The recent literature on epistemic injustice has convincingly showed that injustice is often self-concealing, because those who suffer it lack the hermeneutical resources to talk about it. How, then, are the victims of epistemic injustice capable of denouncing and resisting it? The article seeks an answer to this question by inquiring into what Judith Shklar calls the “sense of injustice.” Following Shklar, I argue that the identification and critique of injustice relies on feeling rather than established moral values. In order (...) to clarify how feelings can be the source of universal claims, I turn to an interpreta - tion of Kant’s analysis of the feeling of the sublime developed by Jean-François Lyotard. According to this interpretation, any act of communication generates a silence that calls to be expressed. Following this view, I argue that epistemic injustice leads to a universalist act of epistemic resistance on the basis of the feeling that silenced voices ought to be head. (shrink)

Images share a common feature with all phenomena of imagination, since they make us aware of what is not present or what is fictional and not existent at all. From this perspective, the philosophical approach of Kendall Lewis Walton—born in 1939 and active since the 1960s at the University of Michigan—is perhaps one of the most notable contributions to image theory. Walton is an authoritative figure within the tradition of analytical aesthetics. His contributions have had a considerable influence on a (...) broad range of topics, such as the role of categories in the understanding of the arts (Walton, “Categories of Art”. Philosophical Review, 79(3): 334–367, 1970), the ambiguous nature of emotions in the experience of fictional stories (Walton, “Fearing Fictions”. The Journal of Philosophy, 75(1): 5–25, 1978), the transparency of photographic images compared to other depictions (Walton, “Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic Realism”. Noûs, 18(1): 67–72, 1984) and, above all, the development of a general theory of fiction as imaginative activity. His 1990 book Mimesis as Make-believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts collects and re-elaborates articles Walton published on the subject since the 1970s. Though he does not attempt to give a definitive answer for what imagination is, Walton thoroughly investigates its role in all cases of representational works, describing depictions as a specific case of “make-believe” activity: images, in short, are specific props of a visual and perceptual “make-believe” game. (shrink)

In the present work, we will analyze the concept of intuition mainly in relation to the epistemological and the metaphysical theses of Schopenhauerian theory. In the first section, we will discuss the central axes of Schopenhauer’s metaphysical system, especially regarding the concept of will (Wille) and the relationship that this entails with his theory of knowledge. Then, we will examine the difference that the German philosopher establishes between representative —or mediated— rational knowledge and direct —or immediate— intuitive knowledge. Likewise, we (...) will trace at first the theses and the fundamental problems of the dualism of representation and we will furtherly establish the problem of the intuition of one’s own body. Finally, we will consider the scope and the limits of intuition, as well as its different variants: mainly aesthetic intuition and its culmination in mystical intuition. (shrink)

Die Arbeit analysiert die für Hannah Arendts politische Philosophie zentrale Differenzierung von Macht und Gewalt, mit der sie einen Gegenpol zu Denkerinnen und Denkern bildet, die das Wesen der Politik explizit in gewaltsamen Strukturen sehen. Allerdings wird die Abgrenzung politischer Macht von Formen der Gewaltsamkeit in der postmodernen Arendt-Rezeption stark kritisiert. Speziell bei poststrukturalistischen Theorien – etwa bei Chantal Mouffe – wird stattdessen betont, das Zusammenschließen zu einer Gruppe und einem konsensfähigen ‚Wir‘ komme nie ohne ein Moment an gewaltsamen diskursiven (...) Ausschlüssen und Marginalisierungen aus. Arendts begriffliche Unterscheidung von Macht und Gewalt könne daher nicht aufrechterhalten werden. Vor der Folie von Mouffes (gegen-)hegemonialem Antagonismus wird herausgearbeitet, inwiefern Arendts Philosophie durch ihren Fokus auf dem Neu-Beginnen die diskursiven Bedingungen, unter denen Handeln sich vollzieht, tatsächlich nur undeutlich in den Blick nehmen kann. Gleichzeitig wird aber auch gezeigt, dass ihre Konzepte der Welt, des Zuschauers und des Handelns im Sinne von gerere bzw. πράττειν durchaus reichhaltige Anknüpfungspunkte bieten für die Berücksichtigung gewaltsamer diskursiver Strukturen – und zwar ohne die für ihr Denken so charakteristische Unterscheidung von Macht und Gewalt aufgeben zu müssen. (shrink)

Embora Schiller reconheça a “origem kantiana da maioria dos princípios” que ele elaborou nas ästhetische Briefe [1794-95], specialistas reportam essa influência, em geral, à Kritik der Urteilskraft [1790]. Todavia, esse artigo aborda a importância das antinomias kantianas da Dialética Transcendental, da Kritik der reinen Vernunft [1780]. Com base nessa observação, levanta-se a hipótese de que há um vínculo direto entre o princípio regulador transcendental, que serviu para reorientar a passagem do condicionado ao incondicionado, e o conceito do belo de Schiller; (...) o qual assume a forma de um princípio regulador-estético para garantir a passagem da humanidade de sua imperfeição à plenitude antropológica. Nesse sentido, a discussão proposta defende a tese de que o belo schilleriano deve seu estatuto moral à resolução metodológica que Kant operou frente ao dilema imposto pelas antinomias; lição essa que inspirou Schiller a realizar a conversão do belo em princípio regulativo moral. Kant; Schiller; Antinomies; Regulatory Principle; Beauty. (shrink)

This article will provide an illustration of Max Weber’s theory of rationalization with a specific impetus on its interdependency with the development of capitalism. Following Horkheimer, I shall critically draw on Weber to outline a theory of human freedom, showing that rationalization not only implies economic and social liberation but entails a totalizing tendency that invades all spheres of socio-political life including people’s mental infrastructure. This mental colonization can be framed as a process of substituting value rationality with instrumental rationality. (...) I will claim that this substitution can be understood as an impediment for human freedom. Following contemporary theories of action, I will show the centrality of value orientation for understanding human freedom. Therefore, I propose a critical theory of freedom that centers value rational action as realization of freedom and can be understood as emancipative. (shrink)

De moderne filosofie lijdt aan muziekvergetelheid. Opvallend is echter dat filosofen, wanneer ze toch aandacht schenken aan muziek, hun aandacht bij voorkeur op één bepaald genre richten, namelijk de opera. Filosofen zoals Søren Kierkegaard en Friedrich Nietzsche lieten hun gedachten over Don Giovanni, Parsifal en Carmen gaan, terwijl omgekeerd de filosofie van Arthur Schopenhauer de opera heeft beïnvloed via Wagner. Diens werk lijkt zich op het snijpunt van het grensverkeer tussen moderne filosofie en moderne muziek te bevinden. Het was zijn (...) ambitie de menselijke existentie en de menselijke geschiedenis in één panoramisch oeuvre te vatten, vanaf het primordiale begin tot en met de dramatische finale die ophanden leek: een catastrofale apotheose die een geheel nieuwe toekomst mogelijk zou maken. Dat is althans de verhaallijn van zijn meesterwerk Der Ring des Nibelungen. Aan het slot van Götterdämmerung lijkt zich een algehele verwoesting te hebben voltrokken: ‘Everything is destroyed and there is an enigmatic kind of hovering over the scene of destruction’ (Badiou 2010, p. 106), een ambivalente stemming van hoop en destructie zette Wagner op muziek. Voor Wagner is dan ook een hoofdrol in deze studie weggelegd: voor zijn muziektheoretische geschriften (waarin hij over een ‘muziek van de toekomst’ filosofeerde), maar meer nog voor de muzikale totaalkunstwerken die hij daadwerkelijk componeerde. (shrink)

Der Beitrag beleuchtet die Struktur und Funktion forschender Laborpraxis vor dem Hintergrund verschiedener erkenntnis- und wissenschaftstheoretischer Positionen. Das Labor kann in seiner Relevanz unterschätzt werden – mit Blick auf die darin verrichteten praktischen Tätigkeiten, auf dabei erforderliche Urteilsbildungen und nicht zuletzt auf unverzichtbare Impulse für die Wissenschaft. Die abstrakte Gegenüberstellung von Theorie und Praxis ist aufzugeben. Zugleich sollte Wissenschaft weder allein über das Labor noch über die Theoriebildung bestimmt werden. Abschließend plädiert der Beitrag dafür, die skizzierten Fragestellungen in die Labordidaktik (...) sowie in die Planung und Durchführung von Lernlaboren einzubeziehen. (shrink)

Die strittige ‚Faktizität des Todes‘ eröffnet die Frage, wie man sich zu ihr stellen soll. Der Beitrag bietet ein Panorama beispielhafter Ex-plikationen von Haltungen gegenüber dem Tod. Hierbei wird aufgewiesen, dass die bloße Bejahung des Todes unzureichend ist, wenn nicht zugleich die abträglichen und abgründigen Aspekte von Sterben und Tod wahrgenommen werden. Eine Abwägung der Effekte ist allerdings kaum durchführbar und das verbreitete Argument drohender Langeweile problematisch. Mit dem Hinweis auf Aristoteles und Kant werden Lektüremöglichkeiten aufgezeigt, die vertraute Topoi einer (...) Ars Moriendi aufbrechen und ein Verständnis gelingender Lebensführung entwickeln, die auf Fortsetzung drängt. Uto- pische Entwürfe der Überwindung des Todes werden zuletzt kritisch diskutiert. (shrink)

During the past few decades, everyday aesthetics has established itself as a new branch of philosophical aesthetics alongside the more traditional philosophy of art. The Paths from Philosophy of Art to Everyday Aesthetics explores the intimate relations between these two branches of contemporary aesthetics. The essays collected in this volume discuss a wide range of topics from aesthetic intimacy to the nature of modernity and the essence of everydayness, which play important roles both in the philosophy of art and everyday (...) aesthetics. With these essays, the writers and editors of this volume wish to commemorate professor Arto Haapala on his 60th birthday. -/- This collection of articles is intended for scholars and students working in the fields of aesthetics, philosophy, and art studies. (shrink)

The dominant position in current debates on the mind-body problem is some version of physicalism, according to which the mind is reducible to the brain and mental phenomena are ultimately explainable in physical terms. But there seems to be an explanatory gap between physicalistic descriptions of neuronal processes and the subjectivity of conscious experience. Some dualists conclude that, therefore, consciousness must be ontologically distinct from any physical properties or entities. This article introduces and argues for a different perspective on these (...) issues, namely, an epistemological dualism - a nonreductive position which is neither a version of physicalism nor an ontological dualism. It is argued that Kant holds this epistemological dualism implicitly as a consequence of his critical epistemology. On the one hand, he stresses the explanatory gap between the mental and the physical. On the basis of his theory of subjectivity set out in the Transcendental Deduction, Kant provides an explanation for why the gap cannot be closed empirically, as the physicalist promises. On the other hand, in his criticism of Descartes’ dualism in the Paralogismschapter, Kant argues that an ontological conclusion on the basis of this epistemological gap is unjustified even though physicalism is explanatory inadequate to account for consciousness. Thus, this epistemological dualism can be seen as an original third way between physicalist reductionism and ontological dualism. (shrink)

Als Signatur moderner demokratischer Gesellschaften gilt heute weithin, was John Rawls zu Beginn der 1990er Jahre als „vernünftigen Pluralismus“ bezeichnet hat. Mit ihm einher geht die Frage, wie divergierende Lebensformen miteinander ins Gespräch gebracht werden können und wie sich dabei zu legitimen politischen Urteilen kommen lässt. Ich werde in meinem Beitrag argumentieren, dass sich die genannte Frage lösen lässt, wenn wir uns der jüngeren Diskussion von Arendts Theorie der Urteilskraft von Linda Zerilli zuwenden und diese mit Rahel Jaeggis Überlegungen zur (...) Kritik von Lebensformen verbinden. Dafür werde ich zunächst Arendts Überlegungen zur politischen Urteilskraft rekonstruieren und zeigen, wie diese Kants Modell der ästhetischen Urteilskraft auf den Bereich des Politischen zu übertragen versucht. Ich werde argumentieren, dass Arendt diese Transposition nur teilweise gelingt und eine Reihe von wichtigen Fragen ungelöst bleibt. Arendts Überlegungen sind damit jedoch keineswegs obsolet, sondern müssen vielmehr weiter gedacht werden. Zerilli hat hierfür jüngst einen wegweisenden Vorschlag vorgelegt, der Arendts Theorie der Urteilskraft nicht mehr im Ausgang von Kant, sondern von Wittgenstein zu denken versucht. Die damit einhergehende Perspektivverschiebung erlaubt es, den Streit zwischen divergierenden Lebensformen mit Jaeggi als eine mit den Mitteln der immanenten Kritik geführte Auseinandersetzung um deren Lernfähigkeit zu begreifen, was am Beispiel des Streits zwischen den Lebensformen der Kleinfamilie und der Kommune deutlich gemacht werden soll. (shrink)

Scopo della presente ricerca è identificare all’interno della «Dialettica» della prima Critica i due tipi di necessità, naturale e funzionale, di cui sono portatori i concetti puri della ragione nonché di chiarire in che modo l’uno sia legato all’altro. Partendo da un chiarimento terminologico relativo alla parola idea si vuole rendere conto del significato del completamento della serie delle condizioni dell’intelletto da parte della ragione, tanto nei termini di una sistematizzazione dell’esperienza quanto nell’ottica di un rimando alla libertà come forma (...) incondizionata di causalità nel regno della ragion pratica. (shrink)

Especialmente ante la consideración de las obras de arte como objetos Intencionales, radicalmente distintos de los objetos meramente físicos, surge la pregunta acerca de la posibilidad de objetividad en los juicios críticos sobre arte. Con esta interrogante como hilo conductor, en el siguiente trabajo se intentará sostener que, sobre todo en el marco de la tradición analítica de este problema, la propuesta de Margolis parece ser la apuesta más sólida, ya que logra responder a los desafíos que sugiere el peculiar (...) carácter de las obras de arte. Además, propondré que el concepto de intersubjetividad histórica permite hacerse cargo adecuadamente de los retos y dificultades que suponen las obras de arte y enunciaré las ventajas de este término en relación con el de “objetividad”. (shrink)

Christian Kock’s essays show the essential interconnectedness of practical reasoning, rhetoric and deliberative democracy. They constitute a unique contribution to argumentation theory that draws on – and criticizes – the work of philosophers, rhetoricians, political scientists and other argumentation theorists. It puts rhetoric in the service of modern democracies by drawing attention to the obligations of politicians to articulate arguments and objections that citizens can weigh against each other in their deliberations about possible courses of action.

This paper addresses theoretical challenges, still relevant today, that arose in the first decades of the twentieth century related to the concept of the organism. During this period, new insights into the plasticity and robustness of organisms as well as their complex interactions fueled calls, especially in the UK and in the German-speaking world, for grounding biological theory on the concept of the organism. This new organism-centered biology understood organisms as the most important explanatory and methodological unit in biological investigations. (...) At least three theoretical strands can be distinguished in this movement: Organicism, dialectical materialism, and holistic biology. This paper shows that a major challenge of OCB was to describe the individual organism as a causally autonomous and discrete unit with consistent boundaries and, at the same time, as inextricably interwoven with its environment. In other words, OCB had to conciliate individualistic with anti-individualistic perspectives. This challenge was addressed by developing a concept of life that included functionalist and metabolic elements, as well as biochemical and physical ones. It allowed for specifying organisms as life forms that actively delimit themselves from the environment. Finally, this paper shows that the recent return to the concept of the organism, especially in the so-called “Extended Evolutionary Synthesis,” is challenged by similar anti-individualistic tendencies. However, in contrast to its early-twentieth-century forerunner, today’s organism-centered approaches have not yet offered a solution to this problem. (shrink)

In the framework of materialism, the major attention is to find general organizational laws stimulated by physical sciences, ignoring the uniqueness of Life. The main goal of materialism is to reduce consciousness to natural processes, which in turn can be translated into the language of math, physics and chemistry. Following this approach, scientists have made several attempts to deny the living organism of its veracity as an immortal soul, in favor of genes, molecules, atoms and so on. However, advancement in (...) various fields of biology has repeatedly given rise to questions against such a denial and has supplied more and more evidence against the completely misleading ideological imposition that living entities are particular states of matter. In the recent past, however, the realization has arisen that cognitive nature of life at all levels has begun presenting significant challenges to the views of materialism in biology and has created a more receptive environment for the soul hypothesis. Therefore, instead of adjudicating different aprioristic claims, the development of an authentic theory of biology needs both proper scientific knowledge and the appropriate tools of philosophical analysis of life. In a recently published paper the first author of present essay made an attempt to highlight a few relevant developments supporting a sentient view of life in scientific research, which has caused a paradigm shift in our understanding of life and its origin [1]. The present essay highlights the uniqueness of biological systems that offers a considerable challenge to the mainstream materialism in biology and proposes the Vedāntic philosophical view as a viable alternative for development of a biological theory worthy of life. (shrink)

The essay presents an interpretation of Hegel’s speculative sentence that, emphasizing the “counter-thrust” that the modern subject undergoes here, allows us to connect the movement of the Hegelian subject to the negativity recognised by Kant at the bottom of the faculty of judgment with regard to its aesthetic dimension. This way, it aims, first, to put into question the interpretation that sees in Hegel’s philosophy a regression with regard to the consciousness, attained by Kant, of the finitude, or the constitutive (...) split, of the modern subject, and, finally, in line with recent interpretations of Hegel, like those of Žižek or Malabou, to contribute to the questioning of the traditional interpretation of Hegel’s dialectics as the overcoming of negativity into a final reconciling synthesis. (shrink)

Since the beginning of the 20th Century to the present day, it has rarely been doubted that whenever formal aesthetic methods meet their iconological counterparts, the two approaches appear to be mutually exclusive. In reality, though, an ahistorical concept is challenging a historical analysis of art. It is especially Susanne K. Langer´s long-overlooked system of analogies between perceptions of the world and of artistic creations that are dependent on feelings which today allows a rapprochement of these positions. Krois’s insistence on (...) a similar point supports this analysis. - I - Unbestritten bis heute gilt, formwissenschaftliche und ikonologische Methoden scheinen sich grundsätzlich auszuschließen, da die ersteren auf ahistorischen und die letzteren auf historischen Grundlagen aufbauen. Dem entgegen soll mit diesem Beitrag gezeigt werden, wie insbesondere die Forschungen Susanne K. Langers und ergänzend diejenigen von John M. Krois eine Annäherung beider Positionen ermöglichen. (shrink)

Do we communicate with pictures? If so, the text asks, what about their complex, dynamic appearances? Are they part of the communication process? By analysing a cover image of the journal Jugend from 1896 and by consulting the research on the logic of pictures (“Eigenlogik”) in Bildwissenschaft, Iconology and Cultural Anthropology these questions shall be persued. The analysis suggests, that instead of consenting the results of epistemological aesthetic research a new understanding of pictures shall be implemented: They can be considered (...) as parts of cultural semiotic processes. That means, it is not the view of something (epistemology) but the view of someone (culture) that is shown by the pictures. - I - -/- Kommunizieren wir über Bilder? Falls das zutrifft, stellt sich die Frage, ob daran auch deren komplexe dynamische Erscheinungsweise Anteil hat? Über die Analyse eines Titelblatts der Zeitschrift Jugend von 1896 und die Betrachtung der Forschungen zur Eigenlogik von Bildern in Bildwissenschaft, Ikonologie und Kultureller Anthropologie soll diesen Fragen nachgegangen werden. Die Auswertung veranlasst, sich von der klassischen, erkenntnisorientierten, ästhetischen Theorie zu distanzieren und sie als kulturtheoretische, semiotische Theorie neu zu fassen. Die Neuausrichtung wird im Verständnis des Gehalts der Bilder im medialen Transfer greifbar: Statt in einer Ansicht von etwas (Erkenntniswert), so eröffnet sich, liegt er in einer Ansicht über etwas (Meinung/Kulturwert). (shrink)

On 11thOctober 2007, at the first international conference on Integrated History and Philosophy of Science (&HPS1) hosted by the Center for Philosophy of Science in Pittsburgh, Ernan McMullin (University of Notre Dame) portrayed a rather gloomy scenario concerning the current relationship between history and philosophy of science (HPS), on the one hand, and mainstream philosophy, on the other hand, as testified by a significant drop in the presence of HPS papers at various meetings of the American Philosophical Association (APA).

This collection brings together a selection of my recently published or forthcoming articles. What unites them is their common concern with one of the central ambitions of philosophy, namely to get clearer about our first-personal perspective onto the world and our minds. Three aspects of that perspective are of particular importance: consciousness, intentionality, and rationality. The collected essays address metaphysical and epistemological questions both concerning the nature of each of these aspects and concerning the various connections among them. More generally, (...) given that intentionality and ratio- nality are both normative phenomena, the main theme of the articles is the relationship between consciousness and normativity and the centrality of this relationship to our first-personal perspective. -/- This focus culminates in the defense of two specific views, experiential rationalism and experiential intentionalism. The first is, very roughly, the view that how our mental episodes are given in consciousness reflects their rational role in our mental lives: it is part of what our mental episodes subjectively are like that we phenomenally experience them as providing and/or responding to certain kinds of reasons. The central claim of the second view, on the other hand, is that the intentionality of our mental episodes is essentially linked to consciousness and involves a token-reflexive element: they intentionally present not only the world, but also themselves as being a certain way. -/- Some of the essays also deal with the contrast between our first- and our third-personal perspectives and the — to some extent related — division of labour between philosophy and the empirical sciences. Both perspectives have their limitations and sometimes conflict with each other, raising the question of what the consequences are for accounts of our first-personal knowledge and its internal or external objects. (shrink)

In this chapter, I argue against empiricist positions which claim that empirical evidence can be sufficient to defeasibly justify aesthetic judgements, or judgements about the adequacy of aesthetic judgements, or sceptical judgements about someone's capacity to form adequate aesthetic judgements. First, empirical evidence provides neither inferential, nor non-inferential justification for aesthetic opinions. Second, while empirical evidence may tell us how we do respond aesthetically to artworks, it cannot tell us how we should respond to them. And, third, empirical insights into (...) the irrationality of many of our aesthetic judgements do not warrant the sceptical conclusion that we ought to refrain from forming aesthetic opinions. As a consequence of these limitations to aesthetic empiricism, we should endorse the rationalist position that aesthetic criticism is largely a matter of reasoning and, moreover, a collective undertaking. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss two questions. What does Kant understand by mechanical explanation in the Critique of judgment? And why does he think that mechanical explanation is the only type of the explanation of nature available to us? According to the interpretation proposed, mechanical explanations in the Critique of judgment refer to a particular species of empirical causal laws. Mechanical laws aim to explain nature by reference to the causal interaction between the forces of the parts of matter and (...) the way in which they form into complex material wholes. Just like any other empirical causal law, however, mechanical laws can never be known with full certainty. The conception according to which we can explain all of nature by means of mechanical laws, it turns out, is based on what Kant calls ‘regulative’ or ‘reflective’ considerations about nature. Nothing in Kant’s Critique of judgment suggests that these considerations can ever be justified by reference to how the natural world really is. I suggest that what, upon first consideration, appears to be a thoroughly mechanistic conception of nature in Kant is much more limited than one might have expected. (shrink)

This is the most comprehensive book ever published on philosophical methodology. A team of thirty-eight of the world's leading philosophers present original essays on various aspects of how philosophy should be and is done. The first part is devoted to broad traditions and approaches to philosophical methodology. The entries in the second part address topics in philosophical methodology, such as intuitions, conceptual analysis, and transcendental arguments. The third part of the book is devoted to essays about the interconnections between philosophy (...) and neighbouring fields, including those of mathematics, psychology, literature and film, and neuroscience. (shrink)

Este texto tem por objetivo mostrar como a concepção filosófica do sublime em Kant e Schopenhauer pode nos ajudar a ver algumas obras pictóricas de Turner e Pollock. Nesse sentido temos um sublime figurativo e um sublime não figurativo na pintura.This text aims to show how the philosophical conception of the sublime in Kant and Schopenhauer can help us to see some pictorial works of Turner and Pollock. In this sense we have a figurative and a non figurative sublime in (...) the painting. (shrink)

This dissertation provides a theory of the nature of aesthetic experiences on the basis of a theory of aesthetic values. It results in the formulation of the following necessary conditions for an experience to be aesthetic: it must consist of a representation of an object and an accompanying feeling; the representation must instantiate an intrinsic value; and the feeling must be the recognition of that value and bestow it on the object. Since representations are of intrinsic value for different reasons, (...) there are different kinds of aesthetic experiences . By means of certain conceptual links, it is possible to extend this account to other aesthetic entities thus enabling the formulation of a general theory of the aesthetic in non-aesthetic terms. In particular, aesthetic values are identical with subjective dispositions to elicit aesthetic experiences under normal conditions. Accordingly, I endorse anti-realism about aesthetic values: their existence, nature and exemplification are mind-dependent, while their ascriptions to objects have genuine truth-values. I back up this account by arguing against the alternative positions that either take aesthetic values to be objective or deny the truth-aptness of their attributions. Furthermore, I put forward a relativist variant of anti-realism according to which ascriptions of different aesthetic values to a particular object are all correct, given that the aesthetic experiences involved are made under normal conditions and concern the same aesthetically nonevaluative features of that object. For there is no specifically aesthetic norm by means of which one of the faultless aesthetic experiences can be picked out as the only appropriate one. That aesthetic values nevertheless show a normative dimension is ensured by their conformity to a general account of values as capacities to satisfy, or dissatisfy, rational desires. (shrink)

The organism is neither a discovery like the circulation of the blood or the glycogenic function of the liver, nor a particular biological theory like epigenesis or preformationism. It is rather a concept which plays a series of roles – sometimes overt, sometimes masked – throughout the history of biology, and frequently in very normative ways, also shifting between the biological and the social. Indeed, it has often been presented as a key-concept in life science and the ‘theorization’ of Life, (...) but conversely has also been the target of influential rejections: as just an instrument of transmission for the selfish gene, but also, historiographically, as part of an outdated ‘vitalism’. Indeed, the organism, perhaps because it is experientially closer to the ‘body’ than to the ‘molecule’, is often the object of quasi-affective theoretical investments presenting it as essential, sometimes even as the pivot of a science or a particular approach to nature, while other approaches reject or attack it with equal force, assimilating it to a mysterious ‘vitalist’ ontology of extra-causal forces, or other pseudo-scientific doctrines. This paper does not seek to adjudicate between these debates, either in terms of scientific validity or historical coherence; nor does it return to the well-studied issue of the organism-mechanism tension in biology. Recent scholarship has begun to focus on the emergence and transformation of the concept of organism, but has not emphasized so much the way in which organism is a shifting, ‘go-between’ concept – invoked as ‘natural’ by some thinkers to justify their metaphysics, but then presented as value-laden by others, over and against the natural world. The organism as go-between concept is also a hybrid, a boundary concept or an epistemic limit case, all of which partly overlap with the idea of ‘nomadic concepts’. Thereby the concept of organism continues to function in different contexts – as a heuristic, an explanatory challenge, a model of order, of regulation, etc. – despite having frequently been pronounced irrelevant and reduced to molecules or genes. Yet this perpetuation is far removed from any ‘metaphysics of organism’, or organismic biology. (shrink)

O presente artigo tem por objetivo, na primeira parte, explorar algumas teses gerais apresentadas por recente pesquisa de Josef Simon acerca do estatuto da linguagem na filosofia de Kant, em especial no que tange ao modo de significar e comunicar presente nas reivindicações de verdade dos juízos. Em segundo lugar, pretende-se pontuar a crítica de Nietzsche a um modo de significar e comunicar ao qual denomina "gregário", contrapondo-o a uma comunicação e significação "individualizada". Como apontamos no final, a visada interlocução (...) entre Kant e Nietzsche acerca do significar e comunicar se dará segundo um aspecto central: o fator subjetivo presente em qualquer reivindicação discursiva da razão. The present article aims, in the first part, to explore some general theses presented by recent research of Josef Simon concerning the status of language in Kant's philosophy, especially regarding the mode of signification and communication present in the claims for truth of judgment. In the second part, it is intended to point out Nietzsche's critique of a mode of meaning and communication, which he calls "gregarious", confronting it to "individualized" communication and meaning. As it is pointed out in the conclusion, the intended dialogue between Kant and Nietzsche on this theme occurs according to a central aspect: the subjective factor present in any discursive claim of human reason. (shrink)

Ordinary Language Philosophy has largely fallen out of favour, and with it the belief in the primary importance of analyses of ordinary language for philosophical purposes. Still, in their various endeavours, philosophers not only from analytic but also from other backgrounds refer to the use and meaning of terms of interest in ordinary parlance. In doing so, they most commonly appeal to their own linguistic intuitions. Often, the appeal to individual intuitions is supplemented by reference to dictionaries. In recent times, (...) Internet search engine queries for expressions of interest have become quite popular. Apparently, philosophers attempt to surpass the limits of their own linguistic intuitions by appealing to experts or to factual uses of language. I argue that this attempt is commendable but that its execution is wanting. Instead of appealing to dictionaries or Internet queries, philosophers should employ computer-based linguistic corpora in order to confirm or falsify hypotheses about the factual use of language. This approach also has some advantages over methods employed by experimental philosophers. If the importance of ordinary language is stressed, the use of linguistic corpora is hardly avoidable. (shrink)

This paper discusses Immanuel Kant’s views on the role of experiments in natural science, focusing on their relationship with hypotheses, laws of nature, and the heuristic principles of scientific enquiry. Kant’s views are contrasted with the philosophy of experiment that was first sketched by Francis Bacon and later developed by Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke. Kant holds that experiments are always designed and carried out in the light of hypotheses. Hypotheses are derived from experience on the basis of a set (...) of heuristic principles. The function of experiments is testing hypotheses in order to either reject them as false, or else to transform them into empirical laws of nature. To this end, we must integrate the hypotheses that are confirmed by experiments with the a priori principles which are the foundations of natural science. Compared with Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke, Kant has elaborate views on the one hand, on how our theoretical and pre-theoretical assumptions bear on experimental practice, and on the other hand, on how the results of experimental activity can be integrated with theories to advance our knowledge of nature. However, Kant overstates the dependence of experiments on theories. (shrink)

In this article, Bakhtin’s early aesthetics is reread in the context of Hermann Cohen’s system of philosophy, especially his aesthetics. Bakhtin’s thinking from the early ethical writing Toward a Philosophy of Act to Author and Hero in Artistic Activity and Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics is followed. In Author and Hero , an individual is in his life conceived as involved in cognitive and ethical action but as remaining without a consummative form; the form, or the ‘soul’, is bestowed upon a (...) person by the creative activity of the artist alone. In his understanding of artistic creativity and the relationship between the ‘hero’ and the author, Bakhtin closely follows Cohen, with the exception that for Cohen the object of artistic form-giving is the universal, idealized man, whereas for Bakhtin it is an individual. In the concept of a ‘polyphonic novel’ as developed in Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics , Bakhtin, however, considers this view of the activity of the artist (or the novelist) to apply to the “traditional” novel only, while in a Dostoevskyean novel the characters are not subordinated to any defining power of the author. Bakhtin’s theory of the Dostoevskyean novel is thus a return to the emphasis of the cognitive and ethical autonomy of the individual. His understanding of the encounter between persons as a ‘subject’—‘subject’ or an ‘I’—‘thou’ relation has a predecessor, among others, in Cohen. (shrink)

Der Beitrag gibt einen Überblick über den Ursprung und die Entwicklung der Sportphilosophie in Nordamerika und Deutschland. Hierbei wird versucht, das Profil der deutschen Sportphilosophie herauszuarbeiten und der Frage nach ihrem Selbstverständnis nachzugehen. Am Beispiel des Prinzips der Natürlichkeit soll gezeigt werden, dass die Sportphilosophie einen eigenständigen Beitrag zur philosophischen Theoriebildung leisten kann und sich auf dem Wege hin zu einer emanzipierten Sportphilosophie befindet. Ausgehend von der sportspezifischen Problemstellung des Dopings wird in Anlehnung an Aristoteles’ Unterscheidung zwischen dem „Gewachsenen“ und (...) „Gemachten“ ein Ansatz der „Biogenese“ vorgestellt, welcher kritisch Abstand nimmt zum kulturrelativistischen Blick auf das Gegensatzpaar Natürlichkeit/Künstlichkeit in der Naturethik und Medizinethik. Nicht nur in Bezug auf das Sportdoping, sondern auch für die Bereiche der Reproduktionsmedizin und des Neuroenhancement von Emotionen wird deutlich gemacht, dass das Natürlichkeitsprinzip als Grenzprinzip eine zentrale Rolle spielt und im Verbund mit den Prinzipien Authentizität und Echtheit auch als normatives Prinzip ein unverzichtbares Element bildet für tugendethische, pädagogische und allgemeine Fragen des guten Lebens. (shrink)

Romanticism is recognized as a wellspring of modern-day environmental thought and enthusiasm for nature-preservation, but the character of the affinities between the two is less well understood. Essentially, the Romantics realised that nature only becomes a matter for ethical concern, inspiration and love when the mind and sensibility of the human observer/agent are properly attuned and receptive to its meaning. That attunement involves several factors: a more appropriate scientific paradigm, a subtler appreciation of the impact that the setting of human (...) dwelling, especially landscape, may have on character; the discovery of 'life' and spontaneity as a motif in science and art; a deeper and more complex sense of time; and a feel for place drawn from the life-world rather than physics or economics. Romanticism invented a new language and set of descriptions to illuminate all of these things, one we neglect or forget at our peril. (shrink)

Revaluation of the problem of natural teleology seems an important precondition for elucidating our environmental crisis and for formulating an 'econological ethics', because it calls for a recognition of an intrinsic value in nature and organisms. Therefore, it is necessary to show that the concept of natural teleology is not in contradiction with scientific theories, in particular not with the theory of evolution. In this paper I shall argue that there is a fundamental misunderstanding about the concepts of teleology and (...) chance in modern thinking. This as a result of a radical transformation of the Aristotelian concept of teleology by Christian theologians during the Middle Ages. This confusion resulted in the rejection of teleology from evolution and in an exaggeration of the role of chance. However, not a solution for the problem of teleology is given here, but only an attempt to prove that neither the fossil-record, nor the role of chance in evolution can give adequate arguments for the negation of teleology in evolution. That is not to say that, therefore there exists teleology in evolution, but the problem of teleology in nature cannot, be solved by the scientific theory of evolution, but only be elucidated by philosophical analysis. At the end of the paper it is argued that teleology must be rather presupposed in evolution. (shrink)

Within the debate on the epistemology of aesthetic appreciation, it has a long tradition, and is still very common, to endorse the sentimentalist view that our aesthetic evaluations are rationally grounded on, or even constituted by, certain of our emotional responses to the objects concerned. Such a view faces, however, the serious challenge to satisfactorily deal with the seeming possibility of faultless disagreement among emotionally based and epistemically appropriate verdicts. I will argue that the sentimentalist approach to aesthetic epistemology cannot (...) accept and accommodate this possibility without thereby undermining the assumed capacity of emotions to justify corresponding aesthetic evaluations – that is, without undermining the very sentimentalist idea at the core of its account. And I will also try to show that sentimentalists can hope to deny the possibility of faultless disagreement only by giving up the further view that aesthetic assessments are intersubjective – a view which is almost as traditional and widely held in aesthetics as sentimentalism, and which is indeed often enough combined with the latter. My ultimate conclusion is therefore that this popular combination of views should better be avoided: either sentimentalism or intersubjectivism has to make way. (shrink)

In which sense can human beings be conceived as social animals? To elucidate this question, the present paper distinguishes the logical sociality of all living beings from the material sociality of social animals and the political sociality of self-conscious social animals. The self-conscious political sociality that characterises the human genus-being requires a complex interplay of first and second person through which alone we can participate in our form of life and determine its content. The human form of life thus constituted (...) is characterised by a particularly open, and at the same time precarious, membership which involves specific forms of vulnerability and power. Against this background, forms of objective spirit are necessary which grant us a generalized recognition and relieve us from the contingency of each particular second-personal recognition, without abandoning the openness of the sociality of the human form of life. This double requirement has led to paradoxical institutions in modern society which strive to protect and ensure the sociality of the human form of life precisely by naturalising and individualising our access to it. (shrink)

Living systems employ several mechanisms and behaviors to achieve robustness and maintain themselves under changing internal and external conditions. Regulation stands out from them as a specific form of higher-order control, exerted over the basic regime responsible for the production and maintenance of the organism, and provides the system with the capacity to act on its own constitutive dynamics. It consists in the capability to selectively shift between different available regimes of self-production and self-maintenance in response to specific signals and (...) perturbations, due to the action of a dedicated subsystem which is operationally distinct from the regulated ones. The role of regulation, however, is not exhausted by its contribution to maintain a living system’s viability. While enhancing robustness, regulatory mechanisms play a fundamental role in the realization of an autonomous biological organization. Specifically, they are at the basis of the remarkable integration of biological systems, insofar as they coordinate and modulate the activity of distinct functional subsystems. Moreover, by implementing complex and hierarchically organized control architectures, they allow for an increase in structural and organizational complexity while minimizing fragility. Finally, they endow living systems, from their most basic unicellular instances, with the capability to control their own internal dynamics to adaptively respond to specific features of their interaction with the environment, thus providing the basis for the emergence of minimal forms of cognition. (shrink)

This essay explores the various ways in which in the history of philosophy the imperative to return to nature has been understood. Against this background, it takes up the question as to how the concept of nature is to be determined in contemporary thought.