- Non-Inferential Moral Knowledge.Elizabeth Tropman - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (4):355-366.details
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Intuitional Epistemology in Ethics.Matthew S. Bedke - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1069-1083.details
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(1 other version)Moral intuitions, moral expertise and moral reasoning.Albert W. Musschenga - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 43 (4):597-613.details
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Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.Guy Kahane - 2010 - Noûs 45 (1):103-125.details
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In defence of repugnance.Michael Huemer - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):899-933.details
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Ethical Intuitions: What They Are, What They Are Not, and How They Justify.Matthew S. Bedke - 2008 - American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (3):253-270.details
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Against Metasemantics-First Moral Epistemology.Jesse Hambly & Shang Long Yeo - forthcoming - The Journal of Ethics:1-21.details
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The reliability challenge to moral intuitions.Dario Cecchini - 2024 - Neuroethics 17 (2):1-13.details
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When does self‐interest distort moral belief?Nicholas Smyth - 2022 - Wiley: Analytic Philosophy 2 (4):392-408.details
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The Epistemology of Debunking Argumentation.Jonathan Egeland - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):837-852.details
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The Epistemic Significance of Emotional Experience.Brian Scott Ballard - 2021 - Emotion Review 13 (2):113-124.details
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Between Realism and Relativism: Moral Certainty as a Third Option.Samuel Laves - 2020 - Philosophical Forum 51 (3):297-313.details
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Moral Intuitions from the Perspective of Contemporary Descriptive Ethics.Petra Chudárková - 2019 - Teorie Vědy / Theory of Science 41 (2):259-282.details
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Experimental ethics, intuitions, and morally irrelevant factors.Peter Königs - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2605-2623.details
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Genealogy, Epistemology and Worldmaking.Amia Srinivasan - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (2):127-156.details
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Can Theists Avoid Epistemological Objections to Moral (and Normative) Realism?Justin Morton - 2019 - Faith and Philosophy 36 (3):291-312.details
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(1 other version)Resources and the acceptability of the Repugnant Conclusion.Stephen J. Schmidt - forthcoming - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science.details
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The argument from agreement: How universal values undermine moral realism.Hanno Sauer - 2019 - Ratio 32 (4):339-352.details
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Explaining historical moral convergence: the empirical case against realist intuitionism.Jeroen Hopster - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1255-1273.details
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Debunking leftward progress.Michael Huemer - 2019 - Ratio 32 (4):312-324.details
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Kindliche »Unschuld« ist kein Ideal: Tugendethik und Kind-Erwachsenen-Sex.Thomas O’Carroll - 2018 - Gäufelden, Germany: Thomas Leske. Edited by Thomas Leske.details
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Moral Knowledge Without Justification? A Critical Discussion of Intuitionist Moral Epistemology.Philipp Schwind - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Miamidetails
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Moral Perception without (Prior) Moral Knowledge.Preston J. Werner - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (2):164-181.details
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Experimental Philosophy, Noisy Intuitions, and Messy Inferences.Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2016 - In Jennifer Nado (ed.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy & Philosophical Methodology. New York: Bloomsbury Academic.details
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A New Evolutionary Debunking Argument Against Moral Realism.Justin Morton - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (2):233-253.details
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Do evolutionary debunking arguments rest on a mistake about evolutionary explanations?Andreas L. Mogensen - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1799-1817.details
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Intuitive And Reflective Responses In Philosophy.Nick Byrd - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Coloradodetails
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Ethical Intuitionism: A Structural Critique.Danny Frederick - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (3):631-47.details
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Generics, generalism, and reflective equilibrium: Implications for moral theorizing from the study of language.Adam Lerner & Sarah-Jane Leslie - 2013 - Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):366-403.details
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(1 other version)Ethical Non-Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Supervenience.Tristram McPherson - 2012 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 7. Oxford University Press. pp. 205.details
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Meta‐normative Realism, Evolution, and Our Reasons to Survive.Jeff Behrends - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):486-502.details
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(1 other version)The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton Universitydetails
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Wide reflective equilibrium as a method of justification in bioethics.Peter Nichols - 2012 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 33 (5):325-341.details
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Unifying Moral Methodology.Tristram Mcpherson - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):523-549.details
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Antinatalism, Asymmetry, and an Ethic of Prima Facie Duties.Gerald Harrison - 2012 - South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):94-103.details
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Can Moral Anti-Realists Theorize?Michael Zhao - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (3):693-709.details
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Can Rational Reflection Save Moral Knowledge From Debunking?Noah McKay - 2023 - Episteme 1:1-16.details
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Defusing the Regress Challenge to Debunking Arguments.Shang Long Yeo - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):785-800.details
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Famine, Affluence and Intuitions: Evolutionary Debunking Proves Too Much.Geoffrey S. Holtzman - 2018 - Disputatio 10 (48):57-70.details
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A debunking argument against speciesism.François Jaquet - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1011-1027.details
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The Methodological Irrelevance of Reflective Equilibrium.Tristram McPherson - 2015 - In Christopher Daly (ed.), Palgrave Handbook on Philosophical Methods. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 652-674.details
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Sinnott‐Armstrong Meets Modest Epistemological Intuitionism.Hossein Dabbagh - 2017 - Philosophical Forum 48 (2):175-199.details
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Why so negative? Evidence aggregation and armchair philosophy.Brian Talbot - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3865-3896.details
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Evolutionary Debunking, Moral Realism and Moral Knowledge.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (1):1-38.details
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Reflective Equilibrium Without Intuitions?Georg Brun - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):237-252.details
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Evolutionary debunking arguments and the reliability of moral cognition.Benjamin James Fraser - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):457-473.details
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Intuitions as Intellectual Seemings.Berit Brogaard - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (4):382-393.details
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Moral Relativism and Moral Expressivism.Berit Brogaard - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):538-556.details
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A dilemma for evolutionary debunking arguments.Uri D. Leibowitz - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (1):45-69.details
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Antinatalism and Moral Particularism.Gerald K. Harrison - 2019 - Essays in Philosophy 20 (1):66-88.details
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