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Pragmatic encroachment in epistemology.Brian Kim - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (5):e12415.details
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Knowledge, reasoning, and deliberation.Brian Kim - 2020 - Ratio 33 (1):14-26.details
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Friendship and epistemic norms.Jason Kawall - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):349-370.details
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How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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Justification is potential knowledge.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):184-206.details
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Knowledge in the face of conspiracy conditionals.Ben Holguín - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (3):737-771.details
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Concessive knowledge-attributions: fallibilism and gradualism.Stephen Hetherington - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2835-2851.details
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Knowledge and acceptance.Roman Heil - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-17.details
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Why Purists Should Be Infallibilists.Michael Hannon - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):689-704.details
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The Importance of Knowledge Ascriptions.Michael J. Hannon - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):856-866.details
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Fallibilism and the Value of Knowledge.Michael Hannon - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1119-1146.details
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Probabilistic Proofs, Lottery Propositions, and Mathematical Knowledge.Yacin Hamami - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):77-89.details
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On the epistemic significance of practical reasons to inquire.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1641-1658.details
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Against epistemic partiality in friendship: value-reflecting reasons.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2221-2242.details
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Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk.Georgi Gardiner - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):481-511.details
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On the Nature of Presupposition: A Normative Speech Act Account.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (2):269-293.details
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Against the iterated knowledge account of high-stakes cases.Jie Gao - 2019 - Episteme 16 (1):92-107.details
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Akrasia and Epistemic Impurism.James Fritz - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (1):98-116.details
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Moderate Skeptical Invariantism.Davide Fassio - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):841-870.details
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Knowledge and the Importance of Being Right.Davide Fassio - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (3):265-289.details
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Is there an epistemic norm of practical reasoning?Davide Fassio - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2137-2166.details
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Replies to Cohen, Neta and Reed.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):473-490.details
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Guidance and mainstream epistemology.Jeremy Fantl - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (7):2191-2210.details
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Entitlement and misleading evidence.Jeremy Fantl - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):743-761.details
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What Liars Can Tell Us about the Knowledge Norm of Practical Reasoning.Don Fallis - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):347-367.details
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Statistical resentment, or: what’s wrong with acting, blaming, and believing on the basis of statistics alone.David Enoch & Levi Spectre - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5687-5718.details
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Lottery judgments: A philosophical and experimental study.Philip A. Ebert, Martin Smith & Ian Durbach - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):110-138.details
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On Deniability.Alexander Dinges & Julia Zakkou - 2023 - Mind 132 (526):372-401.details
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Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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A (Partial) Defence of Moderate Skeptical Invariantism.Robin McKenna - 2021 - In Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. Routledge. pp. 154-171.details
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Omega Knowledge Matters.Simon Goldstein - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.details
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John Cook Wilson.Mathieu Marion - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Assertion and isolated second-hand knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 251--276.details
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A Tale of Two Doctrines: Moral Encroachment and Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu - 2021 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 99-118.details
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Epistemic scorekeeping.Patrick Rysiew - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press.details
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Reference, Truth, and Biological Kinds.Marcel Weber - 2014 - In: J. Dutant, D. Fassio and A. Meylan (Eds.) Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.details
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Knowledge, Practice, and Merit.Arturs Logins - 2012 - Discipline Filosofiche 22 (2):133-152.details
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Asserting as Commitment to Knowing. An Essay on the Normativity of Assertion.Ivan Milić - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Barcelonadetails
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Belief and Credence: A Defense of Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Notre Damedetails
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Credal sensitivism: threshold vs. credence-one.Jie Gao - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Inference and action: relating beliefs to the world.Javier Gonzalez De Prado Salas - unknowndetails
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In defense of a moderate skeptical invariantism.Davide Fassio - 2021 - In Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. Routledge Series in Epistemology. pp. 129-153.details
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