- Religious diversity and epistemic luck.Max Baker-Hytch - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 76 (2):171-191.details
|
|
Normalcy, justification, and the easy-defeat problem.Marvin Backes - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):2877-2895.details
|
|
Is unsaying polite?Berislav Žarnić - 2011 - In Majda Trobok, Nenad Miščević & Berislav Žarnić (eds.), Between Logic and Reality: Modeling Inference, Action and Understanding. Dordrecht and New York: Springer. pp. 201--224.details
|
|
Design Hypotheses Behave Like Skeptical Hypotheses.René van Woudenberg & Jeroen de Ridder - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (2):69-90.details
|
|
The Antinomies of Serendipity How to Cognitively Frame Serendipity for Scientific Discoveries.Selene Arfini, Tommaso Bertolotti & Lorenzo Magnani - 2020 - Topoi 39 (4):939-948.details
|
|
Real Knowledge Undermining Luck.Raphael van Riel - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (3):325-344.details
|
|
“Absent Contrary Indication”: On a Pernicious Form of Epistemic Luck, and its Epistemic Agency Antidote.Alfonso Anaya - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2341-2364.details
|
|
No Excuses: Performance Mistakes in Morality.Santiago Amaya & John M. Doris - 2014 - In Jens Clausen & Neil Levy (eds.), Springer Handbook of Neuroethics. Dordrecht. pp. 253-272.details
|
|
Why safety doesn’t save closure.Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):127-142.details
|
|
The Social Virtue Of Blind Deference.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):545-582.details
|
|
What’s so Good about a Wise and Knowledgeable Public?Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (2):199-216.details
|
|
Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):799-816.details
|
|
How I Know I'm Not a Brain in a Vat.José L. Zalabardo - 2009 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 64:65-88.details
|
|
No Need for Excuses: Against Knowledge-First Epistemology and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion.Joshua Schechter - 2017 - In J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin W. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 132-159.details
|
|
Folk intuitions and the no-luck-thesis.Adrian Ziółkowski - 2016 - Episteme 13 (3):343-358.details
|
|
Epistemology versus Non-Causal Realism.Jared Warren - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5).details
|
|
Temporary Safety Hazards.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4):152-174.details
|
|
A Bayesian framework for knowledge attribution: Evidence from semantic integration.Derek Powell, Zachary Horne, Ángel Pinillos & Keith Holyoak - 2015 - Cognition 139 (C):92-104.details
|
|
Epistemic action, extended knowledge, and metacognition.Joëlle Proust - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):364-392.details
|
|
Knowledge and Luck.John Turri, Wesley Buckwalter & Peter Blouw - 2015 - Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 22 (2):378-390.details
|
|
When cognition turns vicious: Heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology.Peter L. Samuelson & Ian M. Church - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (8):1095-1113.details
|
|
Skepticism, A Priori Skepticism, and the Possibility of Error.Hamid Vahid - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (4):235-252.details
|
|
The chronometrics of confirmation bias: Evidence for the inhibition of intuitive judgements.Edward Jn Stupple & Linden J. Ball - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):89-90.details
|
|
Lucky understanding without knowledge.Yasha Rohwer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (5):1-15.details
|
|
Truth promoting non-evidential reasons for belief.Brian Talbot - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):599-618.details
|
|
A Defence of Quasi-reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony.Duncan Pritchard - 2006 - Philosophica 78 (2).details
|
|
Wittgenstein and the groundlessness of our believing.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):255-272.details
|
|
Epistemic Luck.Joshue Orozco - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (1):11-21.details
|
|
Radical Epistemic Self-Sufficiency on Reed’s Long Road to Skepticism.Brian Ribeiro - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (4):789-793.details
|
|
Arguing about thought experiments.Alex Wiegmann & Joachim Horvath - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-23.details
|
|
Anti-luck epistemology and pragmatic encroachment.Duncan Pritchard - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):715-729.details
|
|
Safety and Necessity.Niall J. Paterson - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1081-1097.details
|
|
Better virtuous than safe.Haicheng Zhao - 2019 - Synthese 198 (8):6969-6991.details
|
|
In the Space of Reasonable Doubt.Marion Vorms & Ulrike Hahn - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3609-3633.details
|
|
Engineered Knowledge, Fragility and Virtue Epistemology.Dan O’Brien - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):757-774.details
|
|
Fiabilismo.Ernesto Perini-Santos - 2018 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.details
|
|
In defense of an epistemic probability account of luck.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):5099-5113.details
|
|
Information, Epistemic Luck and Generality.Abel Wajnerman Paz - 2017 - Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 26:326-354.details
|
|
Epistemic dependence.Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):305-324.details
|
|
Anti-luck virtue epistemology and epistemic defeat.Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3065-3077.details
|
|
Assertion and safety.Charlie Pelling - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3777-3796.details
|
|
Two Notions of Epistemic Risk.Martin Smith - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (5):1069-1079.details
|
|
Testimony, testimonial belief, and safety.Charlie Pelling - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):205-217.details
|
|
Epistemological disjunctivism and the basis problem.Duncan Pritchard - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):434-455.details
|
|
Relevant alternatives, perceptual knowledge and discrimination.Duncan Pritchard - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):245-268.details
|
|
Certainty and scepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):58-67.details
|
|
Scepticism, epistemic luck, and epistemic angst.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):185 – 205.details
|
|
Replies to Edgington, Pavese, and Campbell-Moore and Konek.Sarah Moss - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):356-370.details
|
|
The epistemic significance of modal factors.Lilith Newton - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):227-248.details
|
|
Knowledge, infallibility, and skepticism.Gregory Douglas Stoutenburg - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Iowadetails
|
|