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Debunking Doxastic Transparency.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2022 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (1):(A3)5-24.details
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Welfarist Pluralism: Pluralistic Reasons for Belief and the Value of Truth.Andrew Reisner - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.details
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Introduction.Daniel Star - 2018 - In The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Pragmatic Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Equal treatment for belief.Susanna Rinard - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1923-1950.details
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Na-na, na-na, Boo-Boo, the accuracy of your philosophical beliefs is doo-doo.Mark Walker - 2022 - Manuscrito 45 (2):1-49.details
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In defence of object-given reasons.Michael Vollmer - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):485-511.details
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Defending Evidence-Resistant Beliefs.Nikolai Viedge - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (3):517-537.details
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Staying true with the help of others: doxastic self-control through interpersonal commitment.Leo Charles Townsend - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (3):243-258.details
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There are no epistemic norms of inquiry.David Thorstad - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-24.details
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Against the newer evidentialists.David Thorstad - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (12):3511-3532.details
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Explaining doxastic transparency: aim, norm, or function?Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3453-3476.details
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Discussion Note: Selim Berker’s Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief.Adam Shmidt - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):763-776.details
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The value of truth and the normativity of evidence.Tommaso Piazza - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5067-5088.details
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Feldman on the Epistemic Value of Truth.Timothy Perrine - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (4):515-529.details
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Doxastic responsibility, guidance control, and ownership of belief.Robert Carry Osborne - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):82-98.details
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A social solution to the puzzle of doxastic responsibility: a two-dimensional account of responsibility for belief.Robert Carry Osborne - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9335-9356.details
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A social solution to the puzzle of doxastic responsibility: a two-dimensional account of responsibility for belief.Robert Carry Osborne - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9335-9356.details
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Impermissible Self-Rationalizing Pessimism: In Defence of a Pragmatic Ethics of Belief.Nikolaj Nottelmann & Boudewijn de Bruin - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (2):257-274.details
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Epistemically flawless false beliefs.Kate Nolfi - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11291-11309.details
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Radical Pragmatism in the Ethics of Belief.Samuel Montplaisir - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (1):403-419.details
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Epistemic Reasons Are Not Normative Reasons for Belief.Samuel Montplaisir - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (4):573-587.details
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Value beyond truth-value: a practical response to skepticism.Miriam Schleifer McCormick - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8601-8619.details
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Responding to Skepticism About Doxastic Agency.Miriam Schleifer McCormick - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (4):627-645.details
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Rational hope.Miriam Schleifer McCormick - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup1):127-141.details
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The Game of Belief.Barry Maguire & Jack Woods - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):211-249.details
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Epistemic reasons for action: a puzzle for pragmatists.Stephanie Leary - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-22.details
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Controlling our Reasons.Sophie Keeling - 2023 - Noûs 57 (4):832-849.details
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Accounting for Doxastic Agency: Mental Action and Self-Awareness.Sophie Keeling - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-24.details
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You ought to have known: positive epistemic norms in a knowledge-first framework.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-23.details
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Weighing epistemic and practical reasons for belief.Christopher Howard - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2227-2243.details
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On the special insult of refusing testimony.Allan Hazlett - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup1):37-51.details
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Doxastic Deontology and Cognitive Competence.Gábor Forrai - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):687-714.details
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Agency of belief and intention.A. K. Flowerree - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2763-2784.details
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The Epistemic Norm of Inference and Non-Epistemic Reasons for Belief.Patrick Bondy - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-21.details
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Internalism and culpable irrationality.Karl Gustav Bergman - 2024 - Erkenntnis:1-21.details
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Minimal disturbance: in defence of pragmatic reasons of the right kind.Lisa Bastian - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3615-3636.details
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Epistemic freedom revisited.Gregory Antill - 2020 - Synthese 197 (2):793-815.details
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Norms of inquiry.David Thorstad - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.details
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Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Trinity and the Light Switch: Two Faces of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen - forthcoming - In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong (eds.), The Nature of Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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How to Argue with a Pragmatist.Artūrs Https://Orcidorg Logins - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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The ethics of belief.Andrew Chignell - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Epistemic Consent and Doxastic Justification.Luis Oliveira - 2022 - In Luis Oliveira & Paul Silva (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on Their Nature and Significance. New York: Routledge. pp. 286-312.details
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Welfarist Pluralism: A Theory of the Foundations of a Pluralist Account of Reasons for Belief [Chapter 1 of A New Theory of Reasons for Belief: Pragmatic Foundations and Pluralistic Reasons (Under Contract with OUP).Andrew Reisner - manuscriptdetails
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Combining Pragmatic and Alethic Reasons for Belief [Ch. 3 of The true and the good: a new theory of theoretical reason].Andrew Reisner - manuscriptdetails
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Two Thesis about the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In C. McHugh, J. Way & D. Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 221-240.details
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