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Decisions with indeterminate probabilities.Teddy Seidenfeld - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):259-261.details
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Facts about incoherence as non-evidential epistemic reasons.Eva Schmidt - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-22.details
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Finitistic and Frequentistic Approximation of Probability Measures with or without σ-Additivity.G. Schurz & H. Leitgeb - 2008 - Studia Logica 89 (2):257-283.details
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Some untoward consequences of Dretske's “causal theory” of information.Kenneth M. Sayre - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):78-79.details
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Objectively homogeneous reference classes.Wesley C. Salmon - 1977 - Synthese 36 (4):399 - 414.details
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Epistemology without knowledge?Ruth Weintraub - 1991 - Ratio 4 (2):157-169.details
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The sufficiency of information-caused belief for knowledge.Bede Rundle - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):78-78.details
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What is the aim of models in formal epistemology?Matheus de Lima Rui - 2022 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 26 (1):135-152.details
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Bilateralism and Probabilism.Mariela Rubin - 2022 - Análisis Filosófico 42 (1):5-29.details
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Can information be de-cognitized?William W. Rozeboom - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):76-77.details
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The Structure of Justification.Sven Rosenkranz - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):629-629.details
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The logic is in the representation.Russell Revlin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):259-259.details
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Human inference: The notion of reasonable rationality.Russell Revlin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):507.details
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Fallibilism.Baron Reed - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):585-596.details
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Probabilistic Belief Contraction.Raghav Ramachandran, Arthur Ramer & Abhaya C. Nayak - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (4):325-351.details
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A New Anti-Expertise Dilemma.Thomas Raleigh - 2021 - Synthese (3-4):1-19.details
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Assertibility and Sensitivity.Geoff Pynn - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):99-117.details
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The norms of acceptance.Joëlle Proust - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):316-333.details
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No Justificatory Closure without Truth.Francesco Praolini - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):715-726.details
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A Bayesian framework for knowledge attribution: Evidence from semantic integration.Derek Powell, Zachary Horne, Ángel Pinillos & Keith Holyoak - 2015 - Cognition 139 (C):92-104.details
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The theory of nomic probability.John L. Pollock - 1992 - Synthese 90 (2):263 - 299.details
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Self-defeating arguments.John L. Pollock - 1991 - Minds and Machines 1 (4):367-392.details
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Reasoning defeasibly about probabilities.John L. Pollock - 2011 - Synthese 181 (2):317-352.details
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How to use probabilities in reasoning.John L. Pollock - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 64 (1):65 - 85.details
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Defeasible Reasoning.John L. Pollock - 1987 - Cognitive Science 11 (4):481-518.details
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Confirming confirmation bias.P. Pollard - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):258-259.details
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Unbelievable thoughts and doxastic oughts.Adam C. Podlaskowski - 2010 - Theoria 76 (2):112-118.details
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Demystifying Dilation.Arthur Paul Pedersen & Gregory Wheeler - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1305-1342.details
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Conditional Probability and Defeasible Inference.Rohit Parikh - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (1):97 - 119.details
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The Ambiguity of Quantifiers.Francesco Paoli - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (3):313-330.details
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Sceptical Theism and the Paradox of Evil.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):319-333.details
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Acceptance and Certainty, Doxastic Modals, and Indicative Conditionals.Kurt Norlin - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (5):951-971.details
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Psychology, statistics, and analytical epistemology.Richard E. Nisbett & Paul Thagard - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):257-258.details
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Skepticism, contextualism, and semantic self-knowledge.Ram Neta - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):396–411.details
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The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.details
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Justificação, Probabilidade e Independência.André Neiva & Tatiane Marks - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (2):207-230.details
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Can philosophy resolve empirical issues?Clifford R. Mynatt, Ryan D. Tweney & Michael E. Doherty - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):506.details
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Consciousness, Certainty, and Epistemic Operators.Masaharu Mizumoto - 2005 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 38 (1):1-15.details
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What is the Normative Role of Logic?Peter Milne - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):269-298.details
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Contrapositivism; or, The only evidence worth paying for is contained in the negatives.David Miller - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):256-257.details
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Belief, Degrees of Belief, and Assertion.Peter Milne - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):331-349.details
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Modality, expected utility, and hypothesis testing.WooJin Chung & Salvador Mascarenhas - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-40.details
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Logical questions behind the lottery and preface paradoxes: lossy rules for uncertain inference.David Makinson - 2012 - Synthese 186 (2):511-529.details
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WEIRD languages have misled us, too.Asifa Majid & Stephen C. Levinson - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):103-103.details
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The irrelevance of belief to rational action.Patrick Maher - 1986 - Erkenntnis 24 (3):363 - 384.details
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Argument and belief: Where we stand in the Keynesian tradition. [REVIEW]R. P. Loui - 1991 - Minds and Machines 1 (4):357-365.details
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Normative theories of rationality: Occam's razor, Procrustes' bed?Lola L. Lopes - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):255-256.details
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Information and belief.Barry Loewer - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):75-76.details
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Cut-off points for the rational believer.Lina Maria Lissia - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-19.details
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