Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Intentionality, mind and folk psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.
    The comment addresses central issues of a "theory theory" approach as exemplified in Gopnik' and Goldman's BBS-articles. Gopnik, on the one hand, tries to demonstrate that empirical evidence from developmental psychology supports the view of a "theory theory" in which common sense beliefs are constructed to explain ourselves and others. Focusing the informational processing routes possibly involved we would like to argue that his main thesis (e.g. idea of intentionality as a cognitive construct) lacks support at least for two reasons: (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Heavy Duty Platonism.Robert Knowles - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1255-1270.
    Heavy duty platonism is of great dialectical importance in the philosophy of mathematics. It is the view that physical magnitudes, such as mass and temperature, are cases of physical objects being related to numbers. Many theorists have assumed HDP’s falsity in order to reach their own conclusions, but they are only justified in doing so if there are good arguments against HDP. In this paper, I present all five arguments against HDP alluded to in the literature and show that they (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Eliminacija eliminativizama.Davor Pecnjak - 2002 - Prolegomena 1 (1):19-33.
    In this article, the author examines two kinds of eliminativisms in the philosophy of mind – eliminative materialism and functional eliminativism. He shows that mature neuroscience has to explain phenomena which are denoted by the concepts »perception«, »mind« or »consciousness« and that these concepts are not introduced as explanations of something. Consciousness, for example, is a factual phenomenon that should be explained and cannot be eliminated, by eliminative materialism or by functional eliminativism, as an explanandum and as a fact.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The neurocomputational mind meets normative epistemology.Kenneth R. Livingston - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (1):33-59.
    The rapid development of connectionist models in computer science and of powerful computational tools in neuroscience has encouraged eliminativist materialist philosophers to propose specific alternatives to traditional mentalistic theories of mind. One of the problems associated with such a move is that elimination of the mental would seem to remove access to ideas like truth as the foundations of normative epistemology. Thus, a successful elimination of propositional or sentential theories of mind must not only replace them for purposes of our (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Knowledge Argument.Luca Malatesti - 2004 - Dissertation, University of Stirling
    Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument is a very influential piece of reasoning that seeks to show that colour experiences constitute an insoluble problem for science. This argument is based on a thought experiment concerning Mary. She is a vision scientist who has complete scientific knowledge of colours and colour vision but has never had colour experiences. According to Jackson, upon seeing coloured objects, Mary acquires new knowledge that escapes her complete scientific knowledge. He concludes that there are facts concerning colour experiences (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Underdetermination, holism and the theory/data distinction.Samir Okasha - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):303-319.
    I examine the argument that scientific theories are typically 'underdetermined' by the data, an argument which has often been used to combat scientific realism. I deal with two objections to the underdetermination argument: (i) that the argument conflicts with the holistic nature of confirmation, and (ii) that the argument rests on an untenable theory/data dualism. I discuss possible responses to both objections, and argue that in both cases the proponent of underdetermination can respond in ways which are individually plausible, but (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • Theory, Observation, and the Role of Scientific Understanding in the Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature.Glenn Parsons - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):165-186.
    Much recent discussion in the aesthetics of nature has focused on Scientific cognitivism, the view that in order to engage in a deep and appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature, one must possess certain kinds of scientific knowledge. The most pressing difficulty faced by this view is an apparent tension between the very notion of aesthetic appreciation and the nature of scientific knowledge. In this essay, I describe this difficulty, trace some of its roots and argue that attempts to dismiss it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Internal recurrence.Don Ross - 1998 - Dialogue 37 (1):155-161.
    It is crucial, first of all, to stress the importance Churchland attaches to the idea that the neural networks whose assemblages he holds to be “engines of reason” must be recurrent. Non-recurrent networks, of the sort best known among philosophers, simply discover patterns in input data presented to them as sets of features. The learning capacities of such networks, extensively discussed since the publication of Rumelhart and McClelland et al., are indeed impressive; and Churchland describes them clearly and gracefully as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Internal Recurrence.Don Ross - 1998 - Dialogue 37 (1):155-162.
    Paul Churchland does not open his latest book,The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul, modestly. He begins by announcing, “This book is about you. And me … More broadly still, it is about every creature that ever swam, or walked, or flew over the face of the Earth” (p. 3). A few sentences later, he says, “Fortunately, recent research into neural networks … has produced the beginnings of a real understanding of how the biological brain works—a real understanding, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Sensations, error, and eliminative materialism.Mark Leon - 1996 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):83-95.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The given regained: Reflections on the sensuous content of experience.Richard Schantz - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):167-180.
    The major part of our beliefs and our knowledge of the world is based on, or grounded in, sensory experience. But, how is it that we can have perceptual beliefs that things are thus and so, and, moreover, be justified in having them? What conditions must experience satisfy to rationally warrant, and not merely to cause, our beliefs? Against the currently very popular contention that experience itself already has to be propositionally and conceptually structured, I will rehabilitate the claim that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Characterising the senses.Mark Leon - 1988 - Mind and Language 3 (4):243-70.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Nonconceptual Content and the Elimination of Misconceived Composites!Adrian Cussins - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (2):234-252.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • On the Speculative Nature of Our Self Conception: A Reply to Some Criticisms.Paul M. Churchland - 1985 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 11:157-173.
    I must begin by thanking the editors for offering me the opportunity to respond to two of the other papers in this collection: ‘A Materialist's Misgivings about Eliminative Materialism,’ by Jeff Foss; and ‘Sensation, Theory, and Meaning,’ by Bonnie Thurston and Sam Coval. In some earlier publications I have defended eliminative materialism at some length, and in others I have argued that the semantics of common observation terms is exhausted by their inferential or conceptual role, to the exclusion of any (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Philosophy of Mind Meets Logical Theory: Perry on Neo‐Dualism.Paul M. Churchland - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):199-206.
    John Perry’s new book makes an important philosophical contribution at two quite distinct levels. The first and most obvious is its systematic critical discussion of three of the most notorious recent arguments in favor of some form of Property Dualism: Chalmers’ Zombie Argument, Jackson’s Knowledge Argument, and Kripke’s Modal Argument. Perry—no stranger himself to matters modal, indexical, and demonstrative—brings an especial authority to this task. Unlike many of us, he eats, drinks, and breathes the same modal vocabulary deployed by all (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Cognitive science and neuroscience: New wave reductionism.Robert C. Richardson - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (3):297-307.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Evaluating New Wave Reductionism: The Case of Vision.D. van Eck - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (1):167-196.
    This paper inquires into the nature of intertheoretic relations between psychology and neuroscience. This relationship has been characterized by some as one in which psychological explanations eventually will fall away as otiose, overthrown completely by neurobiological ones. Against this view it will be argued that it squares poorly with scientific practices and empirical developments in the cognitive neurosciences. We analyse a case from research on visual perception, which suggests a much more subtle and complex interplay between psychology and neuroscience than (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Theory structure, reduction, and disciplinary integration in biology.Kenneth F. Schaffner - 1993 - Biology and Philosophy 8 (3):319-347.
    This paper examines the nature of theory structure in biology and considers the implications of those theoretical structures for theory reduction. An account of biological theories as interlevel prototypes embodying causal sequences, and related to each other by strong analogies, is presented, and examples from the neurosciences are provided to illustrate these middle-range theories. I then go on to discuss several modifications of Nagel''s classical model of theory reduction, and indicate at what stages in the development of reductions these models (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Functional architectures for cognition: are simple inferences possible?Steven W. Zucker - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):153-154.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The psychologist's fallacy.Philip David Zelazo & Douglas Frye - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):89-90.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Quine and the Contemporary Debate on Misreading.Giancarlo Zanet - 2012 - Disputatio 4 (32):395 - 412.
    The paper examines some of the questions emerging from the debate on mindreading regarding Quine’s legacy and contribution to a new agenda on the issue. Since mindreading is an exercise in folk-psychology, a) which role folk psychology has to play according to Quine? b) was Quine’s account of mindreading closer to theory-theory, simulation theory or hybrid theory? c) was Quine a rationality theorist? d) are hybrid-theory and rationality theory incompatible as many would suggest? On the score of the answers to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • II—Moral Dependence and Natural Properties.Nick Zangwill - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):221-243.
    I explore the Because Constraint—the idea that moral facts depend on natural facts and that moral judgements ought to respect the dependence of moral facts on natural facts. I consider several issues concerning its clarification and importance.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Reflective Knowledge and the Nature of Truth.José L. Zalabardo - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (43):147-171.
    I consider the problem of reflective knowledge faced by views that treat sensitivity as a sufficient condition for knowledge, or as a major ingredient of the concept, as in the analysis I advance in Scepticism and Reliable Belief. I present the problem as concerning the correct analysis of SATs — beliefs to the effect that one of my current beliefs is true. I suggest that a plausible analysis of SATs should treat them as neither true nor false when they ascribe (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Empiricist Pragmatism.José L. Zalabardo - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):441-461.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Belief, desire and the prediction of behaviour.José L. Zalabardo - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):295-310.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Intentionality, theoreticity and innateness.Deborah Zaitchik & Jerry Samet - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):87-89.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Is folk psychology a Lakatosian research program?Bill Wringe - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):343-358.
    It has often been argued, by philosophers and more recently by developmental psychologists, that our common-sense conception of the mind should be regarded as a scientific theory. However, those who advance this view rarely say much about what they take a scientific theory to be. In this paper, I look at one specific proposal as to how we should interpret the theory view of folk psychology--namely, by seeing it as having a structure analogous to that of a Lakatosian research program. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Three questions for Goldman.Andrew Woodfield - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):86-87.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Two categories of content.Andrew Woodfield - 1986 - Mind and Language 1 (4):319-54.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Talking to Cats, Rats and Bats.K. V. Wilkes - 1997 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 42:177-.
    This paper tries to argue that at least some alluring, trendy or fashionable problems to do with thought and language — several of which are discussed in this volume — are in fact alluring, trendy or fashionable red herrings or cul-de-sacs. I shall primarily be concerned with the ascription of thought and intelligence to non-language-users; but, en route to that, will need to brood over our ascriptions of such terms quite generally.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Representation redux.Hugh Wilder - 1988 - Metaphilosophy 19 (July-October):185-195.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Provocation on belief: Part 6.Hugh Wilder - 1987 - Social Epistemology 1 (2):195-201.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Object-Based Epistemology at a Creationist Museum.Paul J. Wendel - 2011 - Science & Education 20 (1):37-50.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Cognition is not computation, for the reasons that computers don't solve the mind-body problems.Walter B. Weimer - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):152-153.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • What do propositions measure in folk psychology?Peter Weatherall - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):365-80.
    In this paper I examine the analogical argument that the use that is made of propositions in folk psychology in the characterisation of propositional attitudes is no more puzzling than the use that is made of numbers in the physical sciences in the measurement of physical properties. It has been argued that the result of this analogy is that there is no need to postulate the existence of sentences in a language of thought which underpin the propositional characterisation of propositional (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Common sense, functional theories and knowledge of the mind.Max Velmans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):85-86.
    A commentary on a target article by Alison Gopnik (1993) How we know our minds: the illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality. Focusing on evidence of how children acquire a theory of mind, this commentary argues that there are internal inconsistencies in theories that both argue for the functional role of conscious experiences and the irreducibility of those experiences to third-person viewable information processing.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Intentional system theory and experimental psychology.Michael H. Van Kleeck - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):533.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Intentionally: A problem of multiple reference frames, specificational information, and extraordinary boundary conditions on natural law.M. T. Turvey - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):153-155.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • On radical conceptual revolutions in social science.Raimo Tuomela - 1991 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 22 (2):303-320.
    Summary The paper considers arguments for and against correction and elimination of the basic conceptual categories as well as theories of social science. It is argued that some correction of at least some basic social notions is called for. A great part of the paper consists in a conceptual investigation of such notion of correction in terms of different notions of corrective explanation.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Belief attribution in science: Folk psychology under theoretical stress.J. D. Trout - 1991 - Synthese 87 (June):379-400.
    Some eliminativists have predicted that a developed neuroscience will eradicate the principles and theoretical kinds (belief, desire, etc.) implicit in our ordinary practices of mental state attribution. Prevailing defenses of common-sense psychology infer its basic integrity from its familiarity and instrumental success in everyday social commerce. Such common-sense defenses charge that eliminativist arguments are self-defeating in their folk psychological appeal to the belief that eliminativism is true. I argue that eliminativism is untouched by this simple charge of inconsistency, and introduce (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Where's the person?Michael Tomasello - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):84-85.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Why Alison Gopnik should be a behaviorist.Nicholas S. Thompson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):83-84.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Frames, knowledge, and inference.Paul R. Thagard - 1984 - Synthese 61 (2):233 - 259.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • The consequences of taking consequentialism seriously.Philip E. Tetlock - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):31-32.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Clinical artificial intelligence.Virginia Teller & Hartvig Dahl - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (4):549-550.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Actions, inactions and the temporal dimension.Karl Halvor Teigen - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):30-31.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • What really matters.Charles Taylor - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):532.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Is PARRY paranoid?David W. Swanson - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (4):548-549.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Probaility and information.Patrick Suppes - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):81-82.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • On representationalism, common-factorism, and whether consciousness is here and now.Pär Sundström - 2018 - Philosophical Studies:1-12.
    A strong form of representationalism says that every conscious property of every mental state can be identified with some part of the state’s representational properties. A weaker representationalism says that some conscious property of some mental state can be identified with some part of the state’s representational properties. David Papineau has recently argued that all such theories are incorrect since they construe consciousness as consisting in “relations to propositions or other abstract objects outside space and time”, whereas consciousness is “concrete” (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation