- On Pereboom’s Disappearing Agent Argument.Alfred R. Mele - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):561-574.details
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Moral responsibility and the continuation problem.Alfred R. Mele - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):237-255.details
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Luck and Free Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):543-557.details
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Libertarianism and Human Agency.Alfred R. Mele - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):72-92.details
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Libertarianism, Compatibilism, and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2015 - The Journal of Ethics 19 (1):1-21.details
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Free will and moral responsibility: does either require the other?Alfred Mele - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (3):297-309.details
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Decisions, intentions, and free will.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):146-162.details
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Direct control.Alfred R. Mele - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):275-290.details
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A critical assessment of Pereboom’s Frankfurt-style example.Michael McKenna - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3117-3129.details
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Agency and the Successive Structure of Time-Consciousness.Camden Alexander McKenna - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (5):2013-2034.details
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Indeterminist free will.Storrs McCall & E. J. Lowe - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):681–690.details
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Causal pluralism: agent causation without the panicky metaphysics.Joseph Martinez - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-21.details
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Agent causation as the solution to all the compatibilist’s problems.Ned Markosian - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):383-398.details
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Thomistic Hylomorphism and Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Religion.James Madden - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):664-676.details
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What is ‘mental action’?Yair Levy - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (6):971-993.details
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Recent work on free will and moral responsibility.Neil Levy & Michael McKenna - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.details
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Responsibility as an Obstacle to Good Policy: The Case of Lifestyle Related Disease.Neil Levy - 2018 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 15 (3):459-468.details
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Luck and Agent-Causation: A Response to Franklin.Neil Levy - 2015 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (4):779-784.details
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Hodgson, David., Rationality + Consciousness = Free Will.Neil Levy - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):183-192.details
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Disjunctivism about intending.Yair Levy - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2):161-180.details
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Contrastive explanations: A dilemma for libertarians.Neil Levy - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (1):51-61.details
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Bad Luck Once Again.Neil Levy - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):749-754.details
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Blocking Blockage.Ken Levy - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):565-583.details
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Wanting, Willing, Trying and Kane's Theory of Free Will.John Lemos - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (1):31-48.details
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Flanagan and Cartesian Free Will: A Defense of Agent Causation.John Lemos - 2006 - Disputatio 2 (21):1 - 22.details
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What Does Indeterminism Offer to Agency?Andrew Law - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):371-385.details
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The Conceptual Impossibility of Free Will Error Theory.Andrew J. Latham - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):99-120.details
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Explaining our Choices: Reid on Motives, Character and Effort.Esther Kroeker - 2007 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 5 (2):187-212.details
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Staunch vs. Faint-hearted Hylomorphism: Toward an Aristotelian Account of Composition.Robert Koons - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (2):151-177.details
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Traction without Tracing: A Solution for Control‐Based Accounts of Moral Responsibility.Matt King - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):463-482.details
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The objects of moral responsibility.Andrew C. Khoury - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1357-1381.details
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Free Will Agnosticism.Stephen Kearns - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):235-252.details
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Epistemic control without voluntarism.Timothy R. Kearl - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):95-109.details
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Disenabling Levy's Frankfurt‐Style Enabling Cases.Michael Mckenna Ishtiyaque Haji - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):400-414.details
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Mental causation and the agent-exclusion problem.Terry Horgan - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):183-200.details
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The Metaphysics of Dao in W ang Bi’s Interpretation of Laozi.Hao Hong - 2019 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 18 (2):219-240.details
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Freedom and the Fixity of the Past.Wesley H. Holliday - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):179-207.details
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Timothy O'Connor, persons and causes (oxford: Oxford university press, 2000).Eric Hiddleston - 2005 - Noûs 39 (3):541–556.details
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Against an Agent-Causal Theory of Action.Noel Hendrickson - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):41-58.details
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Do explanation formats in elementary chemistry depend on agent causality?Rom Harré - 2011 - Foundations of Chemistry 13 (3):187-200.details
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The Obligation Dilemma.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (1):37-61.details
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The principle of alternate possibilities and a defeated dilemma.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):179 – 201.details
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Freedom, obligation, and responsibility: Prospects for a unifying theory.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):106-125.details
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Hard- and soft-line responses to Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument.Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (4):19 - 35.details
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Disenabling Levy's Frankfurt-style enabling cases.Ishtiyaque Haji & Michael Mckenna - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):400-414.details
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Active control, agent-causation and free action.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):131-148.details
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At one with our actions, but at two with our bodies: Hornsby's Account of Action.Adrian Haddock - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):157 – 172.details
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A Strengthening of the Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):705-715.details
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Van Inwagen on introspected freedom.Jean-Baptiste Guillon - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):645-663.details
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Sublating the free will problematic: powers, agency and causal determination.Ruth Groff - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):179-200.details
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