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  1. Is Incompatibilism Compatible with Fregeanism?Nils Kürbis - 2018 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 14 (2):27-46.
    This paper considers whether incompatibilism, the view that negation is to be explained in terms of a primitive notion of incompatibility, and Fregeanism, the view that arithmetical truths are analytic according to Frege’s definition of that term in §3 of Foundations of Arithmetic, can both be upheld simultaneously. Both views are attractive on their own right, in particular for a certain empiricist mind-set. They promise to account for two philosophical puzzling phenomena: the problem of negative truth and the problem of (...)
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  • Tolerant reasoning: nontransitive or nonmonotonic?Pablo Cobreros, Paul Egré, Dave Ripley & Robert van Rooij - 2017 - Synthese 199 (Suppl 3):681-705.
    The principle of tolerance characteristic of vague predicates is sometimes presented as a soft rule, namely as a default which we can use in ordinary reasoning, but which requires care in order to avoid paradoxes. We focus on two ways in which the tolerance principle can be modeled in that spirit, using special consequence relations. The first approach relates tolerant reasoning to nontransitive reasoning; the second relates tolerant reasoning to nonmonotonic reasoning. We compare the two approaches and examine three specific (...)
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  • (1 other version)Inferentialism.Florian Steinberger & Julien Murzi - 2017 - In Steinberger Florian & Murzi Julien (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Language. pp. 197-224.
    This article offers an overview of inferential role semantics. We aim to provide a map of the terrain as well as challenging some of the inferentialist’s standard commitments. We begin by introducing inferentialism and placing it into the wider context of contemporary philosophy of language. §2 focuses on what is standardly considered both the most important test case for and the most natural application of inferential role semantics: the case of the logical constants. We discuss some of the (alleged) benefits (...)
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  • The Psychology and Philosophy of Natural Numbers.Oliver R. Marshall - 2017 - Philosophia Mathematica (1):nkx002.
    ABSTRACT I argue against both neuropsychological and cognitive accounts of our grasp of numbers. I show that despite the points of divergence between these two accounts, they face analogous problems. Both presuppose too much about what they purport to explain to be informative, and also characterize our grasp of numbers in a way that is absurd in the light of what we already know from the point of view of mathematical practice. Then I offer a positive methodological proposal about the (...)
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  • An Inferentialist Conception of the A Priori.Ralph Wedgwood - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5:295–314.
    This paper offers an account of the a priori. According to this account, the fundamental notion is not that of a priori knowledge, or even of a priori justified belief, but a notion of an a priori justified inferential disposition. The rationality or justification of such a priori justified inferential dispositions is explained purely by some of the basic cognitive capacities that the thinker possesses, independently of any further experiences or other conscious mental states that the thinker happens to have (...)
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  • Counterfactuals as Strict Conditionals.Andrea Iacona - 2015 - Disputatio 7 (41):165-191.
    This paper defends the thesis that counterfactuals are strict conditionals. Its purpose is to show that there is a coherent view according to which counterfactuals are strict conditionals whose antecedent is stated elliptically. Section 1 introduces the view. Section 2 outlines a response to the main argument against the thesis that counterfactuals are strict conditionals. Section 3 compares the view with a proposal due to Aqvist, which may be regarded as its direct predecessor. Sections 4 and 5 explain how the (...)
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  • Could Evolution Explain Our Reliability about Logic.Joshua Schechter - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 214.
    We are reliable about logic in the sense that we by-and-large believe logical truths and disbelieve logical falsehoods. Given that logic is an objective subject matter, it is difficult to provide a satisfying explanation of our reliability. This generates a significant epistemological challenge, analogous to the well-known Benacerraf-Field problem for mathematical Platonism. One initially plausible way to answer the challenge is to appeal to evolution by natural selection. The central idea is that being able to correctly deductively reason conferred a (...)
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  • What Harmony Could and Could Not Be.Florian Steinberger - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):617 - 639.
    The notion of harmony has played a pivotal role in a number of debates in the philosophy of logic. Yet there is little agreement as to how the requirement of harmony should be spelled out in detail or even what purpose it is to serve. Most, if not all, conceptions of harmony can already be found in Michael Dummett's seminal discussion of the matter in The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. Hence, if we wish to gain a better understanding of the (...)
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  • The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic.Joshua Schechter - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):437-464.
    We think of logic as objective. We also think that we are reliable about logic. These views jointly generate a puzzle: How is it that we are reliable about logic? How is it that our logical beliefs match an objective domain of logical fact? This is an instance of a more general challenge to explain our reliability about a priori domains. In this paper, I argue that the nature of this challenge has not been properly understood. I explicate the challenge (...)
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  • Higher-order thought and pathological self: The case of somatoparaphrenia.Caleb Liang & Timothy Lane - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):661-668.
    According to Rosenthal’s Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, first-order mental states become conscious only when they are targeted by HOTs that necessarily represent the states as belonging to self. On this view a state represented as belonging to someone distinct from self could not be a conscious state. Rosenthal develops this view in terms of what he calls the ‘thin immunity principle’ (TIP). According to TIP, when I experience a conscious state, I cannot be wrong about whether it is (...)
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  • Classical logic without bivalence.Tor Sandqvist - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):211-218.
    Semantic justifications of the classical rules of logical inference typically make use of a notion of bivalent truth, understood as a property guaranteed to attach to a sentence or its negation regardless of the prospects for speakers to determine it as so doing. For want of a convincing alternative account of classical logic, some philosophers suspicious of such recognition-transcending bivalence have seen no choice but to declare classical deduction unwarranted and settle for a weaker system; intuitionistic logic in particular, buttressed (...)
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  • The content and acquisition of lexical concepts.Richard Horsey - 2006
    This thesis aims to develop a psychologically plausible account of concepts by integrating key insights from philosophy (on the metaphysical basis for concept possession) and psychology (on the mechanisms underlying concept acquisition). I adopt an approach known as informational atomism, developed by Jerry Fodor. Informational atomism is the conjunction of two theses: (i) informational semantics, according to which conceptual content is constituted exhaustively by nomological mind–world relations; and (ii) conceptual atomism, according to which (lexical) concepts have no internal structure. I (...)
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  • Speaking with Shadows: A Study of Neo‐Logicism.Fraser MacBride - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (1):103-163.
    According to the species of neo-logicism advanced by Hale and Wright, mathematical knowledge is essentially logical knowledge. Their view is found to be best understood as a set of related though independent theses: (1) neo-fregeanism-a general conception of the relation between language and reality; (2) the method of abstraction-a particular method for introducing concepts into language; (3) the scope of logic-second-order logic is logic. The criticisms of Boolos, Dummett, Field and Quine (amongst others) of these theses are explicated and assessed. (...)
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  • Anti-realism and logic.A. J. Dale - 1989 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (2):213-217.
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  • Meaning and Justification: The Case of Modus Ponens.Joshua Schechter & David Enoch - 2006 - Noûs 40 (4):687 - 715.
    In virtue of what are we justified in employing the rule of inference Modus Ponens? One tempting approach to answering this question is to claim that we are justified in employing Modus Ponens purely in virtue of facts concerning meaning or concept-possession. In this paper, we argue that such meaning-based accounts cannot be accepted as the fundamental account of our justification.
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  • Did Bishop have a philosophy of mathematics?Helen Billinge - 2003 - Philosophia Mathematica 11 (2):176-194.
    When Bishop published Foundations of Constructive Analysis he showed that it was possible to do ordinary analysis within a constructive framework. Bishop's reasons for doing his mathematics constructively are explicitly philosophical. In this paper, I will expound, examine, and amplify his philosophical arguments for constructivism in mathematics. In the end, however, I argue that Bishop's philosophical comments cannot be rounded out into an adequate philosophy of constructive mathematics.
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  • How Tolerant Can You Be? Carnap on Rationality.Florian Steinberger - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):645-668.
    In this paper I examine a neglected question concerning the centerpiece of Carnap's philosophy: the principle of tolerance. The principle of tolerance states that we are free to devise and adopt any well-defined form of language or linguistic framework we please. A linguistic framework defines framework-internal standards of correct reasoning that guide us in our first-order scientific pursuits. The choice of a linguistic framework, on the other hand, is an ‘external’ question to be settled on pragmatic grounds and so not (...)
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  • La détermination de la logique. Réponse à Michel Seymour.Pascal Engel - 1994 - Dialogue 33 (1):133-.
    Je suis trés reconnaissant à Michel Seymour d'avoir soumis mon livre à un examen détaillé, pénétrant, et charitable et d'avoir, par ses objections, mis le doigt sur un certain nombre de présupposés des thèses défendues dans ce livre, qu'il a souvent articulés bien mieux que je n'ai été capable de le faire. Le principal de ces présupposés est mon rejet implicite de la thése quinienne de l'indétermination de la traduction, qui m'engage, selon Seymour, à défendre une conception conservatrice de la (...)
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  • The taming of the true.Michael Glanzberg - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (2):290-293.
    The Taming of the True continues the project Neil Tennant began in Anti-realism and Logic of investigating and defending anti-realism. Tennant’s earlier book anticipated a second volume, in which issues related to empirical discourse would be addressed in greater detail. The Taming of the True provides this sequel. It also attempts a ground-clearing project, by addressing challenges to some of the presuppositions and implications of Tennant’s anti-realist position. Finally, it takes an opportunity to revisit some of the issues examined in (...)
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  • A refutation of global scepticism.Ken Gemes - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):218-219.
    Various possibilities, that one is dreaming, that one is being deceived by a deceitful demon, that one is a brain in the vat being stimulated to think one has a body and is in a regular world, have been invoked to show that all one's experience-based beliefs might be false. Descartes in Meditation I advises that in order not to lapse into his careless everyday view of things he, or at least his meditator, should pretend that all his experience-based beliefs, (...)
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  • Ontological relativity and meaning‐variance: A critical‐constructive review.Christopher Norris - 1997 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):139 – 173.
    This article offers a critical review of various ontological-relativist arguments, mostly deriving from the work of W. V. Quine and Thomas K hn. I maintain that these arguments are (1) internally contradictory, (2) incapable of accounting for our knowledge of the growth of scientific knowledge, and (3) shown up as fallacious from the standpoint of a causal-realist approach to issues of truth, meaning, and interpretation. Moreover, they have often been viewed as lending support to such programmes as the 'strong' sociology (...)
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  • Non-conceptually contentful attitudes in interpretation.Daniel Laurier - 2001 - Sorites 13 (October):6-22.
    Brandom's book Making It Explicit defends Davidson's claim that conceptual thought can arise only on the background of a practice of mutual interpretation, without endorsing the further view that one can be a thinker only if one has the concept of a concept. This involves giving an account of conceptual content in terms of what Brandom calls practical deontic attitudes. In this paper, I make a plea for the conclusion that these practical attitudes are best seen as intentional, but non-conceptually (...)
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  • Proof and truth: an anti-realist perspective.Luca Tranchini - 2013 - Pisa: Edizioni ETS. Edited by Luca Tranchini.
    In the first chapter, we discuss Dummett’s idea that the notion of truth arises from the one of the correctness of an assertion. We argue that, in a first-order language, the need of defining truth in terms of the notion of satisfaction, which is yielded by the presence of quantifiers, is structurally analogous to the need of a notion of truth as distinct from the one of correctness of an assertion. In the light of the analogy between predicates in Frege (...)
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  • Antirealism and the Roles of Truth.B. G. Sundholm - unknown
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  • Not so stable.Florian Steinberger - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):655-661.
    According to Michael Dummett, we may think of the meaning of an expression as given by the principles governing the use we make of it. The principles regulating our linguistic practices can then be grouped into two broad categories (Dummett 1973: 396, 1991: 211). We might state them as follows: I-principles: state the circumstances under which an assertion of a sentence containing the expression in question is warranted. E-principles: state the consequences of asserting a sentence containing the expression. In the (...)
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  • The logic of logical revision formalizing Dummett's argument.Jon Cogburn - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):15 – 32.
    Neil Tennant and Joseph Salerno have recently attempted to rigorously formalize Michael Dummett's argument for logical revision. Surprisingly, both conclude that Dummett commits elementary logical errors, and hence fails to offer an argument that is even prima facie valid. After explicating the arguments Salerno and Tennant attribute to Dummett, I show how broader attention to Dummett's writings on the theory of meaning allows one to discern, and formalize, a valid argument for logical revision. Then, after correctly providing a rigorous statement (...)
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  • Classical Harmony and Separability.Julien Murzi - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (2):391-415.
    According to logical inferentialists, the meanings of logical expressions are fully determined by the rules for their correct use. Two key proof-theoretic requirements on admissible logical rules, harmony and separability, directly stem from this thesis—requirements, however, that standard single-conclusion and assertion-based formalizations of classical logic provably fail to satisfy :1035–1051, 2011). On the plausible assumption that our logical practice is both single-conclusion and assertion-based, it seemingly follows that classical logic, unlike intuitionistic logic, can’t be accounted for in inferentialist terms. In (...)
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  • Validity Concepts in Proof-theoretic Semantics.Peter Schroeder-Heister - 2006 - Synthese 148 (3):525-571.
    The standard approach to what I call “proof-theoretic semantics”, which is mainly due to Dummett and Prawitz, attempts to give a semantics of proofs by defining what counts as a valid proof. After a discussion of the general aims of proof-theoretic semantics, this paper investigates in detail various notions of proof-theoretic validity and offers certain improvements of the definitions given by Prawitz. Particular emphasis is placed on the relationship between semantic validity concepts and validity concepts used in normalization theory. It (...)
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  • The Company Kept by Cut Abstraction (and its Relatives).S. Shapiro - 2011 - Philosophia Mathematica 19 (2):107-138.
    This article concerns the ongoing neo-logicist program in the philosophy of mathematics. The enterprise began life, in something close to its present form, with Crispin Wright’s seminal [1983]. It was bolstered when Bob Hale [1987] joined the fray on Wright’s behalf and it continues through many extensions, objections, and replies to objections . The overall plan is to develop branches of established mathematics using abstraction principles in the form: Formula where a and b are variables of a given type , (...)
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  • Feasibility In Logic.Jacques Dubucs - 2002 - Synthese 132 (3):213-237.
    The paper is a defense of a strict form of anti-realism, competing the "in principle" form defended by Michael Dummett. It proposes to ground anti-realism on the basis of two principles ("immanence" and "implicitness") and to develop the consequences of these principles in the light of sub-structural logics.
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  • Epistemic optimism.Mihai Ganea - 2008 - Philosophia Mathematica 16 (3):333-353.
    Michael Dummett's argument for intuitionism can be criticized for the implicit reliance on the existence of what might be called absolutely undecidable statements. Neil Tennant attacks epistemic optimism, the view that there are no such statements. I expose what seem serious flaws in his attack, and I suggest a way of defending the use of classical logic in arithmetic that circumvents the issue of optimism. I would like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
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  • Creativity, Freedom, and Authority: A New Perspective On the Metaphysics of Mathematics.Julian C. Cole - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):589-608.
    I discuss a puzzle that shows there is a need to develop a new metaphysical interpretation of mathematical theories, because all well-known interpretations conflict with important aspects of mathematical activities. The new interpretation, I argue, must authenticate the ontological commitments of mathematical theories without curtailing mathematicians' freedom and authority to creatively introduce mathematical ontology during mathematical problem-solving. Further, I argue that these two constraints are best met by a metaphysical interpretation of mathematics that takes mathematical entities to be constitutively constructed (...)
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  • Incompleteness, mechanism, and optimism.Stewart Shapiro - 1998 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 4 (3):273-302.
    §1. Overview. Philosophers and mathematicians have drawn lots of conclusions from Gödel's incompleteness theorems, and related results from mathematical logic. Languages, minds, and machines figure prominently in the discussion. Gödel's theorems surely tell us something about these important matters. But what?A descriptive title for this paper would be “Gödel, Lucas, Penrose, Turing, Feferman, Dummett, mechanism, optimism, reflection, and indefinite extensibility”. Adding “God and the Devil” would probably be redundant. Despite the breath-taking, whirlwind tour, I have the modest aim of forging (...)
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  • Tonking a theory of content: an inferentialist rejoinder.Jon Cogburn - 2004 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 13:31-55.
    If correct, Christopher Peacocke’s [20] “manifestationism without verificationism,” would explode the dichotomy between realism and inferentialism in the contemporary philosophy of language. I first explicate Peacocke’s theory, defending it from a criticism of Neil Tennant’s. This involves devising a recursive definition for grasp of logical contents along the lines Peacocke suggests. Unfortunately though, the generalized account reveals the Achilles’ heel of the whole theory. By inventing a new logical operator with the introduction rule for the existential quantifier and the elimination (...)
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  • Mathematics and philosophy of mathematics.Stewart Shapiro - 1994 - Philosophia Mathematica 2 (2):148-160.
    The purpose of this note is to examine the relationship between the practice of mathematics and the philosophy of mathematics, ontology in particular. One conclusion is that the enterprises are (or should be) closely related, with neither one dominating the other. One cannot 'read off' the correct way to do mathematics from the true ontology, for example, nor can one ‘read off’ the true ontology from mathematics as practiced.
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  • Dummett’s Legacy: Semantics, Metaphysics and Linguistic Competence.Massimiliano Vignolo - 2015 - Disputatio 7 (41):207-229.
    Throughout his philosophical career, Michael Dummett held firmly two theses: the theory of meaning has a central position in philosophy and all other forms of philosophical inquiry rest upon semantic analysis, in particular semantic issues replace traditional metaphysical issues; the theory of meaning is a theory of understanding. I will defend neither of them. However, I will argue that there is an important lesson we can learn by reflecting on the link between linguistic competence and semantics, which I take to (...)
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  • Frege meets Brouwer.Stewart Shapiro & Øystein Linnebo - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):540-552.
    We show that, by choosing definitions carefully, a version of Frege's theorem can be proved in intuitionistic logic.
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  • Logique, effectivité et faisabilité.Jacques Dubucs - 1997 - Dialogue 36 (1):45-.
    This paper can be read as an attempt at providing philosophical foundations to linear logic. The only plausible form of philosophical antirealism deals with practical feasibility rather than with effectivity in principle. The very notion of recognizability is ambiguous, audit has to be considered from a stricter perspective than currently done. The intuitionistic assertability conditions are to be reinforced. This change requires a move towards a frame in which the circumstances of the application of a logical rule can be specified. (...)
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