This paper examines Harold Garfinkel's notion of the natural attitude about sex and his claim that it is fundamentally moral in nature. The author looks beneath the natural attitude in order to explain its peculiar resilience and oppressive force. There she reveals a moral order grounded in the dichotomously sexed bodies so constituted through boundaries governing privacy and decency. In particular, naked bodies are sex-differentiated within a system of genital representation through gender presentation—a system that helps constitute the very boundaries (...) between the public and private. (shrink)

The paper deals with the ways in which Edmund Husserl develops the question of God. Six ways to reach God are shown as present in Husserl’s writings, some of them seem to be very close to the traditional philosophical ways to go as far as God (the objective and the subjective ways) others are very original, in particular the way that starts from the analysis of the hyletic sphere of the human being, a sphere which is present in all the (...) reality too. At last it is possible to notice Husserl’s interest in the mystical approach to God. (shrink)

In CyberPhilosophy: The Intersection of Philosophy and Computing, edited by James H. Moor and Terrell Ward Bynum (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2002), 66-77. Also in Metaphilosophy 33.1/2 (2002): 70-82.

In some of his writings, George Psathas suggests that Alfred Schutz’s account of social-scientific methodology as constructing ideal types falls short of ethnomethodology’s approach, which, by giving an account of how actors produce their social order, exemplifies a kind of social-scientific following of Husserl’s stipulation that phenomenology return to “the things themselves”. By distinguishing Schutz’s phenomenology of the natural attitude which does return to the things themselves from his account of social scientific methodology, one can conceive various social-scientific methodologies legitimately (...) serving different scientific purposes with reference to the life-world basis, for instance, ideal–typical methodologies that might seek solutions to problems and ethnomethodological methods that capture actors’ production of order and mimic the phenomenological return to the things themselves. Despite delineating this distinction between phenomenology and ethnomethodology, which Psathas too makes, ethnomethodology reveals many of the investigative tendencies of phenomenology and the two can be seen to engage each other indirectly and interactively. Finally, ethnomethodologists maintain some intellectual, relevance-guided distance from the everyday actors they study, however minimal the distance between them and the actors they study may be. (shrink)

The relationship between an independent scientific discipline called psychology with phenomenology that presents the methodology and method together is an excuse for investigating the relationship between Husserl and Brentano’s thoughts. Although their relationship is come from different sources, according to Husserl’s main problem, end, and concern in confronting psychology, a researcher can find a good issue for research. Psychology and phenomenology bond together in favor of philosophy and seek a different intuition. Husserl keeps a type of psychology and uses it (...) to achieve a philosophical attitude. The difference between Husserl and Brentano is both thematic and methodological, and of course, we can refer to the understanding of others and empathy that reduces the subjective aspect of the experience in Husserl’s phenomenology. Husserl goes to descriptive psychology with criticizing Brentano’s opinion about inner perception and also he criticizes Brentano's psychological reality that is the only appearance for him. Husserl’s attempt for modifying descriptive psychology makes to provides practical and functional solutions for contemporary psychologists. Of course, he does not forget the distinctions between psychology and phenomenology in terms of issue and method but especially holds them together. The brief article wants to follow the relationship between psychology and phenomenology from its origin (Husserl’s phenomenology) to achieve this purpose, the data of research have been collected through the library method and internet search then they are described and analyzed to reveal the concomitance of psychology and phenomenology. They must come together in the interpretation of the word description. (shrink)

As plagiarism is a notion specific to a particular culture and epoch, and is also understood in a variety of ways by individuals, particular attention must be paid to the putting of the phenomenological question, What is plagiarism in its appearing? Resolution of this issue leads us to locate students' perceptions and opinions within the lifeworld, and to seek an initially idiographic set of descriptions. Of twelve interview analyses, three are presented. A student who took an especially anxious line, his (...) morality having to do with the fear of being shamed were he to be accused of plagiarism in his work. A student who saw academic development as the movement from dependence on respected authors such that the novice's work is near plagiaristic, to autonomy and self-assured originality. A student whose degree involved painting and art history—disciplines with very distinct understandings of plagiarism. To combat plagiarism, then, one must not assume that students have a prior grasp of the unequivocal meaning of the notion, but must accept that a process of acculturation is required. (shrink)

The realm of intentionality is definitive of phenomenology as a reflective methodology. Yet it is precisely the focus on the intentionalgiventhat has been condemned recently.Speculative realism argues that phenomenology is unsatisfactory since the reduction to the intentional realm excludes the ‘external’, i.e. reality independent of consciousness. This criticism allows me to clarify the nature of intentionality.Material phenomenologyfinds, in contrast, that the intentional realm excludes the ‘inner’. This criticism allows me to discuss the way in whichipseityenters as an element of experience. (...) Intentionality, viewed psychologically, is rightly the distinct arena of phenomenological psychology. However, there is no doubting the difficulty of maintaining a research focus precisely on the realm of intentionality; there areaporiasof the reduction. I discuss some of the difficulties. (shrink)

Phenomenology and experimental psychology have been largely interested in the same thing when it comes to attention. By building on the work of Aron Gurwitsch, especially his ideas of attention and restructuration, this paper attempts to articulate common ground in psychology and phenomenology of attention through discussion of a new way to think about multistability in some phenomena. What psychology views as an attentionality-intentionality phenomenon, phenomenology views as an intentionality-attentionality phenomenon. The proposal is that an awareness of this restructuring of (...) attentionality and intentionality can benefit both approaches to attention. After reviewing Husserl’s position on attentionality and intentionality, this paper examines multistable phenomena, redefines the attentional transformation called restructuring, discusses disciplinary perspectives on attention and gives an example using common ground. (shrink)

This essay reflects on what it means to bring together the disciplines of Husserlian philosophy and psychology in light of current thinking about interdisciplinarity. Drawing from Allen Repko’s work on the interdisciplinary research process, aspects highlighted include justifying using an interdisciplinary approach, identifying conflicts between disciplinary insights, creating common ground between concepts, and constructing a more comprehensive understanding. To focus the discussion and provide an example, I use Aron Gurwitsch’s work of extending the concepts and theories of Gestalt psychology to (...) phenomenology. Gurwitsch’s writings can be seen as an attempt to first construct common ground for conflicting insights within psychology and within phenomenology, then create common ground for conflicting insights between psychology and phenomenology. Gurwitsch’s work can be taken as a kind of case study or adaptable model of how to find convergence. The ultimate goal is to bring interdisciplinary studies into productive conversation with phenomenological psychology. (shrink)

Part of teaching the descriptive phenomenological psychological method is to assist students in grasping their previously unrecognized assumptions regarding the meaning of “science.” This paper is intended to address a variety of assumptions that are encountered when introducing students to the descriptive phenomenological psychological method pioneered by Giorgi. These assumptions are: 1) That the meaning of “science” is exhausted by empirical science, and therefore qualitative research, even if termed “human science,” is more akin to literature or art than methodical, scientific (...) inquiry; 2) That as a primarily aesthetic, poetic enterprise human scientific psychology need not attempt to achieve a degree of rigor and epistemological clarity analogous to that pursued by natural scientists; 3) That “objectivity” is a concept belonging to natural science, and therefore human science ought not to strive for objectivity because this would require “objectivizing” the human being; 4) That qualitative research must always adopt an “interpretive” approach, description being seen as merely a mode of interpretation. These assumptions are responded to from a perspective drawing primarily upon Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, but also upon Eagleton’s analysis of aestheticism. (shrink)

What does Husserlian phenomenology have to offer feminist theory? More specifically, can we find resources within Husserl’s account of the living body ( Leib ) for the critical feminist project of rethinking embodiment beyond the dichotomies not only of mind/body but also of subject/object and activity/passivity? This essay begins by explicating the reasons for feminist hesitation with respect to Husserlian phenomenology. I then explore the resources that Husserl’s phenomenology of touch and his account of sensings hold for feminist theory. My (...) reading of Husserl proceeds by means of a comparison between his description of touch in Ideas II and Merleau-Ponty’s early appropriation of this account in the Phenomenology of Perception, as well as through an unlikely rapprochement between Husserl and Irigaray on the question of touch. Moreover, by revisiting the limitations in Husserl’s approach to the body—limitations of which any feminist appropriation must remain cognizant—I attempt to take Husserl’s phenomenology of touch beyond its initial methodologically solipsistic frame and to ask whether and how it can contribute to thinking gendered and racialized bodies. The phenomenology of touch, I argue, can allow us to understand the interplay between subjective, felt embodiment and social-historical context. In opening up Husserl’s account of touch to other dimensions—intersubjective and affective—sociality is revealed as residing within, and structuring of, touch. Such touch can allow us to think embodiment anew. (shrink)

The paper presents analysis of form in different domains. It draws on the commonalities and their potential unified classifications based on how forms subjectively appear in perception—as opposed to their standard specification in Euclidean geometry or other objective quantitative methods. The paper provides an overview aiming to offer elements for thought for researchers in various fields.

Experimental phenomenology is the study of appearances in subjective awareness. Its methods and results challenge quite a few aspects of the current debate on consciousness. A robust theoretical framework for understanding consciousness is pending: current empirical research waves on what a phenomenon of consciousness properly is, not least because the question is still open on the observables to be measured and how to measure them. I shall present the basics of experimental phenomenology and discuss the current development of experimental phenomenology, (...) its main features, and the many misunderstandings that have obstructed a fair understanding and evaluation of its otherwise enlightening outcomes. (shrink)

O presente artigo se propõe a confrontar uma leitura antirrealista da obra do fenomenólogo Edmund Husserl e a sugerir que ela pode ser interpretada mais adequadamente como marco do realismo científico. Para tanto, primeiramente, será exposto um dos mais recentes e elaborados projetos nos quais Husserl se relaciona ao Empirismo Construtivo de Van Fraassen. Posteriormente, serão assinaladas as dificuldades encontradas para interpretar algumas teses de Husserl desde o marco antirrealista, enfocando, principalmente, a discussão sobre os inobserváveis, mostrando como a sua (...) existência não é uma tese indiferente à fenomenologia husserliana. Por fim, será indicado como Husserl poderia estar mais próximo do marco realista. In this paper I confront an anti-realistic approach to Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological work and I suggest that this work could most suitably constitute into the Scientific Realistic framework. In order to this, I will first show one of most recent and elaborate claims which relates Husserl with Van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism. Later, I will point out some existing difficulties to interpret the Husserlian thesis using the anti-realist framework. I will specially focus on the discussion about unobservable entities, arguing how the existence of the unobservable is not an alien thesis to the Phenomenology of Husserl. Finally, I will point out how Husserl is closer to the Realistic framework. (shrink)

The essay attempts to delineate how Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception can be applied to theories of sign processes, and how it reworks the framework of the phenomenalist conception of communication. His later philosophy involved a reformulation of subjectivity and a resolution of the subject/object dualism. My claim is that this non-reductionist theory of perception reveals a different view of nature as we experience it in an expressive and meaningful interaction. The perspective that another living being has and communicates entails (...) a form of depth, the invisible dimension of the visible or audible. These two aspects of perception and dialogue are intertwined in a dialectic of presence and absence, so that sense arises in the perceptual field rather than in subjectivity. This, I argue, is the most fundamental result of his theory. The origination of meaning in the workings of the chiasm of visible and invisible in perception opens up an objective sense of intersubjective nature. The essay also deals with the role of the phenomenological reduction; a suspension of beliefs and existence claims in experience. The reduction enables us to take a step back and look more closely at our understanding of nature in light of the historical and cultural influence on our thinking. (shrink)

The suffering of nonhuman animals has become a noted factor in deciding public policy and legislative change. Yet, despite this growing concern, skepticism toward such suffering is still surprisingly common. This paper analyzes the merits of the skeptical approach, both in its moderate and extreme forms. In the first part it is claimed that the type of criterion for verification concerning the mental states of other animals posed by skepticism is overly (and, in the case of extreme skepticism, illogically) demanding. (...) Resting on Wittgenstein and Husserl, it is argued that skepticism relies on a misguided epistemology and, thus, that key questions posed by it face the risk of absurdity. In the second part of the paper it is suggested that, instead of skepticism, empathy together with intersubjectivity be adopted. Edith Stein’s take on empathy, along with contemporary findings, are explored, and the claim is made that it is only via these two methods of understanding that the suffering of nonhuman animals can be perceived. (shrink)

Based on Husserl’s distinction between mode of living presence (Modus der Leibhaftigkeit) and mode of certainty (Glaubensmodus der Gewißheit), which coincide in normal univocal perception, the paper argues for a distinction between two different types of accordance (Einstimmigkeit) in perceptual experience – local accordance and global accordance. While local accordance is characterized by the unfolding of appearances in agreement with lines of accordance instituted by recent perceptual apprehensions within a certain spatio-temporal domain, global accordance is characterized by the agreement between (...) appearances unfolding in local accordance with previous and simultaneous apprehensions concerning the spatio-temporal surroundings of this domain. As will be shown, to perceive something in local accordance amounts to perceiving it in the mode of living presence, while to perceive something in global accordance amounts to perceiving it in the belief mode of certainty (relative to a certain surrounding). In light of these considerations, an account of the perception of figments and immersion is put forward which does not invoke make-belief or the idea of an as-if-perception. (shrink)

My central research focus over the past 30 years has been the articulation of what I call a radically temporal approach to philosophy. In the papers below, written between 2001 and 2022, I treat the varying ways in which radically temporal thinking manifests itself in the phenomenological perspectives of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Eugene Gendlin. I also discuss Jacques Derrida's deconstructive project and George Kelly's personal construct theory as examples of radically temporal thinking. With the aim of clarifying and (...) further defining the nature of this family of orientations, I have delineated the important ways in which it differs from a range of interlinked approaches in philosophy and psychology that includes hermeneutic and radical constructivisms, social constructionism, 4EA (Embodied, Embedded, Enactive, Extended, and Affective) cognition, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of corporeal intersubjectivity, autopoietic self-organizing systems theory and American pragmatism. Among the authors whose work I have submitted to critique from the radically temporal perspective are: Francisco Varela (autopoietic self-organizing systems), Shaun Gallagher, Evan Thompson, Matthew Ratcliffe, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Dan Zahavi, Hanne De Jaegher, Michel Bitbol, Thomas Fuchs (enactive, embodied ('4EA') cognition), Gilles Deleuze (Deleuzian biopolitics), Ken Gergen and John Shotter ( social constructionism), Kym Maclaren ( critical phenomenology) and Jan Slaby (critical neuroscience). I argue that these authors' accounts of the relation between affect, motivation and intention, attention , reflective and pre-reflective self-consciousness, the basis of mathematical naturalism and sensori-motor models of behavior, and the relation between the body, language and culture remain burdened by traditional presuppositions that the radically temporal philosophies of Heidegger et al put into question. (shrink)

This article stems from my presentation at the 2020 Symposium of the Kripke Center for the Study of Religion and Society, whose theme was "Religion and the New Politics." The article is written for an interdisciplinary audience. Drawing on resources from the philosophical tradition of phenomenology and putting them into dialogue with an important theme in Christian theology, I argue that there is a distinctly non-discursive, embodied form of racism that should be recognized and addressed by the new politics. Because (...) this form of racism occurs not at the familiar level of discourse (word), but in the often unconscious habitualities of the lived body (flesh), it resists common antiracist strategies, and seems to be outside the purview of responsibility and of willful, rational change (the logos). I situate these underlying issues with regard to the traditional opposition between mind and body, and then offer a reinterpretation of them by way of some key phenomenological concepts: intentionality, the lived body, the critique of scientism, motivation, and empathy. I conclude that embodied racism is something which is open to an extended conception of rationality that includes the lived body, and for which we are responsible. I then suggest some antiracist political strategies that put these theoretical considerations to use through attention to embodied spaces and practices. (shrink)

While Husserl is widely recognised as the founder of the phenomenological movement, and as responsible for important positions on a number of central philosophical topics (such as, for instance, perception, intentionality, self-consciousness, and the tenability of naturalism), he is frequently regarded, even within phenomenological circles, as having a fairly impoverished understanding of the emotions. And indeed, there is some validity to the observation that, while essential roles are accorded to emotion in Husserl’s phenomenological analyses of personhood, (axiological) reason, value-theory, and (...) ethics (to name just a few examples), it emerges less frequently in his writings as a central theme of inquiry. The following chapter offers the reader an opportunity to reconsider such an assessment, by highlighting and explicating a number of key claims that emerge in those writings where Husserl deals directly and thematically with the phenomenology of emotional life. Focussing mainly on his most productive and significant period as a phenomenologist of the emotions—dating between the publication of 'Logical Investigations' in 1900 and 'Ideas I' in 1913—it indicates that Husserl’s published and unpublished writings contain important contributions to the phenomenological study of emotional life, and to our understanding of the emotions more broadly. (shrink)

Husserlian phenomenology, as the study of conscious experience, has often been accused of solipsism. Husserl’s method, it is argued, does not have the resources to provide an account of consciousness of other minds. This chapter will address this issue by providing a brief overview of the multiple angles from which Husserl approached the theme of intersubjectivity, with specific focus on the details of his account of the concrete interpersonal encounter – “empathy.” Husserl understood empathy as a direct, quasi-perceptual form of (...) intentionality through which the sense of the Other is constituted. Furthermore, his account of empathy is holistically integrated with his overall theory of intersubjectivity, including his discussions of the objectivity of nature, and the social, historical, and communal aspects of subjectivity. Husserl’s theory of empathy continues to cast a long shadow, influencing both the analytic and continental approaches to the problem of other minds, as well as contemporary account of social cognition in the cognitive sciences. (shrink)

Abstract We examine the construction of electromagnetism in its current form, and in an alternative form, from a point of view that combines a minimal realism with strict rational demands. We begin by discussing the requests of reason when constructing a theory and next, we follow the historical development as presented in the record of original publications, the underlying epistemology (often explained by the authors) and the mathematical constructions. The historical construction develops along socio-political disputes (mainly, the reunification of Germany (...) and the second industrial revolution), epistemic disputes (at least two demarcations of science in conflict) and several theories of electromagnetism. Such disputes resulted in the militant adoption of the ether by some, a position that expanded in parallel with the expansion of Prussia. This way of thinking was facilitated by the earlier adoption of a standpoint that required, as a condition for understanding, the use of physical hypothesis in the form of analogies; an attitude that is antithetic to Newton's “hypotheses non fingo”. While the material ether was finally abandoned, the epistemology survived in the form of “substantialism” and a metaphysical ether: the space. The militants of the ether attributed certainties regarding the ether to Faraday and Maxwell, when they only expressed doubts and curiosity. Thus, the official story is not the real history. This was achieved by the operation of detaching Maxwell's electromagnetism from its construction and introducing a new game of formulae and interpretations. Large and important parts of Maxwell work are today not known, as for example, the rules for the transformation of the electromagnetic potentials between moving systems. When experiments showed that all the theories based in the material ether were incorrect, a new interpretation was offered: Special Relativity (SR). At the end of the transformation period a pragmatic view of science, well adapted to the industrial society, had emerged, as well as a new protagonist: the theoretical physicist. The rival theory of delayed action at distance initiated under the influence of Gauss was forgotten in the midst of the intellectual warfare. The theory is indistinguishable in formulae from Maxwell's and its earlier versions are the departing point of Maxwell for the construction of his equations. We show in a mathematical appendix that such (relational) theory can incorporate Lorentz' contributions as well as Maxwell's transformations and C. Neumann's action, without resource to the ether. Demarcation criteria was further changed at the end of the period making room for habits and intuitions. When these intuited criteria are examined by critical reason (seeking for the fundaments) they can be sharpened with the use of the Non Arbitrariness Principle, which throws light over the arbitrariness in the construction of SR. Under a fully rational view SR is not acceptable, it requires to adopt a less demanding epistemology that detaches the concept from the conception, such as Einstein's own view in this respect, inherited from Hertz. In conclusion: we have shown in this relevant exercise how the reality we accept depends on earlier, irrational, decisions that are not offered for examination but rather are inherited from the culture. (shrink)

Building on past constructive criticism, the present study provides further methodological development focused on the elimination of bias that may occur during first-person observation. First, various sources of errors that may accompany introspection are distinguished based on previous critical literature. Four main errors are classified, namely attentional, attributional, conceptual, and expressional error. Furthermore, methodological recommendations for the possible elimination of these errors have been determined based on the analysis and focused excerpting of introspective scientific literature. The following groups of methodological (...) recommendations were determined: 1) a better focusing of the subject’s attention to their mental processes, 2) providing suitable stimuli, and 3) the sharing of introspective experience between subjects. Furthermore, the potential of adjustments in introspective research designs for eliminating attentional, attributional, conceptual, and expressional error is discussed. (shrink)

This paper bridges art history and consciousness studies and investigates the network of gazes and frames in Las Meninas and how this engages with a system of higher-order thoughts and reflexive operations.

What is logotherapy based on? How does logotherapy differ from psychotherapies or other traditional forms of therapy? What disorders does logotherapy help with? These are the questions to which the 'Handbook for logotherapists' gives a clear and consistent answer. The Handbook starts from two logotherapeutic premisses, according to which there is a Noological dimension in human consciousness, which differs from the psychic dimension of consciousness and human has a will to purpose. These premisses are basic assumptions set by Viktor Frankl (...) himself. ‘Handbook for Logotherapists’ aims to verify these premisses by starting with studying the Noological dimension of human consciousness in relation to the psychic dimension. Based on research, the Handbook draws e.g. the following conclusions: a) The Noological dimension differs in its function and content from the psychic dimension, b) the human will to purpose is a characteristic of the Noological dimension that cannot be found in the psychic dimension, and c) there can be disorders in the Noological dimension that originate from the experienced conflict between the functioning of (the agents of) the Noological dimension (self-distancing and self-transcendence) and the situational reality. -/- Purpose cannot be invented, but is to be found outside of a person, in the situational reality. Searching, finding, realizing and implementing purposes always involve the functioning of both self-transcendence and self-distancing. That is why self-distancing and self-transcendence are the primary agents of the Noological dimension. However, the process of searching, finding and implementing a purpose can become corrupted, as purpose may be missing, it may be lost or gone, it may be distorted, or the situation may have distorted the purpose, even if the functioning of the agents of the Noological dimension is healthy. Although these distortions with experiencing a purpose often manifest themselves unfavorably also in a person's somatic condition and in the functioning of the psychic dimension in many different ways, they are - nevertheless - distortions that are a person's healthy reaction to a sick state or situation, and their basis is in the Noological dimension of consciousness. With the help of logotherapy, it is possible to separate disorders of the Noological dimension from disorders of the psychic dimension, to detect what kind of distortion with experiencing a purpose is involved, and to treat a particular distortion with logotherapy's own treatment methods. 'Handbook for logotherapists' shows why logotherapy as a specific form of therapy is the most appropriate aid for the treatment of purpose-centered distortions and demonstrates, how these distortions can be detected and treated with logotherapeutic tools. (shrink)

What is logotherapy based on? How does logotherapy differ from psychotherapies or other traditional forms of therapy? What disorders does logotherapy help with? These are the questions to which the 'Handbook for logotherapists' gives a clear and consistent answer. The Handbook starts from two logotherapeutic premisses, according to which there is a Noological dimension in human consciousness, which differs from the psychic dimension of consciousness and human has a will to purpose. These premisses are basic assumptions set by Viktor Frankl (...) himself. ‘Handbook for Logotherapists’ aims to verify these premisses by starting with studying the Noological dimension of human consciousness in relation to the psychic dimension. Based on research, the Handbook draws e.g. the following conclusions: a) The Noological dimension differs in its function and content from the psychic dimension, b) the human will to purpose is a characteristic of the Noological dimension that cannot be found in the psychic dimension, and c) there can be disorders in the Noological dimension that originate from the experienced conflict between the functioning of (the agents of) the Noological dimension (self-distancing and self-transcendence) and the situational reality. Purpose cannot be invented, but is to be found outside of a person, in the situational reality. Searching, finding, realizing and implementing purposes always involve the functioning of both self-transcendence and self-distancing. That is why self-distancing and self-transcendence are the primary agents of the Noological dimension. However, the process of searching, finding and implementing a purpose can become corrupted, as purpose may be missing, it may be lost or gone, it may be distorted, or the situation may have distorted the purpose, even if the functioning of the agents of the Noological dimension is healthy. Although these distortions with experiencing a purpose often manifest themselves unfavorably also in a person's somatic condition and in the functioning of the psychic dimension in many different ways, they are - nevertheless - distortions that are a person's healthy reaction to a sick state or situation, and their basis is in the Noological dimension of consciousness. With the help of logotherapy, it is possible to separate disorders of the Noological dimension from disorders of the psychic dimension, to detect what kind of distortion with experiencing a purpose is involved, and to treat a particular distortion with logotherapy's own treatment methods. 'Handbook for logotherapists' shows why logotherapy as a specific form of therapy is the most appropriate aid for the treatment of purpose-centered distortions and demonstrates, how these distortions can be detected and treated with logotherapeutic tools. -/- . (shrink)

It is often supposed one can draw a distinction, among the assumptions on which an inference rests, between certain background assumptions and certain more salient, or foregrounded, assumptions. Yet what may such a fore-v-background structure, or such structures, consist it? In particular, how do they relate to consciousness? According to a ‘Boring View’, such structures can be captured by specifying, for the various assumptions of the inference, whether they are phenomenally conscious, or access conscious, or else how easily available they (...) are to such consciousness. According to an ‘Interesting View’, there are fore-v-background structures over and above such classifications. The chapter gestures at reasons for thinking that an Interesting View at least merits exploration. The paper discusses some recent contributions to such a view in analytical philosophy; some remarks in Husserl on what he dubbed the horizonal dimension of acts of consciousness; and psychological work on the role of gist or schema representations in perception and memory. It is proposed that background assumptions can figure in consciousness by being as it were condensed into a consciously, though inattentively, entertained notion of their overall thematic gist, where this thematic gist gives the drift of a possible elucidation of how or why such-and-such salient grounds mean that so-and-so conclusion holds. (shrink)

According to a traditional view, there is no categorical difference between the phenomenology of perception and the phenomenology of imagination; the only difference is in degree (of intensity, resolution, etc.) and/or in accompanying beliefs. There is no categorical difference between what it is like to perceive a dog and what it is like to imagine a dog; the former is simply more vivid and/or is accompanied by the belief that a dog is really there. A sustained argument against this traditional (...) view is prosecuted by Sartre, who develops an alternative according to which there is a categorical difference between the two phenomenologies. This paper draws on Sartre’s work in this area to develop a similar account of perception and imagination as categorically different. (shrink)

This thesis explores and discusses foundational issues concerning the relationship between phenomenological philosophy and the enactive approach to cognitive science, with the aim of clarifying, developing, and promoting the project of enactive phenomenology. This project is framed by three general ideas: 1) that the sciences of mind need a phenomenological grounding, 2) that the enactive approach is the currently most promising attempt to provide mind science with such a grounding, and 3) that this attempt involves both a naturalization of phenomenology (...) and a phenomenologization of the concept of nature. More specifically, enactive phenomenology is the project of pursuing mutually illuminative exchanges between, on the one hand, phenomenological investigations of the structures of lived experience and embodied existence and, on the other, scientific accounts of mind and life – in particular those framed by theories of biological self-organization. The thesis consists of two parts. Part one is an introductory essay that seeks to clarify some of enactive phenomenology’s overarching philosophical commitments by tracing some of its historical roots. Part two is a compilation of four articles, each of which intervenes in a different contemporary debate relevant to the dissertation’s project. (shrink)

Following the philosophy of embodiment of Merleau-Ponty, Jonas and others, enactivism is a pivot point from which various areas of science can be brought into a fruitful dialogue about the nature of subjectivity. In this chapter we present the enactive conception of agency, which, in contrast to current mainstream theories of agency, is deeply and strongly embodied. In line with this thinking we argue that anything that ought to be considered a genuine agent is a biologically embodied (even if distributed) (...) agent, and that this embodiment must be affectively lived. However, we also consider that such an affective agent is not necessarily also an agent imbued with an explicit sense of subjectivity. To support this contention we outline the interoceptive foundation of basic agency and argue that there is a qualitative difference in the phenomenology of agency when it is instantiated in organisms which, due to their complexity and size, require a nervous system to underpin their physiological and sensorimotor processes. We argue that this interoceptively grounded agency not only entails affectivity but also forms the necessary basis for subjectivity. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present an outline of a phenomenological theory of thought experiments. In doing so, I am dealing with a topic that is currently starting to receive increased attention from philosophers with phenomenological leanings. However, since no serious attempt has been made to tackle the issue in a systematic fashion, I will not merely review existing phenomenological work on thought experiments. For the most part, my paper is programmatic: its aim is to suggest some basic (...) directions in which a phenomenological theory of scientific thought experiments should be developed. (shrink)

Abstract: In this article I intend to highlight how the relationship between the psychic ego (seelischen Ich) and the spiritual ego (geistige Ich) is fundamental to the understanding of intersubjectivity and the lifeworld (Lebenswelt). In Ideas II, Husserl explains how, from the ego, natural, psychic and spiritual objectivities are constituted. These three strata of objectivity are known, first, in the theoretical attitude and, second, in the spiritual attitude. In this process, the ego becomes explicit. In the theoretical attitude, the constitution (...) of nature takes place, for which the body (Körper/Leib) is fundamental. This is followed by the constitution of objects of psychic nature, human or animal (tierisch), including self-perception. In assuming the spiritual attitude, the other is perceived (Urpräsenz) initially as a body together with things, and alongside this perception there is an apprehension (Appräsenz) of co-given horizons. There is an identity between the body of others and mine; it is the moment of empathy (Einfühlung). The scientific world constituted in the theoretical attitude is a reduction of the surrounding world (Umwelt) – the lifeworld (Lebenswelt). This lifeworld is the world of spiritual attitude and precedes any comprehension or explanation of the world. It is therefore through the spiritual attitude that a community of spiritual subjects is constituted and constitutes the lifeworld. Keywords: Husserl, Psyche, Spirit, Intersubjectivity, Lifeworld. (shrink)

Ranging from Alan Turing’s seminal 1936 paper to the latest work on Kolmogorov complexity and linear logic, this comprehensive new work clarifies the relationship between computability on the one hand and constructivity on the other. The authors argue that even though constructivists have largely shed Brouwer’s solipsistic attitude to logic, there remain points of disagreement to this day. Focusing on the growing pains computability experienced as it was forced to address the demands of rapidly expanding applications, the content maps the (...) developments following Turing’s ground-breaking linkage of computation and the machine, the resulting birth of complexity theory, the innovations of Kolmogorov complexity and resolving the dissonances between proof theoretical semantics and canonical proof feasibility. Finally, it explores one of the most fundamental questions concerning the interface between constructivity and computability: whether the theory of recursive functions is needed for a rigorous development of constructive mathematics. This volume contributes to the unity of science by overcoming disunities rather than offering an overarching framework. It posits that computability’s adoption of a classical, ontological point of view kept these imperatives separated. In studying the relationship between the two, it is a vital step forward in overcoming the disagreements and misunderstandings which stand in the way of a unifying view of logic. (shrink)

Collection of papers presented at the 2nd and 3rd Budapest Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy.

This philosophical anthropology tries to explore the basic categories of man’s being in the worlds using a special quantum meta-ontology that is introduced in the book. Quantum understanding of space and time, consciousness, or empirical/nonempirical reality elicits new questions relating to philosophical concerns such as subjectivity, free will, mind, perception, experience, dialectic, or agency. The authors have developed an inspiring theoretical framework transcending the boundaries of particular disciplines, e.g. quantum philosophy, metaphysics of consciousness, philosophy of mind, phenomenology of space and (...) time, and ontological relativity. (shrink)

I set the stage for Socrates and Aristophanes’ alliance by beginning with Hegel’s question, what is the object of art?, in the context of his analysis of ancient Greek “art-religion.” Hegel traces the shifting object of art through a variety of artistic practices before arriving at comedy, which he identifies as the last stage of Greek aesthetic life. He finally asks, what is the object of comedy? Unlike other artistic practices that are positively defined by their created object or creative (...) activity, ancient comedy appears to be purely destructive, terminating anything that might be traditionally recognizable as an object of art. Hegel points to Aristophanes and Socrates as representing two sides of the defacement of the object of art-religion as such. Moving beyond Hegel, I turn to Aristophanes and Plato to consider how in the performative destruction of the object of aesthetic and philo- sophical reflection, something slips into being that may be identified as the phantom form of the Subject. (shrink)

My research into Virtual Reality technology and its central property of immersion has indicated that immersion in Virtual Reality (VR) electronic systems is a significant key to the understanding of contemporary culture as well as considerable aspects of previous culture as detected in the histories of philosophy and the visual arts. The fundamental change in aesthetic perception engendered by immersion, a perception which is connected to the ideal of total-immersion in virtual space, identifies certain shifts in ontology which are relevant (...) to a better understanding of the human being. This understanding was achieved through a broad inquiry into the histories of Virtual Reality, philosophy, and the visual arts and has lead to the formulation of an aesthetic theory of immersive consciousness indicative of immersive culture. The primary subject of this discourse is immersion then: an experience which will be identified within the dissertation as the indispensable characteristic of Virtual Reality. The understanding of immersion arrived at here will be used to fashion a synchronous theory of art particularly informed by encounters and concepts of immersion into virtuality. To sufficiently address this subject in a scholarly fashion, I have researched, found and accumulated aesthetic and philosophic examples of immersive tendencies, as found within the histories of art and philosophy, which subsequently contributed towards the articulation of what I have come to call immersive consciousness. As a result of formulating such an immersive consciousness, a good deal of the basis for the questioning of the Western ontological tradition has been found in the Western tradition itself when we look with new eyes and ask new uncertain questions. Moreover, this immersive consciousness will be used to propose some abstract questions encircling today's electronic-based culture. Through the structuring of the argument within the thesis - and overtly within the conclusion - I have articulated a non-teleological creative strategy which provides the basis for an unconstraining integration of noologies (ways of semblancing the thinking process). This strategy provides a means of exemplifying - and for honoring - various methods of thinking. This structuring strategy is consistent with the 'hacker ethic' as defined by Steven Levy, as a demand that access to computers - and anything which might teach us something about the way the world works - should be unlimited and total. To follow this strategy, this dissertation has set out to understand how topical conceptions of virtual immersion connect to pre-existing systems of thought as revealed in art as they have extended out of antecedent ontological self-understandings, historical human self-understandings which have evidenced themselves in the elaboration of technological objectives. To do this I have forged a certain rhizomatic paternity/maternity for Virtual Reality within this dissertation by joining choice immersive examples of simulacra technology into mental connections with the relevant examples culled from the histories of art, architecture, information-technology, sex, myth, space, consciousness and philosophy. (shrink)

[The Complex Self: Empirical and theoretical perspectives] I have throughout this paper emphasized the complexity of the self. This complexity necessitates interdisciplinary collaboration; collaboration across the divide between theoretical analysis and empirical investigation. To think that a single discipline, be it philosophy or neuroscience, should have a monopoly on the investigation of self is merely an expression of both arrogance and ignorance.

This article presents a comparison between Ricoeur’s and Patočka’s ideas on the subject as a rational and ethical person. Despite differences in style and interests, their work manifests important resemblances and agreements. The comparison focuses on the primordial embedding of the individual subject in natural and social structures, on the ethical implications of this situation of the subject, and on the differences in both philosophers’ evaluation of modern culture.

This essay provides a condensed introductory ‘snapshot’ of just a few of the many and profound correlations existing between early (pre-Abhidhamma) Pāḷi Buddhism and Transcendental Phenomenology, by focusing on what is arguably the most central and essential ‘philosophical problem’ in both traditions: the true nature and significance of the ‘I’ of subjective intentional consciousness. It argues that the Buddhist axiom of ‘not-self’ (anattā) is by no means incompatible with the fundamental phenomenological irreducibility, and necessity, of transcendental subjectivity – or, as (...) Husserl also puts it, of the ‘pure’ or ‘transcendental ‘I’’ – a structure evidently essential to intentional consciousness as ‘consciousness-of’. On the one hand, Husserl recognises (and struggles with) the peculiar ‘emptiness’ of the ‘pure ‘I’’. On the other hand, a fundamental distinction must clearly be drawn between genuine intentional subjectivity – which even Buddhas and Arahants must of necessity possess – and the erroneous bases upon which the concept of ‘self’ (attā) that Buddhism rejects is constituted: the feeling of ‘I am’ (‘asmī’ti), the sense of ‘I am this’ (‘ayam-aham-asmī’ti), and the concept/conceit of ‘I am’ (asmi-māna) – all of which Buddhas and Arahants by definition do not possess. Hence, it is argued that, while the ‘pure I’ does not refer to some permanent ‘entity’ called ‘self’, nor is it merely an empty, non-referring, conventional linguistic marker: it has not merely a ‘use’, but a genuine meaning, which derives from the intrinsic, irreducible, and ‘pre-linguistic’ experiential structure of ‘consciousness-of’ itself. What is more, this meaning is not only recognised and admitted, but actively utilised, within the doctrine and methodology of early Buddhism, without any sense of contradicting the axiom of anattā. (shrink)