- Senses for senses.Brad Thompson - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):99 – 117.details
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El problema de la consciencia en la filosofía contemporánea.Nicolás Alarcón Zambrano - 2018 - Logos: Revista de Lingüística, Filosofía y Literatura 28 (2):429-442.details
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The Ability Hypothesis: An Empirically Based Defense.Mahdi Zakeri & Majid Ghasemi - 2016 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):23-38.details
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The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood.Kenneth Williford, Daniel Bennequin, Karl Friston & David Rudrauf - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.details
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Retinal Images and Object Files: Towards Empirically Evaluating Philosophical Accounts of Visual Perspective.Assaf Weksler - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):91-103.details
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Misrepresenting consciousness.Josh Weisberg - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):409 - 433.details
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Same old, same old: The same-order representational theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal labor.Josh Weisberg - 2008 - Synthese 160 (2):161-181.details
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Knowing what we can do: actions, intentions, and the construction of phenomenal experience.Dave Ward, Tom Roberts & Andy Clark - 2011 - Synthese 181 (3):375-394.details
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Colour hallucination: In defence of externalist representationalism.Elisabeth Lucia Waczek & Wolfgang Barz - 2022 - Analysis 82 (1):3-7.details
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Sensations and the language of thought.Adam Vinueza - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):373-392.details
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The Social Epistemology of Introspection.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (3):925-942.details
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Shoemaker on phenomenal content.Brad Thompson - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (3):307--334.details
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Representationalism and the argument from hallucination.Brad Thompson - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):384-412.details
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Color constancy and Russellian representationalism.Brad Thompson - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):75-94.details
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Inverting intentional content.R. Takenaga - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (3):197-229.details
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Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.details
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Nagel's case against physicalism.Pär Sundström - 2002 - SATS 3 (2):91-108.details
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Is the mystery an illusion? Papineau on the problem of consciousness.Pär Sundström - 2008 - Synthese 163 (2):133-143.details
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Review of David Papineau's Thinking about Consciousness. [REVIEW]Pär Sundström - 2006 - Theoria 72 (1):80-86.details
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Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot.Pär Sundström - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.details
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The Semantics of ‘What it’s like’ and the Nature of Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1161-1198.details
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The Consequences Of Intentionalism.Daniel Stoljar - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):247-270.details
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The argument from diaphanousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (Supplement):341--90.details
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Rethinking synesthesia.Michael Sollberger - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):171 - 187.details
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Does Loudness Represent Sound Intensity? (Preprint).Kim Soland - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-27.details
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The mental lives of zombies.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):343-372.details
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In favor of (plain) phenomenology.Charles Siewert - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):201-220.details
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Can Informational Theories Account for Metarepresentation?Miguel Ángel Sebastián & Marc Artiga - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):81-94.details
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Drop it like it’s HOT: a vicious regress for higher-order thought theories.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1563-1572.details
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Distinguishing the senses.Michael Scott - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):257 – 262.details
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Where's the Beef? Phenomenal Concepts as Both Demonstrative and Substantial.Robert Schroer - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):505-522.details
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The unreliability of naive introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Philosophical Review 117 (2):245-273.details
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The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):665-682.details
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Phenomenal consciousness, attention and accessibility.Tobias Schlicht - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (3):309-334.details
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Knowing Your Own Beliefs.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):41-62.details
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In Defense of Perceptual Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):409-447.details
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Attention and Internal Monitoring: A Farewell to HOP.Wesley Sauret & William G. Lycan - 2014 - Analysis 74 (3):363-370.details
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The sense of temporal flow: a higher-order account.Thomas Sattig - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):3041-3059.details
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Transparency and introspective unification.Kateryna Samoilova - 2016 - Synthese 193 (10).details
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The Relativity Of Color.Peter W. Ross - 2000 - Synthese 123 (1):105-129.details
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On the brain and emotion.Edmund T. Rolls - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):219-228.details
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Povinelli’s Problem and Introspection.Michael Roche - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4):559-576.details
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A Difficulty for Testing the Inner Sense Theory of Introspection.Michael Roche - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):1019-1030.details
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Intrinsic qualities of experience: Surviving Harman's critique. [REVIEW]William S. Robinson - 1997 - Erkenntnis 47 (3):285-309.details
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Modes of Introspective Access: a Pluralist Approach.Adriana Renero - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):823-844.details
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Content, Consciousness, and Cambridge Change.Matthew Rellihan - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (4):325-345.details
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Філософські проблеми ідеї свідомої машини.Konstantin Rayhert - 2017 - Схід 6 (152):104-107.details
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El impenetrable silencio del corazón animal. A propósito de la concepción de los animales en la obra de Descartes.Vicente Raga Rosaleny - 2022 - Pensamiento 78 (298 S. Esp):821-840.details
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Emotional consciousness: A neural model of how cognitive appraisal and somatic perception interact to produce qualitative experience.Paul Thagard & Brandon Aubie - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):811-834.details
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The Two-Dimensional Content of Consciousness.Simon Prosser - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):319 - 349.details
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