- Indeterminate Oughts.J. Robert G. Williams - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):645-673.details
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Does MITE Make Right? Decision-Making Under Normative Uncertainty.Brian Hedden - 2016 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 11. Oxford University Press UK. pp. 102-128.details
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Blame and wrongdoing.Jessica Brown - 2017 - Episteme 14 (3):275-296.details
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Explaining away epistemic skepticism about culpability.Gunnar Björnsson - 2013 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford studies in agency and responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 141–164.details
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Veritism Unswamped.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):381-435.details
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Just do it? When to do what you judge you ought to do.Julien Dutant & Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3755-3772.details
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Responsibility for Strategic Ignorance.Jan Willem Wieland - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4477-4497.details
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When Ignorance is No Excuse.Maria Alvarez & Clayton Littlejohn - 2017 - In Philip Robichaud & Jan Willem Wieland (eds.), Responsibility - The Epistemic Condition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 64-81.details
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Explaining (away) the epistemic condition on moral responsibility.Gunnar Björnsson - 2017 - In Philip Robichaud & Jan Willem Wieland (eds.), Responsibility - The Epistemic Condition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 146–162.details
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You ought to ϕ only if you may believe that you ought to ϕ.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):760-82.details
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What's Special about Moral Ignorance?Jan Willem Wieland - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2).details
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Normativity without Cartesian privilege.Amia Srinivasan - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):273-299.details
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"Transforming Others: On the Limits of "You "ll Be Glad I Did It" Reasoning.Dana Sarah Howard - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):341-370.details
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A Plea for Epistemic Excuses.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant Fabian Dorsch (ed.), The New Evil Demon Problem. Oxford University Press.details
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Moral ignorance and blameworthiness.Elinor Mason - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):3037-3057.details
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Should have known.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2863-2894.details
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Reasons and Theoretical Rationality.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Adventures in Moral Consistency: How to Develop an Abortion Ethic through an Animal Rights Framework.Cheryl E. Abbate - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (1):145-164.details
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Moral responsibility.Andrew Eshleman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Running risks morally.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):141-163.details
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Free Will Agnosticism.Stephen Kearns - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):235-252.details
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Normative Uncertainty without Theories.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):747-762.details
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Are We Playing a Moral Lottery? Moral Disagreement from a Metasemantic Perspective.Sinan Dogramaci - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):523-550.details
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Must We Worry About Epistemic Shirkers?Daniele Bruno - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-26.details
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How Far Can Genealogies Affect the Space of Reasons? Vindication, Justification and Excuses.Francesco Testini - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Nonhuman Moral Agency: A Practice-Focused Exploration of Moral Agency in Nonhuman Animals and Artificial Intelligence.Dorna Behdadi - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Gothenburgdetails
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An Instrumentalist Theory of Political Legitimacy.Matthias Brinkmann - 2024 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Schuldhafte Unkenntnis und moralische Überforderung in der Konsumethik.Lukas Naegeli - 2023 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 77 (4):543-567.details
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It was a Different Time: Judging Historical Figures by Today’s Moral Standards.Alfred Archer & Benjamin Matheson - forthcoming - Journal of Applied Philosophy.details
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A Bargaining-Theoretic Approach to Moral Uncertainty.Hilary Greaves & Owen Cotton-Barratt - 2023 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 21 (1-2):127-169.details
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The Subjective Ought and the Accessibility of Moral Truths.Frederick Choo - 2024 - American Philosophical Quarterly 61 (3):245-253.details
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Reasonable standards and exculpating moral ignorance.Nathan Biebel - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (1):1-21.details
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Haters and egoists: Quality of will and degrees of moral responsibility.Martin Montminy - 2023 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 61 (3):491-505.details
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Varieties of moral mistake.Zoë Johnson King - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (3):718-742.details
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At least you tried: The value of De Dicto concern to do the right thing.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (9):2707-2730.details
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The Problem of Morally Repugnant Beliefs.Declan Smithies - 2023 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 18. Oxford University Press. pp. 218-241.details
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Difficulty & quality of will: implications for moral ignorance.Anna Hartford - forthcoming - Tandf: Philosophical Explorations:1-18.details
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Contributing to Historical-Structural Injustice via Morally Wrong Acts.Jennifer M. Https://Orcidorg Page - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (5):1197-1211.details
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Defending the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility.Martin Montminy - 2021 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 20 (2).details
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Excuse without Exculpation: The Case of Moral Ignorance.Paulina Sliwa - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 72-95.details
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A Review of Elinor Mason’s Ways to be Blameworthy. [REVIEW]Andreas Brekke Carlsson - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (1):215-221.details
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Moral Appraisal for Everyone: Neurodiversity, Epistemic Limitations, and Responding to the Right Reasons.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (3):733-752.details
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Embracing Incoherence.Claire Field - 2021 - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-29.details
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Can morally ignorant agents care enough?Daniel J. Miller - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):155-173.details
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Collective culpable ignorance.Niels de Haan - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):99-108.details
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Evidence-Coherence Conflicts Revisited.Alex Worsnip - 2021 - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
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The epistemic demands of friendship: friendship as inherently knowledge-involving.Cathy Mason - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2439-2455.details
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Radical Externalism.Amia Srinivasan - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (3):395-431.details
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Ought-contextualism and reasoning.Darren Bradley - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2977-2999.details
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Is it OK to Make Mistakes? Appraisal and False Normative Belief.Claire Field - 2019 - Dissertation, University of St Andrewsdetails
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