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  1. Musical change deafness: The inability to detect change in a non-speech auditory domain.Kat R. Agres & Carol L. Krumhansl - 2008 - In B. C. Love, K. McRae & V. M. Sloutsky (eds.), Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. pp. 969--974.
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  • Know thyself: Metacognitive networks and measures of consciousness.Antoine Pasquali, Bert Timmermans & Axel Cleeremans - 2010 - Cognition 117 (2):182-190.
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  • Concepts about agency constrain beliefs about visual experience.Daniel T. Levin - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):875-888.
    Recent research exploring phenomena such as change blindness, inattentional blindness, attentional blink and repetition blindness has revealed a number of counterintuitive ways in which apparently salient visual stimuli often go unnoticed. In fact, large majorities of subjects sometimes predict that they would detect visual changes that actually are rarely noticed, suggesting that people have strong beliefs about visual experience that are demonstrably incorrect. However, for other kinds of visual metacognition, such as picture memory, people underpredict performance. This paper describes two (...)
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  • Visual working memory capacity: from psychophysics and neurobiology to individual differences.Steven J. Luck & Edward K. Vogel - 2013 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (8):391-400.
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  • (2 other versions)Change blindness: Past, present, and future. [REVIEW]Daniel J. Simons & Ronald A. Rensink - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):16-20.
    Change blindness is the striking failure to see large changes that normally would be noticed easily. Over the past decade this phenomenon has greatly contributed to our understanding of attention, perception, and even consciousness. The surprising extent of change blindness explains its broad appeal, but its counterintuitive nature has also engendered confusions about the kinds of inferences that legitimately follow from it. Here we discuss the legitimate and the erroneous inferences that have been drawn, and offer a set of requirements (...)
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  • Self-intimation.Galen Strawson - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):1-31.
    Aristotle, Dignāga, Descartes, Arnauld, Locke, Brentano, Sartre and many others are right about the nature of conscious awareness: all such awareness comports—somehow carries within itself—awareness of itself . This is a necessary condition of awareness being awareness at all: no ‘higher-order’ account of what makes conscious states conscious can be correct. But is very paradoxical: it seems to require that awareness be somehow already present, in such a way as to be available to itself as object of awareness, in order (...)
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  • Is mind extended or scaffolded? Ruminations on Sterelney’s extended stomach.Jennifer Greenwood - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):629-650.
    In his paper, in this journal, Sterelney claims that cases of extended mind are limiting cases of environmental scaffolding and that a niche construction model is a more helpful, general framework for understanding human action. He further claims that extended mind cases fit into a corner of a 3D space of environmental scaffolds of cognitive competence. He identifies three dimensions which determine where a resource fits into this space and suggests that extended mind models seem plausible when a resource is (...)
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  • Time, Unity, and Conscious Experience.Michal Klincewicz - 2013 - Dissertation, Cuny Graduate Center
    In my dissertation I critically survey existing theories of time consciousness, and draw on recent work in neuroscience and philosophy to develop an original theory. My view depends on a novel account of temporal perception based on the notion of temporal qualities, which are mental properties that are instantiated whenever we detect change in the environment. When we become aware of these temporal qualities in an appropriate way, our conscious experience will feature the distinct temporal phenomenology that is associated with (...)
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  • Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers.John Bengson - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):495-532.
    This paper poses a constructive, evenhanded challenge to the idea that recent experimental work shows intuitions to be epistemically problematic. It is a challenge because it suggests that these experimental attacks neglect a considerable gap between intuitions and answers, and this neglect implies that we are at the present time unwarranted in drawing any negative conclusions about intuition’s epistemic status from the relevant empirical studies. The challenge is evenhanded because it does not load the dice by invoking an overly narrow (...)
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  • Tracking the processes behind conscious perception: A review of event-related potential correlates of visual consciousness. [REVIEW]Henry Railo, Mika Koivisto & Antti Revonsuo - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):972-983.
    Event-related potential studies have attempted to discover the processes that underlie conscious visual perception by contrasting ERPs produced by stimuli that are consciously perceived with those that are not. Variability of the proposed ERP correlates of consciousness is considerable: the earliest proposed ERP correlate of consciousness coincides with sensory processes and the last one marks postperceptual processes. A negative difference wave called visual awareness negativity , typically observed around 200 ms after stimulus onset in occipitotemporal sites, gains strong support for (...)
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  • Exploring the informational sources of metaperception: The case of Change Blindness Blindness.Anna Loussouarn, Damien Gabriel & Joëlle Proust - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1489-1501.
    Perceivers generally show a poor ability to detect changes, a condition referred to as “Change Blindness” . They are, in addition, “blind to their own blindness”. A common explanation of this “Change Blindness Blindness” is that it derives from an inadequate, “photographical” folk-theory about perception. This explanation, however, does not account for intra-individual variations of CBB across trials. Our study aims to explore an alternative theory, according to which participants base their self-evaluations on two activity-dependent cues, namely search time and (...)
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  • Is Perspectival Self-Consciousness Non-Conceptual?Alva Noë - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):185-194.
    As perceivers we are able to keep track of the ways in which our perceptual experience depends on what we do. This capacity, which Hurley calls perspectival self- consciousness, is a special instance of our more general ability as perceivers to keep track of how things are. I argue that one upshot of this is that perspectival self- consciousness, like the ability to perceive more generally, relies on our possession of conceptual skills.
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  • When is perception conscious?Jesse J. Prinz - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the world. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 310--332.
    Once upon a time, people thought that all perception was conscious. Indeed, it was widely believed that all mental states are conscious, so the problem of explaining consciousness collapses into the problem of explaining mentality. But things have changed. Most people now believe that a lot goes on unconsciously. Indeed, some people believe that mental states that are not perceptual in nature are never conscious. That’s a matter of controversy. Less controversial is the claim that perceptual states are conscious some (...)
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  • Bridging language with the rest of cognition: computational, algorithmic and neurobiological issues and methods.Shimon Edelman - unknown
    The computational program for theoretical neuroscience initiated by Marr and Poggio (1977) calls for a study of biological information processing on several distinct levels of abstraction. At each of these levels — computational (defining the problems and considering possible solutions), algorithmic (specifying the sequence of operations leading to a solution) and implementational — significant progress has been made in the understanding of cognition. In the past three decades, computational principles have been discovered that are common to a wide range of (...)
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  • Objects and attention: the state of the art.Brian J. Scholl - 2001 - Cognition 80 (1-2):1-46.
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  • "Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2004.Thomas Metzinger - unknown
    This is a bibliography of books and articles on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience over the last 30 years. There are three main sections, devoted to monographs, edited collections of papers, and articles. The first two of these sections are each divided into three subsections containing books in each of the main areas of research. The third section is divided into 12 subsections, with 10 subject headings for philosophical articles along with two additional subsections for articles in cognitive (...)
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  • Attention is Rational-Access Consciousness.Declan Smithies - 2011 - In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 247--273.
    This chapter argues that attention is a distinctive mode of consciousness, which plays an essential functional role in making information accessible for use in the rational control of thought and action. The main line of argument can be stated quite simply. Attention is what makes information fully accessible for use in the rational control of thought and action. But what makes information fully accessible for use in the rational control of thought and action is a distinctive mode of consciousness. Therefore, (...)
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  • Endogenous versus exogenous change: Change detection, self and agency.Bruno Berberian & Axel Cleeremans - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):198-214.
    The goal of this study is to characterize observers’ abilities to discriminate between endogenous and exogenous changes. To do so, we developed a new experimental paradigm. On each trial, participants were shown a dot pattern on the screen. Next, the pattern disappeared and participants were to reproduce it. Changes were surreptuously introduced in the stimulus, either by presenting participants anew with the dot pattern they had themselves produced on the previous trial or by presenting participants with a slightly different dot (...)
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  • The cognitive and neural correlates of “tactile consciousness”: A multisensory perspective.Alberto Gallace & Charles Spence - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):370-407.
    People’s awareness of tactile stimuli has been investigated in far less detail than their awareness of stimuli in other sensory modalities. In an attempt to fill this gap, we provide an overview of studies that are pertinent to the topic of tactile consciousness. We discuss the results of research that has investigated phenomena such as “change blindness”, phantom limb sensations, and numerosity judgments in tactile perception, together with the results obtained from the study of patients affected by deficits that can (...)
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  • Perceptual illusions in brief visual presentations.Vincent de Gardelle, Jérôme Sackur & Sid Kouider - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (3):569-577.
    We often feel that our perceptual experience is richer than what we can express. For instance, when flashed with a large set of letters, we feel that we can see them all, while we can report only a few. However, the nature of this subjective impression remains highly debated: while many favour a dissociation between two forms of consciousness , others contend that the richness of phenomenal experience is a mere illusion. Here we addressed this question with a classical partial-report (...)
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  • Failures to see: Attentive blank stares revealed by change blindness.Gideon P. Caplovitz, Robert Fendrich & Howard C. Hughes - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):877-886.
    Change blindness illustrates a remarkable limitation in visual processing by demonstrating that substantial changes in a visual scene can go undetected. Because these changes can ultimately be detected using top–down driven search processes, many theories assign a central role to spatial attention in overcoming change blindness. Surprisingly, it has been reported that change blindness can occur during blink-contingent changes even when observers fixate the changing location [O’Regan, J. K., Deubel, H., Clark, J. J., & Rensink, R. A. . Picture changes (...)
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  • Six Views of Embodied Cognition.Margaret Wilson - 2002 - Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 9 (4):625--636.
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  • Constraining the neural representation of the visual world.Shimon Edelman - 2002 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):125-131.
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  • Passive frame theory: A new synthesis.Ezequiel Morsella, Godwin Christine, Jantz Tiffany, Krieger Stephen & Gazzaley Adam - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
    Passive frame theory attempts to illuminate what consciousness is, in mechanistic and functional terms; it does not address the “implementation” level of analysis (how neurons instantiate conscious states), an enigma for various disciplines. However, in response to the commentaries, we discuss how our framework provides clues regarding this enigma. In the framework, consciousness is passive albeit essential. Without consciousness, there would not be adaptive skeletomotor action.
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  • (2 other versions)Change Blindness.Ronald A. Rensink - 2005 - In Laurent Itti, Geraint Rees & John K. Tsotsos (eds.), Neurobiology of Attention. Academic Press. pp. 76--81.
    Large changes that occur in clear view of an observer can become difficult to notice if made during an eye movement, blink, or other such disturbance. This change blindness is consistent with the proposal that focused visual attention is necessary to see change, with a change becoming difficult to notice whenever conditions prevent attention from being automatically drawn to it. -/- It is shown here how the phenomenon of change blindness can provide new results on the nature of visual attention, (...)
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  • The what and why of binding: The modeler's perspective.Christoph von der Malsburg - 1999 - Neuron 24:95-104.
    In attempts to formulate a computational understanding of brain function, one of the fundamental concerns is the data structure by which the brain represents information. For many decades, a conceptual framework has dominated the thinking of both brain modelers and neurobiologists. That framework is referred to here as "classical neural networks." It is well supported by experimental data, although it may be incomplete. A characterization of this framework will be offered in the next section. Difficulties in modeling important functional aspects (...)
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  • How to challenge intuitions empirically without risking skepticism.Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):318–343.
    Using empirical evidence to attack intuitions can be epistemically dangerous, because various of the complaints that one might raise against them (e.g., that they are fallible; that we possess no non-circular defense of their reliability) can be raised just as easily against perception itself. But the opponents of intuition wish to challenge intuitions without at the same time challenging the rest of our epistemic apparatus. How might this be done? Let us use the term “hopefulness” to refer to the extent (...)
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  • The critique of pure phenomenology.Alva Noë - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):231-245.
    The topic of this paper is phenomenology. How should we think of phenomenology – the discipline or activity of investigating experience itself – if phenomenology is to be a genuine source of knowledge? This is related to the question whether phenomenology can make a contribution to the empirical study of human or animal experience. My own view is that it can. But only if we make a fresh start in understanding what phenomenology is and can be.
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  • (1 other version)Visual Attention.Jeremy Wolfe - 2000 - In K.K. De Valois (ed.), Seeing. Academic Press. pp. 335-386.
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  • Visual search for change: A probe into the nature of attentional processing.Ronald A. Rensink - 2000 - Visual Cognition 7:345-376.
    A set of visual search experiments tested the proposal that focused attention is needed to detect change. Displays were arrays of rectangles, with the target being the item that continually changed its orientation or contrast polarity. Five aspects of performance were examined: linearity of response, processing time, capacity, selectivity, and memory trace. Detection of change was found to be a self-terminating process requiring a time that increased linearly with the number of items in the display. Capacity for orientation was found (...)
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  • Separate neural definitions of visual consciousness and visual attention: A case for phenomenal awareness.Victor A. F. Lamme - 2004 - Neural Networks 17 (5):861-872.
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  • Why visual attention and awareness are different.Victor A. F. Lamme - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):12-18.
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  • (1 other version)Visual attention.Marvin Chun & Jeremy Wolfe - 2001 - In E. Bruce Goldstein (ed.), Blackwell Handbook of Perception. Blackwell. pp. 2--335.
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  • Attentional capture and inattentional blindness.Daniel J. Simons - 2000 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):147-155.
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  • Converging evidence for the detection of change without awareness.Ian Thornton & Diego Fernandez-Duque - 2002 - Progress in Brain Research.
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  • What you see is what you need.Jochen Triesch, Dana Ballard, Mary Hayhoe & Brian Sullivan - 2003 - Journal of Vision 3 (1):86-94.
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  • Change blindness, representations, and consciousness: Reply to Noe.Daniel J. Simons & Ronald A. Rensink - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (5):219.
    Our recent opinion article [1] examined what change blindness can and cannot tell us about visual representations. Among other things, we argued that change blindness can tell us a lot about how visual representations can be used, but little about their extent. We and others found the ‘sparse representations’ view appealing (and still do), and initially made the overly strong claim that change blindness supports the conclusion of sparse representations [2,3]. We wrote our article because change blindness continues to be (...)
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  • Evidence for preserved representations in change blindness.Daniel J. Simons, Christopher Chabris & Tatiana Schnur - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (1):78-97.
    People often fail to detect large changes to scenes, provided that the changes occur during a visual disruption. This phenomenon, known as ''change blindness,'' occurs both in the laboratory and in real-world situations in which changes occur unexpectedly. The pervasiveness of the inability to detect changes is consistent with the theoretical notion that we internally represent relatively little information from our visual world from one glance at a scene to the next. However, evidence for change blindness does not necessarily imply (...)
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  • An implicit measure of undetected change.Ian Thornton & Diego Fernandez-Duque - 2000 - Spatial Vision 14 (1):21-44.
    b>—Several paradigms (e.g. change blindness, inattentional blindness, transsaccadic integra- tion) indicate that observers are often very poor at reporting changes to their visual environment. Such evidence has been used to suggest that the spatio-temporal coherence needed to represent change can only occur in the presence of focused attention. However, those studies almost always rely on explicit reports. It remains a possibility that the visual system can implicitly detect change, but that in the absence of focused attention, the change does not (...)
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  • Picture changes during blinks: Looking without seeing and seeing without looking.J. Kevin O'Regan, H. Deubel, James J. Clark & Ronald A. Rensink - 2000 - Visual Cognition 7:191-211.
    Observers inspected normal, high quality color displays of everyday visual scenes while their eye movements were recorded. A large display change occurred each time an eye blink occurred. Display changes could either involve "Central Interest" or "Marginal Interest" locations, as determined from descriptions obtained from independent judges in a prior pilot experiment. Visual salience, as determined by luminance, color, and position of the Central and Marginal interest changes were equalized. -/- The results obtained were very similar to those obtained in (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Change blindness: Implications for the nature of visual attention.Ronald A. Rensink - 2005 - In Laurent Itti, Geraint Rees & John K. Tsotsos (eds.), Neurobiology of Attention. Academic Press. pp. 16-20.
    In the not-too-distant past, vision was often said to involve three levels of processing: a low level concerned with descriptions of the geometric and photometric properties of the image, a high level concerned with abstract knowledge of the physical and semantic properties of the world, and a middle level concerned with anything not handled by the other two. The negative definition of mid-level vision contained in this description reflected a rather large gap in our understanding of visual processing: How could (...)
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  • On the failure to detect changes in scenes across brief interruptions.Ronald A. Rensink, Kevin J. O'Regan & James J. Clark - 2000 - Visual Cognition 7 (1/2/3):127-145.
    When brief blank fields are placed between alternating displays of an original and a modified scene, a striking failure of perception is induced: the changes become extremely difficult to notice, even when they are large, presented repeatedly, and the observer expects them to occur (Rensink, O'Regan, & Clark, 1997). To determine the mechanisms behind this induced "change blindness", four experiments examine its dependence on initial preview and on the nature of the interruptions used. Results support the proposal that representations at (...)
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  • Seeing, sensing, and scrutinizing.Ronald A. Rensink - 2000 - Vision Research 40:1469-1487.
    Large changes in a scene often become difficult to notice if made during an eye movement, image flicker, movie cut, or other such disturbance. It is argued here that this _change blindness_ can serve as a useful tool to explore various aspects of vision. This argument centers around the proposal that focused attention is needed for the explicit perception of change. Given this, the study of change perception can provide a useful way to determine the nature of visual attention, and (...)
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  • The dynamic representation of scenes.Ronald A. Rensink - 2000 - Visual Cognition 7 (1/2/3):17-42.
    One of the more powerful impressions created by vision is that of a coherent, richly-detailed world where everything is present simultaneously. Indeed, this impression is so compelling that we tend to ascribe these properties not only to the external world, but to our internal representations as well. But results from several recent experiments argue against this latter ascription. For example, changes in images of real-world scenes often go unnoticed when made during a saccade, flicker, blink, or movie cut. This "change (...)
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  • The siren song of implicit change detection.Stephen R. Mitroff, Daniel J. Simons & Steven Franconeri - 2002 - Journal Of Experimental Psychology-Human Perception And Performance 28 (4):798-815.
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  • Explicit mechanisms do not account for implicit localization and identification of change: An empirical reply to Mitroff et al (2000).Diego Fernandez-Duque & Ian Thornton - 2003 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 29 (5).
    Several recent findings support the notion that changes in the environment can be implicitly represented by the visual system. S. R. Mitroff, D. J. Simons, and S. L. Franconeri (2002) challenged this view and proposed alternative interpretations based on explicit strategies. Across 4 experiments, the current study finds no empirical support for such alternative proposals. Experiment 1 shows that subjects do not rely on unchanged items when locating an unaware change. Experiments 2 and 3 show that unaware changes affect performance (...)
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  • Representation of change: Separate electrophysiological markers of attention, awareness, and implicit processing.Diego Fernandez-Duque, Giordana Grossi, Ian Thornton & Helen Neville - 2003 - Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 15 (4):491-507.
    & Awareness of change within a visual scene only occurs in subjects were aware of, replicated those attentional effects, but the presence of focused attention. When two versions of a.
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  • (1 other version)False predictions about the detectability of visual changes: The role of beliefs about attention, memory, and the continuity of attended objects in causing change blindness blindness.Daniel T. Levin, Sarah B. Drivdahl, Nausheen Momen & Melissa R. Beck - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):507-527.
    Recently, a number of experiments have emphasized the degree to which subjects fail to detect large changes in visual scenes. This finding, referred to as “change blindness,” is often considered surprising because many people have the intuition that such changes should be easy to detect. Levin, Momen, Drivdahl, and Simons documented this intuition by showing that the majority of subjects believe they would notice changes that are actually very rarely detected. Thus subjects exhibit a metacognitive error we refer to as (...)
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  • Change blindness.Fred Dretske - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):1-18.
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  • Change detection without awareness: Do explicit reports underestimate the representation of change in the visual system?Diego Fernandez-Duque & Ian Thornton - 2000 - Visual Cognition 7 (1):323-344.
    Evidence from many different paradigms (e.g. change blindness, inattentional blindness, transsaccadic integration) indicate that observers are often very poor at reporting changes to their visual environment. Such evidence has been used to suggest that the spatio-temporal coherence needed to represent change can only occur in the presence of focused attention. In four experiments we use modified change blindness tasks to demonstrate (a) that sensitivity to change does occur in the absence of awareness, and (b) this sensitivity does not rely on (...)
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