- Norm-expressivism and regress.Tanyi Attila - 2017 - South African Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):362-376.details
|
|
Projection, indeterminacy and moral skepticism.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2017 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. New York: Routledge.details
|
|
The tale of a moderate normative skeptic.Brendan Cline - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):141-161.details
|
|
Meta-epistemic defeat.J. Adam Carter - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2877-2896.details
|
|
Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truth and Objectivity.Jussi Suikkanen - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (2):193-212.details
|
|
Précis of Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):397-402.details
|
|
Mahdollisuus.Ilkka Niiniluoto, Tuomas Tahko & Teemu Toppinen (eds.) - 2016 - Helsinki: Philosophical Society of Finland.details
|
|
Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.details
|
|
Why companions in guilt arguments still work: Reply to Cowie.Ramon Das - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly:pqv078.details
|
|
If Nothing Matters.Guy Kahane - 2016 - Noûs 51 (2):327-353.details
|
|
Further problems with projectivism.Thomas Pölzler - 2016 - South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):92-102.details
|
|
(1 other version)Why Moral Error Theorists Should Become Revisionary Moral Expressivists.Toby Svoboda - 2015 - Journal of Moral Philosophy (1):1-25.details
|
|
The Supervenience Challenge to Non-Naturalism.Pekka Väyrynen - 2018 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 170-84.details
|
|
After Moral Error Theory, After Moral Realism.Stephen Ingram - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):227-248.details
|
|
Why Jonas Olson Cannot Believe the Error Theory Either.Bart Streumer - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):419-436.details
|
|
Are the Moral Fixed Points Conceptual Truths?Daan Evers & Bart Streumer - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (1):1-9.details
|
|
What is Value? Where Does it Come From? A Philosophical Perspective.Christine Tappolet & Mauro Rossi - 2015 - In Tobias Brosch & David Sander (eds.), The Value Handbook: The Affective Sciences of Values and Valuation. pp. 3-22.details
|
|
Parsimony and the Argument from Queerness.Justin Morton & Eric Sampson - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (4):609-627.details
|
|
Are moral properties impossible?Wouter F. Kalf - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1869-1887.details
|
|
The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism.Terence Cuneo & Russ Shafer-Landau - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):399-443.details
|
|
(1 other version)Moral anti-realism.Richardn D. Joyce - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
(1 other version)Realism.Alexandern D. Miller - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Revolutionary Normative Subjectivism.Lewis Williams - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
|
|
By Which We May Be Judged: Moral Epistemology, Mind-Independent Truth Conditions And Sources Of Normativity.Maarten Van Doorn - 2022 - Dissertation, Central European Universitydetails
|
|
A Dilemma for Theistic Non-Naturalism.StJohn Lambert - 2023 - Religions 14 (9):1–9.details
|
|
The Construction of Epistemic Normativity.Michael Hannon & Elise Woodard - manuscriptdetails
|
|
A Universal Morality: An account of Moral Objectivity against Moral Error Theory.Utkarsh Rana - manuscriptdetails
|
|
Resurrecting the Hume's Dictum argument against metaethical non-naturalism.Noah Gordon - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-23.details
|
|
The Reliability Challenge in Moral Epistemology.Matt Lutz - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15:284-308.details
|
|
Conceptual Ethics and The Categories of “Ideal Theory” and “Non-Ideal Theory” in Political Philosophy: A Proposal for Abandonment.Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett - forthcoming - New Perspectives on Conceptual Engineering.details
|
|
Metaethics as Conceptual Engineering.Knut Olav Skarsaune - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.details
|
|
Moral error theory and hypothetical reasons.Robert Shaver - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-12.details
|
|
Formulating Moral Error Theory.Caleb Perl - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (5):279-288.details
|
|
Can Pascal’s Wager Save Morality from Ockham’s Razor?Tobias Beardsley - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (2):405-424.details
|
|
Debunking What?Hallvard Lillehammer - 2023 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Evolutionary Debunking Arguments: Ethics, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics, and Epistemology. New York: Routledge.details
|
|
Why formal objections to the error theory are sound.Christine Tiefensee & Gregory Wheeler - 2022 - Analysis 82 (4):608-616.details
|
|
Metaepistemology.J. Adam Carter & Ernest Sosa - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
How to be a child, and bid lions and dragons farewell: the consequences of moral error theory.David James Hunt - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Birminghamdetails
|
|
Non-Naturalism and Reasons-Firstism: How to Solve the Discontinuity Problem by Reducing Two Queerness Worries to One.Victor Moberger - 2022 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (1):131-154.details
|
|
Chris Cowie, Morality and Epistemic Judgement, (OUP), 2019. [REVIEW]Alex Murphy - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (2):629-632.details
|
|
The Limits of Self-Effacement: A Reply to Wittwer.Patrick Clipsham - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3617-3636.details
|
|
Error, Consistency and Triviality.Christine Tiefensee & Gregory Wheeler - 2022 - Noûs 56 (3):602-618.details
|
|
On the Dialectical Disadvantage of the Normative Error Theorist: A Reply to Clipsham.Xinkan Zhao - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (2):861-871.details
|
|
Why Epistemic Reductionism Won’t Save the Moral Error Theorist.Alex Murphy - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):53-69.details
|
|
Reasons and Normativity.Jakob Green Werkmäster - 2019 - Dissertation, Lund Universitydetails
|
|
Contingency inattention: against causal debunking in ethics.Regina Rini - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (2):369-389.details
|
|
Moral error theory, explanatory dispensability and the limits of guilt.Silvan Wittwer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2969-2983.details
|
|
What can debunking do for us (sceptics and nihilists)?Jonas Olson - 2019 - Ratio 32 (4):290-299.details
|
|
Moral supervenience.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):592-615.details
|
|
(1 other version)Mind-Independent Values Don’t Exist, But Moral Truth Does.Maarten Van Doorn - 2017 - Essays in the Philosophy of Humanism ; Vol 25, No 1 25 (1):5-24.details
|
|