- If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.details
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A puzzle about enkratic reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3177-3196.details
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Epistemology versus Non-Causal Realism.Jared Warren - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5).details
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Dialogic Consensus in Medicine—A Justification Claim.Paul Walker & Terence Lovat - 2019 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 44 (1):71-84.details
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In defence of object-given reasons.Michael Vollmer - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):485-511.details
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Subjective Reasons.Eric Vogelstein - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):239-257.details
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Moral normativity.Eric Vogelstein - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1083-1095.details
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Morality, reasons, and sentiments.Eric Vogelstein - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):421-432.details
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Parfit’s and Scanlon’s Non-Metaphysical Moral Realism as Alethic Pluralism.Herman Veluwenkamp - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4):751-761.details
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Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism.Katia Vavova - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (2):104-116.details
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Identifications, Volitions and the Case of Successful Psychopaths.Somogy Varga - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (1):87-106.details
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The value of practical usefulness.Rob van Someren Greve - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (1):167-177.details
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Kant and Moral Demandingness.Marcel van Ackeren & Martin Sticker - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (1):75-89.details
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Can Reasons be Self-Undermining?Rob Van Someren Greve - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (2):411-414.details
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No practical reasons for belief: the epistemic significance of practical considerations.Hamid Vahid - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-18.details
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Is Rawls's theory of justice exclusively forward-looking?Moisés Vaca - 2013 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 45 (1):299-330.details
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Rule consequentialism at top rates.Teemu Toppinen - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly:pqv065.details
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How Norms (Might) Guide Belief.Teemu Toppinen - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):396-409.details
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A realist and internalist response to one of Mackie’s arguments from queerness.Torbjörn Tännsjö - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):347-357.details
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Does scrupulous securitism stand-up to scrutiny? Two problems for moral securitism and how we might fix them.Travis Timmerman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1509-1528.details
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Contractualism and the Significance of Perspective-Taking.Peter Timmerman - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (5):909-925.details
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Problems with Compensation: Gleeson on Marilyn McCord Adams on Evil.Joshua C. Thurow - 2020 - Sophia 59 (3):513-524.details
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Moral Failure — Response to Critics.Lisa Tessman - 2016 - Feminist Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1):1-18.details
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Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces.Folke Tersman & Olle Risberg - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-17.details
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Rationality with respect to people, places, and times.Larry S. Temkin - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):576-608.details
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Essentially Grounded Non-Naturalism and Normative Supervenience.Toppinen Teemu - 2018 - Topoi 37 (4):645-653.details
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How could a “blind” evolutionary process have made human moral beliefs sensitive to strongly universal, objective moral standards?William J. Talbott - 2015 - Biology and Philosophy 30 (5):691-708.details
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Consequentialism and Human Rights.William J. Talbott - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1030-1040.details
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Veritism Unswamped.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):381-435.details
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What apparent reasons appear to be.Kurt Sylvan - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):587-606.details
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Skorupski on spontaneity, apriority and normative truth.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264):617-628.details
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Truth monism without teleology.Kurt Sylvan - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):161-163.details
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Reliabilism without Epistemic Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):525-555.details
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Reasons: Wrong, Right, Normative, Fundamental.Kurt Sylvan & Errol Lord - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 15 (1).details
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Nothing ‘Mere’ to It: Reclaiming Subjective Accounts of Normativity of Law.S. Swaminathan - 2019 - Journal of Human Values 25 (1):1-14.details
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What overarching ethical principle should a superintelligent AI follow?Atle Ottesen Søvik - 2022 - AI and Society 37 (4):1505-1518.details
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Non-Naturalism and Reference.Jussi Suikkanen - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 11 (2):1-24.details
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Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truth and Objectivity.Jussi Suikkanen - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (2):193-212.details
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Why the Method of Cases Doesn’t Work.Christopher Suhler - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):825-847.details
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Act and Rule Consequentialism: A Synthesis.Jussi Suikkanen - forthcoming - Moral Philosophy and Politics.details
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Walking the Tightrope of Just War. [REVIEW]B. J. Strawser - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):533-544.details
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Realist Ethical Naturalism for Ethical Non-Naturalists.Ryan Stringer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):339-362.details
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In defense of future tuesday indifference: Ideally coherent eccentrics and the contingency of what matters.Sharon Street - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):273-298.details
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I—Constructivism in Ethics and the Problem of Attachment and Loss.Sharon Street - 2016 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90 (1):161-189.details
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A Puzzle About Reasons and Rationality.Caj Strandberg - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (1):63-88.details
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An Ecumenical Account of Categorical Moral Reasons.Caj Strandberg - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (2):160-188.details
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Animal confinement and use.Robert Streiffer & David Killoren - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-21.details
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Kant, Eudaimonism, Act-Consequentialism and the Fact of Reason.Martin Sticker - 2020 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 102 (2):209-241.details
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The indispensable mental element of justification and the failure of purely objectivist (mostly “revisionist”) just war theories.Uwe Steinhoff - 2020 - Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie (1):51-67.details
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Meriting a Response: The Paradox of Seductive Artworks.Nils-Hennes Stear - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):465-482.details
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