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  1. Probabilistic Opinion Pooling Generalised -- Part Two: The Premise-Based Approach.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2017 - Social Choice and Welfare 48:787–814.
    How can different individuals' probability functions on a given sigma-algebra of events be aggregated into a collective probability function? Classic approaches to this problem often require 'event-wise independence': the collective probability for each event should depend only on the individuals' probabilities for that event. In practice, however, some events may be 'basic' and others 'derivative', so that it makes sense first to aggregate the probabilities for the former and then to let these constrain the probabilities for the latter. We formalize (...)
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  • Aggregating Incoherent Agents Who Disagree.Richard Pettigrew - unknown
    In this paper, we explore how we should aggregate the degrees of belief of a group of agents to give a single coherent set of degrees of belief, when at least some of those agents might be probabilistically incoherent. There are a number of ways of aggregating degrees of belief, and there are a number of ways of fixing incoherent degrees of belief. When we have picked one of each, should we aggregate first and then fix, or fix first and (...)
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  • Stalnaker’s Thesis in Context.Andrew Bacon - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):131-163.
    In this paper I present a precise version of Stalnaker's thesis and show that it is both consistent and predicts our intuitive judgments about the probabilities of conditionals. The thesis states that someone whose total evidence is E should have the same credence in the proposition expressed by 'if A then B' in a context where E is salient as they have conditional credence in the proposition B expresses given the proposition A expresses in that context. The thesis is formalised (...)
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  • Probabilistic Opinion Pooling Generalized -- Part One: General Agendas.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2017 - Social Choice and Welfare 48:747–786.
    How can different individuals' probability assignments to some events be aggregated into a collective probability assignment? Classic results on this problem assume that the set of relevant events -- the agenda -- is a sigma-algebra and is thus closed under disjunction (union) and conjunction (intersection). We drop this demanding assumption and explore probabilistic opinion pooling on general agendas. One might be interested in the probability of rain and that of an interest-rate increase, but not in the probability of rain or (...)
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  • A Theory of Bayesian Groups.Franz Dietrich - manuscript
    A group is often construed as a single agent with its own probabilistic beliefs (credences), which are obtained by aggregating those of the individuals, for instance through averaging. In their celebrated contribution “Groupthink”, Russell et al. (2015) apply the Bayesian paradigm to groups by requiring group credences to undergo a Bayesian revision whenever new information is learnt, i.e., whenever the individual credences undergo a Bayesian revision based on this information. Bayesians should often strengthen this requirement by extending it to non-public (...)
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  • The Joint Aggregation of Beliefs and Degrees of Belief.Paul D. Thorn - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    The article proceeds upon the assumption that the beliefs and degrees of belief of rational agents satisfy a number of constraints, including: consistency and deductive closure for belief sets, conformity to the axioms of probability for degrees of belief, and the Lockean Thesis concerning the relationship between belief and degree of belief. Assuming that the beliefs and degrees of belief of both individuals and collectives satisfy the preceding three constraints, I discuss what further constraints may be imposed on the aggregation (...)
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  • Reasons, Coherence, and Group Rationality.Brian Hedden - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
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  • Resolving Peer Disagreements Through Imprecise Probabilities.Lee Elkin & Gregory Wheeler - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):260-278.
    Two compelling principles, the Reasonable Range Principle and the Preservation of Irrelevant Evidence Principle, are necessary conditions that any response to peer disagreements ought to abide by. The Reasonable Range Principle maintains that a resolution to a peer disagreement should not fall outside the range of views expressed by the peers in their dispute, whereas the Preservation of Irrelevant Evidence Principle maintains that a resolution strategy should be able to preserve unanimous judgments of evidential irrelevance among the peers. No standard (...)
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  • A Theory of Bayesian Groups.Franz Dietrich - 2017 - Noûs.
    A group is often construed as one agent with its own probabilistic beliefs, which are obtained by aggregating those of the individuals, for instance through averaging. In their celebrated “Groupthink”, Russell et al. require group credences to undergo Bayesian revision whenever new information is learnt, i.e., whenever individual credences undergo Bayesian revision based on this information. To obtain a fully Bayesian group, one should often extend this requirement to non-public or even private information, or to non-representable information. I propose a (...)
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