- A Phenomenal Theory of Grasping and Understanding.David Bourget - forthcoming - In Andrei Ionuţ Mărăşoiu & Mircea Dumitru (eds.), Understanding and Conscious Experience: Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives. Routledge.details
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Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2016 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Consciousness and Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 560-585.details
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Not in the Mood for Intentionalism.Davide Bordini - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):60-81.details
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The Cognitive Phenomenology Argument for Disembodied AI Consciousness.Cody Turner - 2020 - In Steven S. Gouveia (ed.), The Age of Artificial Intelligence: An Exploration. Vernon Press. pp. 111-132.details
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Propositional Attitudes as Self-Ascriptions.Angela Mendelovici - 2020 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira & Kevin Corcoran (eds.), Common Sense Metaphysics: Essays in Honor of Lynne Rudder Baker. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 54-74.details
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How Reliably Misrepresenting Olfactory Experiences Justify True Beliefs.Angela Mendelovici - 2020 - In Dimitria Gatzia & Berit Brogaard (eds.), The Epistemology of Non-visual Perception. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. pp. 99-117.details
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Propositionalism Without Propositions, Objectualism Without Objects.Angela Mendelovici - 2018 - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 214-233.details
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Primer, proposal, and paradigm: A review essay of Mendelovici’s The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality.Philip Woodward - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (8):1246-1260.details
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Crane and the mark of the mental.Andrea Raimondi - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):683-693.details
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A Perceptual Theory of Hope.Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.details
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Why Tracking Theories Should Allow for Clean Cases of Reliable Misrepresentation.Angela Mendelovici - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (42):57-92.details
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Reply to Philip Woodward’s Review of The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (8):1261-1267.details
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Why moods change: their appropriateness and connection to beliefs.Tatyana A. Kostochka - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11399-11420.details
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Representationalism and the Intentionality of Moods.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1515-1526.details
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In Search for the Rationality of Moods.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2019 - In Laura Candiotto (ed.), The Value of Emotions for Knowledge. Springer Verlag. pp. 281-296.details
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Limits of propositionalism.Alex Grzankowski - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (7-8):819-838.details
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Moods: From Diffusivness to Dispositionality.Alex Grzankowski & Mark Textor - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Representationalism and Sensory Modalities: An Argument for Intermodal Representationalism.David Bourget - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (3):251-268.details
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Implications of Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions for Relationalism, Disjunctivism, and Representationalism About Perceptual Experience.David Bourget - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):381-408.details
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How Expressivists Can and Should Explain Inconsistency.Derek Clayton Baker & Jack Woods - 2015 - Ethics 125 (2):391-424.details
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Three Perspectives on Perspective.Angela Mendelovici - forthcoming - In Green Mitchell & Michel Jan (eds.), William Lycan on Mind, Meaning, and Method. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.details
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Color.Barry Maund - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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