- The problem of perception and the no-miracles principle.Michael Cohen - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):11065-11080.details
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Problems for Foley's Accounts of Rational Belief and Responsible Belief.E. J. Coffman & Matt Deaton - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):147-160.details
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The Nature of Intuitive Justification.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):313 - 333.details
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Recent Work on Moore’s Proof.J. Adam Carter - 2012 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (2):115-144.details
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Epistemic Perceptualism, Skill, and the Regress Problem.J. Adam Carter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies:1-26.details
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Epistemic perceptualism, skill and the regress problem.J. Adam Carter - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1229-1254.details
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Absolutism, Relativism and Metaepistemology.J. Adam Carter & Robin McKenna - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (5):1139-1159.details
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Archimedean Metanorms.J. Adam Carter - 2021 - Topoi 40 (5):1075-1085.details
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Safely Denying Phenomenal Conservatism.Aaran Burns - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2685-2700.details
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A phenomenal conservative perspective on religious experience.Aaran Burns - 2017 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 81 (3):247-261.details
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Non-cognitivism and rational inference.Mark Bryant Budolfson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):243 - 259.details
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The rational roles of experiences of utterance meanings.Berit Brogaard - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Dogmatism and Ampliative Inference.Berit Brogaard - 2021 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 66 (1):e42186.details
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Why Reid was no dogmatist.Mark Boespflug - 2019 - Synthese 196 (11):4511-4525.details
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The Legacy of Reid's Common Sense in Analytic Epistemology.Mark Boespflug - 2019 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 17 (1):23-37.details
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Solving the Moorean Puzzle.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):493-514.details
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Solving the problem of easy knowledge.Tim Black - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):597-617.details
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Towards a phenomenological conception of experiential justification.Philipp Berghofer - 2020 - Synthese 197 (1):155-183.details
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How to Supplement Mentalist Evidentialism: What Are the Fundamental Epistemological Principles?Philipp Berghofer - 2022 - Theoria 88 (3):679-700.details
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Husserl’s Conception of Experiential Justification: What It Is and Why It Matters.Philipp Berghofer - 2018 - Husserl Studies 34 (2):145-170.details
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The Intellectual Given.John Bengson - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):707-760.details
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A Priori Skepticism and the KK Thesis.James R. Beebe - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):315-326.details
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Intuitions, Meaning, and Normativity: Why Intuition Theory Supports a Non‐Descriptivist Metaethic.Matthew S. Bedke - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):144-177.details
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Was Moore a Moorean? On Moore and Scepticism.Peter Baumann - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):181-200.details
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Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief.David James Barnett - 2016 - Noûs 50 (1):184-212.details
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Against the perceptual model of utterance comprehension.Brendan Balcerak Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):387-405.details
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Normalcy, justification, and the easy-defeat problem.Marvin Backes - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):2877-2895.details
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Epistemic Justification: Probability, Normalcy, and the Functional Theory.Marvin Backes - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):65-81.details
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Epistemology and the law: why there is no epistemic mileage in legal cases.Marvin Backes - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2759-2778.details
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Moore against the sceptics.Jody Azzouni - 2021 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 66 (1):e41521.details
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Justification As A Loaded Notion.Yuval Avnur - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4897-4916.details
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Justification as a loaded notion.Yuval Avnur - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4897-4916.details
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Pascal's birds: Signs and significance in nature.Yuval Avnur - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):3-20.details
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An old problem for the new rationalism.Yuval Avnur - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):175-185.details
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Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia, Falibilidad y normatividad: un análisis filosófico de la suerte. [REVIEW]Alfonso Anaya - 2020 - Critica 52 (155):73-82.details
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Wright Back to Dretske, or Why You Might as Well Deny Knowledge Closure.Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):570-611.details
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Unjustified Defeaters.David Alexander - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):891-912.details
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In Defense of Epistemic Circularity.David Alexander - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (3):223-241.details
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Fallible reasons on behalf of fallibilism.David Alexander - 2017 - Synthese 198 (5):3979-3998.details
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Introduction.[author unknown] - 2013 - Introduction 5 (36):i-vi.details
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Introduction.[author unknown] - 2013 - Introduction 5 (36):i-vi.details
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Inference to the best explanation and epistemic circularity.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2017 - In Kevin McCain & Ted Poston (eds.), Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Verstehen verstehen. Eine erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchung.Federica Isabella Malfatti - 2023 - Berlin, Deutschland: Schwabe Verlag.details
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Dynamic Introspection.Michael Cohen - 2021 - Dissertation, Stanford Universitydetails
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The Point of Moore's Proof.Charles Raff - 2021 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 11 (1):1-27.details
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Introduction.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification: how appearances justify beliefs. Cham: Springer.details
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The Bayesian Objection.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification: how appearances justify beliefs. Cham: Springer.details
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Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification: how appearances justify beliefs. Cham: Springer.details
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Antiscepticism and Easy Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification: how appearances justify beliefs. Cham: Springer.details
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Full Blooded Entitlement.Martin Smith - 2019 - In Nikolaj Pedersen & Peter Graham (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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