Recently, I’ve championed the doctrine that fundamentally different sorts of things exist in fundamentally different ways.1 On this view, what it is for an entity to be can differ across ontological categories.2 Although historically this doctrine was very popular, and several important challenges to this doctrine have been dealt with, I suspect that contemporary metaphysicians will continue to treat this view with suspicion until it is made clearer when one is warranted in positing different modes of existence.3 I address this (...) concern here. The question of when to posit ways of being is closely related to a more general question: when should one think that some philosophically interesting expression is analogous? Accordingly, my strategy here is as follows. First, I briefly explain my interpretation of ontological pluralism, the doctrine that there are ways of being.4 Second, I introduce the notion of an analogous term, and show how, on most ways of implementing ontological pluralism, “existence” is analogous. Third, I discuss two sufficient conditions for when one is warranted in claiming that a philosophically interesting term is analogous. Fourth, I present a series of ontological schemes, each of which satisfies at least one of the sufficient conditions. The upshot is this: if you are attracted to one of these ontologies, you have reason to believe in ways of being. The careful reader will have noted the apparent modesty of my conclusion. Unfortunately, I do not believe that one could ever be rationally required to believe in ways of being. Still, in general a metaphysic is a live option to the extent that it is shown to be rationally permissible to believe. Since the apparent consensus among contemporary analytic metaphysicians is that believing that things can exist in different ways is silly or confused, establishing the rational permissibility of belief in ways of being is a non-trivial task. Let us begin. (shrink)

This research project analyzes a strategy for teaching philosophy in secondary school inspired by Socratic dialogue, which aims at the creation and effective management of cognitive dissonance as a tool for promoting critical thinking, called Socratic Challenge (SC). The research originates from workshops held in the years 2016/2019 in a technical and vocational institute in the province of Varese, in which I participated as the creator and conductor, involving the voluntary participation of about 150 students. The research questions are: What (...) are the characteristics of the Socratic Challenge? Can it constitute a teaching methodology to be proposed? Under what conditions? Within what project framework? The empirical research is qualitative, naturalistic, and exploratory (Lumbelli, 1984), specifically a self-study (Hamilton & Pinnegar 2009), divided into two phases. In the first phase, data regarding motivation and perceptions of training impact were collected through in-depth interviews of students (16) and analyzed using the criteria of reflective thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke 2019). In the second phase, the workshops were repeated remotely in technical and vocational institutes in Milan and the province, involving 113 students who were surveyed with a qualitative questionnaire. The workshops were recorded and the discussion interactions were analyzed according to a qualitative inductive approach that refers to Constructivist Grounded Theory (Charmaz, 2006). Results show how this dialogical instructional strategy in philosophy teaching can be considered an effective alternative to the historical-philosophical approach predominant in the Italian tradition (Illetterati 2007). (shrink)

The paper interprets Wittgenstein’s famous call to silence at the end of his Tractatus – that “whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent” – as a critique of philosophy itself. Wittgenstein was concerned throughout his philosophical life with finding a way to delineate the limits of language. These limits, once we have them clearly in view, rob our attempts to put forth philosophical theories of their legitimacy. In order to give a critical assessment of this Wittgensteinian critique of (...) philosophy, the paper primarily focuses on the roots of that critique in Wittgenstein’s earliest writings – his notebooks, his 1913 “Notes on Logic,” the 1914 set of notes dictated to G. E. Moore, and the Tractatus itself. Wittgenstein’s influence by Fritz Mauthner and, mediated through Mauthner, by Kant receive special attention. The conclusion is that, far from Mauthner’s radical anti-philosophical bias, we can come to see a deep appreciation of the power, the draw, and the significance of philosophical problems in Wittgenstein’s writings. The text closes with a short look at how Wittgenstein’s thinking about the limits of language evolved later in his life. (shrink)

This paper concerns an epistemological objection against mathematical platonism, due to Hartry Field.The argument poses an explanatory challenge – the challenge to explain the reliability of our mathematical beliefs – which the platonist, it’s argued, cannot meet. Is the objection compelling? Philosophers disagree, but they also disagree on (and are sometimes very unclear about) how the objection should be understood. Here I distinguish some options, and highlight some gaps that need to be filled in on the potentially most compelling version (...) of the argument. (shrink)

This book is in honour of Professor Anna-Sofia Maurin on her 50th birthday. It consists of eighteen essays on metaphysical issues written by Swedish and international scholars.

Section 1 contrasts the approaches to Plato of F.M.Cornford and Gilbert Ryle, two of the early twentieth century’s leading Plato interpreters. Then I trace and evaluate attempts to discern in Plato’s Theaetetus a recognition of the role of the proposition. Section 2 focuses on the hunting of the proposition in Socrates’ Dream in the Theaetetus. Ryle, inspired by Logical Atomism, argued that Plato there anticipated an insight about the difference between names and propositions that Russell credited to Wittgenstein. I rehearse (...) difficulties for understanding the logos of the Dream as a proposition, preferring a reading of logos there as something like definition: a reading Wittgenstein also adumbrated. Section 3 examines attempts by writers such as Burnyeat and Kahn to find Plato allocating a starring role to the proposition in the argument at Theaetetus 185–6: perception, since it cannot grasp being, cannot grasp truth and hence cannot be knowledge. On their reading a grasp of being is understood as a grasp of something propositional. Problems for the propositional reading include Socrates’ talk of grasping ‘the truth of something’ (alētheia tinos), and the way the dialogue develops after 186. (shrink)

La vida en el laboratorio. La construcción social de los hechos científicos (Latour y Woolgar, 1979) sostiene que los hechos y las entidades cuya existencia ha sido establecida por la ciencia no son descubrimientos sino “construcciones sociales” llevadas a cabo por los científicos mediante “versiones” o “explicaciones ordenadas” al establecer acuerdos (“cierres de controversias”). Se sostiene, siguiendo la terminología de la filosofía de la ciencia actual, que este argumento es una forma de antirrealismo científico lingüístico, tesis sustentada también por autores (...) como Richad Rorty, Nelson Goodman, Thomas Kuhn y Ludwik Fleck, que es inconsistente y que confunde niveles de lenguaje, porque al referirse metalingüísticamente a las teorías, “versiones” o descripciones científicas no diferencia entre cosas metafísicamente diferentes: la existencia (o la inexistencia) de una entidad o un hecho, y la creencia compartida o la descripción de la existencia (o la inexistencia) de esa entidad o ese hecho. Ello lo lleva a cometer el error categorial de atribuir características del lenguaje (como la de explicar o la de ser usado) a cosas que no son lingüísticas (como la naturaleza o un hecho). Si bien tanto la versión de Latour y Woolgar como las demás no diferencian entre que un conjunto de personas crean que existe lo que la ciencia afirma y las propias afirmaciones de la ciencia sobre lo que existe, ambas cosas ocurren en la realidad social, por lo que el argumento constructivista –tal como el de Goodman de que una constelación ha sido creada mediante una versión, el de Kuhn de que “los conceptos” “conforman el mundo al que se aplican” o el de que los hechos y las teorías no son categóricamente separables, el de Fleck de que la sífilis no existe independientemente de las representaciones lingüísticas de la medicina o el de Rorty de que el color de la piel de un dinosaurio depende de la descripción científica sobre él, por ejemplo-, en la medida en que niega la existencia independiente de esos hechos y entidades no es más que una forma actual de lo que se llamó idealismo metafísico, en la que no se considera como entidad primitiva las “ideas” o estados de conciencia sino hechos de sociedad humana como las afirmaciones y los significados científicos y las creencias que generan en las personas. (shrink)

A central problem for any truthmaker theory is the problem of negative truths. In this paper, I develop a novel, piecemeal strategy for solving this problem. The strategy puts central focus on a truth-relevant notion of aboutness within a metaphysically modest version of truthmaker theory and uses key conceptual tools gained by taking a deeper look at the best attempts to solve the problem of intentionality. I begin this task by critically discussing past proposed solutions to P-NEG in light of (...) Russell’s debate with Demos. This reveals a central difficulty with addressing the problem, specifically that one cannot be committed to incompatibility facts in one’s account of negation and of the truth of negative truths. I then present an aboutness-based version of truthmaker theory. Utilising what I call the strict and full account of aboutness, I extract aboutness-based theories of truth and falsity. I use this machinery to present a promising new strategy for solving P-NEG which does not have the problems of alternative approaches. Finally, I present and respond to some potential objections. (shrink)

Whether or not the particular view of generic sentences articulated above is correct, it is quite clear that the study of generic terms and the truth-conditions of generic sentences touches on the representation of other parts of the grammar, as well as on how the world around us is reflected in language. I would hope that the problems mentioned above will highlight the relevance of semantic analysis to other apparently distinct questions, and focus attention on the relevance of linguistic problems (...) to other already established areas of inquiry. (shrink)

Beliefs have what I will call ‘propositional content’. A belief is always a belief that so-and-so: a belief that grass is green, or a belief that snow is white, or whatever. Other things have propositional content too, such as sentences, judgments and assertions. The Standard View amongst philosophers is that what it is to have a propositional content is to stand in an appropriate relation to a proposition. Moreover, on this view, propositions are objects, i.e. the kind of thing you (...) can refer to with singular terms. For example, on the Standard View, we should parse the sentence ‘Simon believes that Sharon is funny’ as: [Simon] believes [that Sharon is funny]; ‘Simon’ is a term referring to a thinking subject, ‘that Sharon is funny’ is a term referring to a proposition, and ‘x believes y’ is a dyadic predicate expressing the believing relation. In this paper, I argue against the Standard View. This is how I think we should parse ‘Simon believes that Sharon is funny’: [Simon] believes that [Sharon is funny]; here we have a singular term, ‘Simon’, a sentence ‘Sharon is funny’, and a ‘prenective’ joining them together, ‘x believes that p’. On this Prenective View, we do not get at the propositional content of someone’s belief by referring to a reified proposition with a singular term; we simply use the sentence ‘Sharon is funny’ to express that content for ourselves. I argue for the Prenective View in large part by showing that an initially attractive version of the Standard View is actually vulnerable to the same objection that Wittgenstein used against Russell’s multiple-relation theory of judgment. (shrink)

The paper seeks a perfectly general argument regarding the non-contingent limits to any (human or non-human) knowledge. After expressing disappointment with the history of philosophy on this score, an argument is grounded in Fitch’s proof, which demonstrates the unknowability of some truths. The necessity of this unknowability is then defended by arguing for the necessity of Fitch’s premise—viz., there this is in fact some ignorance.

A study is made of the history of the type and related concepts, from Greek Antiquity up to the present. It is demonstrated that the type-concept of eighteenth century biology was based on Leibniz's concept of substantial form, and was not related to a Platonic Idea, whilst it is now generally understood in the sense of model or norm. In the present paper, a type-concept is developed which includes ontogenetic and phylogenetic time and various evolutionary mechanisms. This type can serve (...) as a model of the evolutionary potentialities of a taxon, and as a standard of higher classification. All classifications based on the same archetype, whether typological, numerical or phylogenetic, will be comparable, although not necessarily identical. (shrink)

Suprotno općeprihvaćenom mišljenju, argumentiram da Gettierovi protuprimjeri za trodijelnu analizu znanja kao opravdanoga istinitog vjerovanja nisu uspjeli zato što uvjet opravdanja, a pogotovo uvjet istinitosti za znanje u tim slučajevima nisu jednoznačno ispunjeni. Jer sudovi u koje se vjeruje jesu semantički ambivalentni te se za njih ne može jasno reći jesu ili istiniti ili neistiniti, pa stoga ni jesu li predmeti opravdanih istinitih vjerovanja. To je zbog zbunjujuće semantičke uloge koju igra odreðeni opis i ekskluzivna disjunkcija . Stoga nijedan od (...) Gettierovih navodnih protuprimjera zapravo ne opovrgava trodijelnu analizu kao takvu, nego samo jednu njezinu interpretaciju. Gettierovi se slučajevi mogu u najboljem slučaju protumačiti kao oni koji zahtijevaju modifikaciju i poboljšanje tradicionalne analize, a ne kao oni koji zahtijevaju njezino zamjenjivanje. Neki se drugi gettierovski slučajevi, npr. oni koje su iznijeli Lehrer i Feldman, mogu razmatrati na analogan način.Contrary to the received view, I argue that Gettier’s counterexamples to the tripartite analysis of knowledge as justified true belief failed, because the justification condition and especially truth condition for knowledge in these cases are not unambiguously fulfilled. For the propositions believed are semantically ambiguous and cannot be clearly said to be either true or false and, therefore, to be the objects of justified true beliefs. This is due to the puzzling semantic role played by a definite description and an exclusive disjunction . Therefore, neither of Gettier’s alleged counterexamples does in fact refute the tripartite analysis as such, but only an interpretation of it. Gettier’s cases can be at best construed as demanding a modification and improvement of the traditional analysis and not as demanding its replacement. Some other Gettier-like cases, e.g. those proposed by Lehrer and Feldman, can be treated in an analogous manner. (shrink)

The present paper is one installment in a lengthy task, the replacement of atomistic interpretations of Wittgenstein's Tractatus by a wholistic interpretation on which the world-in-logical-space is not constructed out of objects but objects are abstracted from out of that space. Here, general arguments against atomism are directed toward a specific target, the four aspects of the atomistic reading of Tractatus given in the Hintikkas' Investigating Wittgenstein (Hintikka & Hintikka 1986). The aspects in question are called the semantical, metaphysical, epistemological (...) and formal.What follows a précis of the Hintikkas' rendering of Wittgenstein's perspective is a characterization of the wholistic interpretation, comparing Wittgenstein's world and the transcendental conditions it sets upon possible notation to a blank page and the conditions it sets upon what is about to be written there. There will not be occasion to bring arguments against each plank in the atomist's platform or in support of each facet of wholism. But there is an extended treatment of the first two aspects — the semantical and metaphysical — which takes off from Wittgenstein's determination that, in his hands, logic must take care of itself. (shrink)

Evidence is drawn together to connect sources of inconsistency that Frege discerned in his foundations for arithmetic with the origins of the paradox derived by Russell in "Basic Laws" I and then with antinomies, paradoxes, contradictions, riddles associated with modal and intensional logics. Examined are: Frege's efforts to grasp logical objects; the philosophical arguments that compelled Russell to adopt a description theory of names and a eliminative theory of descriptions; the resurfacing of issues surrounding reference, descriptions, identity, substitutivity, paradox in (...) the debates concerning modal and intensional logics; the development of the New Theory of Reference. I consider this to be the philosophical ground upon which the debates regarding that theory should take place. (shrink)

The paper argues that Plato’s dialogue form creates a Quinean “opaque context” that segregates the assertions by Plato’s characters in the dialogues from both Plato and the real world with the result that the dialogues require a hermeneutical interpretation. Sec. I argues that since the assertions in the dialogues are located inside an opaque context, the forms of life of the characters in the dialogues acquires primary philosophical importance for Plato. The second section argues that the thesis of Sec. I (...) coheres with the claim in Plato’s Seventh Letter that since philosophical truth is incommunicable by means of language it is of primary importance for philosophers to develop proper “schemes of living”. Sec. III argues since the forms of life of the characters portrayed in the dialogues is of primary philosophical importance for Plato, and since hermeneutical methods are required to interpret emerging forms of life, Plato’s dialogues are positively crafted to be read hermeneutically. Sec IV argues that Heidegger, who is famous for seeing Plato’s views as antithetical to his own hermeneutical approach, is mistaken, and that Plato’s real views are, in principle, more akin to Heidegger’s views than he thinks. (shrink)

Frege held that the result of applying a predicate to names lacks reference if any of the names lack reference. We defend the principle against a number of plausible objections. We put forth an account of consequence for a first-order language with identity in which the principle holds.

Among truthmaker theorists it is generally thought that we are not able to use the entailment principle to ground negative truths. But these theorists usually only discuss truthmakers for truth-functional complexes, thereby overlooking the fact that there are non-truth-functional complexes whose truth values are not solely determined by the truth or falsity of their atomic propositions. And once we expand the class of truths that require their own bespoke truthmakers to also include these, there is no reason to exempt negative (...) truths from grounding. For given that truthmaking is closed under entailment and every negative truths is entailed by some non-truth-functional complex or other, any resources rich enough to ground the truth of the latter will do the same job for the former. (shrink)