- Hyperintensional Foundations of Mathematical Platonism.David Elohim - manuscriptdetails
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'Explicating ways of consensus-making: Distinguishing the academic, the interface and the meta-consensus.Laszlo Kosolosky & Jeroen Van Bouwel - 2014 - In Martini Carlo (ed.), Experts and Consensus in Social Science. Springer. pp. 71-92.details
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(1 other version)Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017 - Dissertation, Arché, University of St Andrewsdetails
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(1 other version)Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017details
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Chance, Credence and Circles.Fabrizio Cariani - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):49-58.details
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Agreement and Updating For Self-Locating Belief.Michael Caie - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (3):513-547.details
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Can All-Accuracy Accounts Justify Evidential Norms?Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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On the preference for more specific reference classes.Paul D. Thorn - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6):2025-2051.details
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A pluralistic account of epistemic rationality.Matthew Kopec - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3571-3596.details
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Foundations of Probability.Rachael Briggs - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):625-640.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic Consequentialism: Its Relation to Ethical Consequentialism and the Truth-Indication Principle.Jochen Briesen - 2016 - In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 277-306.details
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Scoring Imprecise Credences: A Mildly Immodest Proposal.Conor Mayo-Wilson & Gregory Wheeler - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):55-78.details
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The puzzle of the changing past.L. Barlassina & F. Del Prete - 2015 - Analysis 75 (1):59-67.details
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Why Truth-Relativists Should Be Non-conformists.Michele Palmira - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (3):239-247.details
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Belief Update across Fission.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (3):659-682.details
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Immoderately rational.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):41-56.details
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Ten Reasons to Care About the Sleeping Beauty Problem.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1003-1017.details
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You've Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.details
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Belief Is Credence One (in Context).Roger Clarke - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-18.details
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Why It Is Time To Move Beyond Nagelian Reduction.Marie I. Kaiser - 2012 - In D. Dieks, S. Hartmann, T. Uebel & M. Weber (eds.), Probabilities, Laws and Structure. Springer. pp. 255-272.details
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Entropy - A Guide for the Perplexed.Roman Frigg & Charlotte Werndl - 2011 - In Claus Beisbart & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), Probabilities in Physics. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 115-142.details
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An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):236-272.details
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Gradational accuracy and nonclassical semantics.J. Robert G. Williams - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):513-537.details
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Clarifying the relationship between coherence and accuracy in probability judgments.Jian-Qiao Zhu, Philip W. S. Newall, Joakim Sundh, Nick Chater & Adam N. Sanborn - 2022 - Cognition 223 (C):105022.details
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(1 other version)Accuracy, conditionalization, and probabilism.Don Fallis & Peter J. Lewis - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4017-4033.details
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Lying, more or less: a computer simulation study of graded lies and trust dynamics.Borut Trpin, Anna Dobrosovestnova & Sebastian J. Götzendorfer - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1-28.details
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Varieties of Justification—How (Not) to Solve the Problem of Induction.Marius Backmann - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (2):235-255.details
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Subjective Probability and its Dynamics.Alan Hajek & Julia Staffel - 2021 - In Markus Knauff & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), The Handbook of Rationality. London: MIT Press.details
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(1 other version)Justifying the Principle of Indifference.Jon Williamson - forthcoming - European Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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Inference to the Best Explanation in Uncertain Evidential Situations.Borut Trpin & Max Pellert - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (4):977-1001.details
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Imprecise probability in epistemology.Elkin Lee - 2017 - Dissertation, Ludwig–Maximilians–Universitatdetails
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Rationality as the Capacity for Understanding.Karl Schafer - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):639-663.details
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Risk, rationality and expected utility theory.Richard Pettigrew - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):798-826.details
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Dr. Truthlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities.Kenny Easwaran - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4):816-853.details
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Philosophy of Science in Germany, 1992–2012: Survey-Based Overview and Quantitative Analysis.Matthias Unterhuber, Alexander Gebharter & Gerhard Schurz - 2014 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (1):71-160.details
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Three conceptions of explaining how possibly—and one reductive account.Johannes Persson - 2011 - In Henk W. de Regt (ed.), EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 275--286.details
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Formal Epistemology Meets Mechanism Design.Jürgen Landes - 2023 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 54 (2):215-231.details
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Credal accuracy and knowledge.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2).details
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Group epistemic value.Jeffrey Dunn - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):65-92.details
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Towards a pluralistic view of formal methods.Ko-Hung Kuan - 2020 - Dissertation, London School of Economicsdetails
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The Problem of Modally Bad Company.Tom Schoonen - 2020 - Res Philosophica 97 (4):639-659.details
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The Bi-directional Relationship between Source Characteristics and Message Content.Peter J. Collins, Ulrike Hahn, Ylva von Gerber & Erik J. Olsson - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.details
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Judging the Probability of Hypotheses Versus the Impact of Evidence: Which Form of Inductive Inference Is More Accurate and Time‐Consistent?Katya Tentori, Nick Chater & Vincenzo Crupi - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (3):758-778.details
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Reliability for degrees of belief.Jeff Dunn - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1929-1952.details
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Conditionalization and not Knowing that One Knows.Aaron Bronfman - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (4):871-892.details
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Epistemic Utility Theory.Richard Pettigrew - 2010details
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Doxastic Correctness.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):217-234.details
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A New Epistemic Utility Argument for the Principal Principle.Richard G. Pettigrew - 2013 - Episteme 10 (1):19-35.details
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Leitgeb and Pettigrew on Accuracy and Updating.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (3):413-424.details
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Nonclassical Probability, Convex Hulls, and Dutch Books.Michał Gil Sanchez, Zalán Gyenis & Leszek Wroński - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.details
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