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  1. The Number of Moons Is Not a Number. Towards a Comprehensive Linguistic Approach to Frege's Commitment Puzzle.Borys Jastrzębski - 2016 - Filozofia Nauki 24 (2 (94)):31-49.
    Comprehensive Linguistic Approach to Frege's Commitment Puzzle There is a puzzle, noticed by Frege, about inferences from sentences like (F1) "Jupiter has four moons" to sentences like (F2) "The number of moons of Jupiter is four". They seem to be truth-conditionally equivalent but, apparently, they say something about completely different things. (F1) seems to be about moons, while (F2) about numbers. This phenomenon raises several puzzles about semantics, syntax, and is one of main tools of easy ontology. Recently, new linguistic (...)
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  • Talking About Numbers: Easy Arguments for Mathematical Realism. [REVIEW]Richard Lawrence - 2017 - History and Philosophy of Logic 38 (4):390-394.
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  • Nominalization, Specification, and Investigation.Richard Lawrence - 2017 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
    Frege famously held that numbers play the role of objects in our language and thought, and that this role is on display when we use sentences like "The number of Jupiter's moons is four". I argue that this role is an example of a general pattern that also encompasses persons, times, locations, reasons, causes, and ways of appearing or acting. These things are 'objects' simply in the sense that they are answers to questions: they are the sort of thing we (...)
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  • Intensional Relative Clauses and the Semantics of Variable Objects.Friederike Moltmann - forthcoming - In Manfred Krifka & Schenner Mathias (eds.), Reconstruction Effects in Relative Clauses. De Gruyter.
    NPs with intensional relative clauses such as 'the book John needs to write' pose a significant challenge for semantic theory. Such NPs act like referential terms, yet they do not stand for a particular actual object. This paper will develop a semantic analysis of such NPs on the basis of the notion of a variable object. The analysis avoids a range of difficulties that a more standard analysis based on the notion of an individual concept would face. Most importantly, unlike (...)
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  • Ontological Trivialism?Seyed N. Mousavian - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):38-68.
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  • Extraction, Displacement, and Focus: A Reply to Balcerak Jackson.Thomas Hofweber - unknown
    On the one hand they seem to be quite obviously truth conditionally equivalent, but on the other hand they seem to be about different things. Whereas (1) is about Jupiter and its moons, (2) is about numbers. In particular, the word ‘four’ appears in (1) in the position of an adjective or determiner, whereas it seems to be a name for a number in (2). Furthermore, (2) appears to be an identity statement claiming that what two number terms stand for (...)
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  • Towards a Fictionalist Philosophy of Mathematics.Robert Knowles - unknown
    In this thesis, I aim to motivate a particular philosophy of mathematics characterised by the following three claims. First, mathematical sentences are generally speaking false because mathematical objects do not exist. Second, people typically use mathematical sentences to communicate content that does not imply the existence of mathematical objects. Finally, in using mathematical language in this way, speakers are not doing anything out of the ordinary: they are performing straightforward assertions. In Part I, I argue that the role played by (...)
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  • A Numeral Oddity.Luca Gasparri - forthcoming - Journal of Semantics.
    Natural language appears to allow the ascription of properties of numeral symbols to the denotation of number referring phrases. The paper describes the phenomenon and presents two alternative explanations for why it obtains. One combining an intuitive semantics for number referring phrases and a predicate-shifting mechanism, the other assigning number referring phrases a structured denotation consisting of two parts: a mathematical object (the number) and a contextually determined numeral symbol. Some preliminary observations in favor of the second analysis are offered.
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  • On 'Average'.Christopher Kennedy & Jason Stanley - 2009 - Mind 118 (471):583 - 646.
    This article investigates the semantics of sentences that express numerical averages, focusing initially on cases such as 'The average American has 2.3 children'. Such sentences have been used both by linguists and philosophers to argue for a disjuncture between semantics and ontology. For example, Noam Chomsky and Norbert Hornstein have used them to provide evidence against the hypothesis that natural language semantics includes a reference relation holding between words and objects in the world, whereas metaphysicians such as Joseph Melia and (...)
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  • Why Care About What There Is?Daniel Z. Korman - forthcoming - In Javier Cumpa (ed.), The Question of Ontology: The Contemporary Debate. Oxford University Press.
    There’s the question of what there is, and then there’s the question of what ultimately exists. Many contend that, once we have this distinction clearly in mind, we can see that there is no sensible debate to be had about whether there are such things as properties or tables or numbers, and that the only ontological question worth debating is whether such things are ultimate (in one or another sense). I argue that this is a mistake. Taking debates about ordinary (...)
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  • Cardinals, Ordinals, and the Prospects for a Fregean Foundation.Eric Snyder, Stewart Shapiro & Richard Samuels - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82:77-107.
    There are multiple formal characterizations of the natural numbers available. Despite being inter-derivable, they plausibly codify different possible applications of the naturals – doing basic arithmetic, counting, and ordering – as well as different philosophical conceptions of those numbers: structuralist, cardinal, and ordinal. Some influential philosophers of mathematics have argued for a non-egalitarian attitude according to which one of those characterizations is ‘more basic’ or ‘more fundamental’ than the others. This paper addresses two related issues. First, we review some of (...)
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  • Hofweber's Philosophy of Mathematics.AgustÍn Rayo - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):474-480.
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  • Defusing Easy Arguments for Numbers.Brendan Balcerak Jackson - 2013 - Linguistics and Philosophy 36 (6):447-461.
    Pairs of sentences like the following pose a problem for ontology: (1) Jupiter has four moons. (2) The number of moons of Jupiter is four. (2) is intuitively a trivial paraphrase of (1). And yet while (1) seems ontologically innocent, (2) appears to imply the existence of numbers. Thomas Hofweber proposes that we can resolve the puzzle by recognizing that sentence (2) is syntactically derived from, and has the same meaning as, sentence (1). Despite appearances, the expressions ‘the number of (...)
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  • Hale’s Argument From Transitive Counting.Eric Snyder, Richard Samuels & Stewart Shaprio - forthcoming - Synthese:1-29.
    A core commitment of Bob Hale and Crispin Wright’s neologicism is their invocation of Frege’s Constraint—roughly, the requirement that the core empirical applications for a class of numbers be “built directly into” their formal characterization. According to these neologicists, if legitimate, Frege’s Constraint adjudicates in favor of their preferred foundation—Hume’s Principle—and against alternatives, such as the Dedekind–Peano axioms. In this paper, we consider a recent argument for legitimating Frege’s Constraint due to Hale, according to which the primary empirical application of (...)
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  • Extraction, Displacement, and Focus.Thomas Hofweber - 2014 - Linguistics and Philosophy 37 (3):263-267.
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  • Number Sentences and Specificational Sentences.Robert Schwartzkopff - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2173-2192.
    Frege proposed that sentences like ‘The number of planets is eight’ be analysed as identity statements in which the number words refer to numbers. Recently, Friederike Moltmann argued that, pace Frege, such sentences be analysed as so-called specificational sentences in which the number words have the same non-referring semantic function as the number word ‘eight’ in ‘There are eight planets’. The aim of this paper is two-fold. First, I argue that Moltmann fails to show that such sentences should be analysed (...)
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  • Reply to Critics.Agustín Rayo - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (4):498-534.
    Cameron, Eklund, Hofweber, Linnebo, Russell and Sider have written critical essays on my book, The Construction of Logical Space (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Here I offer some replies.
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  • Should Metaphysics Care About Linguistics?Tobias Rosefeldt - 2018 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 49 (2):161-178.
    Naturalized metaphysics is based on the idea that philosophy should be guided by the sciences. The paradigmatic science that is relevant for metaphysics is physics because physics tells us what fundamental reality is ultimately like. There are other sciences, however, that de facto play a role in philosophical inquiries about what there is, one of them being the science of language, i.e. linguistics. In this paper I will be concerned with the question what role linguistics should and does play for (...)
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  • Number Words and Reference to Numbers.Katharina Felka - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (1):261-282.
    A realist view of numbers often rests on the following thesis: statements like ‘The number of moons of Jupiter is four’ are identity statements in which the copula is flanked by singular terms whose semantic function consists in referring to a number (henceforth: Identity). On the basis of Identity the realists argue that the assertive use of such statements commits us to numbers. Recently, some anti-realists have disputed this argument. According to them, Identity is false, and, thus, we may deny (...)
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