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In Defence of Ungrounded Desires: Against Raz's Classical Account of Agency.Stephen Everson - 2004 - European Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):283-303.details
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Wanting and willing.Eric Marcus - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):887-899.details
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More Than a Feeling.E. Sonny Elizondo - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):425-442.details
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Kantian Cognitivism.E. Sonny Elizondo - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (4):711-725.details
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Utilitarianism without Moral Aggregation.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (4):256-269.details
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Moral competence is cognitive but (perhaps) nonmodular.Susan Dwyer - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):128-129.details
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What a Difference Emotions Make.Sabine A. Döring - 2010 - In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Oxford, UK: Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 191–199.details
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The Epistemology and Science of Justified Reason.Verdie Michael Dreyer - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (2):503-532.details
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Accepting agent centred norms: A problem for non-cognitivists and a suggestion for solving it.James Dreier - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (3):409–422.details
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Expecting the Unexpected.Tom Dougherty, Sophie Horowitz & Paulina Sliwa - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):301-321.details
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Are My Temporal Parts Agents?Alexander Dietz - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):362-379.details
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Urges.Ashley Shaw - forthcoming - Philosophical Review.details
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Émotions et Valeurs.Christine Tappolet - 2000 - Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.details
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Infinitism about cross-domain conflict.David Killoren - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14.details
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An Explanation of the Essential Publicity of Practical Reasons.Alisabeth Ayars - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.details
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The Nature of Desire.Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.) - 2017 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral Reality: A Defence of Moral Realism.Caj Strandberg - 2004 - Lund University.details
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Debunking What?Hallvard Lillehammer - forthcoming - In Diego Machuca (ed.), Evolutionary Debunking Arguments: Ethics, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Mathematics, and Epistemology. Routledge.details
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Ambivalenzen und Grenzen des Mitleids bei Jean-Jacques Rousseau.Gregor Schiemann - 2007 - In H. Landweer (ed.), Gefühle – Struktur und Funktion. Akademieverlag.details
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Agent-Relativity and the Foundations of Moral Theory.Matthew Hammerton - 2017 - Dissertation, Australian National Universitydetails
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A defence of the desire theory of well-being.Atus Mariqueo-Russell - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Southamptondetails
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Hume on Justice.Rosalind Hursthouse - 2009 - In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 264.details
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Autonomy as Practical Understanding.Reza Hadisi - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.details
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Knowing what you Want.Eric Marcus - forthcoming - In Lucy Campbell (ed.), Forms of Knowledge. Oxford.details
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Utilitarianism and the Social Nature of Persons.Nikhil Venkatesh - 2023 - Dissertation, University College Londondetails
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Altruistic Motivation Beyond Ultimate Desires.Junior Mendonca - 2023 - Dissertation, The University of Western Australiadetails
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Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism.Mark van Roojen - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013 (1):1-88.details
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Metaethics.Geoff Sayre-McCord - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Moral motivation.Connie S. Rosati - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Practical reason and the structure of actions.Elijah Millgram - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Reasons for action: Internal vs. external.Stephen Finlay & Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Altruism.Richard Kraut - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Moral psychology: Empirical approaches.John Doris & Stephen Stich - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Why Does Kant Think That Moral Requirements Are Categorical Imperatives’?Maria Mejia - unknowndetails
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Agency, Shmagency.David Enoch - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):169-198.details
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Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good.Kieran Setiya - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13.details
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Kant, Skepticism, and Moral Sensibility.Owen Ware - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Torontodetails
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The World According to Suffering.Antti Kauppinen - 2020 - In Michael S. Brady, David Bain & Jennifer Corns (eds.), The Philosophy of Suffering. London: Routledge.details
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Adversus Homo Economicus: Critique of Lester’s Account of Instrumental Rationality.Danny Frederick - manuscriptdetails
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Trois sortes d'altruisme et leur rapport à la morale.Christine Clavien - 2011 - In Masala & Ravat (ed.), La Morale Humaine Et les Sciences. Editions Matériologiques. pp. 141--68.details
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Internal Reasons.Kieran Setiya - 2012 - In Kieran Setiya & Hille Paakkunainen (eds.), Internal Reasons: Contemporary Readings. MIT Press.details
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Is there a nexus between reasons and rationality?Michael Smith - 2007 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 94 (1):279-298.details
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On the Objectivity of Welfare.Alexander F. Sarch - unknowndetails
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Psychological Egoism.Joshua May - 2011 - Internet Encyclopeida of Philosophy.details
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Empathy and Intersubjectivity.Joshua May - 2017 - In Heidi Maibom (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Empathy. New York: Routledge. pp. 169-179.details
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The Obscurity of Internal Reasons.Stephen Finlay - 2009 - Philosophers' Imprint 9:1-22.details
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Knowing what I want.Alex Byrne - 2011 - In JeeLoo Liu & John Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.details
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An Argument against Bernard Williams’ Account of Reason Internalism.Muhammad Heydarpour & Hosein Dabbagh - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 24 (1):21-42.details
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You don't say! Lying, asserting and insincerity.Neri Marsili - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Sheffielddetails
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