- Blameless Moral Criticism – the Case of Moral Disappointment.Julius Schönherr - 2023 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 26:53-71.details
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Knowing How to Feel: Racism, Resilience, and Affective Resistance.Taylor Rogers - 2021 - Hypatia 36 (4):725-747.details
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The logic of challenging research into bias and social disparity.Regina Rini - 2022 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45.details
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Regrettable beliefs.Mica Rapstine - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (7):2169-2190.details
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Moral hinges and steadfastness.Chris Ranalli - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):379-401.details
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Deep Disagreement (Part 2): Epistemology of Deep Disagreement.Chris Ranalli & Thirza Lagewaard - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (12):e12887.details
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Verbal Microaggressions as Hyper‐implicatures.Javiera Perez Gomez - 2021 - Journal of Political Philosophy 29 (3):375-403.details
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IX—Equal Opportunity: A Unifying Framework for Moral, Aesthetic, and Epistemic Responsibility.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2020 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120 (2):203-235.details
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Reply to MacFarlane and Greco.Sarah Moss - 2020 - Res Philosophica 97 (1):119-133.details
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Resisting Pessimism Traps: The Limits of Believing in Oneself.Jennifer M. Morton - 2021 - Wiley: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):728-746.details
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Epistemic Partialism.Cathy Mason - 2023 - Philosophy Compass (2):e12896.details
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Disagreement and alienation.Berislav Marušić & Stephen J. White - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):210-227.details
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Bounded emotionality and our doxastic norms.Winnie Ma - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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What it means to respect individuality.Xiaofei Liu & Ye Liang - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2579-2598.details
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Banks, Bosses, and Bears: A Pragmatist Argument Against Encroachment.Stephanie Leary - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):657-676.details
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Algorithms and the Individual in Criminal Law.Renée Jorgensen - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):1-17.details
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The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.details
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Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):e12670.details
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How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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Belief, Credence, and Moral Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson & James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1387–1408.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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You ought to have known: positive epistemic norms in a knowledge-first framework.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-23.details
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Beyond Bad Beliefs.Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 18 (5):500-521.details
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What should relational egalitarians believe?Anne-Sofie Greisen Hojlund - 2021 - Sage Publications: Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (1):55-74.details
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What should relational egalitarians believe?Anne-Sofie Greisen Hojlund - 2022 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (1):55-74.details
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The structure of moral encroachment.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5-6):1793-1812.details
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Wissenschaftsfreiheit, Moralische Kritik und die Kosten des Irrtums.Tim Henning - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-28.details
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On statistical criteria of algorithmic fairness.Brian Hedden - 2021 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 49 (2):209-231.details
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Acting on Probabilistic Knowledge.Daniel Greco - 2020 - Res Philosophica 97 (1):109-117.details
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Equalized Odds is a Requirement of Algorithmic Fairness.David Gray Grant - 2023 - Synthese 201 (3).details
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Moral encroachment and the epistemic impermissibility of (some) microaggressions.Javiera Perez Gomez - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9237-9256.details
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Can the Demands of Justice Always Be Reconciled with the Demands of Epistemology? Testimonial Injustice and the Prospects of a Normative Clash.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (4):537-558.details
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The safe, the sensitive, and the severely tested: a unified account.Georgi Gardiner & Brian Zaharatos - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-33.details
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Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk.Georgi Gardiner - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):481-511.details
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Moral encroachment and reasons of the wrong kind.James Fritz - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3051-3070.details
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Knowledge and the Many Norms on Action.James Fritz - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1191-1210.details
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Encroachment on Emotion.James Fritz - 2022 - Episteme 19 (4):515-533.details
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Akrasia and Epistemic Impurism.James Fritz - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (1):98-116.details
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No Infelicity for the Infallibilist.Giada Fratantonio - 2021 - Theoria (5):1307-1321.details
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Do we really need a knowledge-based decision theory?Davide Fassio & Jie Gao - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7031-7059.details
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III—Doxastic Wrongs, Non-Spurious Generalizations and Particularized Beliefs.Cécile Fabre - 2022 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 122 (1):47-69.details
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Statistical resentment, or: what’s wrong with acting, blaming, and believing on the basis of statistics alone.David Enoch & Levi Spectre - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5687-5718.details
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Does legal epistemology rest on a mistake? On fetishism, two‐tier system design, and conscientious fact‐finding.David Enoch, Talia Fisher & Levi Spectre - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):85-103.details
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Profile Evidence, Fairness, and the Risks of Mistaken Convictions.Marcello Di Bello & Collin O’Neil - 2020 - Ethics 130 (2):147-178.details
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Fit-Related Reasons to Inquire.Genae Matthews - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Instrumentalism, Moral Encroachment, and Epistemic Injustice.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.details
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Risky Inquiry: Developing an Ethics for Philosophical Practice.Rima Basu - 2023 - Hypatia 38:275-293.details
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Ideology as Relativized A Priori.Sabina Vaccarino Bremner & Chloé de Canson - manuscriptdetails
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A Tale of Two Doctrines: Moral Encroachment and Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu - 2021 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 99-118.details
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