- Belief as an act of reason.Nicholas Koziolek - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (4):287-318.details
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A pluralistic account of epistemic rationality.Matthew Kopec - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3571-3596.details
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The Myth of Practical Consistency.Niko Kolodny - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):366-402.details
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The uncomfortable truth about wrongful life cases.Hyunseop Kim - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):623-641.details
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Inference Is Not a Process.Christian Kietzmann - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):539-549.details
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Accounting for Doxastic Agency: Mental Action and Self-Awareness.Sophie Keeling - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-24.details
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The Activity of Reasoning: How Reasoning Can Constitute Epistemic Agency.David Jenkins - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (3):413-428.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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A Permissivist Defense of Pascal’s Wager.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2315-2340.details
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Self-deceptive resistance to self-knowledge.Graham Hubbs - 2018 - Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 13 (2):25-47.details
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In Defense of Constitutivism About Epistemic Normativity.David Horst - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (2):232-258.details
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The reasons of trust.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):213 – 236.details
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Making a Difference.Pamela Hieronymi - 2011 - Social Theory and Practice 37 (1):81-94.details
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Reflection and Responsibility.Pamela Hieronymi - 2014 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (1):3-41.details
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Responsibility for believing.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):357-373.details
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Believing at Will.Pamela Hieronymi - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 35 (sup1):149-187.details
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Expressivism and Explaining Irrationality: Reply to Baker.Sebastian Hengst - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2503-2516.details
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Diachronic agency and practical entitlement.Matthew Heeney - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):177-198.details
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Strong cognitivist weaknesses.Nathan Hauthaler - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 64 (2):161-176.details
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Epistemic Responsibility and Criminal Negligence.Alexander Greenberg - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (1):91-111.details
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Interlocking content and attitude: a reply to the anti-normativist.Javier González de Prado & Víctor M. Verdejo - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (10):1051-1072.details
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Doxastic Responsibility is Owed to Others.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Research 44:63-77.details
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A normative account of epistemic luck.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):97-109.details
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Intentions, compliance, and fiduciary obligations.Stephen R. Galoob & Ethan J. Leib - 2014 - Legal Theory 20 (2):106-132.details
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Doxastic Voluntarism: A Sceptical Defence.Danny Frederick - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (1):24-44.details
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Evidentialism in action.A. K. Flowerree - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3409-3426.details
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A “Good” Explanation of Five Puzzles about Reasons.Stephen Finlay - 2019 - Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):62-104.details
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III—Doxastic Wrongs, Non-Spurious Generalizations and Particularized Beliefs.Cécile Fabre - 2022 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 122 (1):47-69.details
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Emotions, Attitudes, and Reasons.Kelly Epley - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):256-282.details
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Is epistemic agency possible?Pascal Engel - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):158-178.details
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Epistemic responsibility without epistemic agency.Pascal Engel - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):205 – 219.details
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Croyance et spontanéité.Pascal Engel - 2009 - Philosophiques 36 (1):215-220.details
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A classification of Newcomb problems and decision theories.Kenny Easwaran - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 27):6415-6434.details
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The Attitudes We Can Have.Daniel Drucker - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):591-642.details
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Testimony from a Popperian perspective.Antoni Diller - 2008 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (4):419-456.details
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Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu & Mark Schroeder - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 181-205.details
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What is (In)coherence?Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:184-206.details
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Deliberative Control and Eliminativism about Reasons for Emotions.Conner Schultz - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Belief as Commitment to the Truth.Keshav Singh - forthcoming - In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong (eds.), The Nature of Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Do Reasons Expire? An Essay on Grief.Berislav Marušić - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.details
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Action.George Wilson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The ethics of belief.Andrew Chignell - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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El problema de las razones inadecuadas.Miranda del Corral - 2014 - Factótum 11:103-111.details
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The Powers that bind : doxastic voluntarism and epistemic obligation.Neil Levy & Eric Mandelbaum - 2014 - In Jonathan Matheson (ed.), The Ethics of Belief. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 12-33.details
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On Fundamental Responsibility.Anna Sara Malmgren - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):198-213.details
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Matters of Interpersonal Trust.Andrew Kirton - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Manchesterdetails
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How inference isn’t blind: Self-conscious inference and its role in doxastic agency.David Jenkins - 2019 - Dissertation, King’s College Londondetails
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Beliefs That Wrong.Rima Basu - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Southern Californiadetails
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Knowledge as a Thick Concept: New Light on the Gettier and Value Problems.Brent G. Kyle - 2011 - Dissertation, Cornell Universitydetails
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Descartes on Will and Suspension of Judgment: Affectivity of the Reasons for Doubt.Jan Forsman - 2017 - In Gábor Boros, Judit Szalai & Oliver Istvan Toth (eds.), The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy. Budapest, Hungary: pp. 38-58.details
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