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  1. Understanding and Testimony.Allan Hazlett - forthcoming - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford.
    Can understanding be transmitted by testimony, in the same sense that propositional knowledge can be transmitted by testimony? Some contemporary philosophers – call them testimonial understanding pessimists – say No, and others – call them testimonial understanding optimists – say Yes. In this chapter I will articulate testimonial understanding pessimism (§1) and consider some arguments for it (§2).
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  • Elgin on Understanding: How Does It Involve Know-How, Endorsement and Factivity?Emma C. Gordon - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):4955-4972.
    In Chapter 3 of True Enough, Elgin outlines her view of objectual understanding, focusing largely on its non-factive nature and the extent to which a certain kind of know-how is required for the “grasping” component of understanding. I will explore four central issues that feature in this chapter, concentrating on the role of know-how, the concept of endorsement, Elgin’s critique of the factivity constraint on understanding, and how we might use aspects of Elgin’s framework to inform related debates on the (...)
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  • Know-how-first anti-intellectualism: Williamson against Williamson.M. Hosein & M. A. Khalaj - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-30.
    Inspired by Williamson’s knowledge-first epistemology, I propose a position on practical knowledge that can be called the ‘know-how-first view’; yet whereas Williamson is one of the pioneers of the new intellectualism about know-how, I employ the know-how-first view to argue against intellectualism and instead develop a know-how-first version of anti-intellectualism. Williamson argues that propositional knowledge is a sui generis unanalyzable mental state that comes first in the epistemic realm; in parallel, I propose that know-how is a sui generis unanalyzable power (...)
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  • Know-How as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Lowenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
    What does it mean to know how to do something? This book develops a comprehensive account of know-how, a crucial epistemic goal for all who care about getting things right, not only with respect to the facts, but also with respect to practice. It proposes a novel interpretation of the seminal work of Gilbert Ryle, according to which know-how is a competence, a complex ability to do well in an activity in virtue of guidance by an understanding of what it (...)
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  • The Virtue of Knowing-How.Felipe Rocha L. Santos - 2015 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 60 (3):483-499.
    Intellectualists about knowledge-how state that knowledgehow is a kind of propositional knowledge. Anti-intellectualists try to show that there are cases where the agent has knowledge-how without knowing-that. This paper focuses on recent anti-intellectualists’ arguments by Carter and Pritchard. I argue that Carter and Pritchard’s arguments are not well succeeded and that, if we apply virtue epistemology to this debate, we can conclude that knowledge-how shares the same epistemic properties as propositional knowledge. If this is correct, we can say that knowledge-how (...)
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  • Epistemic Agency and the Self-Knowledge of Reason: On the Contemporary Relevance of Kant’s Method of Faculty Analysis.Thomas Land - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 13):3137-3154.
    Each of Kant’s three Critiques offers an account of the nature of a mental faculty and arrives at this account by means of a procedure I call ‘faculty analysis’. Faculty analysis is often regarded as among the least defensible aspects of Kant’s position; as a consequence, philosophers seeking to inherit Kantian ideas tend to transpose them into a different methodological context. I argue that this is a mistake: in fact faculty analysis is a live option for philosophical inquiry today. My (...)
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  • The Limits of Stanley and Williamson’s Attack on Ryle's View About Know-How.Juan Camilo Espejo-Serna - 2018 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):59-88.
    The purpose of this paper is to discuss Stanley and Williamson’s take on Ryle’s argument against know-how being know-that. For this, I provide an initial consideration of the possibility of isolating Ryle’s argument from his overall philosophical outlook and Stanley and Williamson’s purpose in their discussion of Ryle. I then examine in detail Stanley and Williamson’s reconstruction of Ryle’s argument with the specific aim of showing where they have introduced extraneous elements: I examine what they take to bes additional assumptions (...)
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  • Knowing How to Know That.Benjamin Elzinga - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1987-2001.
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  • Knowing How to Know That.Benjamin Elzinga - 2020 - Annalen der Philosophie 87 (4):1987-2001.
    Many virtue-based approaches to propositional knowledge begin with the ability and achievement intuitions. In this paper, I rely on this pair of intuitions to explore the relationship between knowing how and knowing that. On the view that emerges, propositional knowledge is a kind of success through cognitive know how. Rather than simply equating know how with ability, I reveal deeper connections between both kinds of knowledge by focusing on the role of self-regulation.
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  • Knowledge How.Jeremy Fantl - 2012 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Art and Achievement.James Grant - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2517-2539.
    An increasingly popular view in the philosophy of art is that some artworks are good artworks at least partly because they are achievements. This view was introduced to explain why two works that look the same, such as an original painting and a perfect copy, can differ in artistic merit. An achievement theory can say that the original is better because it is a greater achievement. Achievement theories have since been used to answer other questions, and they are now a (...)
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  • Introspective Knowledge by Acquaintance.Anna Giustina - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-23.
    Introspective knowledge by acquaintance is knowledge we have by being directly aware of our phenomenally conscious states. In this paper, I argue that introspective knowledge by acquaintance is a sui generis kind of knowledge: it is irreducible to any sort of propositional knowledge and is wholly constituted by a relationship of introspective acquaintance. My main argument is that this is the best explanation of some epistemic facts about phenomenal consciousness and introspection. In particular, it best explains the epistemic asymmetry between (...)
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  • Keeping Students Out of Mary’s (Class)Room: Approaches to Supporting Students’ Acquisition of Non-Propositional Knowledge in Science Education.Richard Brock & David Hay - 2019 - Science & Education 28 (9-10):985-1000.
    Whilst many science educators, it is reported, associate knowledge with justified true belief, epistemologists have observed that the JTB model is an incomplete account of knowledge. Moreover, researchers from several fields have argued that developing scientific expertise involves not only the acquisition of knowledge that can be expressed in the form of a sentence, propositional knowledge, but also knowledge that cannot be articulated. This article examines the Mary’s room thought experiment proposed by Frank Jackson and applies it to the context (...)
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  • Keeping Students Out of Mary’s (Class)Room.Richard Brock & David Hay - 2019 - Science & Education 28 (9-10):985-1000.
    Whilst many science educators, it is reported, associate knowledge with justified true belief, epistemologists have observed that the JTB model is an incomplete account of knowledge. Moreover, researchers from several fields have argued that developing scientific expertise involves not only the acquisition of knowledge that can be expressed in the form of a sentence, propositional knowledge, but also knowledge that cannot be articulated. This article examines the Mary’s room thought experiment proposed by Frank Jackson and applies it to the context (...)
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  • Knowledge‐How and Epistemic Luck.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Noûs 49 (3):440-453.
    Reductive intellectualists hold that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge-how and knowledge-that have the same epistemic properties. In particular, knowledge-how ought to be compatible with epistemic luck to the same extent as knowledge-that. It is argued, contra reductive intellectualism, that knowledge-how is compatible with a species of epistemic luck which is not compatible with knowledge-that, and thus it is claimed that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart.
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  • (Anti)-Anti-Intellectualism and the Sufficiency Thesis.J. Adam Carter & Bolesław Czarnecki - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):374-397.
    Anti-intellectualists about knowledge-how insist that, when an agent S knows how to φ, it is in virtue of some ability, rather than in virtue of any propositional attitudes, S has. Recently, a popular strategy for attacking the anti-intellectualist position proceeds by appealing to cases where an agent is claimed to possess a reliable ability to φ while nonetheless intuitively lacking knowledge-how to φ. John Bengson & Marc Moffett (2009; 2011a; 2011b) and Carlotta Pavese (2015a; 2015b) have embraced precisely this strategy (...)
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  • The Defeasibility of Knowledge-How.J. Adam Carter & Jesús Navarro - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):662-685.
    Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. If this thesis is correct, then we should expect the defeasibility conditions for knowledge-how and knowledge-that to be uniform—viz., that the mechanisms of epistemic defeat which undermine propositional knowledge will be equally capable of imperilling knowledge-how. The goal of this paper is twofold: first, against intellectualism, we will show that knowledge-how is in fact resilient to being undermined by (...)
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  • Disability and the Goods of Life.Stephen M. Campbell, Sven Nyholm & Jennifer K. Walter - 2021 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 46 (6):704-728.
    The so-called Disability Paradox arises from the apparent tension between the popular view that disability leads to low well-being and the relatively high life-satisfaction reports of disabled people. Our aim in this essay is to make some progress toward dissolving this alleged paradox by exploring the relationship between disability and various “goods of life”—that is, components of a life that typically make a person’s life go better for her. We focus on four widely recognized goods of life (happiness, rewarding relationships, (...)
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  • Knowing How to Know That.Benjamin Elzinga - 2020 - Erkenntnis:1-15.
    Many virtue-based approaches to propositional knowledge begin with the ability and achievement intuitions. In this paper, I rely on this pair of intuitions to explore the relationship between knowing how and knowing that. On the view that emerges, propositional knowledge is a kind of success through cognitive know how. Rather than simply equating know how with ability, I reveal deeper connections between both kinds of knowledge by focusing on the role of self-regulation.
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  • The Value of Knowing How.Peter Markie - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1291-1304.
    Know-how has a distinctive, non-instrumental value that a mere reliable ability lacks. Some, including Bengson and Moffett Knowing how, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 161–195, 2011) and Carter and Pritchard :799–816, 2015b) have cited a close relation between knowhow and cognitive achievement, and it is tempting to think that the value of know-how rests in that relation. That’s not so, however. The value of know-how lies in its relation to the fundamental value of autonomy.
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  • Understanding: Not Know-How.Emily Sullivan - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):221-240.
    There is considerable agreement among epistemologists that certain abilities are constitutive of understanding-why. These abilities include: constructing explanations, drawing conclusions, and answering questions. This agreement has led epistemologists to conclude that understanding is a kind of know-how. However, in this paper, I argue that the abilities constitutive of understanding are the same kind of cognitive abilities that we find in ordinary cases of knowledge-that and not the kind of practical abilities associated with know-how. I argue for this by disambiguating between (...)
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  • Skills, Procedural Knowledge, and Knowledge-How.Benoit Gaultier - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):4959-4981.
    My main intention in this article is to settle the question whether having the ability to \ is, as Ryleans think, necessary for knowing how to \, and to determine the kind of role played by procedural knowledge in knowing how to \ and in acquiring and possessing the ability to \. I shall argue, in a seemingly anti-Rylean fashion, that when it comes to know-hows that are ordinarily categorised as physical skills, or—to be, for the moment, philosophically neutral—as enabling (...)
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  • How to Be Skilful: Opportunistic Robustness and Normative Sensitivity.Andrew Buskell - 2015 - Synthese 192 (5):1445-1466.
    In a recent article, Fridland characterises a central capacity of skill users, an aspect she calls ‘control’. Control, according to Fridland, is evidenced in the way in which skill users are able to marshal a variety of mental and bodily resources in order to keep skill deployment operating fluidly and appropriately. According to Fridland, two prevalent contemporary accounts of skill—Stanley & Krakauer’s and Hubert Dreyfus’s —fail to account for the features of control, and do so necessarily. While I agree with (...)
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  • Testimonial Knowledge-How.Andrew Peet - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (4):895-912.
    There is an emerging skepticism about the existence of testimonial knowledge-how :387–404, 2010; Poston in Noûs 50:865–878, 2016; Carter and Pritchard in Philos Phenomenol Res 91:181–199, 2015a). This is unsurprising since a number of influential approaches to knowledge-how struggle to accommodate testimonial knowledge-how. Nonetheless, this scepticism is misguided. This paper establishes that there are cases of easy testimonial knowledge-how. It is structured as follows: first, a case is presented in which an agent acquires knowledge-how simply by accepting a speaker’s testimony. (...)
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  • Scaffolded practical knowledge: a problem for intellectualism.Nikolaj Nottelmann & Kári Thorsson - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):577-595.
    Roughly speaking, intellectualists contend that practical knowledge is always a matter of having the right kind of propositional knowledge. This article argues that intellectualism faces a serious explanatory challenge when practical knowledge crucially relies on ecological information, i.e. when know-how is scaffolded. More precisely, intellectualists struggle to provide a satisfactory explanation of seeming know-how contrasts in structurally similar cases of scaffolded ability manifestation. In contrast, even if anti-intellectualism is similarly challenged, at least some varieties of anti-intellectualism seemingly hold resources to (...)
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  • Knowledge-How, Understanding-Why and Epistemic Luck: An Experimental Study.J. Adam Carter, Duncan Pritchard & Joshua Shepherd - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):701-734.
    Reductive intellectualists about knowledge-how hold, contra Ryle, that knowing how to do something is just a kind of propositional knowledge. In a similar vein, traditional reductivists about understanding-why insist, in accordance with a tradition beginning with Aristotle, that the epistemic standing one attains when one understands why something is so is itself just a kind of propositional knowledge—viz., propositional knowledge of causes. A point that has been granted on both sides of these debates is that if these reductive proposals are (...)
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  • Epistemic Luck and the Extended Mind.J. Adam Carter - 2017 - In Ian M. Church (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Theories of Luck. London: Routledge.
    Contemporary debates about epistemic luck and its relation to knowledge have traditionally proceeded against a tacit background commitment to cognitive internalism, the thesis that cognitive processes play out inside the head. In particular, safety-based approaches (e.g., Pritchard 2005; 2007; Luper-Foy 1984; Sainsbury 1997; Sosa 1999; Williamson 2000) reveal this commitment by taking for granted a traditional internalist construal of what I call the cognitive fixedness thesis—viz., the thesis that the cognitive process that is being employed in the actual world is (...)
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  • Extended Knowledge-How.J. Adam Carter & Bolesław Czarnecki - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (2):259-273.
    According to reductive intellectualists about knowledge-how :147–190, 2008; Philos Phenomenol Res 78:439–467, 2009) knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. To the extent that this is right, then insofar as we might conceive of ways knowledge could be extended with reference to active externalist :7–19, 1998; Clark in Supersizing the mind: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) approaches in the philosophy of mind, we should expect no interesting difference between the two. However, (...)
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  • Sosa on Knowledge, Judgment and Guessing.J. Adam Carter - 2018 - Synthese:1-20.
    In Chapter 3 of Judgment and Agency, Ernest Sosa (2015) explicates the concept of a fully apt performance. In the course of doing so, he draws from illustrative examples of practical performances and applies lessons drawn to the case of cognitive performances, and in particular, to the cog- nitive performance of judging. Sosa's examples in the practical sphere are rich and instructive. But there is, I will argue, an interesting disanalogy between the practical and cognitive examples he relies on. Ultimately, (...)
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  • Introduction to special issue: knowledge, virtue and action—eastern and western perspectives.J. Adam Carter, Chienkuo Mi, S. Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2291-2294.
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  • Knowledge-How (Reference Entry).Bolesław Czarnecki - 2016 - Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy.
    The entry is intended as an advanced introduction to the topic of knowledge-how. It starts with a list of overviews, monographs and collections, followed by selected 20th century discussions. The last two sections contain sources pertaining to Ryle's own work on the topic as well as work by other influential thinkers, and themes that are sometimes associated with knowledge-how. The remaining seven sections survey the contemporary literature on knowledge-how from three perspectives: (i) generic desiderata for accounts of knowledge-how, (ii) specific (...)
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  • Inferring by Attaching Force.Ulf Hlobil - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):701-714.
    The paper offers an account of inference. The account underwrites the idea that inference requires that the reasoner takes her premises to support her conclusion. I reject views according to which such ‘takings’ are intuitions or beliefs. I sketch an alternative view on which inferring consists in attaching what I call ‘inferential force’ to a structured collection of contents.
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  • Knowing How, Basic Actions, and Ways of Doing Things.Kevin Lynch - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (8):956-977.
    This paper investigates whether we can know how to do basic actions, from the perspective according to which knowing how to do something requires knowledge of a way to do it. A key argument from this perspective against basic know-how is examined and is found to be unsound, involving the false premise that there are no ways of doing basic actions. However, a new argument along similar lines is then developed, which contends that there are no ways of doing basic (...)
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  • Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):799-816.
    A conspicuous oversight in recent debates about the vexed problem of the value of knowledge has been the value of knowledge-how. This would not be surprising if knowledge-how were, as Gilbert Ryle [1945, 1949] famously thought, fundamentally different from knowledge-that. However, reductive intellectualists [e.g. Stanley and Williamson 2001; Brogaard 2008, 2009, 2011; Stanley 2011a, 2011b] maintain that knowledge-how just is a kind of knowledge-that. Accordingly, reductive intellectualists must predict that the value problems facing propositional knowledge will equally apply to knowledge-how. (...)
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  • One More Twist ~ Knowledge How and Ability.Masaharu Mizumoto - forthcoming - Episteme:1-9.
    According to Bengson et al.’s Salchow case, Irina is a novice skater who has a mistaken belief about what amounts to a Salchow, but also has a neurological abnormality which, unknowingly to her, affects both her movement and her sense of it. As a result of this twist, she always ends up succeeding in jumping the Salchow whenever she tries. This story was presented as a counterexample to a variant of anti-intellectualism, and as Bengson and colleagues expected, the vast majority (...)
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