloquium of the The Philosophical Society of Finland. The word was "Possibility".

Kant was never satisfied with the version of his “Refu- tation” published in 1787 (KrV, B 275-279). His dissatisfaction is already evident in the footnote added to the preface of the second edition of the Critique in 1787. As a matter of fact, Kant continued to rework his argument for at least six years after 1787. The main exegetical problem is to figure out who is the target of the “Refutation”: a non-skeptic idealist, a global skeptic of Cartesian provenance or (...) both. In this last case, the related problem is to know whether either of them is the Cartesian skeptic of the first Meditation, the idealist skeptic of the second Meditation and first part of the third Meditation, or some other non-skeptic idealist. I present and defend a new reconstruction of Kant’s “Refu- tation” as a successful argument against Mendelssohnian idealism of Cartesian provenance. This defense is based on a simple logical sketch of the proof provided by Dicker but essentially modified in light of Dyck’s insight about Kant’s opponent. How shall I support my reading? First, by appealing to overwhelming textual evidence according to which the proof is of the existence of mind-independent things, showing that Kant’s main opponent is Mendelssohn’s idealism of Cartesian provenance. Finally, I support my reading by showing that Kant’s “Refutation” is doomed to fail against all forms of global skepticism but is quite successful against Mendelssohn’s idealism. (shrink)

The aim of this paper has been to present a new reconstruction of Kant’s Refutation of Idealism. I have considered several different targets of the Refutation, five of them mentioned by Kant himself. I believe that I have shown that the Refutation of Idealism is best considered only as a sound argument against Mendelssohnian subjectivist idealism, against Mendelssohnian immaterialism, and against Mendelssohnian realist idealism. First, Kant’s Refutation is a sound argument in favor of the claim that the outer things represented (...) in our minds are real rather than ideal; that is, they exist mind-independently as noumena. And second, Kant’s refutation is a sound argument for a fundamental ontology of noumena: the ultimate nature of reality and of our minds is neither material nor mental but made up of things in themselves. (shrink)

Im ersten Teil(Abschnitte 2 und 3) rekapituliere ich einige grundlegende Bestimmungen des Dualismus von Natur und Geist, wie er auf Rene Descartes' Philosophie im 17. Jahrhundert zurückgeht. Damit soll nicht nur die bis heute anhaltende berechtigte Kritiken diesem Dualismus, sondern auch ihre unverkennbare Wirkungslosigkeit besser verständlich werden. Der bis in die Gegenwart reichende Einfluß der Natur-Geist-Entgegensetzung läßt vermuten, daß auch die Kritik noch in seinem Bann steht. In dieser Situation empfiehlt es sich, Abstand durch eine Besinnung auf die vorangehende aristotelische (...) Naturauffassung zu gewinnen. Deshalb stelle ich im zweiten Teil (Abschnitt 4) eine Interpretation von Aristoteles' Seelenlehre vor, die als Alternative oder zur Reformierung des cartesischen Dualismus geeignet ist. Dabei beschränke ich mich auf die mentalen Naturrepräsentationen, da ich ihnen den größten Stellenwert für Descartes' heutige Relevanz beimesse. Diese thematische Eingrenzung erlaubt es, mit der Seelenlehre auf Aristoteles' Naturbegriff zu rekurrieren, ohne die für ihn typische Opposition zum Begriff der Technik berücksichtigen zu müssen. Zur Begründung der modernen Naturwissenschaft war und ist die Ablehnung der antiken Kontrastierung von Natur und Technik unverzichtbar. Daß aber trotz der Legitimität dieser Zurückweisung zahlreiche Gründe für den aristotelischen Naturbegriff sprechen, geht auch auf seinen immer noch fruchtbaren anticartesischen Gehalt zurück. (shrink)

Leibniz argues against Descartes’s conception of material substance based on considerations of unity. I examine a key premise of Leibniz’s argument, what I call the Plurality Thesis—the claim that matter (i.e. extension alone) is a plurality of parts. More specifically, I engage an objection to the Plurality Thesis stemming from what I call Material Monism—the claim that the physical world is a single material substance. I argue that Leibniz can productively engage this objection based on his view that matter is (...) discrete. The discreteness of matter provides two aspects of support for the Plurality Thesis. First, it indicates that the parts of matter do not share boundaries and are, therefore, independent in an important sense. Second, it indicates that the parts of matter are determinate and are, therefore, ontologically prior to the wholes they compose. (shrink)

I offer a novel reading in this dissertation of René Descartes’s (1596–1650) skepticism in his work Meditations on First Philosophy (1641–1642). I specifically aim to answer the following problem: How is Descartes’s skepticism to be read in accordance with the rest of his philosophy? This problem can be divided into two more general questions in Descartes scholarship: How is skepticism utilized in the Meditations, and what are its intentions and relation to the preceding philosophical tradition? -/- I approach the topic (...) from both a historical and a text-based analysis, combining textual and contextual research. I examine Descartes’s skepticism against two main traditions in the historical analysis: philosophical skepticism and Aristotelian Scholasticism. I argue that skepticism in the Meditations is intended to oppose and upheave both Scholasticism and skepticism. The intended results of the work are not merely epistemological but also metaphysical and even ethical. Furthermore, these ambitions cannot be neatly distinguished but merge into each other. -/- The third historical context against which the skeptical meditations are examined is the literary genre of meditative exercises, particularly from the 1500–1600’s, which, while religiously and spiritually oriented, likewise provided the practitioner with an enlightened understanding of self-knowledge and their cognitive place in the world on the way to closer spiritual proximity to God. I argue by this reading that the skepticism of the Meditations is an attentive, meditational cognitive exercise that is not merely instrumental and methodological but is to have a genuine and serious (psychologically real) effect on our thinking. The skeptical meditation is not simply a theoretical thought experiment but is to be seriously practiced as a transformative process of reorienting one’s cognitive framework to discover truth, certainty, and a way to a happy, tranquil, and virtuous life. -/- I offer a close reading in the textual analysis of the first three meditations of the Meditations. I argue that the meditative skepticism employed in the work does not reject the previous beliefs but suspends judgment on them, withdrawing assent until further evidence can be found. I introduce a new term into Descartes scholarship in this analysis, based on the terminology of ancient skepticism: Cartesian epochē (gr. epochē, suspension, withdrawal). Instead of rejecting previous beliefs or assenting to the probably false, the skeptical procedure of the Meditations is argued to emulate in important ways the suspension of judgment on equally balanced reasons in ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism. Novel interpretations are presented along the way of the will’s freedom, of the First Meditation’s skeptical scenarios, of the cogito, and of the vindication of metaphysical certainty, as well as a clarification of the Cartesian Circle problem. -/- Reinterpreting the relation of Descartes’s skepticism to the preceding historical and literary traditions leads to a new look at the skeptical method itself. Presenting a new interpretation of skepticism in the Meditations leads at the same time to a new look at its relation to the historical context. The two research questions are, then, intrinsically tied together. -/- My focus in the study is on the Meditations, but I also reference and discuss Descartes’s other philosophical works, as well as his correspondence, when necessary. (shrink)

In this paper, I join the so-called voluntarism debate on Descartes’s theory of will and judgment, arguing for an indirect doxastic voluntarism reading of Descartes, as opposed to a classic, or direct doxastic voluntarism. More specifically, I examine the question whether Descartes thinks the will can have a direct and full control over one’s suspension of judgment. Descartes was a doxastic voluntarist, maintaining that the will has some kind of control over one’s doxastic states, such as belief and doubt. According (...) to a long-held reading, the control that the will has over doxastic states in Descartes’s theory is direct; the doxastic states are affected by the mere act of will. This reading is called direct doxastic voluntarism (DDV), or direct voluntarism (DV) for short, and it states that we are capable of assenting, rejecting and suspending a judgment based only on our will to do so. Thus, these actions would be utterly and merely volitional. DV can be divided into two further positions, direct positive voluntarism (+DV) and direct negative voluntarism (-DV). Direct positive voluntarism deals with the act of forming judgments, maintaining that one can accept or deny a proposition wilfully and either merely believe or not believe something voluntarily. Direct negative voluntarism deals with the suspension of judgment, maintaining that it can likewise be accomplished by a simple act of will. However, I support an alternate account of Descartes’s voluntarism, which is called indirect doxastic voluntarism (IDV), or indirect voluntarism (IV) for short. By this account, the will is capable of affecting a doxastic state indirectly by making one concentrate on essential tasks for forming that state, such as gathering up and paying attention to strong reasons and evidence. IV is also possible to divide into indirect positive voluntarism (+IV) and indirect negative voluntarism (-IV). Per indirect positive voluntarism the will needs to pay attention to reasons for accepting or denying some proposition. Likewise, by indirect negative voluntarism, in order to suspend judgment the will needs to direct this attention to the reasons for doubt. By attending to these reasons, the will also comes face-to-face with its own freedom. This feeling of freedom can be described as affectivity of the reasons for belief (assent) and doubt (suspension). (shrink)

Spinoza rarely refers to art. However, there are extensive resources for a Spinozist aesthetics in his discussion of health in the Ethics and of social affects in his political works. There have been recently been a few essays linking Spinoza and art, but this essay additionally fuses Spinoza’s politics to an affective aesthetics. Spinoza’s statements that art makes us healthier (Ethics 4p54Sch; Emendation section 17) form the foundation of an aesthetics. In Spinoza’s definition, “health” is caused by external objects that (...) maintain our power to act in a variety of ways. Humans need such objects because our complex bodies constantly lose or consume many parts necessary to our overall functioning. Notably, Spinoza defines humans’ bodies through this complexity (2p13Sch), so health as maintenance of complexity is a distinctly human endeavor. Further, while art is not the only healthy activity, I argue that art is a particularly potent cure, which explains Spinoza’s otherwise opaque comment that music can cure melancholy (by which he meant a near-total inability to act, akin to death). Rather than only causing frivolous pleasures, art may be as essential to human flourishing as are other human beings in general; other people are “most useful” because of the variety of actions they make possible (4p35Cor & Sch1). Art’s production of a dizzying variety of affects is likewise most useful for health. -/- Having established how art in general affects the individual, I then explain the role of artists in shaping social groups. Artists use vivid and highly charged affective techniques, as do political sovereigns and religious prophets (TTP chapters 1-2 & 15-16). However, sovereigns and prophets are concerned exclusively with “morality,” defined by Spinoza as the use of affects (primarily based on fear and hope) to produce “obedience” in the generic multitude or people at large. An artist, however, rarely causes affects in the whole nation, affecting instead only a smaller niche or “sub-genre” of people. The affects produced in this group are also not identical to those used by sovereigns, since artists do not primarily deploy sad affects of hope and fear but instead use a wide variety of joyful affects. Further, in Spinoza’s analysis of ceremonies (TTP chapter 5), we see how small groups exposed to repeated ceremonies or social practices eventually develop new strengths which they lacked before. Repeated exposure to shared aesthetic “ceremonies” (e.g., live music performances) of the same sub-genre will over time create the capacity of new powers in the sub-genre of people, which distinguishes them from the masses. Spinoza says sovereigns forge a “second nature” for the generic people through affects; we can then affirm that smaller groups exposed to a distinct sub-genre of art can acquire a new “third nature” which will contain unique powers extending beyond healthy maintenance of their existing bodies. That is, art in general is necessary to flourish and remain whole (maintaining health), but it can also occasionally expand what one is to unforeseen heights (through specific artistic sub-genres). (shrink)

En la desolación de la Francia en poder de las guerras de religión, para Montaigne, la imposibilidad de distinguir entre civilización y barbarie se enlaza al rechazo de la distinción misma entre el hombre y el animal: es el abandono del motivo humanístico de la grandeza y centralidad del hombre en el plano del universo. Sostiene, de hecho, una amistad 'pitagórica' con respecto a los animales. Están completamente ausentes en Montaigne aquellos animales fantásticos, monstruosos, que los bestiarios medievales a menudo (...) sitúan en regiones lejanas del espacio y el tiempo, y que una lábil frontera separaba de los animales reales. In the midst of France's desolation caused by the religious wars, Montaigne rejects the distinction between civilization and barbarism as much as the distinction between man and animal-which means a rejection to the humanistic idea of man's greatness and centrality regarding the universe. He supports, in fact, a "Pythagoric" friendship with animals. In Montaigne there will not be found those fantastic, monstrous animals that the medieval bestiaries located in a faraway space and time, and that only a labile line separated from real animals. (shrink)

Tässä artikkelissa käsittelen Descartesin ikuisten totuuksien välttämättömyyteen liittyvää ongelmaa. Teoksessa Mietiskelyjä ensimmäisestä filosofiasta (1641–1642) Descartes nostaa esiin käsitteen ikuisista totuuksista, käyttäen esimerkkinään kolmiota. Kolmion muuttumattomaan ja ikuiseen luontoon kuuluu esimerkiksi, että sen kolme kulmaa ovat yhteenlaskettuna 180°. Se on totta kolmiosta, vaikka yhtään yksittäistä kolmiota ei olisi koskaan ollutkaan olemassa. Eräät ajattelemieni asioiden piirteet ovat siis Descartesin mukaan ajattelustani riippumattomia. Ikuisia totuuksia ovat ainakin matemaattiset ja geometriset tosiseikat sekä ristiriidan laki. Samoin Descartesin kuuluisa lause “ajattelen, siis olen” lukeutuu ikuisten totuuksien (...) joukkoon. Descartesin ikuiset totuudet olisivatkin siis loogisesti välttämättömiä. Niillä on kyseinen olemus riippumatta ulkoisten kohteiden olemassaolosta tai siitä, ajattelenko niitä lainkaan. Kuitenkin kirjeenvaihdossaan Descartes pitää itsepintaisesti kiinni käsityksestään, että ikuiset totuudet ovat Jumalan vapaasti luomia ja Jumala olisi voinut luoda ne erilailla. Näin ollen luodut ikuiset totuudet eivät tarkkaan ottaen olisikaan välttämättömiä vaan kontingentteja. Ne voisivat olla myös toisella tavalla. Artikkelin alkuun esittelen Descartesin modaalista metafysiikkaa sekä luotujen ikuisten totuuksien kontingenttiudesta seuraavia tulkinnallisia vaikeuksia. Tämän jälkeen pureudun kolmeen erilaiseen ratkaisuyritykseen kommentaarikirjallisuudessa (Frankfurt 1977; Curley 1984 & Bennett 1994) ja osoitan, miksi ne eivät riitä vastaamaan ongelmaan. Lopussa vedän johtopäätöksiä ja luonnostelen mahdollisen ratkaisun. (shrink)

resumo O propósito deste artigo é o de discutir em linhas gerais a relação entre método e me t a f í s ica na filosof ia de Descartes. Pre t e ndemos fazê-lo me d ia nte a cont raposição das Meditações de filosofia primeira às Regras para a direção do espírito quanto a alguns temas em comum. Nosso objetivo principal é questio nar o papel desempenhado pela evid ê nc ia intelectual no cont exto epistemo l ó g (...) ico das Regras e no cont exto metafísico das Meditações. Retoma ndo, num prime i ro mo me nto, algumas int e r p retações sobre o assunto e discutindo, num segundo momento, a natureza da dúvida e a noção de evidênc ia nas Meditações, pro c u ramos concluir com a sugestão de que no sistema cartesia no tem lugar um conflito de ordem estrutural entre método e metafísica.palavras-chave método; metafísica; evidência; dúvida; idéia; existência. (shrink)

Descartes understood the subject matter of physics (or natural philosophy) to encompass the whole of nature, including living things. It therefore comprised not only nonvital phenomena, including those we would now denominate as physical, chemical, minerological, magnetic, and atmospheric; it also extended to the world of plants and animals, including the human animal (with the exception of those aspects of the human mind that Descartes assigned to solely to thinking substance: pure intellect and will). Descartes wrote extensively on physiology and (...) on the physiology and psychology of the senses. This chapter examines the notions of *physiology* and *psychology* in medical and natural philosophical works of Descartes' day; follows his efforts to bring physiology into his mechanistic idiom; considers the relation between physiology of the animal machine and psychological functions that yield functionally appropriate behavior; goes into his physiology and psychology of vision; and elaborates the tension in Descartes' works between his metaphysically supported micro-corpuscularism and his discussion of the animal machine as an organic unity comprising various functionally and teleologically characterized systems. The chapter draws on Descartes' works in both metaphysics and natural philosophy, including his Treatise on Man (originally published as L'Homme, 1664). (shrink)

O termo sujeito na filosofia aristotélico-tomista era empregado no sentido de fundamento, substrato, referindo-se a qualquer substância. Com a Idade Moderna surge Descartes que desencadeará uma verdadeira revoluçáo na concepçáo filosófica de sujeito: o homem passa a ser o fundamento primeiro de toda a realidade, sujeito único, inaugurando-se a filosofia da subjetividade. O sujeito cartesiano primeiro é o ego do cogito ( penso ), em que o homem é concebido apenas como espírito, substância pensante . Entretanto, o caminhar meditativo de (...) Descartes aponta para novos desdobramentos de sua concepçáo de homem e conseqüentemente do sujeito, permitindo-nos falar de uma subjetividade corporal. Por outro lado, a realidade das paixões nos leva também a considerar a existência de um sujeito resultante da uniáo alma-corpo. (shrink)