- .Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - 2023 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies.Christopher Cowie - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):115-130.details
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The Normative Error Theorist Cannot Avoid Self-Defeat.Spencer Case - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):92-104.details
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The Type-B Moral Error Theory.Anthony Robert Booth - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2181-2199.details
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The Type-B Moral Error Theory.Anthony Robert Booth - 2020 - Erkenntnis:1-19.details
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No Perils of Rejecting the Parity Argument.Mustafa Khuramy & Erik Schulz - forthcoming - Studia Humana.details
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Anti-Luminosity and Anti-Realism in Metaethics.Jussi Suikkanen - forthcoming - Synthese.details
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Why companions in guilt arguments still work: Reply to Cowie.Ramon Das - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly:pqv078.details
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Evolutionary debunking of morality: epistemological or metaphysical?Ramon Das - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):417-435.details
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Bad News for Moral Error Theorists: There Is No Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies.Ramon Das - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):58-69.details
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The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism.Terence Cuneo & Russ Shafer-Landau - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):399-443.details
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Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.details
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Do constitutive norms on belief explain Moore’s Paradox?Christopher Cowie - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1685-1702.details
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A New Explanatory Challenge for Nonnaturalists.Christopher Cowie - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (4):661-679.details
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‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ against epistemic deontologism: beyond doxastic involuntarism.Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1641-1656.details
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Ethical Theories and Controversial Intuitions.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2023 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 31 (3):318-345.details
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The tale of a moderate normative skeptic.Brendan Cline - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):141-161.details
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The Limits of Self-Effacement: A Reply to Wittwer.Patrick Clipsham - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3617-3636.details
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Is there a Distinct Metaphilosophical Companions in Guilt Argument (and Does it Work)?Patrick Clipsham - 2018 - Philosophia 51 (1):53-68.details
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Moral Fixed Points and Conceptual Deficiency: Reply to Ingram (2015).Kyriacou Christos - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2017 (3):1-9.details
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Is Free Will Scepticism Self-Defeating?Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):55-78.details
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From Epistemic to Moral Realism.Spencer Case - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (5):541-562.details
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Meta-epistemic defeat.J. Adam Carter - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2877-2896.details
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Expressivist Moral Abolitionism.Eric Campbell - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (4):776-790.details
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Varieties of epistemic instrumentalism.Daniel Buckley - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9293-9313.details
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Why we can still believe the error theory.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):523-536.details
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Can Pascal’s Wager Save Morality from Ockham’s Razor?Tobias Beardsley - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (2):405-424.details
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Cognitivism and Metaphysical Weight: A Dilemma for Relaxed Realism.Annika Böddeling - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (3):546-559.details
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Heraclitean Flux Metaphysics.Andrew Dennis Bassford - 2023 - Metaphysica: International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics 24 (2):299-322.details
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Norm-expressivism and regress.Tanyi Attila - 2017 - South African Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):362-376.details
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Consequentialism and Its Demands: The Role of Institutions.Attila Tanyi & András Miklós - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-21.details
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By Which We May Be Judged: Moral Epistemology, Mind-Independent Truth Conditions And Sources Of Normativity.Maarten Van Doorn - 2022 - Dissertation, Central European Universitydetails
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The Metaphysics of Reasons.Jonas Olson - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 255-274.details
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The Supervenience Challenge to Non-Naturalism.Pekka Väyrynen - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 170-84.details
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Error Theory in Metaethics.Jonas Olson - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 58-71.details
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Conceptual Ethics and The Categories of “Ideal Theory” and “Non-Ideal Theory” in Political Philosophy: A Proposal for Abandonment.Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett - forthcoming - New Perspectives on Conceptual Engineering.details
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Nihilism and the Epistemic Profile of Moral Judgment.Jonas Olson - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. New York: Routledge.details
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Rationalism vs. Sentimentalism: Reviewing Price's Review.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Philosophical Papers 43 (3):429-445.details
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Why We Really Cannot Believe the Error Theory.Bart Streumer - 2018 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. New York: Routledge.details
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Projection, indeterminacy and moral skepticism.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2018 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. New York: Routledge.details
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Moral Lessons from Psychology: Contemporary Themes in Psychological Research and their relevance for Ethical Theory.Henrik Ahlenius - 2020 - Stockholm: Stockholm University.details
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No point of view except ours?Luke Elson - forthcoming - Topoi:1-11.details
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Tiantai Metaethics.Jason Dockstader - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):215-229.details
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On the Dialectical Disadvantage of the Normative Error Theorist: A Reply to Clipsham.Xinkan Zhao - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (2):861-871.details
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Moral error theory, explanatory dispensability and the limits of guilt.Silvan Wittwer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2969-2983.details
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Mind-Independent Values Don’t Exist, But Moral Truth Does.Maarten Van Doorn - 2017 - Essays in the Philosophy of Humanism ; Vol 25, No 1 25 (1):5-24.details
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Is Irreducible Normativity Impossibly Queer?Teemu Toppinen - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):437-460.details
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Why formal objections to the error theory are sound.Christine Tiefensee & Gregory Wheeler - 2022 - Analysis 82 (4):608-616.details
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Saving which differences? Creeping minimalism and disagreement.Christine Tiefensee - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1905-1921.details
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Hypercrisy and standing to self-blame.Hannah Tierney - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):262-269.details
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