- Self-Knowledge and Self-Love.Jan Bransen - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2):309-321.details
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Two Kinds of Self‐Knowledge.Matthew Boyle - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):133-164.details
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Transparency and reflection.Matthew Boyle - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):1012-1039.details
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II—Matthew Boyle: Transparent Self-Knowledge.Matthew Boyle - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):223-241.details
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Critical Study: Cassam on Self‐Knowledge for Humans.Matthew Boyle - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):337-348.details
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Active belief.Matthew Boyle - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary 35 (S1):119-147.details
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Delusional beliefs and reason giving.Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew R. Broome - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):801-21.details
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On knowing one's own resistant beliefs.Cristina Borgoni - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):212-225.details
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Basic self-knowledge and transparency.Cristina Borgoni - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):679-696.details
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A role for ownership and authorship in the analysis of thought insertion.Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):205-224.details
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Disinterested Pleasure and Beauty: Perspectives from Kantian and Contemporary Aesthetics.Larissa Berger (ed.) - 2023 - Boston: De Gruyter.details
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The puzzle of transparency and how to solve it.Wolfgang Barz - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):916-935.details
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Transparent introspection of wishes.Wolfgang Barz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):1993-2023.details
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Transparency, expression, and self-knowledge.Dorit Bar-On - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):134-152.details
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Self-Knowledge Requirements and Moore's Paradox.David James Barnett - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (2):227-262.details
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Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief.David James Barnett - 2016 - Noûs 50 (1):184-212.details
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Introspection as a Game of Make‐Believe.Wolfgang Barz - 2014 - Theoria 80 (4):350-367.details
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First-Person Authority: Dualism, Constitutivism, and Neo-Expressivism.Dorit Bar-On - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (1):53-71.details
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Cogito and Moore.David James Barnett - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-27.details
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Are Introspective Beliefs about One’s Own Visual Experiences Immediate?Wolfgang Barz - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (1).details
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A modal analysis of phenomenal intentionality: horizonality and object-directed phenomenal presence.Kyle Banick - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):10903-10922.details
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Schaffer's Demon.Nathan Ballantyne & Ian Evans - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):552-559.details
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Why transparency undermines economy.Derek Baker - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):3037-3050.details
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The Riddle of the Self revisited.David Bakhurst - 2011 - Studies in East European Thought 63 (1):63 - 73.details
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The Authority of Reflection.Carla Bagnoli - 2007 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 22 (1):43-52.details
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Deep, dark…or transparent? Knowing our desires.Lauren Ashwell - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):245-256.details
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Constitutivism and the Self-Reflection Requirement.Caroline T. Arruda - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (4):1165-1183.details
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Advisors and Deliberation.Steven Arkonovich - 2011 - The Journal of Ethics 15 (4):405-424.details
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Why ‘believes’ is not a vague predicate.Sophie Archer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3029-3048.details
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Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life.Louise M. Antony (ed.) - 2010 - Oup Usa.details
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Extending the Transparency Method beyond Belief: a Solution to the Generality Problem.Adam J. Andreotta - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):191-212.details
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Confabulation does not undermine introspection for propositional attitudes.Adam J. Andreotta - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4851-4872.details
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Why we cannot rely on ourselves for epistemic improvement.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):276-296.details
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Introduction.[author unknown] - 2007 - Introduction 2 (23):153-160.details
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Introduction.[author unknown] - 2007 - Introduction 2 (23):153-160.details
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The Hard Problem of Responsibility.Victoria McGeer & Philip Pettit - 2013 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.details
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John Cook Wilson.Mathieu Marion - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Armstrong's Just-so Story about Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2022 - In Peter R. Anstey & David Braddon-Mitchell (eds.), Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Du moi au soi : variations phénoménologiques et herméneutiques.Paulo Jesus, Gonçalo Marcelo & Johann Michel (eds.) - 2017 - Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes.details
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Stipulative Agency.Derek Lam - 2021 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 7. Oxford University Press. pp. 7-31.details
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A Abordagem Ecológica das Habilidades e a Epistemologia dos eixos.Carvalho Eros - 2022 - In Plinio J. Smith & Nara Figueiredo (eds.), A epistemologia dos eixos: uma introdução e debate sobre as certezas de Wittgenstein. Porto Alegre: Editora Fênix. pp. 101-123.details
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Transparent Self-Knowledge of Attitudes and Emotions: A Davidsonian Attempt.Ning Fan - 2021 - International Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):275-284.details
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How to read minds.Tim Bayne - 2012 - In Sarah Richmond, Geraint Rees & Sarah J. L. Edwards (eds.), I know what you're thinking: brain imaging and mental privacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 41.details
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Freier Wille, Personale Identität und epistemische Ungewissheit.Dagmar Kiesel & Sebastian Schmidt - 2019 - In Ferrari Cleophea & Dagmar Kiesel (eds.), Willensfreiheit. Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann. pp. 221-258.details
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Subjective and Objective Reasons.Andrew Sepielli - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Skepticism about the internal world.Alex Byrne - 2015 - In Gideon A. Rosen, Alex Byrne, Joshua Cohen & Seana Valentine Shiffrin (eds.), The Norton Introduction to Philosophy. New York: W. W. Norton.details
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Rational Agency and the Struggle to Believe What Your Reasons Dictate.Brie Gertler - 2021 - In Cristina Borgoni, Dirk Kindermann & Andrea Onofri (eds.), The Fragmented Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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What Is Evaluable for Fit?Oded Na'aman - 2023 - In Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. OUP.details
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Agency and Reasons in Epistemology.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherstdetails
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Filozofija uma: pregled suvremenih rasprava o umu i tijelu (Eng. Philosophy of mind: a survey of contemporary debates on the mind-body problem).Marko Jurjako & Luca Malatesti - 2022 - Rijeka: University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences.details
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