- Morgan’s Quaker gun and the species of belief.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):119-144.details
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Beliefs as inner causes: the (lack of) evidence.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):850-877.details
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We believe the error theory.John Alton Christmann - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (5):632-644.details
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Discursive Integrity and the Principles of Responsible Public Debate.Matthew Chrisman - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 22 (2).details
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How can belief be akratic?Eugene Chislenko - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13925-13948.details
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Understanding a communicated thought.J. Adam Carter, Emma Gordon & J. P. Grodniewicz - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):12137-12151.details
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Implicit versus Explicit Attitudes: Differing Manifestations of the Same Representational Structures?Peter Carruthers - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (1):51-72.details
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What we can (and can’t) infer about implicit bias from debiasing experiments.Nick Byrd - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-29.details
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Doing without believing: Intellectualism, knowledge-how, and belief-attribution.Michael Brownstein & Eliot Michaelson - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9):2815–2836.details
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Spinozan Doxasticism About Delusions.Federico Bongiorno - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (4):720-752.details
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Émotions et sensibilité aux valeurs : quatre conceptions philosophiques contemporaines.Constant Bonard - 2021 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 110 (2):209-229.details
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Unconscious perceptual justification.Jacob Berger, Bence Nanay & Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):569-589.details
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Implicit attitudes and awareness.Jacob Berger - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1291-1312.details
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If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It.Grace Helton - 2018 - Noûs 54 (3):501-526.details
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Exploring by Believing.Sara Aronowitz - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (3):339-383.details
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Out of habit.Santiago Amaya - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11161-11185.details
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Belief revision in psychotherapy.J. P. Grodniewicz - 2024 - Synthese 203 (4):1-22.details
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The Fragmentation of Belief.Joseph Bendana & Eric Mandelbaum - 2021 - In Cristina Borgoni, Dirk Kindermann & Andrea Onofri (eds.), The Fragmented Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Understanding Delusions: Evidence, Reason, and Experience.Chenwei Nie - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Warwickdetails
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Experience, Seemings, and Evidence.Indrek Reiland - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):510-534.details
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What's Wrong With Testimony? Defending the Epistemic Analogy between Testimony and Perception.Peter Graham - 2024 - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
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How to commit to commissive self‐knowledge.Benjamin Winokur - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):210-223.details
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Is the wandering mind a planning mind?Frederik T. Junker & Thor Grünbaum - forthcoming - Mind and Language.details
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Davidson, first-person authority, and direct self-knowledge.Benjamin Winokur - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13421-13440.details
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Believing for truth and the model of epistemic guidance.Xintong Wei - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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In the Space of Reasonable Doubt.Marion Vorms & Ulrike Hahn - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3609-3633.details
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Varieties of Pictorial Illusion.Katherine Tullmann - 2016 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 74 (3):265-278.details
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Virtually imagining our biases.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (4):860-893.details
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Biased by our imaginings.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (5):627-647.details
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Superspreading the word.Bart Streumer - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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The Affirmative Mind: Spinoza on Striving under the Attribute of Thought.Justin Steinberg - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.details
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Conceptual clarification and implicit-association tests: psychometric evidence for racist attitudes.Emily Spencer - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (1):51-70.details
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Beliefs and biases.Shannon Spaulding - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7575-7594.details
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Other‐Centric Reasoning.Roy Sorensen - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (4):489-509.details
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Cognitive access and cognitive phenomenology: conceptual and empirical issues.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):188-204.details
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The Nature of Belief From a Philosophical Perspective, With Theoretical and Methodological Implications for Psychology and Cognitive Science.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.details
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Phenomenal dispositions.Henry Ian Schiller - 2020 - Synthese 197 (9):3969-3980.details
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Acts of desire.Henry Ian Schiller - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (9):955-972.details
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Negative Doxastic Voluntarism and the concept of belief.Hans Rott - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2695–2720.details
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The language-of-thought hypothesis as a working hypothesis in cognitive science.Jake Quilty-Dunn, Nicolas Porot & Eric Mandelbaum - 2023 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46:e292.details
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Believing in Perceiving: Known Illusions and the Classical Dual‐Component Theory.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):550-575.details
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Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science.Jake Quilty-Dunn & Eric Mandelbaum - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2353-2372.details
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Consciousness, belief, and the group mind hypothesis.Søren Overgaard & Alessandro Salice - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1-25.details
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Testimonial injustice and prescriptive credibility deficits.Wade Munroe - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (6):924-947.details
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The sound-board account of reasoning: A one-system alternative to dual-process theory.Joshua Mugg - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (7):1046-1073.details
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How Not to Deal with the Tragic Dilemma.Joshua Mugg - 2020 - Social Epistemology 34 (3):253-264.details
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Faith Entails Belief: Three Avenues of Defense Against the Argument from Doubt.Joshua Mugg - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (4):816-836.details
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Implicit bias, stereotype threat, and seeing‐as: An alternative to “alief” as an explanation of reason‐recalcitrant behaviours.Talia Morag - 2020 - Mind and Language 37 (1):38-55.details
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The Information Environment and Blameworthy Beliefs.Boyd Millar - 2019 - Social Epistemology 33 (6):525-537.details
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Epistemic obligations and free speech.Boyd Millar - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.details
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