- A Puzzle About Knowledge, Blame, and Coherence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (4):493-503.details
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What is justified credence?Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):16-30.details
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On the Normativity of Rationality and of Normative Reasons.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - manuscriptdetails
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The explanatory role of consistency requirements.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2020 - Synthese 197 (10):4551-4569.details
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From probabilities to categorical beliefs: Going beyond toy models.Igor Douven & Hans Rott - 2018 - Journal of Logic and Computation 28 (6):1099-1124.details
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Learning and Value Change.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19:1--22.details
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Surreal Decisions.Eddy Keming Chen & Daniel Rubio - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):54-74.details
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Two Approaches to Belief Revision.Ted Shear & Branden Fitelson - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):487-518.details
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Repugnant Accuracy.Brian Talbot - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):540-563.details
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Rational endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.details
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Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.details
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Must Good Reasoning Satisfy Cumulative Transitivity?Shyam Nair - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):123-146.details
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Accuracy for Believers.Julia Staffel - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):39-48.details
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Stability and Scepticism in the Modelling of Doxastic States: Probabilities and Plain Beliefs.Hans Rott - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (1):167-197.details
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When Rational Reasoners Reason Differently.Michael G. Titelbaum & Matthew Kopec - 2019details
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Truth, knowledge, and the standard of proof in criminal law.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5253-5286.details
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Moral Caution and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson - 2016 - Journal of Social Philosophy 47 (2):120-141.details
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Who Cares What You Accurately Believe?Clayton Littlejohn - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):217-248.details
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Plausible Permissivism.Michael G. Titelbaum & Matthew Kopec - manuscriptdetails
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A Game-Theoretic Approach to Peer Disagreement.Remco Heesen & Pieter van der Kolk - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1345-1368.details
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The Calendar Paradox.Sam Shpall - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):801-825.details
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II—Pluralism about Belief States.Richard Pettigrew - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):187-204.details
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Formal Representations of Belief.Franz Huber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Interpretations of probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Dogmatism and Inquiry.Sam Carter & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - Mind.details
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Still no lie detector for language models: probing empirical and conceptual roadblocks.Benjamin A. Levinstein & Daniel A. Herrmann - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-27.details
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The Epistemic and the Deontic Preface Paradox.Lina M. Lissia & Jan Sprenger - manuscriptdetails
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Are There Counterexamples to the Consistency Principle?Clayton Littlejohn - 2023 - Episteme 20 (4):852-869.details
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Prefaces, Knowledge, and Questions.Frank Hong - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.details
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Getting Accurate about Knowledge.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2022 - Mind 132 (525):158-191.details
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Knowledge and Prizes.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In Artūrs Logins & Jacques Henri Vollet (eds.), Putting Knowledge to Work: New Directions for Knowledge-First Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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What is Rational Belief?Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Suspending belief in credal accounts.Andrew del Rio - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):3-25.details
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Accurate believers are deductively cogent.Matthew Hewson - 2021 - Noûs 56 (4):763-786.details
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Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):201-217.details
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A normative comparison of threshold views through computer simulations.Alice C. W. Huang - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-23.details
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Remarks on staffel on full belief.Branden Fitelson - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (2):385-393.details
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Imperfection, Accuracy, and Structural Rationality.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (3):1095-1116.details
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Faith and traditions.Lara Buchak - 2023 - Noûs 57 (3):740-759.details
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Replies to Fitelson and Konek.Julia Staffel - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (10):3155-3167.details
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Perception and Probability.Alex Byrne - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):343-363.details
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Credal accuracy and knowledge.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2).details
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Metaepistemology.J. Adam Carter & Ernest Sosa - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Why Ideal Epistemology?Jennifer Rose Carr - 2021 - Mind 131 (524):1131-1162.details
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Changes in attitude.Daniel Drucker - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):151-169.details
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Anti-Exceptionalism About Requirements of Epistemic Rationality.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (3):423-441.details
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A puzzle about epistemic value and steps towards a solution.Timothy Perrine - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12103-12119.details
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Lockean Beliefs, Dutch Books, and Scoring Systems.Daniel Rothschild - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (5):1979-1995.details
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Eleven angry men.Clayton Littlejohn - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):227-239.details
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On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):9-31.details
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