- Concepts, introspection, and phenomenal consciousness: An information-theoretical approach.Murat Aydede & Güven Güzeldere - 2005 - Noûs 39 (2):197-255.details
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Affect: Representationalists' Headache.Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):175-198.details
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Perceptual variation and access to colors.Edward Wilson Averill - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):22-22.details
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Are There Pure Conscious Events?Rocco J. Gennaro - 2008 - In Chandana Chakrabarti & Gordon Haist (eds.), Revisiting mysticism. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 100--120.details
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Degrees of Consciousness.Andrew Y. Lee - 2023 - Noûs 57 (3):553-575.details
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Are our concepts CONSCIOUS STATE and CONSCIOUS CREATURE vague?Michael V. Antony - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (2):239 - 263.details
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Extending the Transparency Method beyond Belief: a Solution to the Generality Problem.Adam J. Andreotta - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):191-212.details
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Confabulation does not undermine introspection for propositional attitudes.Adam J. Andreotta - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4851-4872.details
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Know-how, ability, and the ability hypothesis.Torin Alter - 2001 - Theoria 67 (3):229-39.details
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Not All Attitudes are Propositional.Alex Grzankowski - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy (3):374-391.details
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Introspective acquaintance: An integration account.Anna Giustina - 2023 - European Journal of Philosophy 31 (2):380-397.details
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Hume on Mental Transparency.Hsueh Qu - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (4):576-601.details
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Are perspectival shapes seen or imagined? An experimental approach.John Schwenkler & Assaf Weksler - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (5):855-877.details
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Content and the stream of consciousness.Matthew Soteriou - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):543–568.details
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A Metacognitive Account of Phenomenal Force.Lu Teng - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (4):1081-1101.details
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Relational vs Adverbial Conceptions of Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget - 2019 - In Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, and Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 137-166.details
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Fregean Particularism.Susanna Schellenberg - forthcoming - In Dirk Kindermann, Peter van Elswyk, Andy Egan & Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini (eds.), Unstructured Content. Oxford University Press.details
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The Philosophy of Phenomenal Consciousness.Zoe Drayson - 2015 - In Drayson Zoe (ed.), The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness. pp. 273-292.details
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Grounding, Analysis, and Russellian Monism.Philip Goff - 2019 - In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 198-222.details
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Gombrich and the Duck-Rabbit.Robert Eamon Briscoe - 2015 - In Michael Beaney, Brendan Harrington & Dominic Shaw (eds.), Aspect Perception After Wittgenstein: Seeing-as and Novelty. New York: Routledge. pp. 49-88.details
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Why Panpsychism doesn't Help Us Explain Consciousness.Philip Goff - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):289-311.details
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Dimensions of Reliability in Phenomenal Judgment.Brentyn J. Ramm - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (3-4):101-127.details
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Consideraciones filosóficas sobre la ontología de la consciencia y los conceptos mentales: un siglo de debates.Anyerson Stiths Gómez-Tabares - 2022 - Perseitas 11:108-146.details
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Pictures Have Propositional Content.Alex Grzankowski - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (1):151-163.details
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Senses for senses.Brad Thompson - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):99 – 117.details
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Evans, transparency, and Cartesianism.David Zapero - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):685-702.details
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El problema de la consciencia en la filosofía contemporánea.Nicolás Alarcón Zambrano - 2018 - Logos: Revista de Lingüística, Filosofía y Literatura 28 (2):429-442.details
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The Ability Hypothesis: An Empirically Based Defense.Mahdi Zakeri & Majid Ghasemi - 2016 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):23-38.details
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Smelling matter.Benjamin D. Young - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):1-18.details
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Olfactory Amodal Completion.Benjamin D. Young & Bence Nanay - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (2):372-388.details
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Dissolving type‐b physicalism.Helen Yetter-Chappell - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):469-498.details
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Projectivist representationalism and color.Wayne Wright - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):515-529.details
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Critical Reasoning and the Inferential Transparency Method.Benjamin Winokur - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (1):23-42.details
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The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood.Kenneth Williford, Daniel Bennequin, Karl Friston & David Rudrauf - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.details
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Retinal Images and Object Files: Towards Empirically Evaluating Philosophical Accounts of Visual Perspective.Assaf Weksler - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):91-103.details
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Confusion of sensations and their physical correlates.Richard M. Warren - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):51-51.details
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Colour hallucination: In defence of externalist representationalism.Elisabeth Lucia Waczek & Wolfgang Barz - 2022 - Analysis 82 (1):3-7.details
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Beautiful red squares.Robert Van Gulick - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):50-51.details
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The Social Epistemology of Introspection.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (3):925-942.details
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Intentionalism and the Argument from No Common Content.Michael Tye - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):589-613.details
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A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts.Michael Tye - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:91-105.details
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Color realism and color illusions.Dejan Todorovic - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):49-50.details
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Representationalism and the argument from hallucination.Brad Thompson - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):384-412.details
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Color: A vision scientist's perspective.Davida Y. Teller - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):48-49.details
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How Physicalists Can—and Cannot—Explain the Seeming “Absurdity” of Physicalism.Pär Sundström - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):681-703.details
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Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot.Pär Sundström - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.details
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The Semantics of ‘What it’s like’ and the Nature of Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1161-1198.details
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The Regress Objection to Reflexive Theories of Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):293-308.details
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The Consequences Of Intentionalism.Daniel Stoljar - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):247-270.details
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The argument from diaphanousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (Supplement):341--90.details
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