- Salience Reasoning.Gerald J. Postema - 2008 - Topoi 27 (1-2):41-55.details
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Maximalism and Moral Harmony.Douglas W. Portmore - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):318-341.details
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Responsible Belief, Influence, and Control: Response to Stephen White.Rik Peels - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Research 44:53-62.details
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Educating for ignorance.Rik Peels & Duncan Pritchard - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7949-7963.details
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Against Doxastic Compatibilism.Rik Peels - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):679-702.details
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Against Doxastic Compatibilism.Rik Peels - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):679-702.details
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Contrastive Intentions.Andrew Peet - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (4):24.details
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Mental action.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (6):e12741.details
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How to judge intentionally.Antonia Peacocke - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):330-339.details
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The very idea of rational irrationality.Spencer Paulson - 2024 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 23 (1):3-21.details
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Social Objects, Response-Dependence, and Realism.Asya Passinsky - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (4):431-443.details
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What do we epistemically owe to each other? A reply to Basu.Robert Carry Osborne - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):1005-1022.details
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Doxastic responsibility, guidance control, and ownership of belief.Robert Carry Osborne - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):82-98.details
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A social solution to the puzzle of doxastic responsibility: a two-dimensional account of responsibility for belief.Robert Carry Osborne - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9335-9356.details
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A social solution to the puzzle of doxastic responsibility: a two-dimensional account of responsibility for belief.Robert Carry Osborne - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9335-9356.details
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Why is Epistemic Evaluation Prescriptive?Kate Nolfi - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):97-121.details
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Which Mental States Are Rationally Evaluable, And Why?Kate Nolfi - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):41-63.details
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Functional belief and judgmental belief.Kate Nolfi - 2017 - Synthese 197 (12):5301-5317.details
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Games and the art of agency.C. Thi Nguyen - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (4):423-462.details
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How Privacy Rights Engender Direct Doxastic Duties.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2022 - Journal of Value Inquiry 56 (4):547-562.details
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Epistemic Reasons Are Not Normative Reasons for Belief.Samuel Montplaisir - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (4):573-587.details
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Epistemic Akrasia and Mental Agency.Cristina Borgoni - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):827-842.details
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The Reasons-Responsiveness Account of Doxastic Responsibility.Anne Meylan - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (4):877-893.details
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Requesting Belief.Benjamin McMyler - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1).details
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Obedience and Believing a Person.Benjamin McMyler - 2015 - Philosophical Investigations 39 (1):58-77.details
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On not making up one’s own mind.Benjamin McMyler - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):2765-2781.details
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Entkräftung und Widerruf: Fügsame Überzeugungen im Zeitverlauf.Benjamin McMyler - 2019 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 67 (6):992-1007.details
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All Reasons are Fundamentally for Attitudes.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (2).details
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When a Free Act Costs a Motive: Clearing Consequentialism of Conflict.Austen McDougal - 2023 - Utilitas 35 (1):25-39.details
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Taking control of belief.Miriam McCormick - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):169-183.details
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The Ethics of Belief.Berislav Marušić - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (1):33-43.details
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Intentions, Permissibility, and Choice.Anton Markoč - 2018 - Res Publica 24 (4):493-508.details
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Asymmetry arguments.Berislav Marušić - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1081-1102.details
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On fundamental responsibility.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):198-213.details
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Two Faces of Responsibility for Beliefs.Giulia Luvisotto - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (7):761-776.details
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The Normative Complexity of Virtues.Giulia Luvisotto - 2023 - Philosophies 8 (5):77.details
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Non-rational aspects of skilled agency.Yannig Luthra - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2267-2289.details
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Epistemic instrumentalism.Matthew Lockard - 2013 - Synthese 190 (9):1701-1718.details
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The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.details
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Constitutive Reasons and the Suspension of Judgement.Whitney Lilly - 2019 - Dialogue 58 (2):215-224.details
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Changing One's Mind: Self‐Conscious Belief and Rational Endorsement.Adam Leite - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):150-171.details
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The Real Myth of Coherence.Wooram Lee - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1211-1230.details
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Reasoning, rational requirements, and occurrent attitudes.Wooram Lee - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1343-1357.details
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À la défense du déontologisme doxastique.Daniel Laurier - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (1):37.details
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Decentering and attention.Victor Lange - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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Why doxastic responsibility is not based on direct doxastic control.Andrea Kruse - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2811-2842.details
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Belief as an act of reason.Nicholas Koziolek - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (4):287-318.details
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A pluralistic account of epistemic rationality.Matthew Kopec - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3571-3596.details
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The Myth of Practical Consistency.Niko Kolodny - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):366-402.details
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