Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. A Novel Theory of Consciousness.Petros A. M. Gelepithis - 2014 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 6 (2):125-139.
    I propose a physicalist theory of consciousness that is an extension of the theory of noémona species. The proposed theory covers the full consciousness spectrum from animal to machine and its human consciousness base is compatible with the corresponding work of Wundt, James, and Freud. The paper is organized in three sections. In the first, I briefly justify the methodology used. In Sec. 2, I state the inadequacies of the major work on the nature of consciousness and present a definitional (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Non-Basic Time and Reductive Strategies: Leibniz's Theory of Time.J. A. Cover - 1997 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 28 (2):289-318.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Does Perceiving Entail Knowing?John Turri - 2010 - Theoria 76 (3):197-206.
    This article accomplishes two closely connected things. First, it refutes an influential view about the relationship between perception and knowledge. In particular, it demonstrates that perceiving does not entail knowing. Second, it leverages that refutation to demonstrate that knowledge is not the most general factive propositional attitude.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • How Hard Are the Sceptical Paradoxes?Alex Byrne - 2004 - Noûs 38 (2):299–325.
    The sceptic about the external world presents us with a paradox: an apparently acceptable argument for an apparently unacceptable conclusion—that we do not know anything about the external world. Some paradoxes, for instance the liar and the sorites, are very hard. The defense of a purported solution to either of these two inevitably deploys the latest in high-tech philosophical weaponry. On the other hand, some paradoxes are not at all hard, and may be resolved without much fuss. They do not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Remarks on Perception and Other Minds.Edmund Dain - 2017 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 6 (2):31-45.
    It is a simple truth about the English language that we can see or hear or feel what others are thinking or feeling. But it is tempting to think that there is a deeper sense in which we cannot really see or hear or feel these things at all. Rather, what is involved must be a matter of inference or interpretation, for instance. In these remarks, I argue against a variety of ways in which that thought, the thought that we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Concept of Structure in Galileo: Its Role in the Methods of Proportionality and Ex Suppositione as Applied to the Tides.Donald W. Mertz - 1982 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 13 (2):111-131.
    It is generally agreed that Galileo’s distinctive place in the history of science is due to the power of his method, and that, in general terms, this consists in an effective combination of mathematics and physical experiment. In attempting to be more specific, some authors have assigned a particular method to Galileo as either new or a unique adaptation of a traditional method, e.g. hypothetico-deduction, the method of analysis, or ex suppositione. William Wallace, for example, has argued that by the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • An Objectivist Argument for Thirdism.Oscar Seminar - 2008 - Analysis 68 (2):149-155.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • It Must Be True – But How Can It Be? Some Remarks on Panpsychism and Mental Composition.Pierfrancesco Basile - 2010 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 67:93-112.
    Although panpsychism has had a very long history, one that goes back to the very origin of western philosophy, its force has only recently been appreciated by analytic philosophers of mind. And even if many still reject the theory as utterly absurd, others have argued that it is the only genuine form of physicalism. This paper examines the case for panpsychism and argues that there are at least good prima facie reasons for taking it seriously. In a second step, the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Is There a Problem of Other Minds?Anil Gomes - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):353-373.
    Scepticism is sometimes expressed about whether there is any interesting problem of other minds. In this paper I set out a version of the conceptual problem of other minds which turns on the way in which mental occurrences are presented to the subject and situate it in relation to debates about our knowledge of other people's mental lives. The result is a distinctive problem in the philosophy of mind concerning our relation to other people.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • What Else Justification Could Be.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10 - 31.
    According to a captivating picture, epistemic justification is essentially a matter of epistemic or evidential likelihood. While certain problems for this view are well known, it is motivated by a very natural thought – if justification can fall short of epistemic certainty, then what else could it possibly be? In this paper I shall develop an alternative way of thinking about epistemic justification. On this conception, the difference between justification and likelihood turns out to be akin to the more widely (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  • What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.
    According to a captivating picture, epistemic justification is essentially a matter of epistemic or evidential likelihood. While certain problems for this view are well known, it is motivated by a very natural thought—if justification can fall short of epistemic certainty, then what else could it possibly be? In this paper I shall develop an alternative way of thinking about epistemic justification. On this conception, the difference between justification and likelihood turns out to be akin to the more widely recognised difference (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Structural Realism but Were Afraid to Ask.Roman Frigg & Ioannis Votsis - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (2):227-276.
    Everything you always wanted to know about structural realism but were afraid to ask Content Type Journal Article Pages 227-276 DOI 10.1007/s13194-011-0025-7 Authors Roman Frigg, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE UK Ioannis Votsis, Philosophisches Institut, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Universitätsstraße 1, Geb. 23.21/04.86, 40225 Düsseldorf, Germany Journal European Journal for Philosophy of Science Online ISSN 1879-4920 Print ISSN 1879-4912 Journal Volume Volume 1 Journal Issue Volume 1, Number 2.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • What is Shannon Information?Olimpia Lombardi, Federico Holik & Leonardo Vanni - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7).
    Despite of its formal precision and its great many applications, Shannon’s theory still offers an active terrain of debate when the interpretation of its main concepts is the task at issue. In this article we try to analyze certain points that still remain obscure or matter of discussion, and whose elucidation contribute to the assessment of the different interpretative proposals about the concept of information. In particular, we argue for a pluralist position, according to which the different views about information (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Causal Realism: Events and Processes.Anjan Chakravartty - 2005 - Erkenntnis 63 (1):7-31.
    Minimally, causal realism (as understood here) is the view that accounts of causation in terms of mere, regular or probabilistic conjunction are unsatisfactory, and that causal phenomena are correctly associated with some form of de re necessity. Classic arguments, however, some of which date back to Sextus Empiricus and have appeared many times since, including famously in Russell, suggest that the very notion of causal realism is incoherent. In this paper I argue that if such objections seem compelling, it is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • How Simple is It for Science to Acquire Wisdom According to its Choicest Aims.Giridhari Lal Pandit - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (4):649-666.
    Focusing on Nicholas Maxwell’s thesis that “science, properly understood, provides us the methodological key to the salvation of humanity”, the article discusses Maxwell’s aim oriented empiricism and his conception of Wisdom Inquiry as advocated in Maxwell’s (2009b, pp.1–56) essay entitled “How Can Life of Value Best Flourish in the Real World?” (in Science and the Pursuit of Wisdom: Studies in the Philosophy of Nicholas Maxwell 2009, edited by Leemon McHenry) and in Maxwell (2004 & 2009a).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Unification and Revolution: A Paradigm for Paradigms.Nicholas Maxwell - 2014 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (1):133-149.
    Incommensurability was Kuhn’s worst mistake. If it is to be found anywhere in science, it would be in physics. But revolutions in theoretical physics all embody theoretical unification. Far from obliterating the idea that there is a persisting theoretical idea in physics, revolutions do just the opposite: they all actually exemplify the persisting idea of underlying unity. Furthermore, persistent acceptance of unifying theories in physics when empirically more successful disunified rivals can always be concocted means that physics makes a persistent (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Did God Know It? God’s Relation to a World of Chance and Randomness.Benedikt Paul Göcke - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 78 (2):233-254.
    A common type of argument against the existence of God is to argue that certain essential features associated with the existence of God are inconsistent with certain other features to be found in the actual world. for an analysis of the different ways to deploy the term “God” in philosophical and theological discourse and for an analysis of the logical form of arguments for and against the existence of God.) A recent example of this type of argument against the existence (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Radical Epistemic Self-Sufficiency on Reed’s Long Road to Skepticism.Brian Ribeiro - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (4):789-793.
    Baron Reed has developed a new argument for skepticism: (1) contemporary epistemologists are all committed to two theses, fallibilism and attributabilism; unfortunately, (2) these two theses about knowledge are incompatible; therefore, (3) knowledge as conceived by contemporary epistemologists is impossible. In this brief paper I suggest that Reed's argument appears to rest on an understanding of attributabilism that is so strong (call it maximal attributabilism) that it's doubtful that many contemporary epistemologists actually embrace it. Nor does Reed offer any direct (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Intentionality: Hardware, Not Software.Grover Maxwell - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):437.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Artificial Intelligence—the Real Thing?John C. Marshall - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):435.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Beliefs, Machines, and Theories.John McCarthy - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):435.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Mental Phenomena and Behavior.B. Libet - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):434.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Functionalist Reply.William G. Lycan - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):434.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Reductionism and Religion.Douglas R. Hofstadter - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):433.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Programs, Causal Powers, and Intentionality.John Haugeland - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):432.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • A Dualist-Interactionist Perspective.John C. Eccles - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):430.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Searle on What Only Brains Can Do.J. A. Fodor - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):431.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • The Milk of Human Intentionality.Daniel Dennett - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):428.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • The Use and Mention of Terms and the Simulation of Linguistic Understanding.Arthur C. Danto - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):428.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Brains + Programs = Minds.Bruce Bridgeman - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):427.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • What Intuitions About Homunculi Don't Show.Ned Block - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):425.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Searle's Argument is Just a Set of Chinese Symbols.Robert P. Abelson - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):424.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Intrinsic Intentionality.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):450.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   111 citations  
  • Computers, Cognition and Philosophy.Robert Wilensky - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):449.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Thermostat and the Philosophy Professor.Donald O. Walter - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):449.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • How to Turn an Information Processor Into an Understander.Aaron Sloman & Monica Croucher - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):447.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Simulation Games.William E. Smythe - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):448.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Understanding Searle.Roger C. Schank - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):446.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Searle and the Special Powers of the Brain.Richard Rorty - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):445.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Mysticism as a Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence.Martin Ringle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):444.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Behaviorist Reply.Howard Rachlin - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):444.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The ‘Causal Power’ of Machines.Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):442.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   72 citations  
  • The Chess Room: Further Demythologizing of Strong AI.Roland Puccetti - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):441.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The Primary Source of Intentionality.Thomas Natsoulas - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):440.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Decentralized Minds.Marvin Minsky - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):439.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Is the Pen Mightier Than the Computer?E. W. Menzel - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):438.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Consciousness, Awareness and First-Person Perspective.K. Ramakrishna Rao - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):407.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Consciousness, Not Focal Attention, is Causally Effective in Human Information Processing.W. Trammell Neill - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):406.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On Relativity of Time and the Causal Status of Consciousness.Ali Habibi & Michael S. Bendele - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):404.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark