- The Nature, Common Usage, and Implications of Free Will and Determinism.Shirley Matile Ogletree & Crystal D. Oberle - 2008 - Behavior and Philosophy 36:97 - 111.details
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(2 other versions)Willensfreiheit.Geert Keil - 2017 - Berlin: De Gruyter.details
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In Defense of a Broad Conception of Experimental Philosophy.David Rose & David Danks - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (4):512-532.details
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Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: A test of the Expertise Defense.Eric Schulz, Edward T. Cokely & Adam Feltz - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1722-1731.details
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A Unified Empirical Account of Responsibility Judgments.Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):611-639.details
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(1 other version)Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.details
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At the Heart of Morality Lies Folk Psychology.Steve Guglielmo, Andrew E. Monroe & Bertram F. Malle - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (5):449-466.details
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Experimental philosophy and free will.Tamler Sommers - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (2):199-212.details
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(1 other version)More work for hard incompatibilism.Tamler Sommers - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):511-521.details
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Natural compatibilism versus natural incompatibilism: Back to the drawing board.Adam Feltz, Edward T. Cokely & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (1):1-23.details
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The past and future of experimental philosophy.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):123 – 149.details
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(1 other version)The rise and fall of experimental philosophy.Antti Kauppinen - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):95 – 118.details
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The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First Person versus Third Person Approaches.Kirk Ludwig - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):128-159.details
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The Phenomenology of Agency.Tim Bayne - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.details
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(1 other version)Folk concepts and intuitions: From philosophy to cognitive science.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (11):514-518.details
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Neuroscientific challenges to free will and responsibility.Adina Roskies - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (9):419-423.details
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(1 other version)Folk intuitions, slippery slopes, and necessary fictions : an essay on Saul Smilansky's free will illusionism.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - In Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Philosophy and the Empirical. Blackwell. pp. 202–213.details
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Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility.Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):561-584.details
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Beyond the Courtroom: Agency and the Perception of Free will.Edouard Machery, Markus Kneer, Pascale Willemsen & Albert Newen - 2023 - In Samuel Murray & Paul Henne (eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Action. Bloomsbury.details
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The Compact Compendium of Experimental Philosophy.Alexander Max Bauer & Stephan Kornmesser (eds.) - 2023 - Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter.details
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Philosophical Intuitions Are Surprisingly Robust Across Demographic Differences.Joshua Knobe - 2019 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 56 (2):29-36.details
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Experimental philosophy and moral responsibility.Gunnar Björnsson - 2022 - In Dana Kay Nelkin & Derk Pereboom (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 494–516.details
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Forget the Folk: Moral Responsibility Preservation Motives and Other Conditions for Compatibilism.Cory J. Clark, Bo M. Winegard & Roy F. Baumeister - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10:397001.details
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Folk Intuitions, Science Fiction and Philosophy: Comment on Experimental Philosophy.Renia Gasparatou - 2010 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 10 (3-4):377-382.details
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A Critique of Substance Causation.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1019-1026.details
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Consciousness, Free Will, Moral Responsibility.Caruso Gregg - 2018 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Consciousness. New York: Routledge. pp. 89-91.details
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What kinds of alternative possibilities are required of the folk concept(s) of choice?Jason Shepard & Aneyn O’Grady - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 48:138-148.details
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What Do People Find Incompatible With Causal Determinism?Adam Bear & Joshua Knobe - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (8):2025-2049.details
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The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the question of natural compatibilism.Oisín Deery, Taylor Davis & Jasmine Carey - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):776-801.details
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The free will inventory: Measuring beliefs about agency and responsibility.Thomas Nadelhoffer, Jason Shepard, Eddy Nahmias, Chandra Sripada & Lisa Thomson Ross - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 25:27-41.details
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Don’t panic: Self-authorship without obscure metaphysics1.Adina L. Roskies - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):323-342.details
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(1 other version)Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk intuitions.Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):663–685.details
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Frankfurt cases, alternative possibilities and agency as a two-way power.Helen Steward - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (9):1167-1184.details
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Indirect Compatibilism.Andrew James Latham - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Sydneydetails
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Are morally good actions ever free?Cory J. Clark, Adam Shniderman, Jamie B. Luguri, Roy F. Baumeister & Peter H. Ditto - 2018 - Consciousness and Cognition 63 (C):161-182.details
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Are we Living an Illusion? Folk Intuitions on the Problem of Free Will.Silvia Felletti - 2015 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 6 (1):161-175.details
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Compatibilism can be natural.John Turri - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 51:68-81.details
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Compatibilism and Incompatibilism in Social Cognition.John Turri - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (S3):403-424.details
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Replies to Randolph Clarke, John Bishop, and Helen Beebee.Helen Steward - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (3):547-557.details
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(1 other version)Flanagan and Cartesian free will: a defense of agent causation.John Lemos - 2006 - Disputatio 2 (21):69-90.details
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(1 other version)Flanagan and Cartesian Free Will: A Defense of Agent Causation.John Lemos - 2006 - Disputatio 2 (21):1 - 22.details
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Free will in everyday life: Autobiographical accounts of free and unfree actions.Tyler F. Stillman, Roy F. Baumeister & Alfred R. Mele - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):381 - 394.details
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Judgments of moral responsibility: a unified account.Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson - 2012 - In Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson (eds.), The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility. Blackwell. pp. 1–10.details
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(1 other version)On trying to save the simple view.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (5):565-586.details
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Not what I expected: Feeling of surprise differentially mediates effect of personal control on attributions of free will and responsibility.Samuel Murray & Thomas Nadelhoffer - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-25.details
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Constrained Choice: Children's and Adults’ Attribution of Choice to a Humanoid Robot.Teresa Flanagan, Joshua Rottman & Lauren H. Howard - 2021 - Cognitive Science 45 (10):e13043.details
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The developmental and cultural psychology of free will.Tamar Kushnir - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (11):e12529.details
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The emergence of human prosociality: aligning with others through feelings, concerns, and norms.Keith Jensen, Amrisha Vaish & Marco F. H. Schmidt - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5:91239.details
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Bad is freer than good: Positive–negative asymmetry in attributions of free will.Gilad Feldman, Kin Fai Ellick Wong & Roy F. Baumeister - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 42:26-40.details
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(3 other versions)Identification, situational constraint, and social cognition: Studies in the attribution of moral responsibility.Robert L. Woolfolk, John M. Doris & John M. Darley - 2006 - Cognition 100 (2):283-301.details
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